




THE ASIAN CLASSICS
INSTITUTE

13

COURSE

THE ART OF REASONING

Level 2 of Buddhist Logic and Perception (*Pramana*)





THE ASIAN CLASSICS

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Thank you for your interest in the Asian Classics Institute's Correspondence Courses. A complete Formal Study Course consists of audio recordings from the original class series in New York, along with the supporting text materials from each class. The text and audio may be downloaded (see www.world-view.org in the on-line teachings section), or ordered by mail (see the Courses by mail section of the web site).

This Course consists of eleven classes, each of which has approximately two hours of audio, along with corresponding written materials. The audio can be ordered by mail, listened to on-line as streaming Real Audio, or downloaded onto your computer in mp3 or RA format for playback later. The written materials for this Course are contained in nine on-line files which can be downloaded, printed and assembled into a three-ring binder.

A complete Course binder contains the following sections in this order: a binder cover and spine, an overview of the teacher training program, prayers, a course syllabus, readings, class notes, homework, quizzes, a final examination, answer keys and Tibetan study materials. (The class notes were taken by a student in the original live classes, and you'll need these for reference as what's written on the board isn't always spoken.) For ease of binder assembly, be sure to print the files on three hole paper.

Each class lecture has a corresponding homework, quiz, meditation, and class notes. Most classes have readings, although not every class does. After listening to the audio from a class, the homework, quiz and meditation should be completed for that class before continuing on to the next class. The homework can be completed using your class notes, open book style. The quizzes should be completed from memory only, without the aid of notes or other materials. (A good approach is to look at an answer key *after* you have finished that homework, and to use that answer key to study for that quiz.) A final exam is given at the end of the Course.

You may grade your own papers using the supplied answer keys or, if you wish to do so, you may mail your quizzes, homework and final examination to the Asian Classics Institute to be graded. All of the quiz and final exam questions come from the homework, so the homework answer keys are also used to grade the quizzes and the final exam.

If you use the answer keys to complete your homework or quizzes by copying, please do not mail your papers to the Institute for grading. If you do mail your papers in, upon successfully passing, you will be presented with a certificate of proficiency from the Institute.

If you choose to have your papers graded by the Institute (this is completely optional), please mail all of the homework, quizzes and the final for the Course together – **DO NOT** mail papers from individual classes, or a partially completed Course. Once you have completed the entire Course, mail it to: The Asian Classics Institute, Correspondence Courses, 7055 Juniper Drive, Colorado Springs, CO 80908. Please make a copy of all materials that you send to us, in case they are lost in the mail. **Be sure to provide a self-addressed, stamped envelope of appropriate size and postage to have your papers returned.**

We would like to emphasize finally that, although recordings and written materials can be extremely helpful, it is essential for serious Buddhist practitioners to meet and study directly with a qualified Teacher who can give the necessary guidance and personal instructions of the lineage.

The wisdom of Enlightened Beings has been passed down in an unbroken lineage in these teachings. May you put them into practice in your life, gain every realization, and benefit all. May every goodness grow and spread in all directions right now!



Overview of the Formal Study Course Teacher Training Program

The Six Great Books of Buddhism outlined below are the subject of a geshe's eighteen year program of monastic study. The Asian Classics Institute condenses these Six Great Books of Buddhism into a series of 15 Formal Study Courses.

Book One

Geshe Study Subject: The Perfection of Wisdom (Prajnya Paramita)

School of Buddhism Studied: Beginning Middle-Way (Madhyamika Svatantrika); also includes some material from Mind-Only (Chitta Matra)

Main Root Text: *The Jewel of Realization (Abhisamaya Alamkara)*

Written by: Maitreya (the Future Buddha) as related to Master Asanga, circa 350 AD

Traditional period to cover this subject: Six years in a Tibetan monastery

Summarized in ACI Courses:

Course II: Buddhist Refuge

Course XV: What the Buddha Really Meant

Principal monastic textbooks used for ACI Courses: *Analysis of the Perfection of Wisdom, Overview of the Art of Interpretation, Overview of the Twenty Practitioners, Overview of Dependent Origination, Overview of the Form and Formless*

Written by: Kedrup Tenpa Dargye (1493-1568); Gyalwang Trinley Namgyal (fl. 1850)

Typical Subjects: The three kinds of refuge; The wish for enlightenment; What is nirvana?; The proofs for emptiness; Who is Maitreya?; The twelve links of dependent origination in the Wheel of Life; Deep levels of meditation; How do we know when the Buddha was speaking figuratively?; A flow-chart for liberation.

Book Two

Geshe Study Subject: The Middle Way (Madhyamika)

School of Buddhism Studied: Advanced Middle Way (Madhyamika Prasangika); also includes some material from the Mind-Only School (Chitta Matra)

Main Root Texts: *Entering the Middle Way (Madhyamaka Avatara)* and *A Guide to the Bodhisattva's Way of Life (Bodhisattva Charya Avatara)*

Written by: The first by Master Chandrakirti, circa 650 AD in explanation of Master Nagarjuna, about 200 AD; and the second by Master Shantideva, circa 700 AD

Traditional period to cover this subject: Four years in a Tibetan monastery

Summarized in ACI Courses:

Course VI: The Diamond-Cutter Sutra

Course VII: The Vows of the Bodhisattva

Courses X, XI, XII: A Guide to the Bodhisattva's Way of Life

Overview of the ACI Teacher Training Program

Principal monastic textbooks used for ACI Courses: *Overview of the Middle Way; A Commentary on the Diamond-Cutter Sutra; The String of Shining Jewels, on the Three Sets of Vows; The Point of Entry for Bodhisattvas, a Commentary to the "Guide to the Bodhisattva's Way of Life"*

Written by: Gyaltsab Je Darma Rinchen (1364-1432); Kedrup Tenpa Dargye (1493-1568); Choney Lama Drakpa Shedrup (1675-1748); Geshe Tsewang Samdrup (c. 1830)

Typical Subjects: Emptiness and the Wish for enlightenment; Emptiness and the bodies of a Buddha; The future of the Buddha's teaching; Emptiness and karma; The direct perception of emptiness; Emptiness and paradise; How empty things still work; The root and secondary vows of a bodhisattva; How to keep the vows; How to purify bad deeds; Taking joy; How to fight mental afflictions; The perfection of giving; How anger destroys good karma; The nature of anger; Where bad things really come from; Dealing with jealousy; Quietude; Stopping attachment; On the joys of solitude; Devoting oneself to meditation; On the need to see emptiness; The two realities; The emptiness of feelings; The sliver of Diamond.

Book Three

Geshe Study Subject: Higher Knowledge (Abhidharma)

School of Buddhism Studied: Detailist (Vaibhashika)

Main Root Text: *The Treasure House of Higher Knowledge (Abhidharma Kosha)*

Written by: Master Vasubandhu, circa 350 AD

Traditional period to cover this subject: Two years in a Tibetan monastery

Summarized in ACI Courses:

Course V: How Karma Works

Course VIII: Death and the Realms of Existence

Principal monastic textbooks used for ACI Courses: *Light on the Path to Freedom, a Commentary to the Treasure House*

Written by: Gyalwa Gendun Drup, the First Dalai Lama (1391-1474)

Typical Subjects: The nature of karma; The role of motivation; The correlation of deeds and their results; How karma is carried; The relative severity of deeds; The three realms of existence; The nature of the *bardo* (intermediate state between birth and death); A description of time and space; The destruction of the world; How to do death meditation

Book Four

Geshe Study Subject: Vowed Morality (Vinaya)

School of Buddhism Studied: Detailist (Vaibhashika)

Main Root Text: *A Summary of Vowed Morality (Vinaya Sutra)*

Written by: Master Gunaprabha, circa 500 AD

Traditional period to cover this subject: Two years in a Tibetan monastery

Summarized in ACI Course:

Course IX: The Ethical Life

Principal monastic textbooks used for ACI Course: *Essence of the Ocean of Discipline; Daymaker--A commentary on the "Essence of the Ocean"*

Written by: Je Tsongkapa (1357-1419), Master Ngulchu Dharma Bhadra (1772-1851)

Typical Subjects: The nature of the vows of freedom; Their divisions; The specific vows (note: nuns and monks' vows are presented only to those with ordination); Who can take vows; How vows are lost; The benefits of keeping vows.

Book Five

Geshe Study Subject: Buddhist Logic (Pramana)

School of Buddhism Studied: Sutrist (Sautrantika)

Main Root Text: *The Commentary on Valid Perception (Pramana Varttika)*

Written by: Master Dharmakirti, circa 650 AD, on Master Dignaga, circa 450 AD

Traditional period to cover this subject: Three months per year for 15 years in a Tibetan monastery

Summarized in ACI Courses:

Course IV: The Proof of Future Lives

Course XIII: The Art of Reasoning

Principal monastic textbooks used for ACI Courses: *The Four Reasonings; Light on the Path to Freedom, An Explanation of the "Commentary on Valid Perception"; Jewel of the True Thought; An Explanation of the Art of Reasoning; An Explanation of the Path of Reasoning; The Collected Topics of the Spiritual Son; The Collected Topics of Rato; A Clear Exposition upon Mind and Mental Functions*

Written by: Khen Rinpoche Geshe Lobsang Tharchin (b. 1921); Gyaltsab Je Dharma Rinchen (1364-1432); The First Panchen Lama, Lobsang Chukyi Gyaltsen (1567?-1662); Geshe Yeshe Wangchuk (1928-1997); Master Tutor Purbuchok Jampa Tsultrim Gyatso (1825-1901); Master Ngawang Trashin (c. 1700); Master Chok-hla U-ser (c. 1500)

Typical Subjects: The meaning of valid perception; The nature of omniscience; Proofs for past and future lives; The qualities of a Buddha; Why study the art of reasoning?; The definition of a reason; How to do Buddhist debate; The parts of a logical statement; Cause and effect; The nature of the subject mind; The concept of negatives and positives; The nature of definitions; The concept of time.

Book Six

Geshe Study Subject: The Steps to Buddhahood (Lam Rim)

School of Buddhism Studied: Advanced Middle Way (Madhyamika Prasangika)

Main Root Text: *The Great Book on the Steps to Buddhahood (Lam Rim Chenmo)*

Written by: Je Tsongkapa (1357-1419)

Traditional period to cover this subject: Intermittently over a period of 15 years in a Tibetan monastery

Overview of the ACI Teacher Training Program

Summarized in ACI Courses:

Course I: The Principal Teachings of Buddhism

Course III: Applied Meditation

Course XIV: Lojong, Developing the Good Heart

Principal monastic textbooks used for ACI Courses: *A Gift of Liberation, Thrust into Our Hands; The Principal Teachings of Buddhism; A Commentary on the Principal Teachings of Buddhism; A Thousand Angels of the Heaven of Bliss (Ganden Hlagyama); Preparing for Tantra (The "Source of All My Good" and its Commentary); A Collection of Lojong Texts; Offering of the Mandala; How to Offer the Mandala in Thirty-Seven Parts*

Written by: Khen Rinpoche Geshe Lobsang Tharchin (b. 1921); Je Tsongkapa (1357-1419); Pabongka Rinpoche (1878-1941); Master Ngulchu Dharma Bhadra (1772-1851)

Typical Subjects: The Meaning of Rennciation, the Wish for enlightenment, and correct world view; How to do a daily practice; How to meditate; What to meditate on; How to practice at work and other everyday situations; How to offer the mandala; How to practice love and compassion; Brief presentations of the entire path to Enlightenment; How to prepare for the secret teachings.

༄༅། །མཐུལ། །

mandel

།ས་གཞི་སྟོས་ཀྱིས་བྱལས་ཤིང་མེ་ཏོག་བཟམ།

sashi pukyi jukshing metok tram,

།རི་རབ་སྒྲིང་བཞི་ཉི་ལྷས་བརྒྱན་པ་འདི།

rirab lingshi nyinde gyenpa di,

།སངས་རྒྱས་ཞིང་དུ་དམིགས་ཏེ་དབུལ་བར་བགྱི།

sangye shingdu mikte ulwar gyi,

།འབྲོ་ཀུན་ནམ་དག་ཞིང་ལ་སྦྱོད་པར་ཤོག །།

drokun namdak shingla chupar shok.

།ཨི་དྲི་གུ་རུ་རྩ་མཐུ་ལ་ཀི་ནི་རྒྱ་ཏ་ཡ་མི། །

Idam guru ratna mandalakam niryatayami.

Offering the Mandala

Here is the great Earth,
Filled with the smell of incense,
Covered with a blanket of flowers,

The Great Mountain,
The Four Continents,
Wearing a jewel
Of the Sun, and Moon.

In my mind I make them
The Paradise of a Buddha,
And offer it all to You.

By this deed
May every living being
Experience
The Pure World.

Idam guru ratna mandalakam niryatayami.

༄༅། །སྐབས་འགྲོ་མཁས་བསྐྱེད། །
kyabdro semkye

།སངས་རྒྱས་ཚེས་དང་ཚོགས་ཀྱི་མཚོག་ནམས་ལ།
sangye chudang tsokyi choknam la,

།བྱང་རྩལ་བར་དུ་བདག་ནི་སྐབས་སུ་མཆིས།
jangchub bardu dakni kyabsu chi,

།བདག་གིས་སྤྱིན་སོགས་བབྱིས་པའི་བསོད་ནམས་ཀྱིས།
dakki jinsok gyipay sunam kyi,

།འགྲོ་ལ་ཕན་ཕྱིར་སངས་རྒྱས་འགྲུབ་པར་ཤོག །།
drola penchir sangye druppar shok.

Refuge and The Wish

I go for refuge
To the Buddha, Dharma, and Sangha
Until I achieve enlightenment.

By the power
Of the goodness that I do
In giving and the rest,

May I reach Buddhahood
For the sake
Of every living being.

༄༅། །བཟླ་བ། །

ngowa

།དགེ་བ་འདི་ཡིས་སྐྱེ་བོ་ཀུན།

getwa diyi kyewo kun,

།བསོད་ནམས་ཡེ་ཤེས་ཚོགས་ཚྲགས་ཤིང་།

sunam yeshe tsok-dzok shing,

།བསོད་ནམས་ཡེ་ཤེས་ལས་བྱུང་བའི།

sunam yeshe lejung way,

།དམ་པ་སྐྱ་གཉིས་འཕྲོ་པར་ཤོག །།

dampa kunyi topar shok.

Dedication of the Goodness of a Deed

By the goodness
Of what I have just done
May all beings

Complete the collection
Of merit and wisdom,

And thus gain the two
Ultimate bodies
That merit and wisdom make.

ལྷོ་མཚོ་པ། །
chupa

།སྟོན་པ་སྤྲ་མེད་སངས་རྒྱས་རིན་པོ་ཆེ།
tonpa lame sanggye rinpoche,

།སྟོབ་པ་སྤྲ་མེད་དམ་ཚཱ་རིན་པོ་ཆེ།
kyoppa lame damchu rinpoche,

།འདྲེན་པ་སྤྲ་མེད་དགེ་འདུན་རིན་པོ་ཆེ།
drenpa lame gendun rinpoche,

།སྐྱབས་གནས་དཀོན་མཆོག་གསུམ་ལ་མཚོན་པ་འབུལ།
kyabne konchok sumla chupa bul.

A Buddhist Grace

I offer this
To the Teacher
Higher than any other,
The precious Buddha.

I offer this
To the protection
Higher than any other,
The precious Dharma.

I offer this
To the guides
Higher than any other,
The precious Sangha.

I offer this
To the places of refuge,
To the Three Jewels,
Rare and supreme.



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Course XIII: The Art of Reasoning

Level Two of Buddhist Logic and Perception (Pramana)

Course Syllbus

Reading One

Selection from the collected topics: Why study the art of reasoning?

Readings: *An Explanation of the Art of Reasoning (rTags-rigs)*, by the Tutor of His Holiness the Dalai Lama, Purbuchok Jampa Tsultrim Gyatso (1825-1901); ff. 1A-2A and 10A-10B

The Greater Compendium of All the Sutras (Mahāsūtra-samuccaya, mDo kun las btus-pa chen-po), by Lord Atisha (982-1052); ff. 20A-22A

Formal logic subject: The definition of a reason

Reading: *An Explanation of the Art of Reasoning*, f. 2A

The forms of debate: The motivation for debating, and how to begin a debate

Reading Two

Selection from the collected topics: An Outline of All Existing Things

Reading: *An Outline of All Existing Things (gZhi-grub kyi rnam-bzhag)*, from *An Explanation of the Elementary Path of Reasoning (Rigs-lam chung-ngu'i rnam-par bshad-pa)*, by the Master Tutor Purbuchok Jampa Tsultrim Gyatso; ff. 5A-8B

Formal logic subject: The subject, the quality to be proven, and the quality denied in a logical statement

Reading: *An Explanation of the Art of Reasoning*, ff. 2A-3A

The forms of debate: Posture, the use of a rosary, and formulating the statement of a reason in three parts

Course XIII: The Art of Reasoning
Course Syllabus

Reading Three

Selection from the collected topics: Quality and Characteristic

Reading: *A Presentation of Quality and Characteristic (sPyi dang bye-brag gi rnam-bzhag), from An Explanation of the Elementary Path of Reasoning, ff. 19A-22A*

Formal logic subject: Similar cases, dissimilar cases, and "examples of the combination" in a logical statement

Reading: *An Explanation of the Art of Reasoning, ff. 3A-5B*

The forms of debate: The two responses to the statement of a reason

Reading Four

Selection from the collected topics: Cause and Effect

Reading: *An Elementary Presentation of Cause and Effect (rGyu-'bras kyi rnam-bzhag), from An Explanation of the Elementary Path of Reasoning, ff. 14B-19A*

Formal logic subject: The definition of a correct logical statement, and the three relations

Reading: *An Explanation of the Art of Reasoning, ff. 5B-7B*

The forms of debate: Formulating a statement of necessity

Reading Five

Selection from the collected topics: Subjects and Objects

Reading: *A Presentation of Subject States of Mind and their Objects (Yul and yul-can gyi rnam-bzhag), from The Collected Topics of the Spiritual Son (Sras bsdus-grva), by Master Ngawang Trash, the spiritual son of the great Jamyang Shepa (1648-1721); ff. 30A-38B*

Formal logic subject: An introduction to the types of correct logical statements, and a discussion of the first: the logical statement using a result

Reading: *An Explanation of the Art of Reasoning, ff. 8A-9A*

The forms of debate: The two responses to a statement of necessity

Course XIII: The Art of Reasoning
Course Syllabus

Reading Six

Selection from the collected topics: Negative and Positive

Reading: *A Presentation of the Concept of Negative and Positive (dGag-sgrub kyi rnam-bzhag), from The Collected Topics of the Spiritual Son, ff. 131B-136B.*

Formal logic subject: A discussion of the second type of correct logical statement: the logical statement using a nature

Reading: *An Explanation of the Art of Reasoning, ff. 9A-10A*

The forms of debate: Using scriptural authority

Reading Seven

Selection from the collected topics: Contradiction and Relationship

Reading: *A Presentation of the Concepts of Contradiction and Relationship ('Gal-'brel gyi rnam-bzhag), from An Explanation of the Intermediate Path of Reasoning (Rigs-lam 'bring-gi rnam-par bshad-pa), by the Master Tutor Purbuchok Jampa Tsultrim Gyatso; ff. 26B-31B*

Formal logic subject: A discussion of the third type of correct logical statement—the logical statement to prove an absence of something—and the first category of this type of statement, which involves something that is not normally perceptible

Reading: *An Explanation of the Art of Reasoning, ff. 10A-12A*

The forms of debate: Some debating tactics

Reading Eight

Selection from the collected topics: Definitions and the Things They Define

Reading: *A Presentation of Definitions and the Things They Define (mTsan-mtson gyi rnam-bzhag), from An Explanation of the Elementary Path of Reasoning, ff. 33B-39A*

Formal logic subject: The category of the third type of correct logical statement which involves something that is normally perceptible

Reading: *An Explanation of the Art of Reasoning, ff. 12A-16A*

The forms of debate: Different types of ritual debates

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Course Syllabus

Reading Nine

Selection from the collected topics: The Concept of Exclusion in Perception

Reading: *A Presentation of the Concept of Elimination in Perception (gZhan-sel gyi rnam-bzhag), from The Collected Topics of the Spiritual Son, ff. 136B-138B.*

Formal logic subject: Identifying elements of a logical statement; classifying correct logical statements by means of the quality to be proven; classifying them by means of the manner of proof; by means of what is to be proven; by means of the similar cases; and by means of the debater involved

Reading: *An Explanation of the Art of Reasoning, ff. 16A-20A*

The forms of debate: The traditional debating classes and subjects

Reading Ten

Selection from the collected topics: The Concept of Time

Reading: *A Presentation of the Concept of Time (Dus-gsum gyi rnam-bzhag), from The Collected Topics of Rato (Rva-stod bsdu-sgrva), by Master Chok-hla U-ser (about 1500 AD); ff. 101B-106B, 111A-112A*

Formal logic subject: A discussion of incorrect logical statements

Reading: *An Explanation of the Art of Reasoning, ff. 20A-24A*

The forms of debate: The traditional debate year

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Course XIII: The Art of Reasoning

Reading One: Why Study the Art of Reasoning?

Selection from the collected topics:
Why study the art of reasoning?

The first two selections here are from a monastic textbook entitled An Explanation of the Science of Logic, included in the Advanced Path of Reasoning, a Section from the "Key to the Logic Machine"—a Presentation of the Collected Topics which Clarifies the Meaning of the Great Scriptures on Valid Perception (Tsad-ma'i gzhung-don 'byed-pa'i bsdus-grva'i rnam-par bshad-pa rigs-lam 'phrul gyi lde'u-mig las rigs-lam che-ba rtags-rigs kyi skor). This text was written by Purbuchok Jampa Tsultrim Gyatso (1825-1901), who in his day held the position of Tutor to the Dalai Lama.

Between the two sections is a very relevant snippet from the Overview of the Perfection of Wisdom, composed by the great writer of textbooks for Sera Mey Tibetan Monastery named Kedrup Tenpa Dargye (1493-1568).

Our first selection discusses the importance of learning how to reason well:

།སྤྲེལ་དང་མགོན་པོ་འཇམ་དཔལ་དབྱངས་ལ་ཕུག་འཛལ་ལོ།

I bow down to my Lama and my Protector, the glorious Gentle Voice (Manjushri).

།འདིར་རིགས་པའི་སྒོ་འབྱེད་བསྐྱུས་གྲུའི་རྣམ་པར་བཤད་པ་རིགས་ལམ་འཕུལ་གྱི་ལྷ་
མིག་ལས་རིགས་ལམ་ཆེ་བ་དྲགས་རིགས་ཀྱི་རྣམ་བཞག་བཤད་པ་ལ།

Course XIII: The Art of Reasoning
Reading One

Here begins *An Explanation of the Science of Logic, included in the Advanced Path of Reasoning, a Section from the "Key to the Logic Machine," a Presentation of the Collected Topics* which opens the door to the art of reasoning.

ཆད་མར་གྱུར་པ་འགྲོ་ལ་ཕན་བཞིན་པ། སྟོན་པ་བདེ་གཤེགས་སྐྱབ་ལ་ཕྱག་འཆ་ལ་
ལོ། །ཞེས་པའི་གཞུང་འདིས་བདག་ཅག་གི་སྟོན་པ་ཕྱི་རིལ་པའི་སྟོན་པ་ལས་བྱུང་པར་
དུ་འཕགས་པའི་སྟོན་པ་ཆད་མར་བསྟན་ཏེ། འགྲོ་ལ་ཕན་བཞིན་པ། ཞེས་པས། རང་
སྐྱབས་སྐྱོར་ཕུན་ཚོགས་ལས་འབྱུངས་པའི་ཕྱིར་ཞེས་བསྟན།

Let us consider first the quotation [from Master Dharmakirti's *Commentary on Valid Perception*] which says:

I bow down to the Teacher, the One Who has Gone to Bliss,
To the Protector, the one who is totally correct,
Who undertakes to benefit every living being.

The purpose of these lines is to show that our Teacher is a teacher who is totally correct (Tib: *tsad-ma*; Skt: *pramana*), and a teacher who is infinitely superior to those of non-Buddhist traditions. The reason here is that he "undertakes to benefit every living being"; which is to say, he was created by a very special cause—consummate thoughts and actions.

འོན་རང་རེའི་སྟོན་པ་ལ་ཡོན་ཏན་ཇི་ལྟ་བུ་མངའ་ཞིན། བདེ་གཤེགས་སྐྱབ་ཞེས་པས།
རང་དོན་སྤངས་པ་ཕུན་ཚོགས་དང་། གཞན་དོན་རྟོགས་པ་ཕུན་ཚོགས་གཉིས་མངའ་
བས་ན་སྐྱབ་པ་སླ་ན་མེད་པར་བསྟན་པ་ཡིན་ཏེ། རྣམ་འགྲེལ་ལས། རྟོག་པའི་དྲ་བ་
རྣམ་བསལ་ཞིང་། ཞེས་གསུངས་པའི་ཕྱིར།

"Just what," one may ask, "are the extraordinary qualities which our own Teacher possesses?" This is answered in the words "the One Who has Gone to Bliss, the Protector." Our Teacher possesses both a consummate form of all that will benefit himself—that is, he has eliminated every negative thing within himself; and he possesses as well a consummate form of all that will benefit others—which is to say, he has realized all knowable things. As such he is said to be a Protector surpassed by none other; for as the *Commentary [on Valid Perception]* says, "He has smashed the web of ideas, and..."

དེ་ལྟར་རང་རེའི་སྟོན་པ་ནི་སྟོན་པ་ཚད་མ། དེའི་ལུང་རྟོགས་ཀྱི་བསྟན་པ་ནི་བསྟན་པ་
རྣམ་དག། །དེའི་ལུང་ལས་གསུང་པའི་ཚད་མ་མངོན་རྗེས་གཉིས་ནི་འཇུག་བྱའི་ཚད་
མ་རྣམ་དག། །

And so it is that our Teacher is a teacher who is totally correct; and that his teaching is a teaching which is totally pure; and that the correct perceptions described in his words—that is, the pair of direct and deductive perception—are totally pure and correct methods of perception for us to use.

རྒྱ་བསམ་སྒྲུབ་ཕུན་ཚོགས་ནི་ཉམས་སུ་སྤང་བྱའི་ལམ་རྣམ་དག་ཏུ་རྟོག་གའི་ཆོག་དོན་
བརྒྱད་ཀྱི་སྒྲོ་ནས་སྒྲུབ་པར་མཛད། དེས་ན་སྒྲུབ་ངག་དང་། སུན་འབྲིན་གྱི་རྣམ་
བཞག་ལ་མཁས་པའི་སྒྲོ་ནས་རྒྱལ་བའི་བསྟན་པ་འཛིན་པ་དེ་ནི། བསྟན་འཛིན་གྱི་གཙོ་
བོ་ཡིན་ཏེ། རིགས་གཏོར་ལས། དེ་ལྟ་སྒྲུབ་དང་སུན་འབྲིན་གྱི། །རིགས་པའི་གཞུང་
ལུགས་གང་གིས་ཤེས། །མཁས་པ་དེ་ནི་རྟོགས་པ་ཡི། །སངས་རྒྱས་ཀྱི་ནི་བསྟན་པ་
འཛིན། །ཞེས་གསུངས་པའི་ཕྱིར།

The causes that create the Buddha are consummate thoughts and actions. Proving that these constitute a totally pure path that we should practice is accomplished by using the eight different forms of logic. As such there is but one main way of keeping the teachings of the victorious Buddha safe in the world, and this is to become a master of the logical forms used to prove some things and to disprove others. As the *Goldmine of Reasoning* [by the Sakya Pandita, Kunga Gyeltsen (1182-1251)] says,

Suppose a person comes to understand
The scriptural tradition for how to reason:
This art of proving or disproving things.
A master like this is a person who keeps
The teachings of the totally enlightened
Buddhas safe here in the world.

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The role of faith versus the understanding that is born from the ability to reason properly is stated clearly in many scriptures on the perfection of wisdom, including the following:

གདུལ་བྱ་གཉིས་ཀྱིས་ཡུམ་ལ་དང་བ་སྐྱེ་ཚུལ་དགོས་པ་དང་བཅས་པ་འཆད་པ་དང་།
གཞི་ལམ་རྣམ་གསུམ་བདེན་པའི་སྐྱེ་མེད་ཀྱི་དོན་བཤད་པ་གཉིས།

Here our discussion will have two parts: a description of the different ways in which people gain feelings of admiration for the Mother [of the Buddhas—that is, the perfection of wisdom] along with a discussion of the need to reach this emotion; and an explanation of what it means when we say that developing the three kinds of high knowledge—foundation knowledge, path knowledge, and omniscience—has no true existence.

དང་པོ་ལ་ཁ་ཅིག །རེ་ཞིག་དད་པའི་ཇེས་སུ་འབྲང་བ་རྣམས་ཀྱིས་འདི་ལ་ཐེ་ཚོམ་མེད་
པར་སྒྱུར་དུ་རབ་དུ་དང་བ་སྐྱེའོ་ཞེས་པའི་སྐྱབས་ནས་དངོས་བསྟན་གྱི་རྒྱན་གྱི་གདུལ་
བྱ་དབང་རྟུལ་དད་པའི་ཇེས་འབྲང་དེ། རྒྱན་གྱི་ཆེད་དུ་བྱ་བའི་གདུལ་བྱ་ཡིན་ཟེར་ན།

Here is the first of the two. Suppose someone makes the following claim:

Consider the section where the commentary makes this statement: "At this particular point at least, those who follow after faith develop, quite quickly, strong feelings of admiration for it, beyond all doubt." There is a certain kind of disciple being referred to directly here, and that is the one who is studying the *Ornament* [of *Realizations* by Maitreya] and who is poor in his intellectual capacity—the kind that follows a teaching because of his or her faith alone. It is this kind of disciple for whom the *Ornament* was designed.

དེ་མི་འཐད་པར་ཐལ། རྒྱན་གྱི་ཆེད་དུ་བྱ་བའི་གདུལ་བྱ་ཡིན་ན་ཐེག་ཆེན་གྱི་རིགས་
ཅན་དབང་པོ་ཤིན་ཏུ་རྣོན་པོ་ཡིན་པས་བྱུང་། ཐེག་ཆེན་གྱི་རིགས་ཅན་དབང་པོ་ཤིན་ཏུ་
རྣོན་པོ་ལམ་མ་ཞུགས་རྣམས་ཀྱིས་མཐུན་གསུམ་གྱི་ཡོན་ཏན་བརྗོད་པའི་ཆོག་ཙམ་རྒྱ་
མཚན་དུ་བྱས་པ་མ་ཡིན་པར་གཞི་ལམ་རྣམ་གསུམ་གང་ཟག་དང་། ཆོས་ཀྱི་བདག་

མེད་པ་རིགས་པ་ཡང་དག་གིས་གཏན་ལ་ཕབ་ནས། ཚད་མས་ངེས་པ་ལ་བརྟེན་ནས་
ཡུམ་མཁུན་གསུམ་ལ་དང་བ་དང་ཡིད་ཆེས་ཀྱི་དད་པ་བསྐྱེད་པའི་ཕྱིར།

But you are wrong in your assertion. It is always the case that, if a person is one of those disciples for whom the *Ornament* was designed, then he or she is a person who belongs to the greater way, and who possesses intellectual abilities which are extremely high. Think about these people—the ones who belong to the greater way and who possess an intellect which is very great. They don't begin to feel admiration for the three kinds of high knowledge simply based on the fact that someone has described to them the extraordinary qualities that these three possess. Rather they use correct forms of reasoning to come to a clear understanding of what the three—that is, foundation knowledge, path knowledge, and omniscience—really are, and they do the same to establish in their own minds the fact that neither people nor their "things" [or parts] have any nature of their own. When they have in this way come to actually see things through a valid form of perception, then they begin to have feelings of admiration for the Mother, for the three types of high knowledge—it is only then that they begin to have the kind of faith which believes in the good qualities of its object.

The second selection is a very famous quotation from scripture which is memorized by every young monk who begins the geshe course in a Tibetan monastery. It describes one of the ultimate reasons for studying the art of reasoning:

མདོ་ལས། གང་ཟག་གིས་གང་ཟག་གི་ཚད་གཟུང་བར་མི་བྱ་སྟེ། ཉམས་པར་གྱུར་
ཏེ་རེ། ཞེས་རང་ལ་མི་སྒྲུང་བ་ཙམ་གྱིས་གཞན་ལ་ཡོན་ཏན་དེ་ལྟ་བུ་མེད་ཅེས་འཆད་
མི་རིགས་པའི་དོན་སྟོན་པ་ལ། རྣམ་འབྲེལ་ལས། ཚད་མ་རྣམས་ནི་མི་འདུག་པ།
མེད་ལ་མི་འདུག་འབྲས་བུ་ཅན། ཞེས་སོགས་ཀྱིས་བསྟན།

There is a sutra where it says,

No person should ever judge another; those who try will fall.

The point of these words is to show us how wrong it is for us to say that someone else lacks any particular good quality, only because it does not appear to us that they do. This same point is made in the *Commentary* with lines such as the following:

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In a case where valid perception has yet
To engage in the object, the result obtained
Is that they don't: they didn't engage.

The full story behind this quotation is not often told in traditional Tibetan monasteries. It appears as an important section of the Greater Compendium of All the Sutras (Mahāsūtrasamuccaya, mDo kun las btus-pa chen-po), compiled by Lord Atisha (982-1052), and is translated here in full:

།དེ་བཞིན་གཤམས་པ་དེ་ཡོངས་སུ་སྤྱངས་ལས་འདས་ནས་ལོ་སྟོང་དུ་དམ་པའི་ཆོས་
གནས་པར་གྱུར་ཏེ། དེ་ཕྱིན་ཆད་སྤྱོད་དེ་དག་གྱང་ཤིང་དེ་དག་ལས་འབྱུང་བ་མེད་པར་
གྱུར་ཏོ།

[Lord Buddha is speaking to his disciples, and describing a Buddha who had come before him:]

"The holy Dharma survived in the world for a thousand years after this Buddha, the One Gone Thus, had passed into his final nirvana. After that, those special sounds that came from the trees and spoke the Dharma to people disappeared as well.

།རིགས་ཀྱི་བྱ་དེ་བཞིན་གཤམས་པ་དག་བཙུག་པ་ཡང་དག་པར་རྫོགས་པའི་སངས་
རྒྱལ་རི་རབ་ལྗར་མངོན་པར་འཕགས་པའི་རྒྱལ་པོ་དེས་ཡང་དག་སྟོང་ཆོས་སྤྱོད་
པ་ནས་པར་དག་པ་ཞིས་བྱ་བ་དམ་པའི་ཆོས་ཡོངས་སུ་འཇིན་པར་བསྐྱོས་ནས།
ཡོངས་སུ་སྤྱངས་ལས་འདས་པར་གྱུར་ཏོ།

"Listen, o child of noble family. That Buddha—the One Gone Thus, the Destroyer of the Foe, the Totally Enlightened One whose name was 'Towering like the Mountain at the Center of the World'—passed into his final nirvana only after he had appointed a certain monk, a teacher of the Dharma by the name of 'Pure Life,' to protect the teachings in this world.

།དེའི་ཆོ་དག་སྤྲོད་སྤྲོད་པའི་སྤྲོ་གོས་ཞེས་བྱ་བ་ཞིག་བྱུང་སྟེ། དེ་ནི་ཚུལ་བློམས་ཀྱི་ཕུང་
པོ་ཤིན་ཏུ་རྣམ་པར་དག་པ་དང་ལྷན་ཞིང་། འཇིག་རྟེན་པའི་མངོན་པར་ཤེས་པ་ལྷ་ཐོབ་
པར་གྱུར་ཏེ། འདུལ་བའི་སྤྲོ་སྤྲོད་ལའང་མངོན་དུ་བྱུང་བར་གྱུར་ཏེ།

"In those days there came another monk, one whose name was 'Intellect of Action.' He was possessed of a veritable mountain of morality, and had as well attained the five different kinds of worldly clairvoyance. He was moreover well versed in the scriptural collection concerning the subject of vowed morality.

།དག་སྤྲོད་དེ་ནི་དཀའ་ཐུབ་ཀྱི་མཆོག་དང་ལྷན། ངན་ངོན་ལ་མོས་པ་འཁོར་གྱི་ནང་ན་
སྤྲོད་པ་སྟེ། དེས་གཙུག་ལག་ཁང་ཅིག་བརྩིགས་ནས་དེ་ན་གནས་ཤིང་དེའི་འཁོར་དུ་
གྱུར་པ་རྣམས་ཀྱང་། ཚུལ་བློམས་ཀྱི་ཕུང་པོ་ཤིན་ཏུ་དག་པ་ལ་བཀོད་པར་གྱུར་ཏེ།
སྤངས་པའི་ཡོན་ཏན་གྱི་སྤྲོ་པ་ལ་མོས་པར་གྱུར་ཏེ།

"This monk lived with a group of followers who were the highest masters of an ascetic way of life, and who had found joy in living with nothing but the worst of food and lodging. They all built themselves an abbey in which to stay, and there Intellect succeeded in bringing his followers to a very high and pure level of moral living. They came to have a deep love for the way of vows, for the way of life that leads of purification.

།དག་སྤྲོད་དེ་ནི་བརྩོན་འགྲུས་བརྩམས་ཤིང་རྟག་པར་བྱང་རྒྱུ་གྱི་སེམས་ལ་གནས་
པར་གྱུར་ཏེ། །བྱང་རྒྱུ་སེམས་དཔའ་གཞན་དག་ཀྱང་། སྤྲོད་ལམ་དེ་ནི་ད་ལ་ཡང་
དག་པར་བསྐྱེལ་ཏེ། དམིགས་པ་ཅན་གྱི་ལྷ་བ་ལ་ཡང་དག་པར་བསྐྱེལ་ལོ།

"This monk, Intellect, spent his days making great efforts in the spiritual life, and in his heart he kept to the Wish for enlightenment. He was continually urging all the other aspiring bodhisattvas to live this way of life as well, and to keep up a worldview, a way of looking at things, which was pure and correct.

དེའི་འདུ་བྱེད་ཐམས་ཅད་མི་ཉག་པ་ཞེས་བྱ་བར་འཛིན་དུ་བཅུག་གོ། འདུ་བྱེད་ཐམས་
ཅད་སྤྱག་བསྐྱེལ་ཞེས་བྱ་བར་འཛིན་དུ་བཅུག་གོ། འདུ་བྱེད་ཐམས་ཅད་བདག་མེད་
ཅས་བྱ་བར་འཛིན་དུ་བཅུག་གོ། དག་སྟོང་དེ་ནི་ཉིང་ངེ་འཛིན་ལ་མཁས་པར་གྱུར་ཏོ།
ཁྱེད་ཀྱི་སེམས་དཔའི་སྟོན་པ་ལ་མཁས་པ་མ་ཡིན་ཞིང་དག་བའི་རྩ་བ་དང་ལྷན་པར་
གྱུར་ཏོ།

"He succeeded in bringing the others to believe in that part of the view which states that all things with causes are impermanent. He succeeded in bringing them to believe that all things with causes are suffering. He succeeded in bringing them to believe that nothing with a cause has any nature of its own. He became a great master of single-pointed meditation. He became a great master of the deeds of a bodhisattva, and he came to possess a great store of good karma within him.

[Our reading here reverses the negative particle *ma* in the Tibetan, which seems to be a printing error, given the context.]

དག་སྟོང་ཆོས་སྒྲ་བ་སྟོན་པ་རྣམ་པར་དག་པ་དེ་ནི། སེམས་ཅན་རྣམས་ཀྱི་དབང་པོ་
མཆོག་དང་ཐ་མ་ཤེས་པ་ལ་མཁས་པར་གྱུར་ཏོ། དེའི་འཁོར་དུ་གྱུར་པ་ཇི་སྟེད་པ་དེ་
དག་ཀྱང་། སྤངས་པའི་ཡོན་ཏན་གྱི་སྟོམ་པ་ལྟར་ལེན་པར་གྱུར་ཏོ། མི་དམིགས་པའི་
བཟོད་པ་ཅན་ཐབས་ལ་མཁས་པ་དག་ཏུ་གྱུར་ཏོ།

"Now that other monk named 'Pure Life,' the teacher of the Dharma, came to be a great master in being able to understand the needs of other living beings, whether they were of the very highest or the very lowest of intellectual capacity. He and every one of his followers reached a point of true fluency in the way of life which leads to purification: they became well versed in the meaning of the invisible [that is, emptiness], and learned as well the art of acting in unexpected ways to help others.

རིགས་ཀྱི་བྱ་དེ་ནས་ཆོས་སྒྲ་བ་སྟོན་པ་རྣམ་པར་དག་པ་འཁོར་དང་བཅས་ཏོ། དག་

སྤྲོད་སྤྲོད་པའི་སྤྲོ་བོས་གང་ན་གནས་པའི་གཙུག་ལག་ཁང་དེར་ཕྱིན་ནས་དེ་ན་གནས་
པར་གྱུར་ཏེ། དེ་གཙུག་ལག་ཁང་དེ་ནས་ཡང་དང་ཡང་སེམས་ཅན་རྣམས་ལ་སྤྲོད་
བཅེ་བའི་ཕྱིར། བྲོད་དུ་འབྱོཞིང་དེ་དག་ཏུ་ཟས་ཀྱི་བྲ་བ་བྲས་ནས་ཕྱིར་འོང་བར་གྱུར་
ཏོ། །དེས་དེ་དག་ཏུ་རིགས་བརྒྱ་སྤྲོད་དུ་མ་དད་པར་བྲས་པར་གྱུར་ཏོ།

"Listen, o child of noble family. There came a day when the teacher, Pure Life, came with his followers to the abbey where the monk Intellect was staying. They took up residence there. Pure Life, out of compassion for those living in the nearby towns, would often leave the abbey and go to take his food with the people. Then he would return home to the abbey. There in the homes of the people he was able to bring many hundreds, nay—many thousands, of families to have faith in the Dharma.

།དའི་འཁོར་ཇི་སྤྲོད་པ་དེ་དག་གྲང་ཚུལ་ལ་མཁས་པར་གྱུར་ཏོ། །དེ་དག་གྲང་དེ་དག་
ཏུ་དོང་ཞིང་སེམས་ཅན་རྣམས་ལ་ཆོས་སྤྲོད་ཏེ། དེ་དག་གིས་གྲང་སྤྲོ་བ་ཆགས་བརྒྱ་
སྤྲོད་མང་པོ་སྤྲོ་ན་མེད་པ་ཡང་དག་པར་ཚྭ་གས་པའི་བྲང་ཆུབ་ཏུ་བཀོད་པར་གྱུར་ཏོ།

"All of Pure Life's followers came to be masters too in this way of helping others. They would also go to the towns, and teach the Dharma to the beings who lived there. They too brought many hundreds, nay—many thousands, of living creatures to the unsurpassed state of a purely and totally enlightened being.

།དག་སྤྲོད་སྤྲོད་པའི་སྤྲོ་བོས་ཀྱི་འཁོར་དེ་དག་ནི་བསམ་གཏན་ལྟར་ལེན་ཅིང་བྲོད་དག་
ཏུ་ཡང་འཁོར་བར་མི་འདོང་ངོ། །དེ་ནས་དག་སྤྲོད་སྤྲོད་པའི་སྤྲོ་བོས་ཀྱིས་བྲང་ཆུབ་
སེམས་དཔའ་གཞན་དག་ལ་མ་དད་པའི་སེམས་བསྐྱེད་ནས། དེ་དག་ནི་བྲོད་དུ་ཡང་
དང་ཡང་འཇུག་གོ་ཞེས་དེས་གཞི་བརྟུངས་ཏེ། དག་སྤྲོད་གི་དག་འདུན་བསྐྱས་ནས་
བཅའ་བ་བྲས་པ།

Course XIII: The Art of Reasoning
Reading One

"All the followers of the monk Intellect devoted themselves to meditating, and never went into the towns. There came a time when the monk Intellect began to lose his faith in those other bodhisattvas. He began to talk about how they were always going into the towns, and finally ordered that the *gandi* stick be beaten, to announce an assembly of the community of monks. When they had all come together, he gave the following order:

བདག་ཅག་གི་ནང་ནས་སྐྱུ་ཁྱེད་ཀྱང་བྱོང་དུ་འཇུག་པར་མི་བྱའོ། །སྤྱོད་ནི་ཤེས་བཞིན་
མེད་པར་སྤྱོད་པ་ཡིན་ཏེ། ཉུང་དུ་སྤྱོད་པ་མ་ཡིན་གྱིས་སྤྱོད་བྱོང་དུ་འགོ་བས་ཀྱང་ཅི་
ཞིག་བྱ་སྟེ། དགོན་པ་ལ་གནས་པ་ནི། བཅོམ་ལྡན་འདས་ཀྱིས་གནང་ཞིང་བསྐྱུགས་
པ་ཡིན་གྱི་སྤྱོད་བྱོང་དུ་མ་འདོང་བར་བསམ་གཏན་གྱི་བདེ་བས་རྣམ་པར་སྤྱོད་ཅིག་ཅས་
བསྟོན།

"None of us is allowed to go to the towns any more," he said. "You are behaving carelessly. And what need is there anyway for those who are supposed to speak little to go to town? Staying in the monastery is an activity which Lord Buddha has clearly allowed us, and which He has recommended for our way of life.

"And so did he command them: 'You must stop going into the towns now. Spend your days here, wrapped in the pleasure of meditation.'

རིགས་ཀྱི་བྱ་དེ་ནས་སྤྱོད་པ་རྣམ་པར་དག་པས་དེའི་འཁོར་གྱིས་དེ་ཟེར་བ་ལྟར་མ་
མཉན་ཏེ། ཡང་དང་ཡང་བྱོང་དག་ཏུ་འདོང་བར་གྱུར་ཏོ། །རིགས་ཀྱི་བྱ་དེ་ནས་དག་
སྤྱོད་དེ་དག་ནམ་བྱོང་ནས་སྤྱིར་འོངས་པར་གྱུར་པ་དེའི་ཆེ། དག་སྤྱོད་སྤྱོད་པའི་སྒོ་
གྲོས་གྱིས་ཡང་གཞི་བརྟུངས་ནས། དག་སྤྱོད་གི་དག་འདུན་བསྐྱུས་ཏེ། འདི་རྒྱུད་དུ་
གལ་ཏེ་ད་ཕྱིན་ཆད་སྤྱོད་བྱོང་དུ་འདོང་དང་། སྤྱོད་གཙུག་ལག་ཁང་འདི་ན་མ་གནས་
ཞེས་བསྟོན།

"Listen, o child of noble family. Pure Life and his followers refused to follow the order, and continued to go frequently into the towns. Once, when they

had returned to the abbey, the monk Intellect again had the *gandi* stick beaten, calling an assembly of the monks. There in the assembly, Intellect made the following declaration: 'From now on, anyone who goes to town is prohibited from staying in our abbey.'

རིགས་ཀྱི་བྱ་དེ་ནས་དག་སྟོང་ཆོས་སྤྱོད་པ་རྣམ་པར་དག་པས། དག་སྟོང་དེའི་
སེམས་བསྐྱེད་བའི་ཕྱིར་རང་གི་འཁོར་རྣམས་བོས་ཏེ་འདི་སྐད་དུ། ཁྱེད་གྲོང་དུ་སྐྱེ་
ཡང་མ་འདོང་ཅིག་ཅེས་སྤྱིས་སོ།།

"Listen, o child of noble family. The monk Pure Life—this teacher of the Dharma—determined that he would try to protect Intellect from wrong thoughts, and so he called together all his followers, and said to them, 'Now none of you should go to town.'

དེ་ནས་དེའི་ཆེ་དག་སྟོང་དེ་དག་གིས་སེམས་ཅན་གང་ཇི་སྟེན་ཅིག་སྟོན་པར་བྱས་པ་དེ་
དག་དག་སྟོང་དེ་དག་དང་མ་ཕྱད་པས། ཤིན་ཏུ་མི་དགའ་བར་ཡང་གྱུར། དག་བའི་
རྩ་བ་ཡང་ཡོངས་སུ་འགྲིབས་པར་གྱུར་ཏོ།།

"But then came a problem with all the people whom these monks had sought to develop spiritually. Because they no longer had any contact with the monks, these people began to be very upset, and a dark cloud began to form over all the good karma they had collected up to that time.

རིགས་ཀྱི་བྱ་དེ་ནས་དག་སྟོང་ཆོས་སྤྱོད་པ་རྣམ་པར་དག་པ་ཟླ་བ་གསུམ་པོ་དེ་
དག་འདས་ནས། གཙུག་ལག་ཁང་དེ་ནས་གཙུག་ལག་ཁང་གཞན་དུ་འཕྲོས་ནས།
གྲོང་དང་། གྲོང་ཁྱེར་དང་། རྫོང་ས་དང་། ཡུལ་དང་། རྒྱལ་པོའི་ཕོ་བྲང་འཁོར་
དག་དུ་འགྲོ་ཞིང་། སེམས་ཅན་དག་ལ་ཆོས་སྟོན་པར་གྱུར་ཏོ།།

"Listen, o child of noble family. Three months passed this way, and then the monk, that teacher of the Dharma, Pure Life, moved away from this abbey and went to live in another. From there he would go to the towns, and to the cities, and to whole areas and other lands, and so too among those who lived in the palaces of kings, and taught the Dharma to the people.

རིགས་ཀྱི་བྱ་དེ་ནས་དག་སྤྱོད་སྤྱོད་པའི་སྤྱོ་གྲོས་ཀྱིས་ཆོས་སྤྱོད་པ་རྣམ་པར་དག་
པ་ཡང་དང་ཡང་དུ་འགོ་བ་ཡང་མཐོང་། དེའི་འཁོར་རྣམས་ཀྱང་སྤྱོད་ལམ་ཐ་མལ་པ་
ཅན་དུ་མཐོང་ནས་དེས་ཀྱང་དེ་ལ་མ་དད་པའི་སེམས་བསྐྱེད་པར་གྱུར་ཏེ། དག་སྤྱོད་
འདི་ནི་ཚུལ་གྲིམས་འཆལ་པ་ཅན། ཚུལ་གྲིམས་ལོག་པ་ཅན་ཏེ། འདིས་བྱང་ཆུབ་ག་
ལ་འཐོབ། དག་སྤྱོད་འདིའི་བྱང་ཆུབ་ནི་རྒྱུ་རིང་ངོ་། །དག་སྤྱོད་འདི་ནི་འདུ་འཇོམ་
གནས་པའོ་ཞེས་འགོ་བ་མང་པོ་དག་ལ་དེ་སྐད་ཅེས་བཟླ་དེད།

"Listen, o child of noble family. The monk Intellect saw the teacher of the Dharma, Pure Life, going out all the time. He also saw this teacher's followers acting in ways that seemed worldly to him, and he began to lose faith in them as well. And then he began to criticize the monk widely, in the following words: 'This monk has lost his morality; he is corrupt. How could he ever achieve enlightenment this way? He goes further and further from enlightenment. There he is, living in the hustle and bustle of the everyday world.'

རིགས་ཀྱི་བྱ་དེ་ནས་དུས་གཞན་ཞིག་ན་དག་སྤྱོད་སྤྱོད་པའི་སྤྱོ་གྲོས་དེ་འཆི་བའི་དུས་
བྱས་པར་གྱུར་ནས། དེ་དེ་ལྟར་འཆི་བའི་དུས་བྱས་པ་དང་། ལས་དེའི་རྣམ་པར་སྤྲིན་
པས་མནར་མེད་པའི་སེམས་ཅན་དཔྱལ་བ་ཆེན་པོར་ལྷུང་ངོ་།

"Listen, o child of noble family. Later on there came a day when this monk named Intellect breathed his last. As soon as he died, the karma of his actions ripened, and he dropped to the hell we know as 'No Respite.'

དེ་བསྐྱལ་པ་བྱེ་བ་ཐོག་ཐོག་དགུ་བཅུ་ཙ་དགུར་སེམས་ཅན་དཔྱལ་བ་ཆེན་པོར་སྤྱག་
བསྐྱལ་གྱི་ཆོར་བ་སྤྱོད་བར་གྱུར་ནས། ཆོ་རབས་དུག་ཅུར་མི་སྤྲིན་པར་བཟླ་དེ་པ་ཐོབ་
པར་གྱུར་ཏེ། །ཆོ་རབས་སྤྱོད་ཐོག་སྤྱོད་ཅུ་ཙ་གཉིས་སྤྱོད་པ་ཏུ་བྱུང་བ་ལས་ཕྱིར་
བབས་པར་གྱུར་ཏེ།

Course XIII: The Art of Reasoning
Reading One

"Intellect remained in this great hell, experiencing each of its torments, for 99 periods that each went on for a hundred billion periods of ten million eons each. Then he spent sixty lives constantly slandered by others. And for 32,000 lifetimes he was a monk who lost his robes.

ལས་ཀྱི་སྒྲིབ་པ་དེ་ཉིད་ཀྱི་ལྷན་མས། དེ་བཞིན་གཤེགས་པ་དག་བཙམ་པ་ཡང་དག་
པར་རྫོགས་པའི་སངས་རྒྱས་འོད་འཕྲོ་བྱི་མ་མེད་པའི་གསུང་རབ་ལ་རབ་ཏུ་བྱུང་བར་
གྱུར་ཏོ། །དེ་རབ་ཏུ་བྱུང་ནས་ལོ་བྱེ་བ་བརྒྱ་སྟོང་ཕྱག་རྒྱ་ཏུ་མགོ་འཛིན་ཐོད་ལ་མེ་འབར་
བ་ལྟར་ནམ་པར་སྤྱད་ཀྱང་། མཐུན་པའི་བཟོད་པ་ཙམ་ཡང་མ་ཐོབ་སྟེ། ཆོ་རབས་
བརྒྱ་སྟོང་མང་པོར་དབང་པོ་རྟུལ་པོར་གྱུར་ཏོ། །

"When all these karmic obstacles had befallen him, there was some karma still remaining. These led him to a birth in the days when the Destroyer of the Foe, the Totally Enlightened One, the Buddha named Immaculate Shining Light, was teaching in the world, and he took ordination in His way. He made incredible efforts, exerting himself with the same effort that a person would if his hair had caught on fire, for sixty thousand periods each made of a hundred periods of ten million years each. And yet he was unable to reach even the level known as 'mastery,' which leads into the realization of selflessness. He spent many hundreds and thousands of lifetimes as a person with the dullest of intellect.

རིགས་ཀྱི་བྱ་དེའི་ཆོ་དེའི་དུས་ན། དགོ་སྟོང་ཆོས་སྤྱོད་པ་ནམ་པར་དག་པ་ཞེས་
བྱ་བ་དེ་གཞན་ཡིན་པར་སེམས་ན་དེ་ལྟར་མི་བཟོ་སྟེ། དེ་ཅིའི་ཕྱིར་ཞེ་ན། དེ་བཞིན་
གཤེགས་པ་མི་སྤྱལ་བ་ནི། དེའི་ཆོ་དེའི་དུས་ན་དགོ་སྟོང་ཆོས་སྤྱོད་པ་ནམ་པར་
དག་པ་ཞེས་བྱ་བར་གྱུར་ཏོ། །

"Listen, o child of noble family. You may think that the one monk, the teacher of the Dharma, the one named Pure Life in those days, was just any person at all. But don't think that way. Why do I say this? Because it is the One Gone Thus, the Buddha whom we know as Unshakable, who was in those days that monk, the teacher of the Dharma, by the name of Pure Life.

རིགས་ཀྱི་བྱ་དེའི་ཆོ་དེའི་དུས་ན། དག་སྟོང་ཆོས་སྒྲ་བ་སྟོད་པའི་སྟོ་བྲོས་ཞེས་བྱ་བ་དེ་
གཞན་ཞིག་ཡིན་པ་སྟུང་དུ་སེམས་ན་དེ་སྟུང་དུ་མི་བཟླ་སྟེ། དེ་ཅིའི་ཕྱིར་ཞེ་ན། ང་ནི་
དག་སྟོང་ཆོས་སྒྲ་བ་སྟོད་པའི་སྟོ་བྲོས་ཞེས་བྱ་བར་གྱུར་ཏེ། ང་ཡང་དེ་ལྟ་བུའི་ཐབས་
སྤྲོ་མོས་དེ་ལ་མ་དད་པའི་སེམས་བསྐྱེད་དེ། ལས་ཀྱི་སྒྲིབ་པ་མངོན་པར་འདུགས་པས་
སེམས་ཅན་དཔྱལ་བ་དག་ཏུ་ལྷུང་བར་གྱུར་ཏེ།

"Listen, o child of noble family. You may think that the other monk, the one named Intellect, also a teacher of the Dharma, was just any person at all. But don't think that way. Why do I say this? Because it is I myself who was that teacher, the one named Intellect. And it was I who—due to some small incident—came to lose my faith. It was I who created the karmic obstacle. And it was I who, because of it, fell down to hell.

རིགས་ཀྱི་བྱ་དེ་ལྟར་སྤྲོ་བ་ནི་ལས་ཀྱི་སྒྲིབ་པ་ཡིན་གྱི། རིགས་ཀྱི་བྱ་ལས་ཀྱི་སྒྲིབ་པ་དེ་
ལྟ་བུ་མི་འདོད་པ་དེ་དག་གིས་གཞན་གྱི་སྟོད་པ་ལ་ཁོང་ཁྲོ་བར་མི་བྱའོ། །དེའི་སྟོད་པ་
ཐམས་ཅད་ལ་ཡིད་ཆེས་པར་བྱའོ། །འདི་སྟུང་དུ་པ་རོལ་གྱི་སེམས་ནི་བདག་གིས་མི་
ཤེས་ཏེ། སེམས་ཅན་གྱི་སྟོད་པ་ནི་ཤེས་པར་དགའོ། །དེ་སྟུང་དུ་སེམས་བསྐྱེད་པར་
བྱའོ།

"Listen to me, o child of noble family. Speaking in a way that will split up other people is a great karmic obstacle. Listen, o my child. Anyone who wants to avoid this obstacle must never feel anger about what others may do. They must trust in all that others do. They must think to themselves, 'I cannot know what this other person is really thinking. It is a difficult thing to understand all that others do.' They must come to develop this way of thinking.

དོན་གྱི་དབང་དེ་གཟིགས་ནས་དེ་བཞིན་གཤེགས་པས་འདི་སྐད་དུ་ཆོས་བསྟན་ཏེ།
གང་ཟག་གིས་གང་ཟག་གི་ཆོད་གཟུང་བར་མི་བྱའོ། །གང་ཟག་གིས་གང་ཟག་ལ་

ཚོད་བབུང་ན། མ་འབྱུང་བར་འགྱུར་ཏེ། ང་འཇག་གཞན་ཡང་ང་དང་འདྲ་བ་དག་གིས་
གང་ཟག་ལ་ཚོད་བབུང་བའོ།།

And because He had grasped this king of all ideas, the One Gone Thus then spoke the following, and thus taught the holy Dharma:

No person should ever judge another. Those who do try to judge another will only hurt themselves. Only I, or someone like me, is able to judge another.

རིགས་ཀྱི་བྱ་སྤྱོད་བདག་བསྐྱེད་བར་འདོད་པ་དེས་གཞན་སྤྱི་སྤྱོད་པ་ལ་ཡང་བརྟག་པར་
མི་བྱའོ། །དེ་དག་ལ་འདི་ནི་འདི་འདྲའོ། །འདི་ནི་འདི་འདྲའོ་ཞེས་དཔྱ་བར་མི་བྱའོ།
།ཉིན་མཚན་དུ་སངས་རྒྱས་ཀྱི་ཚེས་ལ་བརྩོན་པར་བྱའོ།།

"Listen, o child of noble family. Those who wish themselves well should never spend their time examining what anyone else at all is doing. They should never criticize another, saying 'Those people are doing this and that. This person is doing such and such.' Rather they should spend all their day, and all their night, in trying to practice the teachings of the Buddha.

རིགས་ཀྱི་བྱ་ཚེས་ལ་བསྐྱོམ་པའི་ཡིད་ཀྱིས་བསམ་པ་ཐག་པ་ནས་ཡང་དག་པར་
ཞུགས་པའི་ཕྱིར། བྱང་རྒྱལ་སེམས་དཔའ་ནི་གཞན་ལ་དཔྱ་བར་བརྩོན་པར་མི་གནས་
སོ།།

"Listen, o child of noble family. A bodhisattva should never spend his time working to criticize others, for he or she must devote their whole heart to living in a pure way themselves, immersed in thoughts of the Dharma."

Formal logic subject:
The definition of a reason

དང་པོ་ལ། རྟགས་སྤྱོད་བཞེད་པ། རྟགས་ཀྱི་མཚན་ཉིད། དེ་སྐྱབ་ཀྱི་རྟགས་སྤྱོད་བཞེད་

པ། དེ་སྐྱབ་ཀྱི་དྭགས་ཀྱི་མཚན་ཉིད།

Here is the first part of our discussion. The definition of a reason is "Anything put forth as a reason." The definition of a reason in any particular logical statement is, "Anything put forth as the reason in any particular logical statement."

ཡོད་མེད་གང་རུང་ཡིན་ན། དེ་སྐྱབ་ཀྱི་དྭགས་ཡིན་པས་བྱབ་སྟེ། དེ་ཡིན་ན། དེ་
སྐྱབ་ཀྱི་དྭགས་སུ་བཀོད་པས་བྱབ་པའི་ཕྱིར་ཏེ། རི་བོང་རྩ་དེ། དེ་ཆོས་ཅན། མི་དག་
སྟེ། རི་བོང་རྩ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར་ཞེས་པའི་དྭགས་སུ་བཀོད་པའི་ཕྱིར།

It doesn't even matter if something exists or not, it can always be a reason in any particular logical statement. This is because of the fact that, no matter what something may be, it can still always be put forth as the reason in any particular logical statement. And this is true because even the horns of a rabbit can be put forth as a reason, in the following way:

Consider anything, whether it exists or not.
It is a changing thing,
Because it is the horns of a rabbit.

སྐྱ་མི་དག་པར་སྐྱབ་པར་བྱེད་པའི་དྭགས་སུ་བཀོད་པ། སྐྱ་མི་དག་པར་སྐྱབ་པར་བྱེད་
པའི་དྭགས་ཀྱི་མཚན་ཉིད། བྱས་དྭགས་ཀྱི་སྐྱ་མི་དག་པར་སྐྱབ་པའི་དྭགས་སུ་བཀོད་
པ། བྱས་དྭགས་ཀྱི་སྐྱ་མི་དག་པར་སྐྱབ་པའི་དྭགས་ཀྱི་མཚན་ཉིད། དེ་བཞིན་དུ་
གཞན་ལ་ཡང་སྟོར་ཚུལ་རིགས་འདྲའོ།

The definition of the reason in a logical statement to prove that sound is a changing thing is, "Anything put forth as the reason in a logical statement to prove that sound is changing." The definition of the reason in a logical statement where a thing which is made is used as a reason in a logical statement to prove that sound is changing is, "Anything put forth as the reason in a logical statement where a thing which is made is used as a reason in a logical statement to prove that sound is changing." This same pattern applies to all other cases as well.

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The forms of debate:
**The motivation for debating,
and how to begin a debate**

Monks in a monastery such as Sera Mey Tibetan Monastery in south India follow a rigorous schedule of debate. At around age twelve, young monks begin to study formal logic (*takrik*) and the basic related topics (*dura*) with their house teacher. By age fifteen, if their progress is satisfactory, they are allowed to enter the debate courtyard and participate in the debates.

At Sera Mey, debates are held twice a day on every other day, once in the morning and once at night. On the remaining days, with the exception of Tuesday (which is market day), debating is held only at night, so that monks can attend extra classes with their scripture teachers in the morning.

Debate is an incredibly powerful tool for reviewing and digging deeper into the subjects learned during classes each day. During a typical day, a monk will spend the early morning in prayers at the assembly hall, and then go home to memorize scripture in his room. Later in the morning he attends either debate or his regular classes. This is followed by a break for lunch, a rest, and personal study. The afternoon is spent in two or three classes with five to twenty other students, in the room of a scripture master.

After an evening meal, monks study on their own. Around six o'clock, a gong called a *ka-nga* (sky-drum) is beat from atop the main temple of the monastery. This is the call to the debate courtyard. The beat begins slow, and then speeds up to a quick pulse. By the time it reaches its crescendo, all monks are expected to be ready in the courtyard, sitting in rows around the platform and throne (called a *shuktri*) where the great debates are centered.

No books are allowed in the debate courtyard; the feeling as you sit in your room and hear the gong beaten is that you will be completely naked, and armed only with your own knowledge. You straighten your robes, grab your monk's shawl and your rosary, and slip a small Tibetan rug under your arm. This carpet will keep your bottom warm through the many hours ahead, exposed to the night, sitting on the flagstones of the courtyard. Until recently, the debate courtyards in south India had no electricity; it still fails frequently, and some of the most pleasant hours of a monk's day are spent out on the courtyard, under the stars, in the sound of the debates and a soft wind blowing past.

The debate master, known as the *giku*, supervises the debates, walking around the courtyard answering questions, urging the debaters on, and enforcing discipline with an occasional hearty swing of his rosary. He is normally a

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senior *geshe*, and serves as vice-abbot of the entire monastery, representing the abbot whenever he is unable to attend a function.

A senior student in the debate courtyard, one with a good voice and memory, begins to recite the *kurim* (*sku-rim*), or opening prayers. No debate session is begun without at least a brief version of the opening prayers. This is a time for every monk to sit quietly, chanting and reviewing his motivation for the debates. It is considered extremely important to think carefully during these prayers, and to remove any emotions of competitiveness or pride for the coming debates. We debate so that we can help the others around us, and to examine what we believe, so that we can become enlightened more quickly, and therefore be of ultimate help to all living beings.

Once a week, an extensive evening *kurim* is held. The entire nighttime debating session is devoted to prayers for the benefit of beings, for everyone's successful practice of the Dharma, for proper motivation, and to prevent obstacles. Here is a list of the prayers that are currently recited in the extensive *kurim*; a few of the items have changed from the days in Tibet:

- 1) The Extensive Verses on Going for Refuge and Thinking about the Wish for Enlightenment

སྐབས་འགྲོ་སེམས་བསྐྱེད་རྒྱས་པ།

- 2) The *Thousand Angels of the Heaven of Bliss* (*Ganden Hlagyama*)

དགའ་ལྷན་ལྷ་བརྒྱ་མ།

- 3) Three repetitions of the *Lady of Liberation* (*Drolma*, or *Tara*) from *Potala*

པོ་ཏ་ལ་ཡི་སྒྲོལ་མ།

- 4) *Reverence to the Goddess, a Praise of the Lady of Liberation*

ལྷ་མོ་ལ་གྲུས།

- 5) The *Twenty-One for the Holy and Realized Being, the Lady of Liberation*; twenty-one verses of praise to the twenty-one forms of Tara, consisting of twenty-one prostrations and recited twenty-one times

སྒྲོལ་མ་ཉིས་གཅིག་

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- 6) The *Prayer of the Holy and Conquering Angel, Verses in Praise of the Lady of Liberation*; this is sometimes alternated with another praise of Tara, *The Glorious Queen of the Divine*

ཇི་བཙུན་བཙུམ་ལྷན་མ།

ལེགས་བྱིས་དཔལ་མ།

- 7) The *Prayer of the Angel of the White Parasol (Dukkar, or Sita Tapatra)*

གདུགས་དཀར།

- 8) The *Seventy Million Victors, in Praise of the Angel of the White Parasol*

ཐུལ་བ་བྱ་བ།

- 9) Three repetitions of the *Essence of Wisdom ("Heart Sutra")* —this can be done either in a very quick version, or in a very slow version to a beautiful tune; on special occasions, 17 of the quicker version and one of the slow are done

ཤེས་རབ་སྣང་པོ།

- 10) The *Prayer of the Angel with the Face of a Lion (Senggey Dongchen, Simha Mukhi), for Preventing Every Obstacle*

སིང་གདོང་མ།

- 11) The *Tree of Sandalwood, a Prayer to the Wishing Jewel, the White Protector (Gunkar Yishin Norbu, Sita Chintamani Mahakala)*

ཙན་དན་ལྷོན་ཤིང་།

- 12) The *Servant of Gentle Voice (Manjushri)*

འཇམ་དཔལ་བཀའ་ཉན།

- 13) The *Powerful One from the Burial Ground of Maru, a Prayer to the Protector Known as Chamsing*; Chamsing is an early major protector for Sera Mey Monastery, and is shared with other monasteries

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དབང་ལྷན་མ་རུ།

Please note! The protectors mentioned here have nothing to do with the object of the current protector controversy.

- 14) *The Palace Built of Bliss, a Prayer to the Protector Known as Taok*; Taok is a unique protector who watches over Sera Mey, and who appeared after Chamsing

རང་བཞིན་བདེ་བ།

- 15) *The Blaze of the Teachings, a Prayer that the Teachings of the Buddha Remain Strong in our World*

བསྐྱེད་འབར་མ།

- 16) A variety of different verses of auspiciousness

བཀྲ་ཤིས་ཚིག་བཅད།

On other days, a different *kurim* is done in the morning and the evening. The following is a typical morning *kurim*:

- 1) Three repetitions of the *Essence of Wisdom* ("Heart Sutra")

ཤེས་རབ་སྣང་པོ།

- 2) *A Supplication to the Lamas of the Lineage of the Debate Tradition*, which is "updated" by the great lamas of subsequent generations to include the great figures of the Sera Mey debate tradition; when His Holiness the Dalai Lama appointed our root Lama, Khen Rinpoche Geshe Lobsang Tharchin, to be abbot of Sera Mey, he told Rinpoche: "Oh, I really wanted to get your name into the lineage!"

ཚེས་ལྷ་སྒྲ་བརྒྱད།

The *kurim* in the evening of the same day would be as follows:

- 1) *A Supplication to an Eminent Lama of the Debate Tradition of Sera Mey, Kedrup Tenpa Dargye*

མཁས་གྲུབ་བསྟན་པ་དང་རྒྱས་ལ་གསོལ་འདེབས།

2) *Chanting the Names of Gentle Voice (Manjushri)*

འཇམ་དཔལ་མཚན་བརྗོད།

3) *Chanting the Longer Incantation of the Woman of Total Victory (Namgyalma, or Vijayi);* this prayer is used for both protection and for a long and healthy life

རྣམ་རྒྱལ་མའི་གཟུངས་རིང་།

4) A single recitation of the *Essence of Wisdom ("Heart Sutra")*

After the *kurim* is completed, the monks break out in a kind of victory cheer using the sound *dhi!*—the root syllable of Gentle Voice, the embodiment of the Buddha's intellect and wisdom—to celebrate the beginning of another debate session. Each monk then stands up and mills around the debate courtyard, looking for another monk with whom to debate one-on-one. This is an opportunity for monks from different classes (like freshmen and sophomores in high school) to challenge each other.

Since each class is debating a completely different subject, this is an excellent time for the older monks to review what they have already learned, by choosing a partner from one of the lower classes. The younger monk, in turn, has a chance either to go through his class's current topic with a more experienced debater, or to hear a little bit about a topic which he will have to debate in the coming years.

The two monks decide on who will be the attacker, and who the defender. The defender throws his carpet down on the flagstones, often near a wall where he can lean, and seats himself. The attacker stands facing his opponent, thinking furiously of a subject from which to begin. He then unfolds part of his monk's shawl and drapes it over his left shoulder from the back, a sign of respect that has been followed since the time of Lord Buddha.

The attacker bows close to his opponent's face and claps his hands, simultaneously whispering, *Dhi jitar chuchen!*—which means: "*Dhi!* So what do you think about this one?" He begins the debate then normally by making a statement which is false, to see if his opponent can disprove him. A typical statement of this kind might be, "There is no logical reason why Lord Buddha repeated himself in the *Heart Sutra*, where he says 'Well done! Well done!'"

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This naturally becomes the starting point of a heated argument, which might last for hours.

The attacker in the debate will accompany his salvos with vigorous body language like stamping and clapping, as well as shouts and taunts. None of this is meant in a competitive or insulting way, but only as a way of breaking the concentration of the opponent. Monks trained in the debate courtyard thereby learn to concentrate deeply, and to stay free of distraction even with hundreds of screaming debaters all around them. This will be a great asset to them when they must sit in their rooms and think out difficult texts, or as they answer future students in different parts of the world, as they present their objections or difficult questions on specific points in the Buddha's teachings.

After about an hour or so, the debate master walks through the midst of the debaters, waving the end of his monk's shawl. This is a sign for the various classes to group together for the second stage of the debates; all the monks studying Middle-Way philosophy, for example, move quickly (for fear of the debate master's rosary) to sit together in a particular corner of the debate ground.

Here the monks of each class sit in two groups facing each other, with a narrow corridor left between the two groups. The groups themselves form into rows, perhaps three or four deep in a larger class, so that every monk can watch the debate. Each class has a class leader, known as a *kyorpon* (or "recitation leader"), who is chosen in the first year that the class is formed, and who will serve in his position until the members of the class take their geshe examinations some 18 years later.

Each member of the class throws his rosary into a pile on the flagstones in the open space between the two groups of monks. The class leader picks all the rosaries up in his hands, and tosses the whole bunch into the air. He closes his eyes and grabs one of the rosaries as the bunch falls to the ground. The owner of this rosary will be the defender in the first debate of the session. This process is repeated for the attacker, and usually for an "assistant" defender. Monks who enjoy debate bring huge, long rosaries to the courtyard, and the lazy ones buy a tiny one.

The two defenders seat themselves on their mats at the head of the corridor between the two groups of monks, and the attacker comes and stands within the corridor. He begins a debate as before. After a few minutes, any monk who has a good idea to bring up might start to yell it at the defenders as well, and will often stand up and push his way past the original attacker. Within about a half an hour, a whole group of attackers may be pushing and shoving to get to the front and scream their question at the defenders. This part can

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be very physical, but it is extremely rare to see anyone in the debate courtyard actually lose their temper.

The tempo of a debate is very fast, with heavy philosophical concepts flying by in a clipped mixture of modern slang and ancient literary Tibetan. The audience has to listen carefully to follow where the debaters are running. It takes only a few minutes to tear through a difficult concept in a way so thorough that it could never be accomplished even in hours of classroom time or reading in one's room. There is probably no more powerful tool for learning the great ideas of Buddhism.

Selecting a topic, and maintaining a good motivation, are the two keys in getting the most out of the wonderful opportunity of a debate. An experienced debater, like any good Buddhist, learns to bring up the difficult points that he or she is unsure of—it is less comfortable than debating what you already understand clearly, but within a few minutes you will have deep insights into your question that you could never come up with on your own. Most nighttime debates last for four or five hours, and it is not unusual for a class to get engrossed and go on for most of the night. The level of understanding which monks reach this way is extraordinary.

It is important to give up any feeling of being self-conscious or embarrassed about debating. Say what you think, and say it with power! If you're wrong, you'll learn something new, and you can only be the better for it. Remember that your whole motivation is to become enlightened as quickly as you can, and be able to lead others to the paradise of enlightenment too. For this you will have to know your stuff well—you will have to know what you believe, and know why you believe it, and be able to express it clearly and defend it, especially in a country where Buddhism is just beginning.

It is essential for American Buddhists to believe in the Dharma only when it makes perfect sense to them, and not because of blind faith or tradition. Only then will the Dharma take strong root in this country, and only then will millions be able to follow it, and reach the goal of deathless bliss. You will have no trouble debating if you remember this—you are debating to save the lives of others.

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Reading Two: An Outline of All Existing Things

Selection from the collected topics:
An Outline of All Existing Things

The selection here is from the monastic textbook entitled An Explanation of the Science of Logic, included in the Advanced Path of Reasoning, a Section from the "Key to the Logic Machine," a Presentation of the Collected Topics which Clarifies the Meaning of the Great Scriptures on Valid Perception (Tsad-ma'i gzhung-don 'byed-pa'i bsdus-grva'i nam-par bshad-pa rigs-lam 'phrul gyi lde'u-mig las rigs-lam che-ba rtags-rigs kyi skor). The text was written by Purbuchok Jampa Tsultrim Gyatso (1825-1901), who in his day held the position of Tutor to the Dalai Lama.

Please note that indented statements are those made by the opponent. The logical statements in brackets are understood responses that are often left out of the text.

༥ །གཉིས་པ་གཞི་བྱུང་གི་རྣམ་བཞག་བཤད་པ་ལ། དགག་བཞག་སྔོང་གསུམ་ལས།

Here is the second section, an outline of existence. Here we will refute the position of our opponents, present our own position, and then finally disprove their rebuttal.

དང་པོ་ལ། ཁ་ཅིག་ན་རེ། གཞི་བྱུང་ན། རྟག་པ་ཡིན་པས་བྱུང་བ་ཟེར་ན།

Here is the first. Suppose someone comes and makes the following claim:

If a thing can be established as existing, then it is necessarily an unchanging thing.

བུམ་པ་ཚེས་ཅན། དྲག་པ་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ། གཞི་གྲུབ་པའི་ཕྱིར། བྱུང་པ་ཁས།

Consider then a water pitcher.
So is it an unchanging thing?
Because it can be established as existing.

[It doesn't necessarily follow.]

But you already agreed that it does necessarily follow.

མ་གྲུབ་ན། དེ་ཚེས་ཅན། དེར་ཐལ། ཚད་མས་གྲུབ་པ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར། བྱུང་སྟེ།
ཚད་མས་གྲུབ་པ། གཞི་གྲུབ་ཀྱི་མཚན་ཉིད་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[It's not correct to say a water pitcher can be established as existing.]

Suppose you say that it's not correct [to say that a water pitcher can be established as existing].
It is so [something that can be established as existing],
Because it is established through a valid perception.

[It doesn't necessarily follow.]

It does necessarily follow,
Because "that which is established through a valid perception" is the definition
of a thing which can be established as existing.

རྩ་བར་འདོད་ན། བུམ་པ་ཚེས་ཅན། དྲག་པ་མ་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ། མི་དྲག་པ་ཡིན་པའི་
ཕྱིར།

[Then I agree to your original statement: the water pitcher is an unchanging thing.]

Suppose you agree to our original statement, [that a water pitcher is an unchanging thing].
Consider the water pitcher.
It isn't so, that it's something unchanging;
Because it's a thing that changes.

མ་གྲུབ་ན། དེ་ཚེས་ཅན། དེར་ཐལ། སྐད་ཅིག་མ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

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[It's not correct to say it's a thing that changes.]

Suppose you say that it's not correct [to say that it's a thing that changes].

Consider this same thing.

It is so [something which changes],

Because it's something that lasts only for a moment.

བྱུང་སྟེ། གླུང་ཅིག་མ། མི་དྲག་པའི་མཆན་ཉིད་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[It doesn't necessarily follow.]

It does necessarily follow,

Because "anything that lasts only for a moment" is the definition of a changing thing.

དེར་ཐལ། དོན་བྱུང་རྣམ་པ། དངོས་པོའི་མཆན་ཉིད། འཇིག་པ། འདུས་བྱས་ཀྱི་
མཆན་ཉིད། གླིས་པ། བྱས་པའི་མཆན་ཉིད་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[It's not true that this is the definition of a changing thing.]

It is so the definition of a changing thing,

Because "anything that performs a function" is the definition of a working thing; "anything that stops" is the definition of a produced thing, and "anything that starts" is the definition of a made thing.

ཁ་ཅིག་ན་རེ། ཡོད་པ་ཡིན་ན། དངོས་པོ་ཡིན་པས་བྱུང་ཟེར་ན།

Suppose someone comes and makes the following claim:

If a thing is something which exists,

Then it must always be a working thing.

འདུས་མ་བྱས་ཀྱི་ནམ་མཁའ་ཆོས་ཅན། དེར་ཐལ། དེའི་ཕྱིར། བྱུང་པ་ཁས།

Consider empty space, the space which is unproduced.

So is it then [a working thing]?

Because it is [something which exists].

[It doesn't necessarily follow.]

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But you already agreed that it does necessarily follow.

མ་གྲུབ་ན། དེ་ཚེས་ཅན། དེར་ཐལ། ཚད་མས་དམིགས་པ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[It's not correct to say that it's something which exists.]

Suppose you say that it's not correct [to say that it is something which exists].
Consider this same thing.

It is so [something which exists],

Because it can be established as existing through a valid perception.

མ་གྲུབ་ན། དེ་ལ་གྲུབ་པ་ཡོད་པར་ཐལ། ཚད་མས་དམིགས་པ། ཡོད་པའི་མཚན་
ཉིད་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[It doesn't necessarily follow.]

It does so [necessarily follow,]

Because "anything which can be perceived through a valid perception" is the
definition of an existing thing.

རྩ་བར་འདོད་ན། དེ་ཚེས་ཅན། དངོས་པོ་མ་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ། དངོས་མེད་ཡིན་པའི་
ཕྱིར།

[Then I agree to your original statement: empty space is a working
thing.]

Suppose you agree to our original statement.

Consider this same thing.

Isn't it so, that it is not a working thing?

Because it is a thing which has no work.

མ་གྲུབ་ན། དེ་ཚེས་ཅན། དེར་ཐལ། དོན་བྱེད་རྒྱས་སྟོང་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

Suppose you say that it's not correct [to say that it is a thing which has no
work].

Consider this same thing.

It is so [a thing which has no work],

Because it is void of the quality of performing a function.

ཁྱབ་སྒྲི། དོན་བྱེད་ནུས་སྟོང་དངོས་མེད་ཀྱི་མཚན་ཉིད། མི་འཇིག་པ་འདུས་མ་བྱས་
ཀྱི་མཚན་ཉིད། མ་སྐྱེས་པ། མ་བྱས་པའི་མཚན་ཉིད་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[It doesn't necessarily follow.]

It does necessarily follow,

Because "anything which is void of the quality of performing a function" is the definition of a thing which has no work; and "anything which never stops" is the definition of a thing which was not produced; and "anything which never starts" is the definition of a thing which was not made.

ཁ་ཅིག་ན་རེ། ཤེས་བྱ་ཡིན་ན། ཡིན་པ་སྲིད་པའི་ཤེས་བྱ་ཡིན་པས་ཁྱབ་ཟེར་ན།

Suppose someone comes and makes the following claim:

Knowable things must always be knowable things which can be.

ཀ་བྱུ་མ་གཉིས་ཚས་ཅན། དེར་ཐལ། དེའི་ཕྱིར།

Consider the two of a pillar and a water pitcher.

So are they [a knowable thing which can be]?

Because they are [knowable things].

མ་ཁྱབ་ན། དེ་ཚས་ཅན། དེར་ཐལ། ཡོད་པ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[It's not correct to say that they are knowable things.]

Suppose you say that it's not correct [to say that they are knowable things].

They are so [knowable things],

Because they are things which exist.

ཁྱབ་སྒྲི། ཤེས་བྱ། ཡོད་པ། གཞལ་བྱ། གཞི་བྱུ་རྣམས་དོན་གཅིག་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[It doesn't necessarily follow.]

It does necessarily follow,

Because "knowable thing," "something which exists," "something which can be apprehended," and "something which can be established as existing" are all different names for the same thing.

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ཕྱ་བར་འདོད་ན། དེ་ཆོས་ཅན། ཡིན་པ་སྲིད་པའི་ཤེས་བྱ་མ་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ། ཡིན་པ་
མི་སྲིད་པའི་ཤེས་བྱ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[Then I agree to your original statement: the two of a pillar and a water pitcher are a knowable thing which can be.]

Suppose you agree to our original statement.
Consider these same things.
It isn't so, that they are a knowable thing which can be,
Because they are knowable things which cannot be.

མ་གྲུབ་ན། དེ་ཆོས་ཅན། དེར་ཐལ། ཤེས་བྱ་ཡིན་པ་གང་ཞིག་བྱོད་ཀྱི་ཡིན་པ་མེད་
པའི་ཕྱིར།

[It's not correct to say that they are knowable things which cannot be.]

Suppose you say that it's not correct [to say they are knowable things which cannot be].
Consider these same things.
They are so [knowable things which cannot be],
Because (1) they are knowable things and (2) there doesn't exist a thing which is them.

གཉིས་པ་སྒྲ། དང་པོ་མ་གྲུབ་ན། དེ་ཆོས་ཅན། ཤེས་བྱ་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ། གཅིག་དང་
ཐ་དད་གང་རུང་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

The second point we just mentioned is easy to accept; now suppose you say that the first is not correct.
Consider these same things.
They are so [knowable things],
Because they are either one thing, or separate things, or both one thing and separate things.

མ་གྲུབ་ན། དེ་ཆོས་ཅན། དེར་ཐལ། ཐ་དད་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[It's not correct to say that they are either one thing, or separate things, or both one thing and separate things.]

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Suppose you say that it's not correct [to say that they are either one thing, or separate things, or both one thing and separate things].

Consider these same things.

They are so [either one thing, or separate things, or both one thing and separate things,]

Because they are separate things.

མ་གྲུབ་ན། དེ་ཆོས་ཅན། དེར་ཐལ། ཕན་ཚུན་ཐ་དད་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[It's not correct to say that they are separate things.]

Suppose you say that it's not correct [to say that they are separate things].

Consider these same things.

They are so [separate things],

Because they are separate in such a way that to be one always means that you cannot be the other.

མ་གྲུབ་ན། ཀ་བྱམ་གཉིས་ཕན་ཚུན་ཐ་དད་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ། ཀ་བ་བྱམ་པ་དང་ཐ་དད།

བྱམ་པ་ཀ་བ་དང་ཐ་དད་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[It's not correct to say that they are separate in a way that to be one always means that you cannot be the other.]

Suppose you say that it's not correct [to say that they are separate in such a way that to be one always means that you cannot be the other].

It is so true, that the two of a pillar and a water pitcher are separate in such a way that to be one always means that you cannot be the other,

Because to be a pillar is not to be a water pitcher, and to be a water pitcher is not to be a pillar.

དང་པོ་མ་གྲུབ་ན། ཀ་བ་ཆོས་ཅན། བྱམ་པ་དང་ཐ་དད་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ། ཡོད་པ་གང་

ཞིག་བྱམ་པ་དང་གཅིག་མ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[It's not correct to say that to be a pillar is not to be a water pitcher.]

Suppose you say that it's not correct to say the first, [that to be a pillar is not to be a water pitcher.]

Consider a pillar.

It is so true, that to be it is not to be a water pitcher,

Because (1) it exists and (2) it is not automatically a water pitcher.

ཁ་ཅིག་ན་རེ། ཡོད་པ་ཡིན་ན། ཡིན་པ་མི་སྲིད་པའི་ཡོད་པ་ཡིན་པས་བྱུང་བ་ཟེར་ན།

Suppose someone comes and makes the following claim:

If something exists,
It must always be something which exists and which cannot be.

དངོས་པོ་ཆོས་ཅན། དེར་ཐལ། དེའི་ཕྱིར། བྱུང་པ་ཁས།

Consider a working thing.
So is it then something which exists and which cannot be?
Because it is [a thing which exists].

[It doesn't necessarily follow.]

But you already agreed that it does necessarily follow.

མ་གྲུབ་ན། དེ་ཆོས་ཅན། དེར་ཐལ། ཉམ་དངོས་གང་རུང་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར་ཏེ། དངོས་
པོ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[It's not correct to say that a working thing is a thing which exists.]

Suppose you say that it's not correct [to say that a working thing is a thing
which exists].

Consider this same thing.
It is so [a thing which exists],
Because it's either an unchanging thing, a working thing, or both;
Because it's a working thing.

རྩ་བར་འདོད་ན། དེ་ཆོས་ཅན། ཡིན་པ་མི་སྲིད་པའི་ཡོད་པ་མ་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ། ཡིན་
པ་སྲིད་པའི་ཡོད་པ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[Then I agree to your original statement: a working thing is something
which exists and which cannot be.]

Suppose you agree to our original statement.
Consider this same thing.
It isn't so, that it's something which exists and which cannot be,
Because it's something which exists and which can be.

མ་གྲུབ་ན། དེ་ཚེས་ཅན། དེར་ཐལ། ཡོད་པ་གང་ཞིག་བཅའཤེས་ལྡན་མིན་འདུ་བྱེད་
གསུམ་སྟོད་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[It's not correct to say that it's something which exists and which can be.]

Suppose you say that it's not correct [to say that it's something which exists and which can be].

Consider this same thing.

It is so [something which exists and which can be],

Because (1) it is something which exists; and (2) the three of matter, mind, and those active things which are neither mind nor matter are all things which are different kinds of it.

ཕྱི་མ་མ་གྲུབ་ན། བཅའཤེས་ལྡན་མིན་འདུ་བྱེད་གསུམ་ཚེས་ཅན། དངོས་པོ་ཡིན་པར་
ཐལ། ཡོད་པ་གང་ཞིག་དྲག་པ་མ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[It's not correct to make the latter statement: that the three of matter, mind, and those active things which are neither mind nor matter are all things which are different kinds of working things.]

Suppose you say that it's not correct to make the latter statement: [the statement that the three of matter, mind, and those active things which are neither mind nor matter are all things which are different kinds of working things].

Consider the three of matter, mind, and those active things which are neither mind nor matter.

They are so working things,

Because they are (1) things which exist and (2) are not things which are unchanging.

ཁ་ཅིག་ན་རེ། དངོས་པོ་མ་ཡིན་ན། དྲག་པ་ཡིན་པས་སྟབ་ཟེར་ན།

Suppose someone comes and makes the following claim:

If something is not a working thing, it must always be an unchanging thing.

རི་བོང་རྩ་ཚེས་ཅན། དེར་ཐལ། དེའི་ཕྱིར། བྱུང་པ་ཁས།

Consider a rabbit's horns.
So are they [an unchanging thing]?
Because they are [something which is not a working thing].

[It doesn't necessarily follow.]

But you already agreed that it does necessarily follow.

མ་གྲུབ་ན། དེ་ཚེས་ཅན། དེར་ཐལ། ཏྲག་དངོས་གང་རུང་མ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[It's not correct to say that a rabbit's horns are not a working thing.]

Suppose you say that it's not correct [that a rabbit's horns are not a working thing.]

Consider this same thing.
They are so [not a working thing],
Because they are neither an unchanging thing, nor a working thing, nor both.

མ་གྲུབ་ན། དེ་ཚེས་ཅན། དེར་ཐལ། ཡོད་པ་མ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[It's not correct to say that they are neither an unchanging thing, nor a working thing, nor both.]

Suppose you say that it's not correct [to say that they are neither an unchanging thing, nor a working thing, nor both].

Consider this same thing.
They are so [neither an unchanging thing, nor a working thing, nor both].
Because they are not something which exists.

མ་གྲུབ་ན། དེ་ཚེས་ཅན། དེར་ཐལ། མེད་པ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[It's not correct to say that they are not something which exists.]

Suppose you say that it's not correct [to say that they are not something which exists].

Consider this same thing.
They are so [not something which exists],
Because they are something which does not exist.

མ་གྲུབ་ན། དེ་ཚེས་ཅན། དེར་ཐལ། ཚད་མས་མ་གྲུབ་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[It's not correct to say they are something which does not exist.]

Suppose you say that it's not correct [to say that they are something which does not exist].

They are so [something which does not exist],

Because their existence cannot be established by a valid perception.

རྩ་བར་འདོད་ན། དེ་ཚེས་ཅན། དྲག་པ་མ་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ། ཡོད་པ་མ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[Then I agree to your original statement: a rabbit's horns are an unchanging thing.]

Suppose you agree to our original statement, [that a rabbit's horns are an unchanging thing.]

Consider this same thing.

It's not so, that they are an unchanging thing,

Because they are not something which exists.

མ་གྲུབ་ན། དེ་ཚེས་ཅན། དེར་ཐལ། བྱེད་གྱི་ངོ་བོ་མེད་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[It's not correct to say that they are not something which exists.]

Suppose you say that it's not correct [to say that they are not something which exists.]

Consider this same thing.

They are so [not something which exists],

Because they have no existing nature.

མ་གྲུབ་ན། དེ་ཚེས་ཅན། དེར་ཐལ། རང་གི་ངོ་བོ་འཛིན་པ་མ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[It's not correct to say that a rabbit's horns have no existing nature.]

Suppose you say that it's not correct [to say that a rabbit's horns have no existing nature].

Consider this same thing.

They are so [something that has no existing nature],

Because they are not something which holds any existing nature.

མ་གྲུབ་ན། དེ་ཚེས་ཅན། དེར་ཐལ། ཚེས་མ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

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[It's not correct to say that a rabbit's horns are not something which holds any existing nature.]

Suppose you say that it's not correct [to say that a rabbit's horns are not something which holds any existing nature].

Consider this same thing.

They are so [not something which holds any existing nature],

Because they are not a thing (a *dharma*).

ཁྱེད་ཀྱི་རང་གི་ངོ་བོ་ལ་འཛིན་པ། ཆོས་ཀྱི་མཚན་ཉིད་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[It doesn't necessarily follow.]

But it does necessarily follow, because "anything which holds an existing nature" is the definition of a "thing" (or *dharma*).

[This definition by the way reflects an etymological explanation in the Sanskrit, since the verbal root for "to hold" is *dhṛ*, which is also the root for *dharma*.]

ཁ་ཅིག་ན་རེ། ཆོས་ཡིན་ན། དགག་གཞི་ཅན་གྱི་ཆོས་མ་ཡིན་པས་སྟབས་ཅེར་ན།

Suppose someone comes and makes the following claim:

If something is a thing, it can never be a thing which is such that there is a place where it doesn't exist.

གུམ་པ་ཆོས་ཅན། དེར་ཐལ། དེའི་ཕྱིར། སྟབས་པ་ཁས།

Consider a water pitcher.

So is it then [not a thing which is such that there is a place where it doesn't exist]?

Because it is [a thing].

[It doesn't necessarily follow.]

But you already agreed that it does necessarily follow.

མ་གྲུབ་ན། དེ་ཆོས་ཅན། དེར་ཐལ། འདུས་བྱས་གྱི་ཆོས་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

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[It's not correct to say that a water pitcher is a thing.]

Suppose you say that it's not correct [to say that a water pitcher is a thing].
Consider this same thing.

It is so [a thing],
Because it is a thing which is produced.

མ་གྲུབ་ན། དེ་ཚོས་ཅན། དེར་ཐལ། དངོས་པོ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[It's not correct to say that a water pitcher is a thing which is produced.]

Suppose you say that it's not correct [to say that a water pitcher is a thing
which is produced].

It is so [a thing which is produced],
Because it is a working thing.

མ་གྲུབ་ན། དེ་ཚོས་ཅན། དེར་ཐལ། དོན་བྱེད་རྒྱས་པ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[It's not correct to say that a water pitcher is a working thing.]

Suppose you say that it's not correct [to say that a water pitcher is a working
thing].

It is so [a working thing],
Because it is a thing which performs a function.

མ་གྲུབ་ན། དེ་ཚོས་ཅན། དེར་ཐལ། ལྗོ་ལྗིར་ཞབས་ཞུམ་ཐུ་སྐྱོར་གྱི་དོན་བྱེད་རྒྱས་པ་
ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[It's not correct to say that a water pitcher is a thing which performs a
function.]

Suppose you say that it's not correct [to say that a water pitcher is a thing
which performs a function].

It is so [a thing which performs a function],
Because it is an object with a rounded body and a supporting base which
performs the function of holding water.

དེར་ཐལ། བུམ་པ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[It's not correct to say that a water pitcher is an object with a rounded
body and a supporting base which performs the function of
holding water.]

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It is so [an object with a rounded body and a supporting base which performs the function of holding water],
Because it's a water pitcher.

བྱུང་སྟེ། དེ་བུམ་པའི་མཚན་ཉིད་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[It doesn't necessarily follow.]

But it does necessarily follow, because that is the classical definition of a water pitcher.

རྩ་བར་འདོད་ན། དེ་ཚེས་ཅན། དགག་གཞི་ཅན་གྱི་ཚེས་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ། བྱེད་གྱི་
དགག་གཞི་ཡོད་པ་གང་ཞིག་བྱེད་ཚེས་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[Then I agree with your original statement: a water pitcher is not a thing which is such that there is a place where it doesn't exist.]

Suppose you agree with our original statement, [that a water pitcher is not a thing which is such that there is a place where it doesn't exist.]

It is so [a thing which is such that there is a place where it doesn't exist],
Because (1) there does exist a place where it doesn't exist, and (2) it is a thing.

གཉིས་པ་སྟེ། དང་པོ་མ་གྲུབ་ན། བུམ་པའི་དགག་གཞི་ཡོད་པར་ཐལ། བུམ་པ་མེད་
པའི་ས་ཕྱོགས་ཡོད་པའི་ཕྱིར།

The second point we just mentioned is easy to accept; now suppose you say that the first is not correct.

It is so true [that there exists a place where a water pitcher doesn't exist],
Because there exists a location where there is no water pitcher.

མ་གྲུབ་ན། དེར་ཐལ། བདག་མེད་ཡིན་ན། བུམ་པ་ཡོད་པས་མ་གྲུབ་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[It's not correct to say that there is a location where there is no water pitcher.]

Suppose you say that it's not correct [to say that there is a location where there is no water pitcher].

It is so true [that there is a location where there is no water pitcher],
Because if any particular thing is such that it has no self-nature, then it is not always the case that a water pitcher has to be there.

ཁ་ཅིག་ན་རེ། རང་མཚན་ཡིན་ན། ཤེས་པ་ཡིན་པས་བྱུང་བེད་ན།

Someone may come and make the following claim:

If something is a thing which exists in and of itself, then it must always be mental.

བེམ་ཤེས་གཉིས་ཆོས་ཅན། དེར་ཐལ། དེའི་ཕྱིར། བྱུང་པ་ཁས།

Consider the two of matter and mind.

So are they then [something mental]?

Because they are [things which exist in and of themselves].

མ་གྲུབ་ན། དེ་ཆོས་ཅན། དེར་ཐལ། མངོན་སུམ་གྱི་སྒྲུང་དོར་གྲུབ་པ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[It's not correct to say that the two of matter and mind are things which exist in and of themselves.]

Suppose you say that it's not correct [to say that the two of matter and mind are things which exist in and of themselves].

Consider these same things.

They are so [things which exist in and of themselves],

Because they can be established as existing to the state of mind of direct, valid perception.

མ་གྲུབ་ན། དེ་ཆོས་ཅན། དེར་ཐལ། མངོན་སུམ་གྱི་སྒྲུང་ཡུལ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[It's not correct to say that the two of matter and mind can be established as existing to the state of mind of a direct, valid perception.]

Suppose you say that it's not correct [to say that the two of matter and mind can be established as existing to the state of mind of a direct, valid perception.]

Consider these same things.

They can so [be established as existing to the state of mind of a direct, valid perception],

Because they are objects which present themselves to direct, valid perception.

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མ་གྲུབ་ན། དེ་ཚོས་ཅན། དེར་ཐལ། དངོས་པོ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[It's not correct to say that they are objects which present themselves to direct, valid perception.]

Suppose you say that it's not correct [to say that they are objects which present themselves to direct, valid perception.]

They are so [objects which present themselves to direct, valid perception],
Because they are working things.

བྱུང་སྟེ། མངོན་སུམ་གྱི་སྒྲུང་ཡུལ་དང་། དངོས་པོ་དོན་གཅིག་ །རྟོག་པའི་སྒྲུང་
ཡུལ་དང་། རྟོག་པ་དོན་གཅིག་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[It doesn't necessarily follow.]

But it does necessarily follow, because the terms "object which presents itself to direct, valid perception" and "working thing" are synonyms. And the terms "object which presents itself to conceptual thought" and "unchanging thing" are also synonyms.

རྩ་བར་འདོད་ན། དེ་ཚོས་ཅན། ཤེས་པ་མ་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ། ལྷན་མིན་འདུ་བྱེད་ཡིན་
པའི་ཕྱིར།

[Then I agree with your original statement: the two of matter and mind are something mental.]

Suppose you agree with our original statement, [that the two of matter and mind are something mental.]

Consider these same things.

It's not so, [that they are something mental],

Because they are active things which are neither mind nor matter.

བྱུང་སྟེ། བཅས་ཤེས་ལྷན་མིན་འདུ་བྱེད་གསུམ་པོ་ནང་པན་རྩུན་འགལ་བ་ཁོ་ན་ཡིན་
པའི་ཕྱིར།

[It doesn't necessarily follow.]

But it does necessarily follow, because these three—matter, mind, and active things which are neither mind nor matter—are always mutually exclusive.

ཁ་ཅིག་ན་རེ། གློག་གྱུར་ཡིན་ན། སྤྱི་མཚན་ཡིན་པས་བྱུང་བེད་ན།

Suppose someone comes and makes the following claim:

If something belongs to hidden reality, it must always be an idealization.

གསེར་བྱུམ་ཚེས་ཅན། དེར་ཐལ། དེའི་ཕྱིར། བྱུང་བ་ཁས།

Consider a pitcher made of gold.

So is it then [an idealization]?

Because it is [something that belongs to hidden reality].

[It doesn't necessarily follow.]

But you already agreed that it does follow.

མ་གྲུབ་ན། དེ་ཚེས་ཅན། དེར་ཐལ། རང་འཛིན་ཏོག་པས་གློག་ཏུ་གྱུར་པའི་ཚུལ་
གྱིས་ཏོགས་པར་བྱ་བ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[It's not correct to say that a pitcher made of gold belongs to hidden reality.]

Suppose you say that it's not correct [to say that a pitcher made of gold belongs to hidden reality].

Consider this same thing.

It is so [something which belongs to hidden reality],

Because it is something which can be perceived by a conceptual state of mind as something which is hidden.

བྱུང་སྟེ། དེ་དེའི་མཚན་ཉིད་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[It doesn't necessarily follow.]

But it does necessarily follow,

Because that is the definition of what it is [to be something which belongs to hidden reality].

གོང་དུ་མ་གྲུབ་ན། དེ་ཚེས་ཅན། རང་འཇིན་རྟོག་པས་སྒྲིག་དུ་གྱུར་པའི་ཚུལ་གྱིས་
རྟོགས་པར་བྱ་བ་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ། རང་འཇིན་རྟོག་པའི་གཞལ་བྱ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[Your point above is not correct: it's not correct to say that a pitcher made of gold is something which can be perceived by a conceptual state of mind as something which is hidden.]

Suppose you say that our point above is not correct; [that is, that it's not correct to say that a pitcher made of gold is something which can be perceived by a conceptual state of mind as something which is hidden].

Consider this same thing.

It is so something which can be perceived by a conceptual state of mind as something which is hidden,

Because it is something which can be apprehended by the particular conceptual state of mind which is grasping it.

མ་གྲུབ་ན། དེ་ཚེས་ཅན། དེར་ཐལ། གཞི་གྲུབ་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[It's not correct to say that a vase made of gold is something which can be apprehended by the particular conceptual state of mind which is grasping it.]

Suppose you say that it's not correct [to say that a vase made of gold is something which can be apprehended by the particular conceptual state of mind which is grasping it.]

Consider this same thing.

It is so [something which can be apprehended by the particular conceptual state of mind which is grasping it],

Because it is something which can be established as existing.

རྩ་བར་འདོད་ན། དེ་ཚེས་ཅན། སྤྱི་མཚན་མ་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ། རང་མཚན་ཡིན་པའི་
ཕྱིར།

[Then I agree with your original statement: a pitcher made of gold is an idealization.]

Suppose you agree to our original statement, [that a pitcher made of gold is an idealization].

It isn't so, [that it is an idealization],

Because it exists in and of itself.

མ་གྲུབ་ན། དེ་ཆོས་ཅན། དེར་ཐལ། དངོས་པོ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[It's not correct to say that a pitcher made of gold exists in and of itself.]

Suppose say that it's not correct [to say that a pitcher made of gold exists in and of itself.]

It does so [exist in and of itself],
Because it is a working thing.

བྱ་བ་སྟེ། དངོས་པོ། རང་མཚན། དོན་དམ་བདེན་པ་ནམས་དོན་གཅིག་ །རྟག་པ།
སྟེ་མཚན། ཀུན་རྫོབ་བདེན་པ་ནམས་དོན་གཅིག་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[It doesn't necessarily follow.]

But it does necessarily follow, because "working thing," "thing which exists in and of itself," and "thing which is ultimately real" are all different names for the same thing. And "unchanging thing," "idealization," and "thing which is deceptively real" are also all different names for the same thing.

ཁ་ཅིག་ན་རེ། མངོན་གྱར་ཡིན་ན། རྟོག་གྱར་མ་ཡིན་པས་བྱ་བ་ཟེར་ན།

Suppose someone comes and makes the following claim:

If something belongs to obvious reality, then it can never belong to hidden reality.

ཀ་བ་ཆོས་ཅན། དེར་ཐལ། དེའི་ཕྱིར།

Consider a pillar.

So is it then [something that could never belong to hidden reality]?

Because it is [something which belongs to obvious reality].

མ་གྲུབ་ན། དེ་ཆོས་ཅན། དེར་ཐལ། མངོན་སུམ་གྱི་ཆད་མས་དངོས་སུ་རྟོགས་པར་
བྱ་བ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

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[It's not correct to say that a pillar is something which belongs to obvious reality.]

Suppose you say that it's not correct [to say that a pillar is something which belongs to obvious reality].

Consider this same thing.

It is so [something which belongs to obvious reality],

Because it's a thing which can be perceived directly by direct, valid perception.

བྱུང་སྟེ། མངོན་སུམ་གྱི་ཚད་མས་དངོས་སུ་རྟོགས་པར་བྱ་བ། མངོན་གྱུར་གྱི་མཚན་
ཉིད་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[It doesn't necessarily follow.]

But it does necessarily follow, because "anything which can be perceived directly by direct, valid perception" is the definition of a thing which belongs to obvious reality.

གོང་དུ་མ་གྱུབ་ན། དེ་ཚེས་ཅན། མངོན་སུམ་གྱི་ཚད་མས་དངོས་སུ་རྟོགས་པར་བྱ་བ་
ཡིན་པར་ཐལ། དངོས་པོ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[Your point above is not correct: it's not correct to say that a pillar is a thing which can be perceived directly by direct, valid perception.]

Suppose you say that our point above is not correct; [suppose you say that a pillar is not a thing which can be perceived directly by direct, valid perception].

Consider this same thing.

It is so [a thing which can be perceived directly by direct, valid perception],

Because it is a working thing.

ཅུ་བར་འདོད་ན། དེ་ཚེས་ཅན། རྟོག་གྱུར་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ། རང་འཛིན་རྟོག་པས་རྟོག་
ཏུ་གྱུར་པའི་ཚུལ་གྱིས་རྟོགས་པར་བྱ་བ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར། རྟགས་བསྐྱབ་ཅིན།

[Then I agree with your original statement: a pillar is something that could never belong to hidden reality.]

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Suppose you agree with our original statement.
Consider this same thing.
It is so something which can belong to hidden reality,
Because it is something which can be perceived by a conceptual state of mind
as something which is hidden.
The reason has already been proven.

གཉིས་པ་རང་གི་ལུགས་ལ། གཞི་གྲུབ་ཀྱི་མཚན་ཉིད་ཡོད་དེ། ཚད་མས་གྲུབ་པ་དེ་
དེ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

Here is the second major part, where we present our own position.

There does exist a definition for "that which can be established as existing,"
Because "that which can be established by a valid perception" is the definition.

གཞི་གྲུབ་ལ་དབྱེ་ན་གཉིས་ཡོད་དེ། རྟག་པ་དང་། དངོས་པོ་གཉིས་ཡོད་པའི་ཕྱིར།

There do exist two different categories for "that which can be established as existing,"
Because there exist the categories of "unchanging things" and "working things."

རྟག་པའི་མཚན་ཉིད་ཡོད་དེ། ཆོས་དང་སྐད་ཅིག་མ་མ་ཡིན་པའི་གཞི་མཐུན་པ་དེ།
རྟག་པའི་མཚན་ཉིད་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

There does exist a definition for "unchanging thing,"
Because "one object which is both a thing and which is not such that it only
lasts for a moment" is the definition of an "unchanging thing."

རྟག་པ་ལ་དབྱེ་ན་གཉིས་ཡོད་དེ། ཡིན་པ་སྲིད་པའི་རྟག་པ་དང་། ཡིན་པ་མི་སྲིད་
པའི་རྟག་པ་གཉིས་ཡོད་པའི་ཕྱིར།

Things which are unchanging can be divided into two different types:
unchanging things which can be, and unchanging things which cannot
be.

ཡིན་པ་སྲིད་པའི་རྟག་པ་བཞག་ཏུ་ཡོད་དེ། ཤེས་བྱ་དེ་དེ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར། ཡིན་པ་མི་

སྲིད་པའི་རྟག་པ་བཞག་ཏུ་ཡོད་དེ། རྟག་དངོས་གཉིས་དེ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

There does exist something which is an unchanging thing that can be,
Because "knowable things" is it.

There does exist something which is an unchanging thing that cannot be,
Because "the two of unchanging things and changing things" is it.

དངོས་པོའི་མཚན་ཉིད་ཡོད་དེ། དོན་བྱེད་རྣམས་པ་དེ་དེ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

There does exist a definition of "working thing,"
Because "anything which performs a function" is the definition.

དངོས་པོ་ལ་དབྱེ་ན་གསུམ་ཡོད་དེ། བཅའ་ཤེས་ལྡན་མིན་འདུ་བྱེད་གསུམ་ཡོད་པའི་
ཕྱིར།

There exist three different kinds of working things, for there are the three of
matter, mind, and active things which are neither matter nor mind.

བཅའ་པོའི་མཚན་ཉིད་ཡོད་དེ། རྩལ་དུ་གྲུབ་པ་དེ་དེ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

There does exist a definition for "matter,"
Because "something made of tiny physical particles" is the definition.

བཅའ་པོ་ལ་དབྱེ་ན་གཉིས་ཡོད་དེ། ཕྱིའི་བཅའ་པོ་དང་། རང་གི་བཅའ་པོ་གཉིས་ཡོད་པའི་
ཕྱིར།

There are two different kinds of matter, for there are the two of outer physical
matter and inner physical matter.

ཕྱིའི་བཅའ་པོའི་མཚན་ཉིད་ཡོད་དེ། སྐྱེས་བུའི་རྒྱུད་ཀྱི་མ་བཟུས་པའི་རྩལ་དུ་གྲུབ་པ་དེ་
དེ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

There does exist a definition for "outer physical matter," for "something which
is made of tiny physical particles, but which is not subsumed by the awareness
of a being" is the definition.

མཚན་གཞི་ཡོད་དེ། བུམ་པ། ཀ་བ། ས་རྒྱ་མེ་རྒྱུང་བཞི་པོ་དེ་དེ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

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There do exist classical examples of outer physical matter, for a water pitcher, a pillar, and the four elements of earth, water, fire, and wind are just such examples.

ནང་གི་བཅའ་པོའི་མཚན་ཉིད་ཡོད་དེ། སྒྲིམ་བུའི་རྒྱུད་ཀྱི་བསྐྱུས་པའི་རྩལ་དུ་གྲུབ་པ་དེ་
དེ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

There does exist a definition for "inner physical matter," for "something which is made of tiny physical particles, and which is subsumed by the awareness of a being" is the definition.

མཚན་གཞི་ཡོད་དེ། ཟག་བཅས་ཉིར་ལེན་གྱི་གཟུགས་ལྷུང་དེ་དེ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

There does exist a classical example of inner physical matter, for the impure heap of physical form is just such an example.

ཤེས་པའི་མཚན་ཉིད་ཡོད་དེ། གསལ་ཞིང་རིག་པ་དེ་དེ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

There does exist a definition for "something mental," because "anything which is both invisible and aware" is the definition.

མཚན་གཞི་ཡོད་དེ། མིག་ཤེས་དེ་དེ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

There does exist a classical example of something mental, because visual consciousness is just such an example.

ལྡན་མིན་འདུ་བྱེད་ཀྱི་མཚན་ཉིད་ཡོད་དེ། བཅའ་ཤེས་གང་རུང་མ་ཡིན་པའི་འདུས་
བྱས་དེ་དེ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

There does exist a definition for an "active thing which is neither matter nor mind," because "any produced thing which is neither matter nor mind" is the definition.

མཚན་གཞི་ཡོད་དེ། དངོས་པོ་དང་། མི་རྟག་པ་དང་། རྟ་དང་བ་སྒྲང་སོགས་གང་
ཟག་རྣམས་དེ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

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There do exist classical examples of active things which are neither matter nor mind, because "working thing" and "changing thing" and persons such as horses or cattle are just such examples.

ཡང་གཞི་གྲུབ་ལ་དབྱེན། གཉིས་ཡོད་དེ། གཅིག་དང་ཐ་དད་གཉིས་ཡོད་པའི་ཕྱིར།

There does exist another way of dividing up those things which can be established as existing, because they can be divided into two, and these are the two of being either one thing or separate things.

གཅིག་གི་མཆན་ཉིད་ཡོད་དེ། སོ་སོ་བ་མ་ཡིན་པའི་ཆོས་དེ་དེ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

There does exist a definition of "being one thing," because "being a thing which is not individual things" is the definition.

མཆན་གཞི་ཡོད་དེ། ཤེས་བྱ། ཏྲག་པ། དངོས་པོ་རྣམས་རེ་རེ་ནས་དེ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

There do exist classical examples of being one, because there are the examples of "all knowable things," "all unchanging things," and "all working things"—each considered as a separate unit.

ཐ་དད་ཀྱི་མཆན་ཉིད་ཡོད་དེ། སོ་སོ་བའི་ཆོས་དེ་དེ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

There does exist a definition for "being separate things," because "being individual things" is the definition.

མཆན་གཞི་ཡོད་དེ། ཏྲག་དངོས་གཉིས། མཆན་མཆོན་གཉིས། ཀ་བུམ་གཉིས།

གསེར་བུམ་དང་ཟངས་བུམ་གཉིས་རྣམས་དེ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

There do exist classical examples of things that are separate things, because there are "the two of unchanging things and changing things," and "the two of definitions and the things they define," and "the two of a pillar and a water pitcher," and "the two of a pitcher made of gold, and a pitcher made of brass."

ཡང་ཤེས་བྱ་ལ་དབྱེན་གཉིས་སུ་ཡོད་དེ། རང་མཆན་དང་སྟེ་མཆན་གཉིས་ཡོད་པའི་
ཕྱིར།

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There does exist another way of dividing up knowable things, because they can be divided into two, and these are the two of things which exist in and of themselves, and conceptualizations.

རང་མཚན་གྱི་མཚན་ཉིད་ཡོད་དེ། སྒྲ་རྟོག་གིས་བཏགས་པ་ཙམ་མ་ཡིན་པར་རང་གི་
མཚན་ཉིད་ཀྱི་གྲུབ་པའི་ཆོས་དེ་དེ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

There does exist a definition for a "thing which exists in and of itself," because a "thing which exists of its own accord, and which is not just something made up with a name or an idea" is the definition.

སྒྲི་མཚན་གྱི་མཚན་ཉིད་ཡོད་དེ། སྒྲ་རྟོག་གིས་བཏགས་པ་ཙམ་མ་ཡིན་གྱི་རང་མཚན་དུ་
མ་གྲུབ་པ་དེ། སྒྲི་མཚན་གྱི་མཚན་ཉིད་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

There does exist a definition for a "conceptualization," because "anything which is just something that is made up with a name or an idea, and which has no existence in and of itself" is the definition of a conceptualization.

དེ་བཞིན་དུ་དོན་དམ་པར་དོན་བྱེད་ལུས་པའི་ཆོས། དོན་དམ་བདེན་པའི་མཚན་ཉིད།

Just so, the definition of a "thing which is ultimately real" is "anything which is, ultimately, able to perform a function."

དོན་དམ་པར་དོན་བྱེད་མི་ལུས་པའི་ཆོས། ཀྱན་རྫོག་བདེན་པའི་མཚན་ཉིད་ཡིན་ནོ།

The definition of a "thing which is deceptively real" is "any thing which is, ultimately, unable to perform a function."

ཚོད་པ་སྒྲོང་བ་ལ་ཁོ་ན་རེ། སྒྲོའི་ཡུལ་དུ་བྱ་རུང་། ཤེས་བྱའི་མཚན་ཉིད་མ་ཡིན་པར་
ཐལ། ཡིན་པ་སྲིད་པའི་སྒྲོའི་ཡུལ་དུ་བྱ་རུང་། ཡིན་པ་སྲིད་པའི་ཤེས་བྱའི་མཚན་ཉིད་
མ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར། ཟེར་ན་”

Here is the third major part, where we disprove any rebuttal.

Suppose someone comes and claims,

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It isn't so, that "anything which can be an object of the mind" is the definition of a "knowable thing,"

Because "anything which can be the object of a mind that can be" is not the definition of a "knowable thing that can be."

མ་ཁྱབ་སྟེ། གཞི་གྲུབ་ན་ཡིན་པ་སྟོན་པའི་སྟོན་ཡུལ་དུ་བྱ་རུང་དང་། ཡིན་པ་མི་
སྟོན་པའི་སྟོན་ཡུལ་དུ་བྱ་རུང་གཉིས་ཀ་ཡིན་པས་ཁྱབ་པའི་ཕྱིར་ཏེ། གཞི་གྲུབ་ན།
ཡིན་པ་སྟོན་པའི་རྣམ་མཁྲོན་དང་། ཡིན་པ་མི་སྟོན་པའི་རྣམ་མཁྲོན་གཉིས་ཀའི་
གཞལ་བྱ་ཡིན་པས་ཁྱབ་པའི་ཕྱིར།

But it doesn't necessarily follow,

Because if something can be established as existing, it is always both (1) something which can be the object of a mind that can be; and (2) something which can be the object of a mind that cannot be.

And this is true because anything which can be established as existing is always something which can be apprehended by both that omniscience which is, and by that omniscience which is not.

ཡང་ཁོ་ན་རེ། མི་རྟག་པ་དང་། རྟག་པའི་གཞི་མཐུན་ཡོད་པར་ཐལ། སྒྲ་མི་རྟག་པ་
དང་། རྟག་པ་གཉིས་ཀ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

Suppose another person comes, and makes another claim:

It is so, that there exists one object which is both changing and unchanging,

Because sound is both changing and unchanging.

དེར་ཐལ། སྒྲ་མི་རྟག་པ་ཡིན་པ་གང་ཞིག་རྟག་པ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར་ཟེར་ན། སྒྲ་མས་
རྟགས་མ་གྲུབ་གྱི་ལན་འདེབས་སོ།།

[It's not correct to say that sounds are both changing and unchanging.]

It is so, [that sounds are both changing and unchanging],

Because what you call "sound" is something which is both (1) changing and (2) unchanging.

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At this point you should use the following answer: "Your combined reason is not correct."

ཡང་ཁ་ཅིག་འདུས་མ་གུས་གྱི་ནམ་མཁའ་ཆོས་ཅན། དོན་དམ་བདེན་པ་ཡིན་པར་
ཐལ། མངོན་སུམ་གྱི་སྒྲུང་ངོར་གྲུབ་པ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

Someone may come and make the following claim:

Consider empty space—space which is unproduced.
So does it then belong to ultimate reality?
Because it can be established as existing to the state of mind of direct,
valid perception.

མ་གྲུབ་ན། དེ་ཆོས་ཅན། དེར་ཐལ། མངོན་སུམ་གྱི་སྒྲུང་ངོར་ཡོད་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[It's not correct to say that it can be established as existing to the state of mind
of direct, valid perception.]

Suppose you say that it's not correct [to say that it can be established as
existing to the state of mind of direct, valid perception].
Consider this same thing.
It can so [be established as existing to the state of mind of direct, valid
perception],
Because it exists to the state of mind of direct, valid perception.

མ་གྲུབ་ན། དེ་ཆོས་ཅན། དེར་ཐལ། མངོན་སུམ་གྱི་ངེས་ངོར་ཡོད་པའི་ཕྱིར་ན་མ་
བྱུང་།

[It's not correct to say that empty space exists to the state of mind of direct,
valid perception.]

Suppose you say that it's not correct [to say that empty space exists to
the state of mind of direct, valid perception].
Consider this same thing.
It does so [exist to the state of mind of direct, valid perception],
Because it exists to the ascertainment of direct, valid perception.

རྟགས་གྲུབ་སྟེ། མངོན་སུམ་གྱི་གཞལ་བྱ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར་ཏེ། རྣམ་མཐུན་གྱི་གཞལ་བྱ་

ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[It's not correct to say that empty space exists to the ascertainment of direct, valid perception.]

It is correct [to say that it exists to the ascertainment of direct, valid perception],

Because it's something that is apprehended by direct, valid perception;
And this is true because it is something apprehended by omniscience.

གོང་དུ་འདོད་ན། དེ་ཆོས་ཅན། དོན་དམ་བདེན་པ་མ་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ། ཀུན་རྫོབ་
བདེན་པ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

And suppose you say that our point above is correct.

Consider this same thing.

It isn't so, that empty space belongs to ultimate reality,
Because it belongs to deceptive reality.

མ་གྲུབ་ན། དེ་ཆོས་ཅན། དེར་ཐལ། ཏྲག་པ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[It's not correct to say that empty space belongs to deceptive reality.]

Suppose you say that it's not correct [to say that empty space belongs to deceptive reality.]

It is so [something that belongs to deceptive reality],
Because it is unchanging.

Formal logic subject:

*The subject, the quality to be proven,
and the quality denied in a logical statement*

།གཉིས་པ་དབྱེ་བ་བཤད་པ་ལ། ཏྲགས་ཡང་དག་བཤད་པ། དེའི་ལྷོག་ལྷོགས་ཏྲགས་
ལྷར་སྒྲིང་བཤད་པ་གཉིས། དང་པོ་ལ། ཏྲགས་ཡང་དག་གི་ལྷོས་གཞི་དང་། མཚན་
ཉིད། དབྱེ་བ་བཤད་པ་དང་གསུམ།

Here is the second part, which is an explanation of the different kinds of reasons. Here there are two divisions: an explanation of correct reasons, and an explanation of the opposite; that is, incorrect reasons. The first comes in three steps of its own—explanations of the pivotal objects for a correct reason; of the definition of a correct reason; and of the different types of correct reasons.

དང་པོ་ལ། རྟོགས་ཆོས་ཀྱི་ལྟོས་གཞི་ཤེས་འདོད་ཆོས་ཅན་བཤད་པ་དང་། བྱབ་པའི་
ལྟོས་གཞི་མཐུན་རྟོགས་དང་མི་མཐུན་རྟོགས་བཤད་པ་གཉིས།

The first of these has two further sections: an explanation of the subject (the basis of the opponent's doubt)—which is the pivotal object in the relationship between the subject and the reason; and an explanation of the pivotal object in the necessary relationships between the quality to be proven and the reason—that is, the groups of similar cases and dissimilar cases.

དང་པོ་ལ། ཤེས་འདོད་ཆོས་ཅན་ཀྱི་མཚན་ཉིད། མཚན་གཞི། ཞར་ལ་བསྐྱབ་བྱའི་
ཆོས་ངོས་བཟུང་བ་དང་གསུམ།

We will present the first of these in three parts: the definition of the subject, a classical example of a subject, and then—as an incidental point—identifying the quality to be proven.

དང་པོ་ལ། བྱོད་བྱས་པའི་དྭགས་ཀྱིས་སྒྲ་མི་དྭག་པར་སྐྱབ་པའི་ཚུད་གཞིར་བཟུང་བ་
ཡང་ཡིན། བྱོད་བྱས་པར་ཆད་མས་ངེས་ནས། བྱོད་མི་དྭག་པ་ཡིན་མིན་ལ་ཤེས་
འདོད་ལྷགས་པའི་གང་ཟག་སྤྱད་པ་ཡང་ཡིན་པའི་གཞི་མཐུན་པར་དམིགས་པ། བྱོད་
བྱས་པའི་དྭགས་ཀྱིས་སྒྲ་མི་དྭག་པར་སྐྱབ་པའི་ཤེས་འདོད་ཆོས་ཅན་སྒྲོན་མེད་ཡིན་
པའི་མཚན་ཉིད།

Here is the first. The following is the definition of a "flawless subject in a proof where being made is used as a reason to prove that sounds are changing things":

It must exist as one object which combines both of the following qualities:

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It must first of all be something which is considered the basis of contention in a proof where being made is used as a reason to prove that sounds are changing things.

There must also be possible a person who, once they have ascertained that it is something which is made, still entertains doubts about whether it is unchanging or not.

གཉིས་པ་མཚན་གཞི་ནི། སྒྲ་དེ་དེ་ཡིན། དེ་འདྲའི་ཤེས་འདོད་ཆོས་ཅན་དེ་ཡིན་ན་སྒྲ་
དང་གཅིག་ཡིན་པས་བྱུང་བོ།

Here secondly is the classical example; and this "sounds." Anything which is this particular subject in a logical statement is necessarily one and the same as sounds themselves.

གསུམ་པ་ནི། བསྐྱབ་བྱའི་ཆོས་སུ་བཟུང་བ། བསྐྱབ་བྱའི་ཆོས་ཀྱི་མཚན་ཉིད།

The third part here will have two parts of its own: identifying the quality to be proven, and the definition of the quality to be proven.

བདག་མེད་ཡིན་ན། བསྐྱབ་བྱའི་ཆོས་ཡིན་པས་བྱུང་སྟེ། བདག་མེད་ཡིན་ན། བྱོད་
སྒྲ་བྱོད་དུ་སྐྱབ་པའི་བསྐྱབ་བྱའི་ཆོས་ཡིན་པས་བྱུང་པའི་ཕྱིར། དེས་ན་བསྐྱབ་བྱའི་
ཆོས་ཡིན་ན། ཆོས་ཡིན་པས་མ་བྱུང་བོ།

If something lacks a self-nature, then it can always be the quality to be proven. This is because—if something lacks a self-nature—it can always be the quality to be proven in a logical statement where you are trying to prove that sounds are it. Therefore we can say that, if something is a quality to be proven, it need not be an existing thing.

སྒྲ་མི་དྭག་པར་བསྐྱབ་པའི་བསྐྱབ་བྱའི་ཆོས་སུ་བཟུང་བ། སྒྲ་མི་དྭག་པར་སྐྱབ་པའི་
བསྐྱབ་བྱའི་ཆོས་ཀྱི་མཚན་ཉིད།

Here is the definition of a quality to be proven in a logical proof that sounds are changing things: "Anything which can be considered the quality to be proven in a logical proof that sounds are changing things."

དེ་ལ་དབྱེ་ན། དེ་སྐྱབ་ཀྱི་དངོས་ཀྱི་བསྐྱབ་བྱའི་ཆོས་དང་། དེ་སྐྱབ་ཀྱི་ཤུགས་ཀྱི་
བསྐྱབ་བྱའི་ཆོས་གཉིས།

Qualities to be proven can be divided into two separate types: qualities to be proven which are explicit, and qualities to be proven which are implicit.

མཚན་ཉིད་རིམ་པ་བཞིན། དེ་སྐྱབ་ཀྱི་དངོས་ཀྱི་བསྐྱབ་བྱའི་ཆོས་སུ་བཟུང་བ། དེ་སྐྱབ་
ཀྱི་དངོས་ཀྱི་བསྐྱབ་བྱའི་ཆོས་ཀྱི་མཚན་ཉིད།

Here are their respective definitions. "Anything which can be considered the explicit quality to be proven in a logical statement" is the definition of an "explicit quality to be proven in any particular logical statement."

དེ་སྐྱབ་ཀྱི་ཤུགས་ཀྱི་བསྐྱབ་བྱའི་ཆོས་སུ་བཟུང་བ། དེ་སྐྱབ་ཀྱི་ཤུགས་ཀྱི་བསྐྱབ་བྱའི་
ཆོས་ཀྱི་མཚན་ཉིད།

"Anything which can be considered the implicit quality to be proven in a logical statement" is the definition of an "implicit quality to be proven in any particular logical statement."

མཚན་གཞི་རིམ་པ་བཞིན། མི་དྭག་པ་དང་པོ་དང་། མི་དྭག་པ་མ་ཡིན་པ་ལས་ལོག་
པ་གཉིས་པ་ཡིན།

Classical examples for these two, respectively, would be the following. An example of the first would be "a changing thing." An example of the second would be "the opposite of all that is not a changing thing."

ཡང་མི་དྭག་པ་དང་སྐད་ཅིག་མ་གཉིས་རེ་རེ་ནས་བྱས་པའི་དྭགས་ཀྱི་དེ་སྐྱབ་ཀྱི་དངོས་
ཀྱི་བསྐྱབ་བྱའི་ཆོས་དང་། དེ་གཉིས་མ་ཡིན་པ་ལས་ལོག་པ་གཉིས་རེ་རེ་ནས་དེ་སྐྱབ་
ཀྱི་ཤུགས་ཀྱི་བསྐྱབ་བྱའི་ཆོས་ཡིན་ནོ།

You could also say that both "a changing thing" and "something that lasts only a moment" are, each of them, explicit qualities to be proven in a logical proof where being made is used as a reason to make the proof. The two

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opposites—of all that each one of them is not—would then each be an example of implicit qualities to be proven.

སྒྲ་ཚུལ་ཅན། མི་ཏྲག་སྟེ། བྱས་པའི་ཕྱིར། ཞེས་བཀོད་པའི་ཚེ། སྒྲ་སྟོར་བ་དེ་སྒྲུབ་
ཀྱི་ཚེད་གཞི། མི་ཏྲག་པ་དེ་སྒྲུབ་ཀྱི་བསྒྲུབ་བྱའི་ཚུལ། སྒྲ་མི་ཏྲག་པ་བསྒྲུབ་བྱ། བྱས་
པ་ཏྲགས་ཡང་དག། ཏྲག་པ་དགག་བྱའི་ཚུལ། སྒྲ་ཏྲག་པ་སྟོར་བ་དེ་སྒྲུབ་ཀྱི་དགག་
བྱར་འཇོག། །དེས་གཞན་ལ་ཡང་རིགས་འབྲེ།

Let's consider now a case where we put forth the following logical statement:

Consider sounds.
They are changing things,
Because they are something which is made.

The basis of contention in this statement [—that is, the subject of the proof—] is "sounds." The quality to be proven is being a changing thing. The assertion, the idea to be proven, is that sounds are changing things. The reason is being something which is made. The quality being denied is being an unchanging thing. The idea being denied is that sounds are unchanging. You can apply this same pattern to every other logical statement.

།སྒྲུབ་བྱེད་ནི། མི་ཏྲག་པ་ཚུལ་ཅན། ཁྱེད་སྒྲ་མི་ཏྲག་པར་སྒྲུབ་པའི་དངོས་ཀྱི་བསྒྲུབ་
བྱའི་ཚུལ་ཡིན་ཏེ། མཚན་ཉིད་དེའི་ཕྱིར་རོ།།

Here are logical statements to prove what we've said:

Consider "being a changing thing."
It is the explicit quality to be proven in a proof that sounds are
changing things,
Because it fits the definition given above.

སྐད་ཅིག་མ་ཚུལ་ཅན། སྒྲ་མི་ཏྲག་པར་སྒྲུབ་པའི་དངོས་ཀྱི་བསྒྲུབ་བྱའི་ཚུལ་མ་ཡིན་ཏེ།
དེ་སྒྲུབ་ཀྱི་ཏྲགས་ཡང་དག་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

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Consider "being a thing that only lasts a moment."
It is not an explicit quality to be proven in a [certain] proof that sounds
are changing things,
Because [in a certain proof] that sounds are unchanging things it
provides the reason in the proof.

*The forms of debate:
Posture, the use of a rosary,
and formulating the statement of a reason in three parts*

In our second lesson we will cover the classical posture for debating, how to use a rosary during a debate, and how to formulate a classical logical statement during a debate.

The person defending in a debate sits down and faces the challenger, who stands. The defender normally maintains a fairly mild appearance (until the debate gets hot), gesturing slightly with his hands, and answering quickly and concisely to points raised by the challenger.

The challenger, on the other hand, uses extensive body language to throw his opponent off. After the initial challenge, he stands sideways to his opponent, with his left foot forward. Each new assertion is accompanied by a stamp of the left foot, and a clap of the right hand on top of the left, where the rosary is strung around the arm. From time to time, the rosary is stretched back with the right hand as if aiming an arrow from a bow. This is an ancient debating custom, and in pictures of Master Dignaga or Master Dharmakirti we can still see the same gesture.

The rosary, as noted earlier, is also used in the selection of the initial challenger and defender. It is also an important tool for counting out lists of things, which are so popular in Buddhism: the two realities, the three Jewels, the four arya truths, the five paths, the six realms. . .and so on. During the course of a debate, the challenger and defender will often count out a list together on their rosaries, to make sure both are in synch on the point. Very occasionally a debater will swing a rosary to make a point, although it is rare and unaccepted to actually strike the other party—it would be more common to strike your own thigh or palm to get a nice "thwock"!

Positioning in front of the opponent says a lot. When an opponent makes a very serious mistake or uses circular reasoning, you might swirl around in a spin and come down with a clap. If an opponent takes too long to answer a

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question or remember a quotation, you might turn your back and walk away a few strides, to feign disgust with his lack of preparation. Sometimes you might make rhetorical comments to the audience on both sides—"Where did he get that statement from? Sounds like a quotation from an autocommentary to a root text that was never written!"—and throw out your arms with your palms up, like "Who could ever debate with such a dummy!"

Sometimes you would get a bunch of your classmates up beside you to scream the same syllogism a few times in unison, with exactly the same claps and stamps: it looks like a chorus line or cheerleaders yelling Buddhist logic. Again, the whole point is that everyone learn to think quickly and clearly under pressure, which will help us all spread the teachings. The debates in Tibetan monasteries are refreshingly free of any of the American competitive attitude, and everybody is just excited about learning. In 15 years of debating in Tibetan monasteries, the American monk writing this account has never once been treated with any trace of disrespect or prejudice.

The classical presentation of a proposition in debate, after the initial challenge, has three parts, following the rules of formal logic established even as early as Lord Buddha himself. We first choose a subject, the thing we are going to debate about. One example would be "human beings." Then we choose a quality about them that we wish to prove to our opponent; for example, that they "have to die." Finally we choose a reason—which in Buddhist logic more often refers to the main thing mentioned in the reason as it is expressed—such as "being born." The entire proposition presented to the opponent then will look like this:

མི་ཚོས་ཅན།

Consider human beings.

འདི་སྐྱུ་ཡིན་ཏེ།

They do have to die,

སྐྱེས་པའི་ཕྱིར།

Because they are born.

The defender listens to this proposition carefully, and then quickly prepares his answer in his mind. The very specific rules for answering will be covered in the reading for the next class.

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Reading Three: Quality and Characteristic

Selection from the collected topics:
Quality and Characteristic

The selection here is from the monastic textbook entitled An Explanation of the Science of Logic, included in the Advanced Path of Reasoning, a Section from the "Key to the Logic Machine," a Presentation of the Collected Topics which Clarifies the Meaning of the Great Scriptures on Valid Perception (Tsad-ma'i gzhung-don 'byed-pa'i bsdus-grva'i nam-par bshad-pa rigs-lam 'phrul gyi lde'u-mig las rigs-lam che-ba rtags-rigs kyi skor). The text was written by Purbuchok Jampa Tsultrim Gyatso (1825-1901), who in his day held the position of Tutor to the Dalai Lama.

Please note that indented statements are those made by the opponent. Responses within brackets are those that are usually left unwritten in the Tibetan text, and are understood to be there because of the context following each.

༥ ། ལྷན་པ་སྒྱིད་དང་བྱེ་བྲག་གི་རྣམ་བཞག་བཤད་པ་ལ། དགག་བཞག་སྒྲིང་གསུམ་
ལས། དང་པོ་ལ།

Here is the sixth section: a presentation of quality and characteristic. For this presentation we will first refute the position of our opponents, then present our own position, and then finally eliminate their rebuttal.

ཁ་ཅིག་ན་རེ། སྒྱི་ཡིན་ན་བྱེ་བྲག་མ་ཡིན་པས་ཁྱབ་ཟེར་ན།

Suppose someone comes and makes the following claim:

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Nothing which is a general category (in the sense of being a quality) can ever be a specific member of a category (in the sense of being characteristic of a quality).

དངོས་པོ་ཚེས་ཅན། གྲེ་བྲག་མ་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ། སྒྲི་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར། ཁྲུབ་པ་ཁས།

Consider "working thing."
So is it never then characteristic of a quality?
Because it is a quality.

[It doesn't necessarily follow.]

But you already agreed that it does necessarily follow.

མ་གྲུབ་ན། དངོས་པོ་ཚེས་ཅན། སྒྲི་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ། ཁྱོད་གྱི་གྲེ་བྲག་ཡོད་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[It's not correct to say that "working thing" is a quality.]

Consider "working thing."
It is so a quality,
Because it has things which are characteristic of itself.

མ་གྲུབ་ན། དངོས་པོ་ཚེས་ཅན། ཁྱོད་གྱི་གྲེ་བྲག་ཡོད་པར་ཐལ། བུམ་པ་དེ་དེ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[It's not correct to say that "working thing" has things which are characteristic of itself.]

Consider "working thing."
It does so have things which are characteristic of itself,
Because a water pitcher is one.

མ་གྲུབ་ན། བུམ་པ་ཚེས་ཅན། ཁྱོད་དངོས་པོའི་གྲེ་བྲག་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ། ཁྱོད་དངོས་པོ་ཡིན། ཁྱོད་དངོས་པོ་དང་བདག་གཅིག་ཏུ་འབྲེལ་ཁྱོད་མ་ཡིན་ཞིང་དངོས་པོ་ཡང་ཡིན་པའི་གཞི་མཐུན་པ་དུ་མ་གྲུབ་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[It's not correct to say that a water pitcher is characteristic of "working thing."]

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Suppose you say that it's not correct [to say that a water pitcher is characteristic of "working thing"].

Consider a water pitcher.

It is so characteristic of "working thing,"

Because (1) it is a working thing; (2) it shares a relationship with "working thing" such that to be it is to automatically be a working thing; and (3) there exist multiple other objects which are both not it, but still a working thing.

རྟགས་གཉིས་པ་མ་གྲུབ་ན། ལུས་པ་ཆོས་ཅན། དངོས་པོ་དང་བདག་གཅིག་འབྲེལ་
ཡིན་པར་ཐལ། དངོས་པོ་དང་བདག་ཉིད་གཅིག་ཡིན་པ་གང་ཞིག །དངོས་པོ་དང་ཐ་
དད་ཀྱང་ཡིན། དངོས་པོ་མེད་ན་ཁྱོད་མེད་དགོས་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[The second part of the reason you gave is not correct.]

Suppose you say that the second part of the reason we gave is not correct.

Consider a water pitcher.

It is so true, that it shares a relationship with "working thing" such that to be it is to automatically be a working thing,

Because (1) to be it is to automatically be a working thing; (2) it is something distinct from "working thing"; and (3) if there were no working things it could not never exist either.

རྟགས་དང་པོ་མ་གྲུབ་ན། ལུས་པ་ཆོས་ཅན། དངོས་པོ་དང་བདག་ཉིད་གཅིག་ཡིན་
པར་ཐལ། དངོས་པོ་དང་རང་བཞིན་གཅིག་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[The first part of the last reason you gave is not correct.]

Suppose you say that the first part of the last reason we gave is not correct.

Consider a water pitcher.

It is so, that to be a water pitcher is to automatically be a working thing,

Because to be a water pitcher is by nature to be a working thing.

རྟགས་གཉིས་པ་མ་གྲུབ་ན། ལུས་པ་ཆོས་ཅན། དངོས་པོ་དང་ཐ་དད་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ།
གཟུགས་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

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[The second part of the reason you gave is not correct.]

Suppose you say that the second part of the reason we gave is not correct.
Consider a water pitcher.
It is so something distinct from "working thing,"
Because it is something physical.

རྟགས་གསུམ་པ་མ་གྲུབ་ན། ལུས་པ་ཆོས་ཅན། དངོས་པོ་མེད་ན་སྟོང་མེད་དགོས་
པར་ཐལ། དངོས་པོ་མེད་ན་གང་དྲན་དྲན་ཡིན་དགོས་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[The third part of the reason you gave is not correct.]

Suppose you say that the third part of the reason we gave is not correct.
Consider a water pitcher.
It is so the case, that if there were no working things it could not never exist
either,
Because if there were no working things, then you could make up anything at
all.

གོང་གི་རྟགས་གསུམ་པ་མ་གྲུབ་ན། ལུས་པ་ཆོས་ཅན། སྟོང་མ་ཡིན་ཞིང་དངོས་པོ་
ཡང་ཡིན་པའི་གཞི་མཐུན་པ་དུ་མ་གྲུབ་པར་ཐལ། ཅན་དན་གྱི་ཀ་བ་དེ་ཡང་དེ་ཡིན།
ཤུག་པའི་ཀ་བ་དེ་ཡང་དེ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[The third part of your original reason is not correct.]

Suppose you say that the third part of our original reason is not correct.
Consider a water pitcher.
There do so exist multiple other objects which are both not it, but still a
working thing,
Because a pillar of sandalwood is one, and a pillar of juniper is also one.

རྩ་བར་འདོད་ན། དངོས་པོ་ཆོས་ཅན། གྲེ་བྲག་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ། ཤེས་བྱའི་གྲེ་བྲག་
ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[Then I agree to your original statement: "working thing" is never
characteristic of a quality.]

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Consider "working thing."
It is so characteristic of a quality,
Because it is characteristic of "knowable things."

མ་གྲུབ་ན། དངོས་པོ་ཚེས་ཅན། ཤེས་བྱའི་བྱེ་བྲག་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ། ཁྱོད་ཤེས་བྱ་ཡིན།
ཁྱོད་ཤེས་བྱ་དང་བདག་གཅིག་ཏུ་འབྲེལ། ཁྱོད་མ་ཡིན་ཞིང་ཤེས་བྱ་ཡང་ཡིན་པའི་
གཞི་མཐུན་པ་དུ་མ་གྲུབ་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[Your reason is not correct.]

Suppose you say that it is not correct [to say that "working thing" is
characteristic of "knowable things"].
Consider "working thing."
It is so characteristic of "knowable things,"
Because (1) a working thing is a knowable thing; (2) it shares a relationship
with "knowable things" such that to be it is to automatically be a
knowable thing; and (3) there exist multiple objects which are both not
a working thing, but still knowable thing.

ཁ་ཅིག་ན་རེ། དངོས་པོའི་སྒྲི་ཡིན་ན། དོན་བྱེད་རུས་པའི་སྒྲི་ཡིན་པས་བྱུང་བར་ན།

Suppose someone comes and makes the following claim:

If something is a quality of which "working thing" is
characteristic, then it is always a quality of which "able to
perform a function" is characteristic.

མཚོན་བྱ་ཚེས་ཅན། དོན་བྱེད་རུས་པའི་སྒྲི་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ། དངོས་པོའི་སྒྲི་ཡིན་པའི་
ཕྱིར། བྱུང་བ་ཁས།

Consider "thing to be defined."
So is it then a quality of which "able to perform a function" is characteristic?
Because it is a quality of which "working thing" is characteristic.

[It doesn't necessarily follow.]

But you already agreed that it does necessarily follow.

མ་གྲུབ་ན། མཚོན་བྱ་ཚུལ་ཅན། བྱིང་དངོས་པོའི་སྤྱི་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ། དངོས་པོ་བྱིང་
ཀྱི་བྱེ་བྲག་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[It's not correct to say that "thing to be defined" is a quality of which
"working thing" is characteristic.]

Consider "thing to be defined."

It is so a quality of which "working thing" is characteristic,

Because "working thing" is characteristic of it.

མ་གྲུབ་ན། དངོས་པོ་ཚུལ་ཅན། མཚོན་བྱའི་བྱེ་བྲག་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ། བྱིང་མཚོན་བྱ་
ཡིན། བྱིང་མཚོན་བྱ་དང་བདག་གཅིག་ཏུ་འབྲེལ། བྱིང་མ་ཡིན་ཞིང་མཚོན་བྱ་ཡང་
ཡིན་པའི་གཞི་མཐུན་པ་དུ་མ་གྲུབ་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[It's not correct to say that "working thing" is characteristic of "thing to
be defined."]

Suppose you say that it's not correct [to say that "working thing" is
characteristic of "thing to be defined"].

Consider "working thing."

It is so characteristic of "thing to be defined,"

Because (1) it is a thing to be defined; (2) it shares a relationship with "thing
to be defined" such that to be it is to automatically be a thing to be
defined; and (3) there do exist multiple other objects which are both not
it and yet are still things to be defined.

ཅུ་བར་འདོད་ན། དོན་བྱེད་རུས་པ་ཚུལ་ཅན། བྱིང་མཚོན་བྱའི་བྱེ་བྲག་མ་ཡིན་པར་
ཐལ། མཚན་ཉིད་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར་ཏེ། དངོས་པོའི་མཚན་ཉིད་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[Then I agree with your original statement: "thing to be defined" is a
quality of which "able to perform a function" is characteristic.]

Suppose you agree with our original statement, [saying that "thing to be
defined" is a quality of which "able to perform a function" is
characteristic].

It is not so, that "thing to be defined" is a quality of which "able to perform a
function" is characteristic,

Because it ["able to perform a function"] is the definition of a working thing.

ཁ་ཅིག་ན་རེ། དངོས་པོའི་སྒྲི་ཡིན་ན། མི་རྟག་པའི་སྒྲི་ཡིན་པས་བྱ་བ་ཟེར་ན།

Suppose someone comes and makes the following claim:

Anything which is a quality of which "working thing" is characteristic must also be a quality of which "changing thing" is characteristic.

མི་རྟག་པ་དང་ཐ་དད་ཆོས་ཅན། མི་རྟག་པའི་སྒྲི་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ། དངོས་པོའི་སྒྲི་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར། བྱ་བ་པ་ཁས།

Consider "distinct from 'changing thing'."

So is it then a quality of which "changing thing" is characteristic?

Because it is a quality of which "working thing" is characteristic.

[It doesn't necessarily follow.]

But you already agreed that it does necessarily follow.

མ་གྲུབ་ན། མི་རྟག་པ་དང་ཐ་དད་ཆོས་ཅན། བྱེད་དངོས་པོའི་སྒྲི་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ།
དངོས་པོ་བྱེད་ཀྱི་བྱེ་བྲག་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

Suppose you say that it's incorrect to say [that "distinct from 'changing thing'" is a quality of which "working thing" is characteristic].

Consider "distinct from 'changing thing'."

It is so a quality of which "working thing" is characteristic,

Because "working thing" is characteristic of it.

རྩ་བར་འདོད་ན། མི་རྟག་པ་དང་ཐ་དད་ཆོས་ཅན། མི་རྟག་པའི་སྒྲི་མ་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ།
མི་རྟག་པ་བྱེད་ཀྱི་བྱེ་བྲག་མ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[Then I agree with your original statement: "distinct from 'changing thing'" is a quality of which "changing thing" is characteristic.]

Suppose you agree to our original statement, [saying that "distinct from 'changing thing'" is a quality of which "changing thing" is characteristic].

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It's not so, that "distinct from 'changing thing' " is a quality of which "changing thing" is characteristic,
Because "changing thing" is not characteristic of it.

མ་གྲུབ་ན། མི་རྟག་པ་ཚེས་ཅན། མི་རྟག་པ་དང་ཐ་དད་གྱི་བྱ་བ་མ་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ།
མི་རྟག་པ་དང་ཐ་དད་མ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[It's not correct to say that "changing thing" is not characteristic of "distinct from 'changing thing'."]

Suppose you say that it's not correct [to say that "changing thing" is not characteristic of "distinct from 'changing thing' "].

Consider "changing thing."

It is so [not correct to say that it is characteristic of the quality of "distinct from 'changing thing',"]

Because it is not distinct from "changing thing."

མ་གྲུབ་ན། མི་རྟག་པ་ཚེས་ཅན། ཁྱོད་ཁྱོད་དང་ཐ་དད་མ་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ། ཁྱོད་གང་
ཟག་གི་བདག་མེད་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[It's not correct to say that "changing thing" is not distinct from "changing thing."]

Suppose you say it's not correct [to say that "changing thing" is not distinct from "changing thing"].

It is so true, that it is not distinct from itself,

Because it is an example of something where the person has no nature of its own.

ཁ་ཅིག་ན་རེ། སྤྱི་འོས་ཡང་ཡིན། བྱ་བ་གི་བྱ་བ་ཀྱང་ཡིན་པའི་གཞི་མཐུན་པ་
མེད་ཟེར་ན།

Suppose someone comes and makes the following claim:

There exists no one thing which is both (1) a quality of a quality of which something is characteristic, and also (2) characteristic of something which is characteristic of a certain quality.

དེ་ཡོད་པར་ཐལ། ཏྲག་པ་དེ་དེ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

Isn't it though so, that there is such a thing?
Because "unchanging thing" is just such a thing.

མ་གྲུབ་ན། ཏྲག་པ་ཆོས་ཅན། ཁྱོད་སྒྲིའི་སྒྲི་ཡང་ཡིན། བྱེ་བྲག་གི་བྱེ་བྲག་ཀྱང་ཡིན་
པའི་གཞི་མཐུན་པ་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ། ཁྱོད་སྒྲིའི་སྒྲི་ཡིན་པ་གང་ཞིག་བྱེ་བྲག་གི་བྱེ་བྲག་
ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[It's not correct to say that "unchanging thing" is one thing which is both (1) a quality of a quality of which something is characteristic, and also (2) characteristic of something which is characteristic of a certain quality.]

Consider "unchanging thing."

It is so one thing which is both (1) a quality of a quality of which something is characteristic, and also (2) characteristic of something which is characteristic of a certain quality,

Because it is a quality of which "quality" is characteristic, and it is characteristic of the quality of "characteristic."

ཏྲགས་དང་པོ་མ་གྲུབ་ན། ཏྲག་པ་ཆོས་ཅན། ཁྱོད་སྒྲིའི་སྒྲི་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ། སྒྲི་ཁྱོད་ཀྱི་
བྱེ་བྲག་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[The first part of your reason is not correct: it's not correct to say that "unchanging thing" is a quality of which "quality" is characteristic.]

Consider "unchanging thing."

It is so a quality of which "quality" is characteristic,

Because "quality" is something which is characteristic of it.

ཏྲགས་གཉིས་པ་མ་གྲུབ་ན། ཏྲག་པ་ཆོས་ཅན། བྱེ་བྲག་གི་བྱེ་བྲག་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ།
ཁྱོད་བྱེ་བྲག་ཡིན། ཁྱོད་བྱེ་བྲག་དང་བདག་གཅིག་ཏུ་འབྲེལ། ཁྱོད་མ་ཡིན་ཞིང་བྱེ་
བྲག་ཀྱང་ཡིན་པའི་གཞི་མཐུན་པ་དུ་མ་གྲུབ་པའི་ཕྱིར།

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[The second part of your reason is not correct: it's not correct to say that "unchanging thing" is characteristic of the quality of "characteristic."]

Suppose you disagree to the second part of our reason, [saying that it's not correct to say that "unchanging thing" is characteristic of the quality of "characteristic"].

Consider "unchanging thing."

It is so characteristic of the quality of "characteristic,"

Because (1) it is characteristic of a quality; (2) it has a relationship with "characteristic" such that to be it is to automatically be characteristic of a quality; and (3) there exist multiple things which are both not it, but still characteristic of a quality.

ཁ་ཅིག ། རྟག་པའི་སྒྲི་ཡིན་ན། རྟག་པའི་བྱེ་བྲག་མ་ཡིན་པས་བྱུང་བའི་ཟུང་།

Someone may come and make the following claim:

Nothing which is a quality of which "unchanging thing" is characteristic can ever be characteristic of the quality "unchanging thing."

སྒྲི་ཚེས་ཅན། དེར་ཐལ། དེའི་ཕྱིར།

Consider "quality."

So is it then never characteristic of the quality "unchanging thing"?

Because it is a quality of which "unchanging thing" is characteristic.

དེར་ཐལ། རྟག་པ་བྱེད་ཀྱི་བྱེ་བྲག་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[It's incorrect to say that "quality" is a quality of which "unchanging thing" is characteristic.]

It is so a quality of which "unchanging thing" is characteristic,

Because "unchanging thing" is characteristic of the quality "quality."

དེར་ཐལ། རྟག་པ་སྒྲི་ཡིན། རྟག་པ་སྒྲི་དང་བདག་གཅིག་ཏུ་འབྲེལ། རྟག་པ་མ་ཡིན་

ཞིང་སྒྲི་ཡང་ཡིན་པའི་གཞི་མཐུན་པ་དུ་མ་གྱུང་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[It's incorrect to say that "unchanging thing" is characteristic of the quality "quality."]

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It is so characteristic of the quality "quality,"

Because (1) "unchanging thing" is a quality; (2) "unchanging thing" has a relationship with "quality" such that to be "unchanging thing" is to automatically be a quality; and (3) there exist multiple things which are both not an unchanging thing, but still a quality.

ཅུ་བར་འདོད་ན། སྒྲི་ཆོས་ཅན། དྲག་པའི་བྱེ་བྲག་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ། བྱེད་དྲག་པ་ཡིན།
བྱེད་དྲག་པ་དང་བདག་གཅིག་ཏུ་འབྲེལ། བྱེད་མ་ཡིན་ཞིང་དྲག་པ་ཡང་ཡིན་པའི་
གཞི་མཐུན་དུ་མ་གྲུབ་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[Then I agree with your original statement: "quality" is never characteristic of the quality "unchanging thing."]

Suppose you agree with our original statement, [saying that "quality" is never characteristic of the quality "unchanging thing"].

Consider "quality."

It is so characteristic of the quality "unchanging thing,"

Because (1) it is an unchanging thing; (2) it has a relationship with "unchanging thing" such that to be "quality" is to automatically be an unchanging thing; and (3) there exist multiple things which are both not "quality," but still an unchanging thing.

ཁ་ཅིག་ །དངོས་པོའི་སྒྲི་ཡིན་ན། དངོས་པོའི་བྱེ་བྲག་མ་ཡིན་པས་མ་བྱུང་ཟེར་ན།

Suppose someone comes and makes the following claim:

It's not necessarily the case that anything which is a quality of which "changing thing" is characteristic can never be characteristic of the quality "changing thing."

མི་འཐད་དེ། དངོས་པོའི་སྒྲི་དང་དངོས་པོའི་བྱེ་བྲག་གཉིས་ཀ་ཡིན་པ་མེད་པའི་ཕྱིར།

But this is incorrect,

Because there exists nothing which is both a quality of which "changing thing" is characteristic and which is also characteristic of the quality "changing thing."

དེར་ཐལ། དེར་གྱུར་པའི་རྟག་པ་ཡང་མེད། དེར་གྱུར་པའི་མི་རྟག་པ་ཡང་མེད་པའི་
ཕྱིར།

[It's not correct to say that there exists nothing which is both a quality of which "changing thing" is characteristic and also characteristic of the quality "changing thing."]

It is so [correct to say that there exists nothing which is both a quality of which "changing thing" is characteristic and which is also characteristic of the quality "changing thing"],

Because there exists neither an unchanging version nor a changing version [of something which is both a quality of which "changing thing" is characteristic and which is also characteristic of the quality "changing thing"].

དང་པོ་དེར་ཐལ། རྟག་པ་ཡིན་ན་དངོས་པོའི་བྱེ་བྲག་མ་ཡིན་པས་བྱུང་པའི་ཕྱིར་ཏེ།
རྟག་པ་ཡིན་ན། དངོས་པོ་མ་ཡིན་པས་བྱུང་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[It's not correct to say that there exists no unchanging version.]

The first point in the reason is so [that is, it is correct to say that there exists no unchanging version of something which both a quality of which "changing thing" is characteristic and which is also characteristic of the quality "changing thing"],

Because something which is an unchanging thing can never be characteristic of the quality "working thing";

Which is to say, if something is unchanging, it can never be a working thing.

གོང་གི་རྟག་པ་གཉིས་པ་གྲུབ་སྟེ། དངོས་པོའི་སྐྱེར་གྱུར་པའི་དངོས་པོ་ཡིན་ན། གང་
བྱུང་བྱུང་ཡིན་པས་བྱུང་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[It's not correct to say there exists no changing version.]

The second point in our reason is so [—that is, it is correct to say that there exists no changing version of something which both a quality of which "changing thing" is characteristic and which is also characteristic of the quality "changing thing"],

Because if there existed a changing thing that could be a quality of which "changing thing" is characteristic, then you could make up anything at all.

རང་རིས་དངོས་པོ་ཡིན་ན། དངོས་པོའི་སྒྲིམ་ཡིན་པས་བྱས་བྱས་པ་ལ། ཁ་ཅིག་ན་
རེ། སྒྲིམ་ཉལ་པ་ཆོས་ཅན། དེར་ཐལ། དེའི་ཕྱིར་ཟེར་ན་ཉལ་ས་མ་གྲུབ་པོ།

Suppose someone comes and makes the following claim regarding our statement that, if something is a working thing, it can never be a quality of which "working thing" is characteristic:

Consider the fact that sound is a changing thing.

Is it then [not a quality of which "working thing" is characteristic]?

Because it is a working thing.

Our definitive answer would be to say, "It's not correct [to say that this fact is a working thing]".

འདོད་མི་རྣམས་ཏེ། སྒྲིམ་ཉལ་པ་དངོས་པོའི་སྒྲིམ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར་ཏེ། །དངོས་པོ་སྒྲིམ་
ཉལ་པའི་བྱེ་བྲག་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[Then I agree with the original statement: the fact that sound is a changing thing is not a quality of which "working thing" is characteristic.]

But you cannot agree to the original statement,

Because the fact that sound is a changing thing is a quality of which "working things" is characteristic,

Because working things are characteristic of the fact that sound is a changing thing.

དེར་ཐལ། དངོས་པོ་སྒྲིམ་ཉལ་པ་ཡིན། དངོས་པོ་སྒྲིམ་ཉལ་པ་དང་བདག་གཅིག་ཏུ་
འབྲེལ། དངོས་པོ་མ་ཡིན་ཞིང་སྒྲིམ་ཉལ་པ་ཡང་ཡིན་པའི་གཞི་མཐུན་དུ་མ་གྲུབ་པའི་
ཕྱིར།

[It's not correct to say that working things are characteristic of the fact that sound is a changing thing.]

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It is so [correct to say that working things are characteristic of the fact that sound is a changing thing],
Because (1) working things are "sound is a changing thing"; (2) working things are related to "sound is a changing thing" in such a way that to be a working thing is to automatically be "sound is a changing thing"; and (3) there exist multiple other things which are both not a working thing and yet still "sound is a changing thing."

རྟགས་ཕྱི་མ་དེར་ཐལ། ཤེས་བྱ་ཡང་དེ་ཡིན། རྟག་པ་དེ་ཡང་དེ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[The final part of your reason is not correct; that is, it is not correct to say that there exist multiple other things which are both not a working thing and yet still "sound is a changing thing."]

The final part of our reason is so true; [that is, it is correct to say that there exist multiple other things which are both not a working thing and yet are still "sound is a changing thing"],
Because "existing things" are one, and "unchanging things" are one as well.

དེར་ཐལ། བདག་མིད་ཡིན་ན། སྒྲ་མི་རྟག་པ་ཡིན་པས་བྱབ་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[It's wrong to say that "existing things" and "unchanging things" are things which are both not a working thing and yet are still "sound is a changing thing."]

It is so [correct, to say that "existing things" and "unchanging things" are things which are both not a working thing and yet are still "sound is a changing thing"],
Because anything which has no self-nature is always "sound is a changing thing."

ཁ་ཅིག་ན་རེ། སྒྲའི་བྱེ་བྲག་ཡིན་ན། དངོས་པོའི་བྱེ་བྲག་ཡིན་པས་བྱབ་ཟེར་ན།

Suppose someone comes and makes the following claim:

Anything which is characteristic of the quality "mental object" is also always characteristic of the quality "working thing."

དངོས་པོའི་རྒྱར་རྒྱར་པའི་ཚད་མ་དང་བཅད་བཤེས་གཉིས་ཆོས་ཅན། དེར་ཐལ།

དེའི་ཕྱིར། བྱུང་པ་ཁས།

Consider the two of valid perception and reflection that act as a cause for a working thing.

So are they then [characteristic of the quality "working thing"]?
Because they are [characteristic of the quality "mental object"].

[It doesn't necessarily follow.]

But you already agreed that it does necessarily follow.

མ་གྲུབ་ན། དེ་ཆོས་ཅན། དེར་ཐལ། བྱུང་སྟོ་ཡིན། བྱུང་སྟོ་དང་བདག་གཅིག་ཏུ་
འབྲེལ། བྱུང་མ་ཡིན་ཞིང་། སྟོ་ཡང་ཡིན་པའི་གཞི་མཐུན་པ་དུ་མ་གྲུབ་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[It's incorrect to say that the two of valid perception and reflection that act as a cause for a working thing are characteristic of the quality "mental object."]

Suppose you say that it's incorrect [to say that the two of valid perception and reflection that act as a cause for a working thing are characteristic of the quality "mental object"].

They are so [characteristic of the quality "mental object"],

Because (1) the two of them are mental objects; (2) they share a relationship with "mental object" such that to be the two of them is to automatically be the mental object; and (3) there exist multiple things which are not the two of them but are still mental objects.

དང་པོ་དང་གཉིས་པ་སྟེ། གསུམ་པ་མ་གྲུབ་ན། དེ་འདྲ་བའི་གཞི་མཐུན་པ་དུ་མ་གྲུབ་
པར་ཐལ། རྣམ་མཁྱེན་དེ་ཡང་དེ་ཡིན། ཚད་མ་དེ་ཡང་དེ་ཡིན། དེ་གཉིས་པ་ལྟན་
ཐ་དད་དུ་གྲུབ་པའི་ཕྱིར།

The first and second parts of our reason are easy to accept; suppose you say that the third is not correct; [which is to say, there do not exist multiple things which are both not the two of valid perception and reflection, but which are still mental objects].

It is so true, that there exist multiple things which are both [not the two of valid perception and reflection, but which are still mental objects],

Because omniscience is just such a thing, and valid perception is just such a thing—the two do exist as separate things.

ཕྱི་བར་འདོད་ན། དེ་ཆོས་ཅན། དངོས་པོའི་བྱེ་བྲག་མ་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ། དངོས་པོ་དང་
བདག་གཅིག་ཏུ་འབྲེལ་བ་མ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[Then I agree with your original statement: the two are characteristic of
the quality "working thing."]

Suppose you agree with our original statement.

Consider these same two.

They are not so—they are not characteristic of the quality "working thing,"
Because they cannot share a relationship with "working thing" such that to be
them is to automatically be the working thing.

མ་གྲུབ་ན། དེ་ཆོས་ཅན། དེར་ཐལ། དངོས་པོའི་རྒྱ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར། ཉགས་སྒྲ།

[It's not correct to say that they cannot share a relationship with
"working thing" such that to be them is to automatically be the
working thing.]

Suppose you say that it's not correct [to say that they cannot share a
relationship with "working thing" such that to be them is to
automatically be the working thing].

Consider these same two.

It is so correct [to say that they cannot share a relationship with "working
thing" such that to be them is to automatically be the working thing],
Because they are the cause of the working thing.

Our reason is easy to accept.

གཉིས་པ་རང་ལུགས་ལ། སྤྱིའི་མཆན་ཉིད་ཡོད་དེ། རང་གི་གསལ་བ་ལ་ཇེས་སུ་
འགྲོ་བའི་ཆོས་དེ་དེ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

Here secondly is the part where we present our own position. There does exist
a definition of "something general," because "any existing thing which
subsumes its members" is the definition.

སྤྱི་ལ་སྒྲས་བཞེད་རིགས་ཀྱི་སྒོ་ནས་དབྱེ་ན་གསུམ་ཡོད་དེ། རིགས་སྤྱི། དོན་སྤྱི།

ཚོགས་སྒྲིལ་དང་གསུམ་ཡོད་པའི་ཕྱིར།

Nominally speaking, things that are "general" may be divided into three different types: general things as far as types, general things as far as objects, and general things as far as collections of parts.

རིགས་སྒྲིལ་མཚན་ཉིད་ཡོད་དེ། རང་གི་རིགས་ཅན་དུ་མ་ལ་ཇེས་སུ་འགྲོ་བའི་ཚུལ་
དེ་དེ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར། མཚན་གཞི་ཡོད་དེ། ཤེས་བྱ་དེ་དེ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

There does exist a definition of a "general thing as far as types" (or "quality"), because "that existing thing which subsumes the multiple things which are of its type" is the definition.

A classical example of a "general thing as far as types" (or "quality") does exist, because "knowable things" is one.

བུམ་པའི་དོན་སྒྲིལ་མཚན་ཉིད་ཡོད་དེ། བུམ་འཛིན་རྟོག་པ་ལ་བུམ་པ་མ་ཡིན་བཞིན་དུ་
བུམ་པ་ལྟ་བུར་སྒྲུང་བའི་སྒྲོ་བཏགས་ཀྱི་ཆ་དེ་དེ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར། མཚན་གཞི་ཡོད་དེ།
བུམ་འཛིན་རྟོག་པ་སྐད་ཅིག་མ་གཉིས་པ་ལ་བུམ་པ་སྐད་ཅིག་གཉིས་པ་མ་ཡིན་པ་
ལས་ལོག་པར་སྒྲུང་བ་དེ་དེ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

There does exist a definition of a "general thing as far as objects" (or "actual mental image") relating to a water pitcher, because it is the following: "That element which is imputed to be the water pitcher, but which is not: that thing which appears to be the water pitcher to the conceptual state of mind which is perceiving a water pitcher, but which is however not the water pitcher."

A classical example of a "general thing as far as objects" (or "actual mental image") does exist, because "the appearance, to the second instant of a conceptual state of mind which is perceiving a water pitcher, of the opposite of all that is not the water pitcher of the second instant" is just this kind of example.

ཚོགས་སྒྲིལ་མཚན་ཉིད་ཡོད་དེ། རང་གི་ཆ་ཤས་དུ་མ་འདུས་པའི་གཟུགས་རགས་པ་
དེ་དེ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར། མཚན་གཞི་ཡོད་དེ། བུམ་པ་དང་ཀ་བ་ལྟ་བུ་དེ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

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There does exist a definition of a "general thing as far as a collection of parts," because it is the following: "A gross physical object which is composed of its multiple parts."

Classical examples of a "general thing as far as a collection of parts" do exist, because a water pitcher or a pillar would each be one.

ཚོགས་སྡེ་དང་། རིགས་སྡེའི་གཞི་མཐུན་ཡོད་དེ། བུམ་པ་དེ་དེ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

There does exist one thing which is both a "general as far as a collection of parts" and a "general as far as types" (or "quality"), because the water pitcher would be one.

ཚོགས་སྡེ་མ་ཡིན་པ་དང་། རིགས་སྡེའི་གཞི་མཐུན་ཡོད་ཡོད་དེ། ཤེས་བྱ་དེ་དེ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

There does exist one thing which is both not a "general as far as a collection of parts" and yet still a "general as far as types" (or "quality"), because "knowable things" would be one.

རིགས་སྡེ་མ་ཡིན་པ་དང་། ཚོགས་སྡེའི་གཞི་མཐུན་ཡོད་དེ། ཀ་བུམ་གཉིས་དེ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

There does exist one thing which is both not a "general as far as types" (or "quality") and yet still a "general as far as a collection of parts," because the two of a pillar and a pitcher would be one.

རིགས་སྡེ་མ་ཡིན་པ་དང་། ཚོགས་སྡེ་མ་ཡིན་པའི་གཞི་མཐུན་ཡོད་དེ། རྟག་དངོས་གཉིས་དེ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

There does exist one thing which is neither a "general as far as types" ("quality") nor a "general as far as a collection of parts," because the two of "changing things" and "unchanging things" would be one.

བྱེ་བྲག་གི་མཆན་ཉིད་ཡོད་དེ། བྱང་བྱེད་དུ་འཕྱག་པའི་རང་གི་རིགས་ཡོད་པ་ཅན་གྱིས་ཆོས་དེ། རང་ཉིད་བྱེ་བྲག་ཡིན་པའི་མཆན་ཉིད་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

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There does exist a definition of a "member" (or "something characteristic of a particular quality"), because "an existing object which is an example of a particular type which subsumes it" is this very definition.

གསུམ་པ་རྩོད་པ་སྒྲོང་བ་ལ་ཁོ་ན་རེ། ཀ་བུམ་གཉིས་ཆོས་ཅན། སྤྱི་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ།
ཆོགས་སྤྱི་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར་ན་མ་བྱལ། ཏྲགས་གྲུབ་སྟེ། རྩལ་རྫས་བརྒྱད་འདུས་ཀྱི་གོང་
བྱ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

Here finally is the third part, eliminating any rebuttal concerning our position.

Suppose someone comes and makes the following claim:

Consider the two of a pillar and a water pitcher.
They are so something general,
Because they are generals in the sense of a collection of parts.

To this we answer, "It is not necessarily the case."

The reason though is correct, because they are units composed of molecules containing the eight substances, [which are: the four elements of earth, water, fire, and wind; and the four objects of visual form, smells, tastes, and touches].

འདོད་ན། དེ་ཆོས་ཅན། སྤྱི་མ་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ། བྱོད་ཀྱི་བྱེ་བྲག་མིད་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[Then I agree to your statement: I agree that the two of a pillar and a water pitcher are something general.]

Suppose you agree to our statement, [and agree that the two of a pillar and a water pitcher are something general].

It is not so, that they are something general, a general quality,
Because there is nothing which is characteristic of them.

མ་གྲུབ་ན། དེ་ཆོས་ཅན། དེར་ཐལ། བྱོད་ཡིན་པ་མི་སྤྱིད་པའི་ཤེས་བྱ་ཡིན་པའི་
ཕྱིར།

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[It's not correct to say that there is nothing which is characteristic of a pillar and a water pitcher.]

Suppose you say that it's not correct [to say that there is nothing which is characteristic of a pillar and a water pitcher].

Consider these same things.

It is so true, [that there is nothing which is characteristic of a pillar and a water pitcher],

Because they are a knowable object which is not.

ཡང་ཁོ་ན་རེ། ཤེས་བྱ་དེ་སྟི་མ་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ། དེ་ཤེས་བྱ་ཡིན་པའི་སྟི་མ་ཡིན་པའི་
སྟེར་ན་མ་བྱལ།

Suppose someone comes and makes the following claim:

Isn't it so, that "knowable objects" itself is not a quality?
Because isn't it not a quality of which that thing which is
"knowable objects" is characteristic?

Our answer is: "It doesn't necessarily follow."

མ་གྲུབ་ན། དེ་ཤེས་བྱ་ཡིན་པའི་སྟི་མ་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ། ཤེས་བྱ་ཡིན་པའི་སྟི་མེད་པའི་
སྟེར།

[It's not correct to say that "knowable objects" is not a quality of which
that thing which is "knowable objects" is characteristic.]

Suppose you say that it's not correct [to say that "knowable objects" is not a
quality of which that thing which is "knowable objects" is characteristic].

It is so true, that it is not a quality of which that thing which is "knowable
objects" is characteristic,

Because there exists no quality of which that thing which is "knowable objects"
is characteristic.

མ་གྲུབ་ན། དེར་ཐལ། ཤེས་བྱའི་སྟི་མེད་པ་གང་ཞིག །ཤེས་བྱ་དང་། ཤེས་བྱ་ཡིན་
པ་གཉིས་དོན་གཅིག་ཡིན་པའི་སྟེར།

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[It's not correct to say that there is no quality of which that thing which is "knowable objects" is characteristic.]

Suppose you say that it's not correct [to say that there is no quality of which that thing which is "knowable objects" is characteristic].

It is so [correct to say that there is no quality of which that thing which is "knowable objects" is characteristic],

Because (1) there exists no quality of which "knowable objects" is characteristic, and (2) "knowable objects" and "that thing which is knowable objects" are synonyms.

གོང་དུ་འདོད་ན། ཤེས་བྱ་ཚེས་ཅན། སྤྱི་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ། རང་གི་གསལ་བ་ལ་ཇེས་
སྟུ་འགྲོ་བའི་ཚེས་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[Then I agree to the statement above: "knowable objects" itself is not a quality.]

Suppose you agree to the statement above, [and say that "knowable objects" itself is not a quality].

Consider "knowable objects."

It is so a quality,

Because it is an existing thing which subsumes its members.

མ་གྲུབ་ན། དེ་ཚེས་ཅན། དེར་ཐལ། རང་གི་རིགས་ཅན་དུ་མ་ལ་ཇེས་སྟུ་འགྲོ་བའི་
ཚེས་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[It's not correct to say that "knowable objects" is an existing thing which subsumes its members.]

Suppose you say that it's not correct [to say that "knowable objects" is an existing thing which subsumes its members.]

Consider this same thing.

It is so [an existing thing which subsumes its members],

Because it is an existing thing which subsumes the multiple members which are of its type.

མ་གྲུབ་ན། དེ་ཚེས་ཅན། དེར་ཐལ། རང་གི་རིགས་ཅན་དུ་མ་ལ་ཇེས་སྟུ་འགྲོ་བའི་
ཕྱིར།

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[It's not correct to say that "knowable objects" is an existing thing which subsumes the multiple members which are of its type.]

Suppose you say that it's not correct [to say that "knowable objects" is an existing thing which subsumes the multiple members which are of its type.]

Consider this same thing.

It is so [an existing thing which subsumes the multiple members which are of its type],

Because it subsumes the multiple members which are of its type.

མ་གྲུབ་ན། དེ་ཆོས་ཅན། དེར་ཐལ། རྟག་དངོས་ཐམས་ཅད་ཁྱོད་ཀྱི་རིགས་སུ་
གཏོགས་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[It's not correct to say that "knowable objects" subsumes the multiple members which are of its type.]

Consider this same thing.

It is so true, [that it subsumes the multiple members which are of its type],

Because all objects, whether they are unchanging things or working things, are of its type.

ཡང་ཁོ་ན་རེ། ཤེས་བྱ་མ་ཡིན་པའི་སྒྱི་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ། མ་ཡིན་པ་ཤེས་བྱའི་བྱེ་བྲག་
ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར་ཟེར་ན་མ་བྲལ།

Suppose someone returns and makes the following claim:

Is it then so, that "knowable things" is a quality of which "not being" is characteristic?

Because "not being" is characteristic of the quality "knowable things."

Our answer is: "It's not necessarily the case."

འདོད་ན། ཤེས་བྱ་མ་ཡིན་པའི་སྒྱི་མ་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ། ཤེས་བྱ་མ་ཡིན་པའི་སྒྱི་ཡིན་ན་
གང་བླན་བླན་ཡིན་པས་བྲལ་པའི་ཕྱིར།

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[Then I agree to the statement: It is so, that "knowable things" is a quality of which "not being" is characteristic.]

Suppose you agree to the statement, [and say that "knowable things" is a quality of which "not being" is characteristic].

It is not so, that "knowable things" is a quality of which "not being" is characteristic,

Because if something were a quality of which something that was not a knowable thing were characteristic, then you could always make up anything at all.

ཡང་ཁོ་ན་རེ། གྱེ་བླག་མ་ཡིན་པའི་གྱེ་བླག་ཡོད་པར་ཐལ། སྟི་མ་ཡིན་པའི་སྟི་ཡོད་
པའི་ཕྱིར་ན་མ་བྱུང་།

Suppose again that someone makes the following claim:

It is so that there exists something which is characteristic
of something which is not characteristic of
something,

Because it is true that there exists something which is a
quality of something which is not a quality.

Our answer is, "It doesn't necessarily follow."

དྲགས་གྲུབ་སྟེ། ཤེས་བྱ་དེ་སྟི་མ་ཡིན་པའི་སྟི་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

It is correct by the way to say that there does exist something which is a
quality of something which is not a quality,

Because "knowable things" is something which is a quality of something which
is not a quality.

མ་གྲུབ་ན། ཤེས་བྱ་ཆོས་ཅན། སྟི་མ་ཡིན་པའི་སྟི་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ། སྟི་མ་ཡིན་པ་ཁྱོད་
ཀྱི་གྱེ་བླག་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[It's not correct to say that "knowable things" is something which is a
quality of something which is not a quality.]

Suppose you say that it's not correct [to say that "knowable things" is
something which is a quality of something which is not a quality].

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Consider "knowable things."

It is so a quality of something which is not a quality,

Because "something which is not a quality" is characteristic of it.

ཡང་ཁོ་ན་རེ། ཤེས་བྱ་ཆོས་ཅན། སྤྱི་མ་ཡིན་པའི་སྤྱི་མ་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ། སྤྱི་ཡིན་
པའི་སྤྱི་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར་ཟེར་ན་མ་ཁྱབ།

Suppose again that someone comes and makes the following claim:

Consider "knowable things."

It isn't so, that it is a quality of that which is not a quality,

Because it is a quality of that which is "quality."

Our answer is, "It doesn't necessarily follow."

རྟགས་བྱུང་སྟེ། སྤྱི་ཡིན་པ་ཁྱོད་ཀྱི་བྱེ་བྲག་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

It is true though to say that "knowable things" is a quality of that which is "quality," because "quality" is characteristic of it.

ཡང་ཁོ་ན་རེ། རྟག་པ་སྒྲ་མི་རྟག་པའི་བྱེ་བྲག་མ་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ། དངོས་པོ་སྒྲ་མི་རྟག་
པའི་བྱེ་བྲག་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར་ཟེར་ན་

Suppose someone comes again and makes the following claim:

Isn't it so, that "unchanging things" is not characteristic of
"sound is a changing thing"?

Because isn't it true, that "working things" is characteristic
of "sound is a changing thing"?

་་་མ་ཁྱབ་སྟེ། རྟག་པ་སྒྲ་མི་རྟག་པའི་བྱེ་བྲག་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ། སྒྲ་མི་རྟག་པ་རང་གི་
གསལ་བ་རྟག་པ་ལ་ཇེས་སུ་འགྲོ་བའི་ཆོས་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

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Our answer is, "It doesn't necessarily follow."

It is so true, that "unchanging things" is characteristic of "sound is a changing thing,"

Because "sound is a changing thing" is an existing thing which subsumes its member "unchanging things."

དེར་ཐལ། དེའི་གསལ་བ་ལ་རྟག་པ་ཡོད་པའི་ཕྱིར་ཏེ། དེའི་གསལ་བ་ལ་རྟག་དངོས་
གཉིས་ཀ་ཡོད་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[It's incorrect to say that "sound is a changing thing" is an existing thing which subsumes its member "unchanging things."]

It is so true [that "sound is a changing thing" is an existing thing which subsumes its member "unchanging things"],

Because it does have a member called "unchanging things."

And this is true because both "unchanging things" and "working things" are members that it has.

ཁོ་ན་རེ། ཡོད་པ་ཆོས་ཅན། བྱེ་བྲག་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ། བྱབ་བྱེད་དུ་འཇུག་པའི་རང་གི་
རིགས་ཡོད་པ་ཅན་གྱི་ཆོས་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར། དེར་ཐལ། བྱབ་བྱེད་དུ་འཇུག་པའི་ཡོད་
པ་ཡོད་པའི་ཕྱིར་ཟེར་ན་

Suppose someone comes and makes the following claim:

Consider "existing things."

So it must then be characteristic of something,

Because it is an existing object which is an example of a particular type which subsumes it.

[It's incorrect to say that it is an existing object which is an example of a particular type which subsumes it.]

It is so an existing object which is an example of a particular type which subsumes it,

Because there does exist an existence which subsumes it.

“མ་ཁྱབ་སྟེ། མཚན་ཉིད་ཀྱི་ཟུར་དུ་རང་གི་རིགས་ཡོད་པ་ཞེས་སྟོས་པ་ལ་དགོས་པ་
ཡོད་པའི་ཕྱིར།

Our answer is, "It doesn't necessary follow." And this is because there is a very important point served by saying the words "an example" in the definition of being characteristic of something.

*Formal logic subject:
Similar cases, dissimilar cases, and
"similar examples" in a logical statement*

གཉིས་པ་ཁྱབ་པའི་ལྟོས་གཞི་མཐུན་ཕྱོགས་དང་མི་མཐུན་ཕྱོགས་གཉིས་བཤད་པ་ལ།
དངོས་བཤད་པ་དང་། ཞར་ལ་མཐུན་དཔེ་དང་མི་མཐུན་དཔེ་བཤད་པ་གཉིས།

This brings us to the second section of our explanation of the pivotal objects: an explanation of the pivotal object in the necessary relationships between the quality to be proven and the reason—that is, the groups of similar cases and dissimilar cases. We will proceed in two steps: the actual explanation, and an incidental treatment of the similar example and the dissimilar example.

དང་པོ་ལ། མཚན་ཉིད། དབྱེ་བ། སྒྲ་བཤད་འཇུག་གི་སྒྲ་བཞི་ཅི་བ། མཐུན་ཕྱོགས་
དང་མི་མཐུན་ཕྱོགས་གཉིས་དངོས་འགལ་ཡིན་མིན་ལ་དཔྱད་པ་དང་བཞི།

The first of these comes in four parts of its own:

- 1) definitions;
- 2) divisions;
- 3) a calculation of the permutations based on whether the cases actually fit their name; and
- 4) an analysis of whether the groups of similar cases and dissimilar cases are directly contradictory or not.

དང་པོ་ལ་སྒྲ་མི་དྭག་པར་སྒྲུབ་པའི་བསྒྲུབ་ཚུལ་དང་མཐུན་པར་མི་དྭག་པས་མི་སྟོང་བ།

སྒྲིལ་མི་དྲག་པར་སྒྲུབ་པའི་མཐུན་ཕྱོགས་ཀྱི་མཚན་ཉིད། མི་དྲག་པ་དང་དེ་སྒྲུབ་ཀྱི་
མཐུན་ཕྱོགས་གཉིས་ཡིན་བྱུང་མཉམ་ཡིན།

Here is the first. The following is the definition of the group of similar cases in a proof that sounds are changing things:

All those things which are not void of the quality of being changing things, in keeping with the way in which sounds are proven to be changing things in any particular logical statement.

"Changing things" and the group of similar cases in just such a proof are such that to be one is always to automatically be the other.

དེ་སྒྲུབ་ཀྱི་བསྒྲུབ་ཚུལ་དང་མི་མཐུན་པར་མི་དྲག་པས་སྟོང་པ། དེ་སྒྲུབ་ཀྱི་མི་མཐུན་
ཕྱོགས་ཀྱི་མཚན་ཉིད། མི་དྲག་པ་མ་ཡིན་པ་དང་དེ་གཉིས་ཡིན་བྱུང་མཉམ་ཡིན།

The following is the definition of the group of dissimilar cases:

All those things which are void of the quality of being changing things, in keeping with the way in which this proof is made in the particular logical statement.

"All that is not a changing thing" and this same group are such that to be one is always to be the other.

གཉིས་པ་དེ་ལ་དབྱེ་ན། དེ་སྒྲུབ་ཀྱི་མིད་པ་མི་མཐུན་ཕྱོགས། གཞན་པ་མི་མཐུན་
ཕྱོགས། འགལ་བ་མི་མཐུན་ཕྱོགས་དང་གསུམ།

Here secondly are the divisions. The group of dissimilar cases can come in three different types:

- 1) The group of dissimilar cases that are not existing things;
- 2) The group of dissimilar cases that are something else; and
- 3) The group of dissimilar cases that are directly contradictory.

རི་བོང་རྩ་དང་པོ། །ཤེས་བྱ་གཉིས་པ། དྲག་པ་གསུམ་པ་ཡིན།

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An example of the first would be the horns on a rabbit's head. An example of the second would be "knowable things." An example of the third would be "unchanging things."

གསུམ་པ་ནི། དེ་སྐྱབ་ཀྱི་མཐུན་ཕྱོགས་ཡིན་ན། དེ་སྐྱབ་ཀྱི་མཐུན་ཕྱོགས་ཀྱི་སྒྲ་བཤད་
དུ་ཡོད་པས་བྱུང་བཅ་ཞེ་ན།

Here is the third part. One may ask the following:

If something is part of a group of similar cases in any particular proof, is it then necessarily part of such a group in such a way that it fits the name of the group?

འདི་ལ་མུ་གསུམ་སྟེ། དེ་སྐྱབ་ཀྱི་མཐུན་ཕྱོགས་ཡིན་ལ། དེ་སྐྱབ་ཀྱི་མཐུན་ཕྱོགས་ཀྱི་
སྒྲ་བཤད་དུ་མེད་པའི་མུ། གཉིས་ཀ་ཡིན་པའི་མུ། གཉིས་ཀ་མ་ཡིན་པའི་མུ་དང་
གསུམ།

Three of the permutations here hold. There do exist the following:

- 1) Something which is part of a group of similar cases in a particular proof, but which is not part of this group in such a way that it fits the name of the group;
- 2) Something which is both [part of a group of similar cases in a particular proof and which is also part of this group in such a way that it fits the name of the group]; and
- 3) Something which is neither [part of a group of similar cases nor part of this group in such a way that it fits the name of the group].

འདུས་མ་བྱས་ཀྱི་ནམ་མཁའ་དེ། སྒྲ་དྭག་པར་སྐྱབ་པའི་མཐུན་ཕྱོགས་ཡིན་ལ། དེ་
སྐྱབ་ཀྱི་མཐུན་ཕྱོགས་ཀྱི་སྒྲ་བཤད་དུ་མེད་པའི་མུ་ཡིན།

"That unproduced thing which is empty space" is an example of the first permutation: it is something which is part of a group of similar cases in a proof that sounds are unchanging things, but it is not part of this group in such a way that it fits the name of the group.

དེ་སྐབ་པ་ནི། དེ་ཆོས་ཅན། དེ་སྐབ་ཀྱི་མཐུན་ཕྱོགས་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ། ཏྲ་པ་ཡིན་
པའི་ཕྱིར། དེ་སྐབ་ཀྱི་མཐུན་ཕྱོགས་ཀྱི་སྒྲ་བཤད་དུ་མེད་དེ། དེ་དང་སྒྲ་གཉིས་ཏྲ་
པར་ཆོས་མི་མཐུན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

Here is a proof that this is true:

Consider this same thing [unproduced, empty space].

It is a part of the group of similar cases in the proof mentioned,
Because it is an unchanging thing.

It is not part of this group in such a way that it fits the
name of the group,
Because it is not a thing which is *similar* to sounds in the sense
that they are both unchanging things.

གཉིས་ཀ་ཡིན་པའི་སྒྲ་ནི། ལུ་པ་དེ་སྒྲ་མི་ཏྲ་པར་སྐབ་པའི་མཐུན་ཕྱོགས་དང་།
དེ་སྐབ་ཀྱི་མཐུན་ཕྱོགས་ཀྱི་སྒྲ་བཤད་དུ་ཡོད་པའི་སྒྲ་གཉིས་ཀ་ཡིན།

Now for the second permutation: something which is both. A water pitcher
is both something which is part of the group of similar cases in a proof that
sound is changing, and also something which is part of this group in such a
way that it fits the name of the group.

དེ་སྐབ་པ་ནི། ལུ་པ་ཆོས་ཅན། དེ་སྐབ་ཀྱི་མཐུན་ཕྱོགས་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ། མི་ཏྲ་པ་
ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར། དེ་ཆོས་ཅན། དེའི་སྒྲ་བཤད་དུ་ཡོད་དེ། ཁྱོད་དང་སྒྲ་གཉིས་མི་ཏྲ་
པར་ཆོས་མཐུན་པའི་ཕྱིར་ཏེ། ཁྱོད་ཀྱང་མི་ཏྲ་པ་ཡིན། སྒྲ་ཡང་མི་ཏྲ་པ་ཡིན་པའི་
ཕྱིར།

Here is a proof that this is true:

Consider a water pitcher.

It is so something which is part of the group of similar
cases of this same proof,
Because it is a changing thing.

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Consider this same thing.

It is a part of this group in such a way that it fits the name of the group,

Because it is a thing which is *similar* to sounds in the sense that they are both changing things: a water pitcher is a changing thing, and a sound is also a changing thing.

གཉིས་ཀ་མ་ཡིན་པའི་སྒྲིལ་ནི། འདུས་མ་བྱས་ཀྱི་ནམ་མཁའ་དེ། སྒྲ་མི་རྟག་པར་སྒྲུབ་
པའི་མཐུན་ཕྱོགས་མ་ཡིན་པ་དང་། དེ་སྒྲུབ་ཀྱི་མཐུན་ཕྱོགས་ཀྱི་སྒྲ་བཤད་དུ་མེད་པའི་
སྒྲ་གཉིས་ཀ་ཡིན།

Next is the permutation where something is neither. "The unproduced thing called 'empty space'" is something which is neither part of the group of similar cases in a proof that sound is a changing thing, nor a part of this group in such a way that it fits the name of the group.

དེ་སྒྲུབ་པ་ནི། དེ་ཆོས་ཅན། དེ་སྒྲུབ་ཀྱི་མཐུན་ཕྱོགས་མ་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ། མི་རྟག་པ་
མ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར། དེ་ཆོས་ཅན། དེའི་སྒྲ་བཤད་དུ་མེད་དེ། ཁྱོད་དང་སྒྲ་གཉིས་མི་
རྟག་པར་ཆོས་མི་མཐུན་པའི་ཕྱིར་ཏེ། ཁྱོད་རྟག་པ་གང་ཞིག །སྒྲ་མི་རྟག་པ་ཡིན་པའི་
ཕྱིར།

Here is a proof that this is true:

Consider this same thing.

It is so true, that it is not a part of the group of similar cases in this same proof,

Because it is not a changing thing.

Consider this same thing.

It is so true, that it is not a part of this same group in such a way that it fits the name of the group,

Because it is not a thing which is *similar* to sounds in the sense that they are both changing things: it is an unchanging thing, and sound is a changing thing.

དེ་སྐབ་ཀྱི་མཐུན་ཕྱོགས་ཀྱི་སྐྱབ་པ་འད་དུ་ཡོད་ལ། དེ་སྐབ་ཀྱི་མཐུན་ཕྱོགས་མ་ཡིན་པའི་
མུ་ནི་མེད་དེ། དེ་སྐབ་ཀྱི་མཐུན་ཕྱོགས་ཀྱི་སྐྱབ་པ་འད་དུ་ཡོད་ན། དེ་སྐབ་ཀྱི་མཐུན་
ཕྱོགས་ཡིན་དགོས་པའི་ཕྱིར།

There does not exist anything which would qualify as the final permutation; that is, something which was a part of the group of similar cases in such a way that it fit the name of the group, but which was not a part of the group of similar cases. This is because anything which is part of the group of similar cases in such a way that it fits the name of the group must also be part of the group of similar cases.

དེ་སྐབ་ཀྱི་མཐུན་ཕྱོགས་ཞེས་པའི་ཕྱོགས་དེ་ཡིན་ན་དེ་སྐབ་ཀྱི་བསྐྱབ་བྱའི་ཆོས་ཡིན་
པས་མ་བྱུང་སྟེ། སྐྱ་མི་རྟག་པར་སྐྱབ་པར་བྱེད་པའི་མཐུན་ཕྱོགས་ཞེས་པའི་ཕྱོགས་
དང་དེ་སྐབ་ཀྱི་མཐུན་ཕྱོགས་ལ་ཡོད་ཅེས་པའི་ཕྱོགས་གཉིས་མི་འདྲ་བར་འཛོལ་
དགོས་པའི་ཕྱིར།

When we speak of the "group" (*chok*) in the "group of similar cases" (*tunchok*) we are not necessarily speaking only of the quality to be proven in the particular proof. This is because we have to draw a distinction between the "group" in the "group of similar cases in a proof that sounds are changing things" and being *part* of the group of similar cases in the same proof. [This distinction has already been drawn for the reader in the translation above.]

མ་བྱུང་ན་སྟེ། མ་བྱུང་ན། དེར་ཐལ། སྐྱ་མི་རྟག་པར་སྐྱབ་པར་བྱེད་པའི་ཕྱོགས་ཀྱི་
རྗེས་སུ་དཔག་བྱ་འཕྲུགས་ཀྱི་སྐྱའི་འཇུག་གཞི་དེ་ལ་གསུམ་ཡོད་པ་ལས། དེ་སྐབ་
ཀྱི་ཕྱོགས་ཆོས་ཞེས་པའི་ཕྱོགས་དེ་དེ་སྐབ་ཀྱི་ཤེས་འདོད་ཆོས་ཅན་ལ་བྱེད། དེ་སྐབ་ཀྱི་
མཐུན་ཕྱོགས་ལ་ཡོད་མེད་ཅེས་པའི་ཕྱོགས་དེ་དང་དེ་སྐབ་ཀྱི་བྱུང་པའི་འབྲེལ་ཡུལ་གྱི་
ཕྱོགས་དེ་གཉིས་དེ་སྐབ་ཀྱི་བསྐྱབ་བྱའི་ཆོས་སམ་མི་རྟག་པའི་སྐྱི་ལྟོག་ལ་བྱེད་ཀྱང་།

དེ་སྐབ་ཀྱི་མཐུན་ཕྱོགས་ཞེས་པའི་ཕྱོགས་དེ་ལ་མི་དྲག་པའི་སྤྱི་ཕྱོག་དང་གཞི་ཕྱོག་
ཐམས་ཅད་འཛོག་དགོས་པའི་ཕྱིར།

It's easy to see how you would prove someone wrong if they replied, "It doesn't necessarily follow."

Suppose though you say,

It's not correct [to say that we have to draw a distinction between the "group" in the "group of similar cases in a proof that sounds are changing things" and being *part* of the group of similar cases in the same proof].

It is so correct to say this, because there are three different things that the word *chok* can make you think of—there are three different things that the word *chok* can refer to—when we speak of the "*chok*" in a proof that sounds are changing things. The *chok* in the word *chokchu* ("relationship between the subject and the reason") refers to the subject in the particular logical statement: the thing which the opponent doubts possesses the quality to be proven.

Then there are pair of further uses of this word: the *chok* we use when we are discussing whether or not something is part of the group of similar cases (*tunchok*), and the *chok* we use when we are discussing the object related to, within the necessary relationships in a logical statement (*kyappay drelyul gyi chok*). Both of these refer to the general type represented by the quality to be proven, or—in this case—the general type represented by "changing thing."

Finally there is the word *chok* as we use it in the expression "group of similar cases" (*tunchok*) itself. Here the word must be understood as referring to everything: to both the general type and the specific instance represented by "changing thing."

དེ་སྐབ་ཀྱི་མི་མཐུན་ཕྱོགས་ཀྱི་སྒྲ་བཤད་དུ་ཡོད་ན། དེ་སྐབ་ཀྱི་མི་མཐུན་ཕྱོགས་ཡིན་
པས་བྱུང་བམ་ཞེ་ན།

One may ask the following question:

If something is part of the group of dissimilar cases for a particular proof in such a way that it fits the name of the group, is it then always something which is part of the group of dissimilar cases for the particular proof?

འདི་ལ་སྤྱི་བཅུ་གསུམ་ཡོད་དེ། འདུས་མ་བྱས་ཀྱི་ནམ་མཁའ་དེ་སྒྲ་ཏྲག་པར་སྒྲུབ་པའི་མི་
མཐུན་ཕྱོགས་ཀྱི་སྒྲ་བཤད་དུ་ཡོད་ལ། དེ་སྒྲུབ་ཀྱི་མི་མཐུན་ཕྱོགས་མ་ཡིན་པའི་སྤྱི་
ཡིན།

Three permutations hold here. The unproduced thing which is empty space is an example of the permutation where something is part of the group of dissimilar cases in the proof that sounds are unchanging things in such a way that it fits the name of the group, but is not part of the group of dissimilar cases.

བུམ་པ་དེ་སྒྲ་མི་ཏྲག་པར་སྒྲུབ་པའི་གཉིས་ཀ་མ་ཡིན་པའི་སྤྱི་ཡིན།

A water pitcher would be an example of the permutation where something is neither, in a proof that sound is a changing thing.

འདུས་མ་བྱས་ཀྱི་ནམ་མཁའ་དེ་སྒྲ་མི་ཏྲག་པར་སྒྲུབ་པའི་མི་མཐུན་ཕྱོགས་ཀྱི་སྒྲ་བཤད་
དུ་ཡོད་ལ། དེ་སྒྲུབ་ཀྱི་མི་མཐུན་ཕྱོགས་ཀྱང་ཡིན་པའི་སྤྱི་ཡིན།

The unproduced thing which is empty space would be an example of the permutation where something is both part of the group of dissimilar cases in the proof that sounds are changing things in such a way that it fits the name of the group; and is also part of the group of dissimilar cases.

དེ་སྒྲུབ་ཀྱི་མི་མཐུན་ཕྱོགས་ཡིན་ལ། དེ་སྒྲུབ་ཀྱི་མི་མཐུན་ཕྱོགས་ཀྱི་སྒྲ་བཤད་དུ་མེད་
པའི་སྤྱི་ནི་མེད་དེ། དེ་སྒྲུབ་ཀྱི་མི་མཐུན་ཕྱོགས་ཡིན་ན། དེ་སྒྲུབ་ཀྱི་མི་མཐུན་ཕྱོགས་
ཀྱི་སྒྲ་བཤད་དུ་ཡོད་པས་བྱུང་པའི་ཕྱིར།

One permutation here does not hold: where something is part of the group of dissimilar cases in the particular proof, but not part of the group of dissimilar cases for the particular proof in such a way that it fits the name of the group. This is because anything that is part of the group of dissimilar cases in a particular proof is always part of the group of dissimilar cases in the particular proof in such a way that it fits the name of the group.

གཞི་པ་མཐུན་སྟོན་དང་མི་མཐུན་སྟོན་གཉིས་དངོས་འགལ་ཡིན་མིན་ལ་དབྱེད་པ་
ནི། མཐུན་སྟོན་དེ་ནི་མི་མཐུན་སྟོན་དང་དངོས་འགལ་ཡིན་ཀྱང་། མི་མཐུན་
སྟོན་མཐུན་སྟོན་དང་དངོས་འགལ་མ་ཡིན་ཏེ། མི་མཐུན་སྟོན་མིད་པའི་ཕྱིར།

Here lastly is the fourth point: an analysis of whether the groups of similar cases and dissimilar cases are directly contradictory or not. The group of similar cases stands in direct contradiction to the group of dissimilar cases, but the group of dissimilar cases does not stand in direct contradiction to the group of similar cases. This is because the group of dissimilar cases does not exist.

གཞི་གྲུབ་ན། མཐུན་སྟོན་ཡིན་པས་བྱུང་པའི་ཕྱིར་ཏེ། གཞི་གྲུབ་ན། ཉགས་ཡང་
དག་གི་མཐུན་སྟོན་ཡིན་པས་བྱུང་པའི་ཕྱིར་ཏེ། གཞི་གྲུབ་ན། སྒྲ་ཤེས་བྱར་སྒྲུབ་
པའི་ཉགས་ཡང་དག་གི་མཐུན་སྟོན་ཡིན་པས་བྱུང་པའི་ཕྱིར།

And this is true because any object which can be established as existing is always part of a group of similar cases. And this is because any object which can be established as existing is always a part of a group of similar cases for some correct reason. And this is because any object which can be established as existing is always a part of the group of similar cases for a correct reason in the proof that sound in a knowable thing.

དེ་ལ་ཁོ་ན་རེ། མི་མཐུན་སྟོན་ཡོད་པར་ཐལ། སྒྲ་མི་ཉག་པར་སྒྲུབ་པར་བྱེད་པའི་
མི་མཐུན་སྟོན་ཡོད་པའི་ཕྱིར་དང་། ཆོས་མི་མཐུན་སྟོན་གྱི་སྒྲུབ་དག་ཡང་དག་ཀྱང་
ཡོད་པའི་ཕྱིར་ན་མ་བྱུང་བོ།

On this point, someone might come and make the following claim:

It is so true, that the group of dissimilar cases exists,
Because there does exist a group of dissimilar cases for the
proof that sounds are changing things; and also
because there does exist a "correct statement of
proof that relates to what is dissimilar."

Our answer would be: it doesn't necessary follow.

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[An actual example of a "correct statement of proof that relates to what is dissimilar" would be the following:

Things that are unchanging are always things that are not made—

*It's like the example of empty space, an unproduced thing;
And so, sounds are things that are made.]*

ཁགཉིས་པ་ཞུར་ལ་མཐུན་དཔེ་དང་མི་མཐུན་དཔེ་བཤད་པ་ལ།

Here is the second major topic—an incidental treatment of the similar example and the dissimilar example.

མཐུན་དཔེར་བཟུང་བ། མཐུན་དཔེའི་མཚན་ཉིད། བདག་མིད་ཡིན་ན། དེ་ཡིན་པས་
བྱབ་སྟེ། གཞི་གྲུབ་ན། དེ་ཡིན་པས་བྱབ། གཞི་མ་གྲུབ་ན་ཡང་དེ་ཡིན་པས་བྱབ་
པའི་ཕྱིར།

The definition of a similar example is: "Anything considered a similar example." Anything that lacks a self-nature is always a similar example, because anything which can be established as existing [that is, which does exist,] is always a similar example, and anything which cannot be established as existing [that is, which doesn't exist,] is also always a similar example.

དང་པོ་དེར་ཐལ། ཐུམ་པ་དེ་དེ་ཡིན་པ་གང་ཞིག །མཚུངས་པའི་ཕྱིར། ཁགཉིས་པ་
དེར་ཐལ། རི་བོང་གི་རྩ་དེ་དེ་ཡིན་པ་གང་ཞིག །མཚུངས་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[The first part of your statement is not correct.]

It is so true, that the first part of our statement is correct,
Because "water pitcher" is one [similar example], and it is equivalent [to the case in question].

[The second part of your statement is not correct.]

It is so true, that the second part of our statement is correct,
Because "the horns on the head of a rabbit" is one [similar example], and it is equivalent [to the case in question].

དང་པོ་མ་གྲུབ་ན། རི་བོང་རྩ་ཆོས་ཅན། དེར་ཐལ། སྐྱ་མི་ཏྲག་པར་སྐྱབ་པའི་མཐུན་
དཔེར་བཟུང་བའི་ཕྱིར་ཏེ། སྐྱ་ཆོས་ཅན། མི་ཏྲག་སྟེ། བྱས་པའི་ཕྱིར། དཔེར་ན་བྱོད་
བཞིན་ཞེས་པའི་སྒྱུར་བ་ཡང་ཡོད། བྱས་ན། མི་ཏྲག་པས་བྲུབ། དཔེར་ན། བྱོད་
བཞིན་ཞེས་པའི་སྐྱབ་ངག་ཀྱང་ཡོད་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[The first part of your latest statement is not correct.]

Suppose you say that the first part of our last statement is not correct.

Consider the horns on the head of a rabbit.

They are too [a similar example],

Because they can be considered a similar example in a proof that sounds are
changing things.

And this is true because there could exist a logical statement where someone
said:

Consider sounds.

They are changing things,

Because they are things that are made;

It's just like the example of those [horns on a rabbit's
head].

It is also true because there could exist a statement of proof where someone
said:

Anything that is made

Is always something that is changing;

It's just like the example of those [horns on a rabbit's head].

སྐྱ་མི་ཏྲག་པར་སྐྱབ་པའི་མཐུན་དཔེར་བཟུང་བ། སྐྱ་མི་ཏྲག་པར་སྐྱབ་པའི་མཐུན་
དཔེའི་མཚན་ཉིད། བདག་མེད་ཡིན་ན། དེ་ཡིན་པས་བྲུབ་སྟེ། གཞི་གྲུབ་ན་ཞེས་
སོགས་རིགས་འགྲེ། བྱས་པའི་ཏྲགས་ལ་ཡང་སྒྱུར་བར་བྱའོ།

Here is the definition of a similar example in a proof that sounds are changing
things:

Anything that can be considered a similar example in a proof that
sounds are changing things.

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Anything that lacks a nature of its own is always just such an example,
Because anything that can be established as existing...(and then you can just
follow the same pattern as above). You can apply all this as well to a
proof where "because it is something made" is used as the reason for the
same assertion.

མི་མཐུན་དཔེར་བཟུང་བ། མི་མཐུན་དཔེའི་མཚན་ཉིད་མ་ཡིན་ཏེ། མི་མཐུན་དཔེ་མེད་
པའི་ཕྱིར་ཏེ། གཞི་གྲུབ་ན། མཐུན་དཔེ་ཡང་དག་ཡིན་པས་བྱུང་པའི་ཕྱིར།

"Anything which is considered a dissimilar example" is not, however, the
definition of a dissimilar example. This is because no dissimilar example
exists: anything that can be established as existing is always a correct similar
example.

འོན་ཀྱང་སྒྲི་མི་དྲག་པར་སྒྲུབ་པའི་མི་མཐུན་དཔེ་ཡང་དག་ནི་ཡོད་པ་གོང་དུ་བསྟུགས་
ཟིན།

There does however exist a correct dissimilar example for the proof that
sounds are changing things; we've established all this already, earlier on.

The forms of debate:
The Two Responses to a Statement of a Reason

The great beauty of debate is that, assuming both parties stick to the rules of
logic, *we must arrive at truth*. If the attacker in any particular exchange poses
a series of questions in a correct, logical order, all the defender must do is give
very simple answers reflecting his own beliefs—answers like "yes," or
"no"—and sooner or later the truth will out. This is much like the way in
which a computer program works, with switches at each logical decision point,
turned "on" or "off" to indicate "yes" or "no"—and then continue on to this
branch, and answer "yes" or "no," until the flowchart takes you where you
must eventually go.

In an actual debate, the attacker will give his assertion in three parts: the
statement of the subject, the quality to be proven about the subject, and the
reason why this quality must be one that the subject possesses. He or she
might say, for example,

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Consider sounds.
They are changing things,
Because they are something hot to touch.

སྒྲ་ཚུལ་ཅན།
མི་དྭགས་སྟེ།
ཚ་བའི་རིག་བྱ་ཡིན་པའི་བྱིར།

Here "sounds" are the subject, "being a changing thing" is the quality we are trying to prove about them, and "because they are things that are something hot to touch" is the full statement of the reason we give to prove that this quality does apply to the subject in question.

This is the most common form of logical statement in a Buddhist debate, and in Tibetan ends with the word *chir*, which is the word for "because." (In Tibetan sentence order, the "because" comes at the end.) A defender who hears a statement ending in *chir* immediately begins to think of two possible answers.

The first answer is *tak ma drup* (*rtags ma grub*), which basically means, "the reason you gave doesn't apply to the subject." In our case above this is to say, "It's incorrect to say that sounds are something hot to touch."

Suppose that the attacker had instead made the following statement:

Consider sounds.
They are changing things,
Because they exist.

སྒྲ་ཚུལ་ཅན།
མི་དྭགས་སྟེ།
ཡོད་པའི་བྱིར།

Here it would be incorrect to answer *tak ma drup*, or "the reason you gave doesn't apply to the subject," because it is true that "existing" applies to "sounds"—that is, sounds do exist. Instead, the defender would answer *kyappa ma jung* (*khyab pa ma byung*), or "it doesn't necessarily follow." This is the same

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as saying, "I admit it's true that sounds exist, but it doesn't necessarily follow then that they have to be changing things." After all, there are things—like emptiness or empty space—which exist but are not changing things.

Both of these answers are equivalent to saying "no," but for different reasons. They are the two classic answers because, if we assume a debate is about to take place, the attacker should begin with something to argue about—something the defender does not accept.

There are times in a debate though where an attacker is attempting to establish a certain context—trying to get the defender to accept one thing in order to go on to something else that he or she does not accept. An example would be the following:

Consider sounds.
They are changing things,
Because they are things that are made.

སྒྲ་ཆོས་ཅན།
མི་དྭག་པ་ཡིན་ཏེ།
བྱས་པ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

This is a correct statement, and so the defender answers "yes" or "right." The way to give such an answer in the Tibetan language is to simply repeat the verb that the opponent has used in his or her statement. With this last statement, for example, the defender would simply say, *Yin!*—or "They are!" meaning, "Yes! They are things that are made!"

The last thing to know about these answers is: *Think carefully before you choose which one to say!* It's quite acceptable in a debate to mull over your opening response carefully, since this already decides which side of the truth you will end up at, when both you and your opponent reach the inevitable conclusion of the flowchart.

The Asian Classics Institute Course XIII: The Art of Reasoning

Reading Four: Causes and Results

Selection from the collected topics: **Causes and Results**

The selection here is from the monastic textbook entitled An Explanation of the Science of Logic, included in the Advanced Path of Reasoning, a Section from the "Key to the Logic Machine," a Presentation of the Collected Topics which Clarifies the Meaning of the Great Scriptures on Valid Perception (Tsad-ma'i gzhung-don 'byed-pa'i bsdus-grva'i nam-par bshad-pa rigs-lam 'phrul gyi lde'u-mig las rigs-lam che-ba rtags-rigs kyi skor). The text was written by Purbuchok Jampa Tsultrim Gyatso (1825-1901), who in his day held the position of Tutor to the Dalai Lama.

Please note that indented statements are usually those given by the opponent. Responses within brackets are those that are usually left unwritten in the Tibetan text, and are understood to be there because of the context following each.

༥ །ཕྱེད་པ་རྒྱ་འབྲས་རྒྱུ་རྟེན་རྣམ་བཞག་བཤད་པ་ལ། དགག་བཞག་སྟོང་གསུམ་
ལས།

Here is the fifth section, which is the more elementary presentation on causes and results. For this presentation we will first refute the position of our opponents, then present our own position, and then finally eliminate their rebuttal.

དང་པོ་ལ། ཁ་ཅིག་ན་རེ། གཞི་གྲུབ་ན། རྒྱ་འབྲས་གང་རུང་ཡིན་པས་བྱུང་བེད་ན།

Here is the first. Suppose someone comes and makes the following claim:

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Anything which can be established as existing is always either a cause, a result, or both.

ཤེས་བྱ་ཆོས་ཅན། དེར་ཐལ། དེའི་ཕྱིར།

Consider "knowable things."

So is it then [always either a cause, a result, or both]?

Because it is [a thing which can be established as existing].

མ་གྲུབ་ན། དེ་ཆོས་ཅན། དེར་ཐལ། ཚད་མས་གྲུབ་པ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[It's incorrect to say that it is a thing which can be established as existing.]

Suppose you say that it's incorrect [to say that "knowable things" is a thing which can be established as existing].

Consider this same thing.

It is so [a thing which can be established as existing],

Because it can be established through valid perception as existing.

ཚུ་བར་འདོད་ན། དེ་ཆོས་ཅན། རྒྱ་འབྲས་གང་རུང་མ་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ། དངོས་པོ་མ་
ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[Then I agree with your original statement: "knowable things" is always either a cause, a result, or both.]

Suppose you agree with our original statement.

Consider this same thing.

It is not so, that "knowable things" is either a cause, a result, or both;

Because it is not a working thing.

མ་གྲུབ་ན། དེ་ཆོས་ཅན། དེར་ཐལ། རྟག་པ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[It's not correct to say "knowable things" is not a working thing.]

Suppose you say that it's not correct [to say that "knowable things" is not a working thing].

Consider this same thing.

It is so true [that it's not a working thing],

Because it is an unchanging thing.

ཁ་ཅིག་ན་རེ། རྒྱ་ཡིན་ན། འབྲས་བྱ་མ་ཡིན་པས་བྱ་བ་ཟེར་ན།

Suppose someone comes and makes the following claim:

Anything which is a cause can never be a result.

དངོས་པོ་ཆོས་ཅན། དེར་ཐལ། དེའི་ཕྱིར། བྱ་བ་པ་ཁས།

Consider a working thing.

So is it then true [that it can never be a result]?

Because it is [a cause].

[It doesn't necessarily follow.]

But you have already agreed that it does necessarily follow.

མ་གྲུབ་ན། དེ་ཆོས་ཅན། དེར་ཐལ། བྱེད་ཀྱི་འབྲས་བྱ་ཡོད་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[It's not correct to say that a working thing is a cause.]

Suppose you say that it's not correct [to say that a working thing is a cause].

Consider this same thing.

It is so [a cause],

Because it has its own result.

མ་གྲུབ་ན། དེ་ཆོས་ཅན། དེར་ཐལ། དངོས་པོའི་ཕྱི་ལོགས་སུ་བྱུང་བ་དེ། བྱེད་ཀྱི་
འབྲས་བྱ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[It's not correct to say that a working thing has its own result.]

Suppose you say that it's not correct [to say that a working thing has its own result].

Consider this same thing.

It does so [have its own result],

Because the working thing as it will be the moment after it is the result of the working thing.

མ་གྲུབ་ན། དེ་ཆོས་ཅན། བྱེད་ཀྱི་ཕྱི་ལོགས་སུ་བྱུང་བ་བྱེད་ཀྱི་འབྲས་བྱ་ཡིན་པར་

ཐལ། ཁྱོད་འདུས་བྱས་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[It's not correct to say that the working thing as it will be the moment after it is the result of the working thing.]

Suppose you say that it's not correct [to say that the working thing as it will be the moment after it is the result of the working thing].

Consider this same thing.

It is so true that the working thing as it will be the moment after it is the result of the working thing,

Because it is a produced thing.

ཅུ་བར་འདོད་ན། དེ་ཆོས་ཅན། འབྲས་བྱ་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ། ཁྱོད་ཀྱི་རྒྱ་ཡོད་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[Then I agree with your original statement: a working thing can never be a result.]

Suppose you agree with our original statement; [that is, suppose you say that a working thing can never be a result].

Consider this same thing.

It is so a result,

Because it has its own cause.

མ་གྲུབ་ན། དེ་ཆོས་ཅན། དེར་ཐལ། ཁྱོད་ཀྱི་སྒྲ་ལོགས་སུ་བྱུང་བ་དེ། ཁྱོད་ཀྱི་རྒྱ་
ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[It's not correct to say that a working thing has its own cause.]

Suppose you say that it's not correct [to say that a working thing has its own cause].

Consider this same thing.

It does so [have its own cause],

Because the working thing as it was the moment before it is its cause.

མ་གྲུབ་ན། དེ་ཆོས་ཅན། དེར་ཐལ། ཁྱོད་དངོས་པོ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[It's not correct to say that the working thing as it was the moment before it is its cause.]

Suppose you say that it's not correct [to say that the working thing as it was the moment before it is its cause].

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Consider this same thing.

It is so true, [that the working thing as it was the moment before it is its cause],

Because it is a working thing.

ཁ་ཅིག་ན་རེ། དངོས་སྐྱུ་ཡིན་ན། བསྐྱེད་སྐྱུ་མ་ཡིན་པས་བྱུང་བ་ཟེར་ན།

Suppose someone comes and makes the following claim:

Nothing which is a direct cause can ever be an indirect cause.

དངོས་པོ་ཆོས་ཅན། དེར་ཐལ། དེའི་ཕྱིར།

Consider a working thing.

Is it then so, [that it can never be an indirect cause]?

Because it is [a direct cause].

མ་གྲུབ་ན། དེ་ཆོས་ཅན། དེར་ཐལ། དངོས་པོའི་ཕྱི་ལོགས་སུ་བྱུང་བའི་དངོས་སྐྱུ་
ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[It's not correct to say that a working thing is a direct cause.]

Suppose you say that it's not correct [to say that a working thing is a direct cause].

Consider this same thing.

It is so [a direct cause],

Because it is a direct cause for the working thing as it will be the moment after it.

མ་གྲུབ་ན། དེ་ཆོས་ཅན། བྱེད་བྱེད་ཀྱི་ཕྱི་ལོགས་སུ་བྱུང་བའི་དངོས་སྐྱུ་ཡིན་པར་
ཐལ། བྱེད་དངོས་པོ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[It's not correct to say that a working thing is a direct cause for the working thing as it will be the moment after it.]

Suppose you say that it's not correct [that a working thing is a direct cause for the working thing as it will be the moment after it].

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Consider this same thing.

It is so a direct cause for the working thing as it will be the moment after it,
Because it's a working thing.

ཅུ་བར་འདོད་ན། དེ་ཆོས་ཅན། བརྒྱད་རྒྱ་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ། དངོས་པོའི་ཕྱི་ལོགས་སུ་
བྱུང་བའི་ཕྱི་ལོགས་སུ་བྱུང་བའི་བརྒྱད་རྒྱ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[Then I agree with your original statement: a working
thing can never be an indirect cause.]

Suppose you agree to our original statement.

Consider this same thing.

It is so an indirect cause,

Because it is an indirect cause of the working thing as it will be the moment
after the working thing as it will be the moment after it.

མ་གྲུབ་ན། དེ་ཆོས་ཅན། ཁྱོད་ཁྱོད་ཀྱི་ཕྱི་ལོགས་སུ་བྱུང་བའི་ཕྱི་ལོགས་སུ་བྱུང་བའི་
བརྒྱད་རྒྱ་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ། ཁྱོད་འདུས་བྱས་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[It's not correct to say that a working thing is an indirect cause of the
working thing as it will be the moment after the working thing
as it will be the moment after it.]

Suppose you say that it's not correct [to say that a working thing is an indirect
cause of the working thing as it will be the moment after the working
thing as it will be the moment after it].

Consider this same thing.

It is so an indirect cause of the working thing as it will be the moment after
the working thing as it will be the moment after it,

Because it is a produced thing.

ཁ་ཅིག་ན་རེ། དངོས་འབྲས་ཡིན་ན། བརྒྱད་འབྲས་མ་ཡིན་པས་ཁྱབ་ཟེར་ན།

Suppose someone comes and makes the following claim:

Nothing which is a direct result can ever be an indirect
result.

དངོས་པོ་ཆོས་ཅན། དེར་ཐལ། དེའི་ཕྱིར།

Consider a working thing.
So can it never then be [an indirect result]?
Because it is [a direct result].

མ་གྲུབ་ན། དེ་ཆོས་ཅན། དེར་ཐལ། དངོས་པོའི་སྔ་ལོགས་སུ་བྱུང་བའི་དངོས་
འབྲས་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[It's not correct to say that a working thing is a direct result.]

Suppose you say that it's not correct [to say that a working thing is a direct
result].

Consider this same thing.

It is so [a direct result],

Because a working thing is a direct result of the working thing as it was the
moment before it.

མ་གྲུབ་ན། དེ་ཆོས་ཅན། ཁྱོད་ཁྱོད་ཀྱི་སྔ་ལོགས་སུ་བྱུང་བའི་དངོས་འབྲས་ཡིན་པར་
ཐལ། ཁྱོད་བྱས་པ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[It's not correct to say that a working thing is a direct result of the
working thing as it was the moment before it.]

Suppose you say that it's not correct [to say that a working thing is a direct
result of the working thing as it was the moment before it].

Consider this same thing.

It is so a direct result of the working thing as it was the moment before it,

Because it's a thing which is made.

ཅུ་བར་འདོད་ན། དེ་ཆོས་ཅན། བརྒྱད་འབྲས་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ། དངོས་པོའི་སྔ་ལོགས་
སུ་བྱུང་བའི་སྔ་ལོགས་སུ་བྱུང་བའི་བརྒྱད་འབྲས་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[Then I agree with your original statement: a working
thing can never be an indirect result.]

Suppose you agree with our original statement.

Consider this same thing.

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It is so an indirect result,
Because it is an indirect result of the working thing as it was the moment
before the working thing as it was the moment before it.

མ་གྲུབ་ན། དེ་ཚེས་ཅན། ཁྱོད་ཁྱོད་ཀྱི་སྔ་ལོགས་སུ་བྱུང་བའི་སྔ་ལོགས་སུ་བྱུང་བའི་
བརྒྱུད་འབྲས་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ། ཁྱོད་འདུས་བྱས་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[It's not correct to say that a working thing is an indirect result of the
working thing as it was the moment before the working thing as
it was the moment before it.]

Suppose you say that it's not correct [to say that a working thing is an indirect
result of the working thing as it was the moment before the working
thing as it was the moment before it].

Consider this same thing.

It is so [an indirect result of the working thing as it was the moment before the
working thing as it was the moment before it],

Because it is a thing that was produced.

ཁ་ཅིག་ན་རེ། དངོས་པོའི་རྒྱ་ཡིན་ན། དངོས་པོའི་དངོས་རྒྱ་ཡིན་པས་བྱུང་བའི་ན།

Suppose someone comes and makes the following claim:

Anything that is a cause for a working thing is always a direct
cause for the working thing.

དངོས་པོའི་སྔ་ལོགས་སུ་བྱུང་བའི་སྔ་ལོགས་སུ་བྱུང་བ་ཚེས་ཅན། དེར་ཐལ། དེའི་
ཕྱིར། བྱུང་བ་ཁས།

Consider the working thing as it was the moment before the working thing as
it was the moment before it.

So is it then [a direct cause for the working thing]?

Because it is [a cause for the working thing].

[It doesn't necessarily follow.]

But you already agreed that it does necessarily follow.

མ་གྲུབ་ན། དེ་ཚེས་ཅན། དེར་ཐལ། དངོས་པོའི་སྔ་ལོགས་སུ་བྱུང་བ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[It's not correct to say that the working thing as it was the moment before the working thing as it was the moment before it is a cause for the working thing.]

Suppose you say that it's not correct [to say that the working thing as it was the moment before the working thing as it was the moment before it is a cause for the working thing].

Consider this same thing.

It is so [a cause for the working thing],

Because it is the working thing as it was the moment before it.

ཅུ་བར་འདོད་ན། དེ་ཚེས་ཅན། དངོས་པོའི་དངོས་སྐྱུ་མ་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ། དངོས་པོའི་
བརྒྱུད་སྐྱུ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[Then I agree to your original statement: the working thing as it was the moment before the working thing as it was the moment before it is a direct cause for the working thing.]

Suppose you agree to our original statement, [which is to say, the working thing as it was the moment before the working thing as it was the moment before it is a direct cause for the working thing].

Consider this same thing.

It is not so, [that it is a direct cause of the working thing],

Because it is an indirect cause of the working thing.

མ་གྲུབ་ན། དེ་ཚེས་ཅན། དེར་ཐལ། དངོས་པོ་བྱོད་ཀྱི་བརྒྱུད་འབྲས་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[It's not correct to say that it is an indirect cause of the working thing.]

Suppose you say that it's not [an indirect cause of the working thing.]

Consider this same thing.

It is so [an indirect cause of the working thing],

Because the working thing is its indirect result.

མ་གྲུབ་ན། དངོས་པོ་རང་གི་སྔ་ལོགས་སུ་བྱུང་བའི་སྔ་ལོགས་སུ་བྱུང་བའི་བརྒྱུད་
འབྲས་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ། དངོས་པོ་རྣམས་རང་གི་སྔ་ལོགས་སུ་བྱུང་བའི་སྔ་ལོགས་སུ་

གྲུང་བའི་བརྒྱུད་འབྲས་དང་རང་གི་སྒྲ་ལོགས་སུ་གྲུང་བའི་དངོས་འབྲས་སུ་འཛོག་
ཅིང་། དངོས་པོ་རྣམས་རང་གི་སྒྲ་ལོགས་སུ་གྲུང་བའི་སྒྲ་ལོགས་སུ་གྲུང་བ་རང་གི་
བརྒྱུད་ཀྱི་དང་། རང་གི་སྒྲ་ལོགས་སུ་གྲུང་བ་རང་གི་དངོས་རྒྱུ་འཛོག་དགོས་པའི་
ཕྱིར།

[It's not correct to say that a working thing is an indirect result of the working thing as it was the moment before the working thing as it was the moment before it.]

Suppose you say that it's not correct to say [that a working thing is an indirect result of the working thing as it was the moment before the working thing as it was the moment before it].

It is so true, that a working thing is an indirect result of the working thing as it was the moment before the working thing as it was the moment before it,

Because working things are established as being the indirect results of the working things as they were the moment before the working things as they were the moment before them; and as the direct results of the working things as they were the moment before them. And working things as they were the moment before the working things as they were the moment before them are established as being the indirect causes of working things, while working things as they were the moment before them are established as being the direct causes of those working things.

ཁ་ཅིག་ན་རེ། དངོས་པོའི་དངོས་འབྲས་ཡིན་ན། དངོས་པོ་ལས་དངོས་སུ་སྐྱེས་པའི་
འབྲས་བྱ་ཡིན་པས་བྱ་བ་ཟེར་ན།

Suppose someone comes and makes the following claim:

Anything which is the direct result of a working thing must always be a result corresponding to that which has grown directly from the working thing.

དངོས་པོའི་ཕྱི་ལོགས་སུ་གྲུང་བ་ཆོས་ཅན། དེར་ཐལ། དེའི་ཕྱིར། བྱ་བ་པ་ཁས།

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Consider the working thing as it will be the moment after it.
So is it then [a result corresponding to that which has grown directly from the
working thing]?
Because it is [a direct result of the working thing].

[It doesn't necessarily follow.]

But you already agreed that it does necessarily follow.

མ་གྲུབ་ན། དངོས་པོ་ཆོས་ཅན། ཁྱོད་ཀྱི་ཕྱི་ལོགས་སུ་བྱུང་བ་ཁྱོད་ཀྱི་དངོས་འབྲས་
ཡིན་པར་ཐལ། ཁྱོད་མི་དྲག་པ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[It's not correct to say that a working thing as it will be the moment
after it is a direct result of the working thing.]

Suppose you say that it's not correct [to say that a working thing as it will be
the moment after it is a direct result of the working thing].
It is so true, that a working thing as it will be the moment after it is a direct
result of the working thing,
Because it is a changing thing.

ཅུ་བར་འདོད་ན། དངོས་པོའི་ཕྱི་ལོགས་སུ་བྱུང་བ་ཆོས་ཅན། དངོས་པོ་ལས་དངོས་
སུ་སྐྱེས་པའི་འབྲས་བྱ་མ་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ། དངོས་པོ་ལས་དངོས་སུ་སྐྱེས་པ་དང་དུས་
མཉམ་དུ་བྱུང་བ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[Then I agree to your original statement: a working thing as it will be
the moment after it is a result corresponding to that which has
grown directly from the working thing.]

Suppose you agree to our original statement, [and say that a working thing as
it will be the moment after it is a result corresponding to that which has
grown directly from the working thing.]

Consider a working thing as it will be the moment after it.
It is not a result corresponding to that which has grown directly from the
working thing,
Because it is something which occurs at the same time as that which has
grown directly from the working thing.

མ་གྲུབ་ན། དེ་ཆོས་ཅན། དེར་ཐལ། དངོས་པོའི་དངོས་འབྲས་དང་དུས་མཉམ་དུ་
སྐྱེས་པ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[It's not correct to say that a working thing as it will be the moment after it is something which occurs at the same time as that which has grown directly from the working thing.]

Suppose you say that it's not correct [to say that a working thing as it will be the moment after it, is something which occurs at the same time as that which has grown directly from the working thing].

Consider this same thing.

It is so [something which occurs at the same time as that which has grown directly from the working thing],

Because it is something which grows at the same time as the direct result of the working thing.

དེར་ཐལ། དངོས་པོའི་བྱི་ལོགས་སུ་བྱུང་བ་གྲུབ་ན། དངོས་པོའི་དངོས་འབྲས་མ་
སྐྱེས་པའི་དུས་ཀྱང་མེད། དངོས་པོའི་དངོས་འབྲས་གྲུབ་ན། དངོས་པོའི་བྱི་ལོགས་
སུ་བྱུང་བ་མ་སྐྱེས་པའི་དུས་ཀྱང་མེད་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[It's not correct to say that a working thing as it will be the moment after it is something which grows at the same time as the direct result of the working thing.]

It is so [something which grows at the same time as the direct result of the working thing],

Because (1) there is no point in time where the working thing as it will be the moment after it has already occurred, but where the direct result of the working thing has yet to grow; and (2) neither is there any point in time where the direct result of a working thing has already occurred, but where the working thing as it will be the moment after it has yet to grow.

ཁ་ཅིག་ན་རེ། བུས་པའི་སྐུ་ཡིན་ན། བུས་པའི་ཉར་ལེན་ཡིན་པས་བྱུང་བ་ཟེར་ན།

Suppose someone comes and makes the following claim:

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Anything which is the cause of a water pitcher is always a material cause of the water pitcher.

བུམ་པའི་རྒྱུ་རྒྱུ་བའི་སྐྱེས་བྱ་ཆོས་ཅན། བུམ་པའི་ཉེར་ལེན་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ། བུམ་
པའི་རྒྱུ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར། བྱེད་པ་ཁས།

Consider an individual who acts as a cause for a water pitcher.
So is he then a material cause of the water pitcher?
Because he is a cause for the water pitcher.

[It doesn't necessarily follow.]

But you already agreed that it does necessarily follow.

མ་གྲུབ་ན། དེ་ཆོས་ཅན། དེར་ཐལ། བུམ་པའི་ལྷན་ཅིག་བྱེད་རྒྱུ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[It's not correct to say that an individual who acts as a cause for a water pitcher is a cause for the water pitcher.]

Suppose you say that it's incorrect [to say that an individual who acts as a cause for a water pitcher is a cause for the water pitcher].

Consider this same person.

He is so [a cause for the water pitcher],

Because he is a contributing factor for the water pitcher.

མ་གྲུབ་ན། དེ་ཆོས་ཅན། དེར་ཐལ། བུམ་པ་རང་གི་ལྷན་ཅིག་བྱེད་འབྲས་རང་གི་
རྒྱུ་རྒྱུ་མ་ཡིན་པར་གཙོ་བོར་སྐྱེད་བྱེད་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[It's not correct to say that an individual who acts as a cause for a water pitcher is a contributing factor for the water pitcher.]

Suppose you say that it's not correct [to say that an individual who acts as a cause for a water pitcher is a contributing factor for the water pitcher].

Consider this same person.

He is so [a contributing factor for the water pitcher],

Because he is something which gives rise to a result of his where he is contributing to its creation, and he is making this contribution in a way where he is not bringing about this result primarily as a continuation of the same material.

ཕྱི་བར་འདོད་ན། བུམ་པའི་རྒྱུ་རྒྱུར་པའི་སྐྱེས་བུ་ཆོས་ཅན། བུམ་པའི་ཉེར་ལེན་མ་
ཡིན་པར་ཐལ། བུམ་པ་རང་གི་རྒྱུ་རྒྱུ་གཙོ་བོར་སྐྱེད་བྱེད་མ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[Then I agree to your original statement: an individual who acts as a
cause for a water pitcher is a material cause of the water pitcher.]

Consider an individual who acts as a cause for a water pitcher.
It isn't so the case, the he is a material cause for the pitcher,
Because he is not bringing about this result primarily as a continuation of the
same material.

མ་གྲུབ་ན། དེ་ཆོས་ཅན། དེར་ཐལ། བྱོད་ཀྱི་རྒྱུ་རྒྱུ་མར་གྱུར་པའི་བུམ་པ་མེད་
པའི་ཕྱིར།

[It's not correct to say that he is not bringing about this result primarily
as a continuation of the same material.]

Suppose you say that it's not correct [to say that he is not bringing about this
result primarily as a continuation of the same material].
Consider this same person.
It is so true, [that he is not bringing about this result primarily as a
continuation of the same material],
Because there exists no water pitcher which is a continuation of his same
material.

མ་གྲུབ་ན། དེ་ཆོས་ཅན། དེར་ཐལ། བྱོད་གང་ཟག་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[It's not correct to say that there exists no water pitcher which is a
continuation of his same material].

Suppose you say that it's not correct [to say that there exists no water pitcher
which is a continuation of his same material].
Consider this same person.
It is so true, [to say that there exists no water pitcher which is a continuation
of his same material],
Because he is a person.

ཁ་ཅིག་ན་རེ། བུམ་པའི་རྒྱུ་ཡིན་ན། བུམ་པའི་ལྷན་ཅིག་བྱེད་རྒྱུ་ཡིན་པས་སྒྲུབ་ཟེར་
ན།

Suppose someone comes and makes the following claim:

Anything which is the cause of a water pitcher is always a contributing factor for the water pitcher.

བུམ་པའི་རྒྱུ་རྒྱུར་པའི་འཇིམ་པ་ཆོས་ཅན། དེར་ཐལ། དེའི་ཕྱིར། སྒྲུབ་པ་ཁས།

Consider the clay which acts as a cause for a water pitcher.
So is it then [a contributing factor for the water pitcher]?
Because it is [a cause of the water pitcher].

[It doesn't necessarily follow.]

But you already agreed that it does necessarily follow.

མ་གྲུབ་ན། དེ་ཆོས་ཅན། དེར་ཐལ། བུམ་པ་སྟོང་གི་འབྲས་བུ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[It's not correct to say that the clay which acts as a cause for a water pitcher is a cause of the water pitcher.]

Suppose you say that it's not correct [to say that the clay which acts as a cause for a water pitcher is a cause of the water pitcher].

Consider this same thing.

It is so [a cause of the water pitcher],
Because the water pitcher is its result.

མ་གྲུབ་ན། བུམ་པ་ཆོས་ཅན། སྟོང་རང་གི་རྒྱུ་རྒྱུར་པའི་འཇིམ་པའི་འབྲས་བུ་ཡིན་
པར་ཐལ། སྟོང་གི་རྒྱུ་རྒྱུར་པའི་འཇིམ་པ་ཡོད་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[It's not correct to say that a water pitcher is a result of the cause of a water pitcher.]

Suppose you say that it's not correct [to say that a water pitcher is a result of the clay which acts as a cause for the water pitcher].

Consider a water pitcher.

It is so a result of the clay which acts as its cause,
Because there does exist clay which acts as its cause.

ཕ་བར་འདོད་ན། དེ་ཆོས་ཅན། ལུས་པའི་ལྷན་ཅིག་གིས་བྱེད་ཀྱིན་མ་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ། ལུས་
པའི་ཉར་ལེན་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[Then I agree to your original statement: the clay which acts as a cause
for a water pitcher is a contributing factor for the water pitcher.]

Suppose you agree to our original statement, [saying that the clay which acts
as a cause for a water pitcher is a contributing factor for the water
pitcher].

Consider this same thing.

It is not so, [that it acts as a contributing factor for the water pitcher],
Because it is the material cause for the water pitcher.

ཁ་ཅིག་ན་རེ། རྒྱ་ཡིན་ན། ཉར་ལེན་ཡིན་པས་བྱུང་བ་ཅན།

Suppose someone comes and makes the following claim:

Anything which is a cause is always a material cause.

མར་མེ་སྐད་ཅིག་གི་ཐ་མ་ཆོས་ཅན། དར་ཐལ། དེའི་ཕྱིར། བྱུང་བ་ཁས།

Consider the flame of a butter lamp at the last instant of its existence.
So is it then [a material cause]?
Because it is [a cause].

[It doesn't necessarily follow.]

But you already agreed that it does necessarily follow.

མ་གྲུབ་ན། དེ་ཆོས་ཅན། དར་ཐལ། དངོས་པོ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[It's not correct to say that the flame of a butter lamp at the last instant
of its existence is a cause.]

Suppose you say that it's not correct [to say that the flame of a butter lamp at
the last instant of its existence is a cause].

Consider this same thing.

It is so [a cause],
Because it is a working thing.

ཕྱི་བར་འདོད་ན། མར་མེ་སྐད་ཅིག་ཐ་མ་ཆོས་ཅན། ཉེར་ལེན་མ་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ།
རང་གི་ཉེར་འབྲས་རང་གི་རྒྱུ་སྤྱི་མར་གཙོ་བོར་སྐྱེད་བྱེད་མ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[Then I agree with your original statement: the flame of a butter lamp at the last instant of its existence is a material cause.]

Suppose you agree to our original statement, [saying that the flame of a butter lamp at the last instant of its existence is a material cause].
Consider the flame of a butter lamp at the last instant of its existence.
It is so true, that it is not a material cause,
Because it does not bring about a material result of it that is primarily a continuation of the same material.

མ་གྲུབ་ན། དེ་ཆོས་ཅན། དེར་ཐལ། བྱོད་ཀྱི་རྒྱུ་སྤྱི་མ་མེད་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[It's not correct to say that the flame of a butter lamp at the last instant of its existence does not bring about a material result of it that is primarily a continuation of the same material.]

Suppose you say that it's not correct [to say that the flame of a butter lamp at the last instant of its existence does not bring about a material result of it that is primarily a continuation of the same material].
Consider this same thing.
It is so true, [that it does not bring about a material result of it that is primarily a continuation of the same material.]
Because there is no later continuation of this same material.

མ་གྲུབ་ན། དེ་ཆོས་ཅན། དེར་ཐལ། བྱོད་རྒྱུ་སྤྱི་ཆད་ཁ་མའི་དངོས་པོ་ཡིན་པའི་
ཕྱིར།

[It's not correct to say that there is no later continuation of this same material.]

Suppose you say that it's not correct [to say that there is no later continuation of this same material].
It is so true, [that there is no later continuation of this same material],
Because this flame is a working thing at the point where the continuation of the same material is about to be cut off.

ཁ་ཅིག་ན་རེ། གྲུབ་བདེ་གཅིག་ཡིན་ན། གྲུབ་བདེ་རྫས་གཅིག་ཡིན་པས་བྱུང་བེད་ན།

Suppose someone comes and makes the following claim:

If two things are the same in the sense of being co-occurring,
then they are always the same in the sense that to be one is to
automatically be the other.

ཅན་དན་གྱི་ཁ་དོག་དང་། ཅན་དན་གྱི་དྲི་གཉིས་ཆོས་ཅན། དེར་ཐལ། དེའི་ཕྱིར།
བྱུང་པ་ཁས།

Consider the two of the color of a piece of sandalwood and the smell of a
piece of sandalwood.

So are they then [the same in the sense that to be one is to automatically be the
other]?

Because they are [the same in the sense of being co-occurring].

མ་གྲུབ་ན། དེ་ཆོས་ཅན། དེར་ཐལ། བྱུང་གཉིས་བྱུང་པ་དུས་མཉམ། གནས་པ་
དུས་མཉམ། འཇིག་པ་དུས་མཉམ་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[It's not correct to say that the two of the color of piece of sandalwood
and the smell of a piece of sandalwood are the same in the sense
of being co-occurring.]

Consider these same things.

They are so [the same in the sense of being co-occurring],

Because they come about at the same time, they stay at the same time, and
they stop at the same time.

བྱུང་སྟེ་དེ་གྲུབ་བདེ་གཅིག་པའི་དོན་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[It doesn't necessarily follow.]

But it does necessarily follow,

Because this is what it means to be "co-occurring."

རྩ་བར་འདོད་ན། ཅན་དན་གྱི་དྲི་དང་། ཅན་དན་གྱི་ཁ་དོག་གཉིས་ཆོས་ཅན། གྲུབ་

བདེ་ལྔ་སྒྲིབ་མ་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ། ལྔ་སྒྲིབ་མ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[Then I agree to your original statement: the two of the color of a piece of sandalwood and the smell of a piece of sandalwood are the same in the sense that to be one is to automatically be the other.]

Suppose you agree to our original statement, [saying that the two of the color of a piece of sandalwood and the smell of a piece of sandalwood are the same in the sense that to be one is to automatically be the other]. It is not so, that they are the same in the sense that to be one is to automatically be the other, Because they are not things that are such that to be one is to automatically be the other.

མ་གྲུབ་ན། ཅན་དན་གྱི་དང་། ཅན་དན་གྱི་ཁ་དྲག་གཉིས་ཆོས་ཅན། ལྔ་སྒྲིབ་མ་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ། ངོ་བོ་སོ་སོ་བར་སྐྱེས་པའི་ཆོས་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[It's not correct to say that the two of the color of a piece of sandalwood and the smell of a piece of sandalwood are not things which are such that to be one is to automatically be the other.]

Suppose you say that it's not correct [to say that the two of the color of a piece of sandalwood and the smell of a piece of sandalwood are not things which are such that to be one is to automatically be the other]. Consider the two of the smell of a piece of sandalwood and the color of a piece of sandalwood. It is so true that they are not things which are such that to be one is to automatically be the other, Because they are existing things which come about in such a way that to be one is not to automatically be the other.

ཁ་ཅིག་ན་རེ། ལྔ་སྒྲིབ་སྒྲིབ་མ་ཡིན་ན། ལྔ་སྒྲིབ་མ་ཡིན་པས་ཁྱེད་ཅེས་ན།

Suppose someone comes and makes the following claim:

Any things which are such that to be one is to automatically be of the same material type as the other are also always such that to be one is to automatically be the other.

ཉིར་ལེན་ནས་དོག་གཅིག་ལས་སྐྱེས་པའི་ནས་འབྲུ་ཆེ་ཆུང་གཉིས་ཆོས་ཅན། ཇུས་
གཅིག་པ་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ། ཇུས་རིགས་གཅིག་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར། ཁྱབ་པ་ཁས།

Consider the two of a larger grain and a smaller grain of barley that grow from a material cause which is a single piece of barley.

So are they then such that to be one is to automatically be the other?

Because they are such that to be one is to automatically be of the same material type as the other.

[It doesn't necessarily follow.]

But you already agreed that it does necessarily follow.

མ་གྲུབ་ན། དེ་ཆོས་ཅན། དེར་ཐལ། རང་གི་ཉིར་ལེན་གཅིག་ལས་སྐྱེས་པའི་ཐ་དང་
པའི་འདུས་བྱས་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[It's not correct to say that the two of a larger grain and a smaller grain of barley that grow from a material cause which is a single piece of barley are such that to be one is to automatically be of the same material type as the other.]

Suppose you say that it's not correct [to say that the two of a larger grain and a smaller grain of barley that grow from a material cause which is a single piece of barley are such that to be one is to automatically be of the same material type as the other].

Consider these same things.

They are so [such that to be one is to automatically be of the same material type as the other],

Because they are produced things which are separate, and which have each grown from the same thing that provided their material cause.

ཁྱབ་སྟེ། ཇུས་རིགས་གཅིག་མི་གཅིག་གི་དོན། རང་གི་ཉིར་ལེན་གཅིག་མི་གཅིག་
ལ་བྱེད་དགོས་པའི་ཕྱིར་ཏེ། ཇུས་རིགས་གཅིག་མི་གཅིག་གི་དོན་བཤད་ཚུལ་ཡོད་
པའི་ཕྱིར།

[It doesn't necessarily follow.]

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But it does necessarily follow,
Because the question of whether two things are such that to be one is to automatically be of the same material type as the other is something you must decide by determining whether they have each grown from the same thing that provided their material cause.

ཕྱ་བར་འདོད་ན། དེ་གཉིས་ཆོས་ཅན། རྒྱས་གཅིག་མ་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ། རྩོ་བོ་གཅིག་
པར་སྐྱེས་པའི་ཆོས་མ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར་ཏེ། རྩོ་བོ་ཐ་དད་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[Then I agree to your original statement: a larger grain and a smaller grain of barley that grow from a material cause which is a single piece of barley are such that to be one is to automatically be the other.]

Suppose you agree with our original statement, [saying that a larger grain and a smaller grain of barley that grow from a material cause which is a single piece of barley are such that to be one is to automatically be the other].

Consider these same two things.

It is not so, [that they are such that to be one is to automatically be the other],
Because they are not existing objects which come about in such a way that to be one is to be the other;

And this is true because they are such that to be one is not to be the other.

ཁ་ཅིག་ན་རེ། རིགས་གཅིག་ཡིན་ན། བདག་ཉིད་གཅིག་ཡིན་པས་བྱབ་ཟེར་ན།

Suppose someone comes and makes the following claim:

Whenever things are of the same type, they are also always such that to be one is to automatically be the other.

ཕྱ་དཀར་ནག་གཉིས་ཆོས་ཅན། བདག་ཉིད་གཅིག་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ། རིགས་གཅིག་
ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར། བྱབ་པ་ཁས།

Consider the two of the darker and lighter channels of the body.

So are they then such that to be one is to automatically be the other?

Because they are of the same type.

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[It doesn't necessarily follow.]

But you already agreed that it does necessarily follow.

མ་གྲུབ་ན། དེ་ཚེས་ཅན། དེར་ཐལ། ལྷོག་པ་རིགས་གཅིག་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[It's not correct to say that the two of the darker and lighter channels of the body are of the same type.]

Suppose you say that it's not correct to say [that the two of the darker and lighter channels of the body are of the same type].

Consider these same things.

They are so [of the same type],

Because they are of the same general type.

མ་གྲུབ་ན། དེ་ཚེས་ཅན། དེར་ཐལ། གང་ཟག་གང་གིས་ཡིད་གཏད་པས་མཐོང་
ཅམ་ཉིད་ནས་འདི་དང་འདི་འདྲའོ་སྟེ་མ་པའི་སྟོང་ང་གི་སྐྱིད་རྒྱས་པའི་ཚེས་ཡིན་པའི་
ཕྱིར།

[It's not correct to say that they are of the same general type.]

Suppose you say that it's not correct [to say they are of the same general type].
They are so [of the same general type],

Because they are existing things that fit the following description: they give the immediate, natural impression of "This thing is similar to the other," to anyone who focusses upon them.

ཁྱབ་སྟེ། ལྷོག་པ་རིགས་གཅིག་གི་དོན་ཡོད་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[It doesn't necessarily follow.]

But it does necessarily follow,

Because there does exist something we mean when we say that a number of things are of the same general type.

རྩ་བར་འདོད་ན། དེ་ཚེས་ཅན། བདག་ཉིད་གཅིག་མ་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ། རོ་བོ་ཐ་དད་
ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར་ཏེ། ཡན་རྒྱུན་འབྲེལ་མེད་དོན་གཞན་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

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[Then I agree to your original statement: the two of the darker and lighter channels of the body are such that to be one is to automatically be the other.]

Suppose you agree to our original statement, [saying that the two of the darker and lighter channels of the body are such that to be one is to automatically be the other].

Consider these same things.

They are not so that to be one is to automatically be the other,
Because they are things such that to be one is not to automatically be the other;
And this is because they are completely separate objects, neither of which shares any relationship with the other.

ཁ་ཅིག་ན་རེ། དངོས་པོའི་ཉར་ལེན་གྱི་འབྲས་བྱ་ཡིན་ན། དངོས་པོའི་ཉར་འབྲས་
ཡིན་པས་བྱ་བ་ཟེར་ན།

Suppose someone comes and makes the following claim:

Anything which is a result of the material of a working thing is
always a material result of the working thing.

དངོས་པོ་ཚུས་ཅན། དངོས་པོའི་ཉར་འབྲས་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ། དངོས་པོའི་ཉར་ལེན་གྱི་
འབྲས་བྱ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར། བྱ་བ་པ་ཁས།

Consider a working thing.

So is it then a material result of the working thing?

Because it is a result of the material of a working thing.

[It doesn't necessarily follow.]

But you already agreed that it did necessarily follow.

མ་གྲུབ་ན། དེ་ཚུས་ཅན། རང་གི་ཉར་ལེན་གྱི་འབྲས་བྱ་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ། བྱེད་གྱི་ཉར་
ལེན་དེ། བྱེད་གྱི་རྒྱ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

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[It's not correct to say that a working thing is the result of the material of a working thing.]

Suppose you say that it's not correct [to say that a working thing is the result of the material of a working thing].

Consider this same thing.

It is so the result of the material of a working thing,

Because the material from which it came was its cause.

ཕྱ་བར་འདོད་ན། དེ་ཚེས་ཅན། དངོས་པོའི་ཉིར་འབྲས་མ་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ། དངོས་
པོའི་འབྲས་བྱ་མ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[Then I agree with your original statement: a working thing is a material result of the working thing.]

Suppose you agree with our original statement, [saying that a working thing is a material result of the working thing].

Consider this same thing.

It is not so, the material result of the working thing,

Because it is not a result of the working thing.

མ་གྲུབ་ན། དེ་ཚེས་ཅན། ཁྱོད་ཁྱོད་ཀྱི་འབྲས་བྱ་མ་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ། བདག་མིང་ཡིན་
པའི་ཕྱིར།

[It's not correct to say that a working thing is not a result of the working thing.]

Suppose you say that it's not correct [to say that a working thing is not a result of the working thing].

It is so not its own result,

Because it is a thing which has no self-nature.

གཉིས་པ་རང་གི་ལྷགས་ལ། སྐྱེའི་མཚན་ཉིད་ཡོད་དེ། སྐྱེད་བྱེད་དེ་དེ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།
སྐྱེ་འབྲས་བྱ་དངོས་པོ་གསུམ་དོན་གཅིག་

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Here next is the second part, where we present our own position. There does exist a definition of a cause, because it is the following:

Anything which brings about something else.

"Cause," "result," and "working thing" all refer to the same thing.

དངོས་པོའི་རྒྱུ་མཚན་ཉིད་ཡོད་དེ། དངོས་པོའི་སྐྱེད་བྱེད་དེ་དེ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར་ཏེ།
དངོས་པོ་ཡིན་ན། བྱེད་ཀྱི་སྐྱེད་བྱེད་བྱེད་ཀྱི་རྒྱུ་མཚན་ཉིད་ཡིན་པས་བྱེད་པའི་ཕྱིར།

There does exist a definition of the cause of a working thing, because it is the following:

Anything which brings about a working thing.

And this is true because, whenever something is a working thing, the definition of its cause is always "the thing which brings it about."

དངོས་པོའི་རྒྱུ་ལ་དབྱེ་ན་གཉིས་ཡོད་དེ། དངོས་པོའི་དངོས་རྒྱུ་དང་། དངོས་པོའི་
བརྒྱུད་རྒྱུ་གཉིས་ཡོད་པའི་ཕྱིར།

Causes for working things can be divided into two kinds: direct causes for working things and indirect causes for working things.

དངོས་པོའི་དངོས་རྒྱུ་མཚན་ཉིད་ཡོད་དེ། དངོས་པོའི་དངོས་སྐྱེད་བྱེད་དེ་དེ་ཡིན་
པའི་ཕྱིར། མཚན་གཞི་ཡོད་དེ། དངོས་པོའི་སྐྱེད་ལོགས་སྐྱེད་བྱེད་དེ་དེ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

There does exist a definition for the direct cause of a working thing, because it is the following:

Anything which brings about a working thing directly.

There does exist a classical example of this kind of cause, because it is the following:

A working thing as it was the moment before it.

དངོས་པོའི་བརྒྱད་རྒྱུའི་མཚན་ཉིད་ཡོད་དེ། དངོས་པོའི་བརྒྱད་ནས་སྐྱེད་བྱེད་དེ་དེ་
ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར། མཚན་གཞི་ཡོད་དེ། དངོས་པོའི་སྣ་ལོགས་སུ་བྱུང་བའི་སྣ་ལོགས་
སུ་བྱུང་བ་དེ་དེ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར། དེས་དངོས་པོ་ཐམས་ཅད་ཀྱི་དངོས་རྒྱ་དང་བརྒྱད་རྒྱུ་
ལ་རིགས་འབྲེ།

There does exist a definition for the indirect cause of a working thing, because it is the following:

Anything which brings about a working thing indirectly.

There does exist a classical example of this kind of cause, because it is the following:

A working thing as it was the moment before the working thing
as it was the moment before it.

These same patterns apply to the direct and indirect causes of all kinds of working things.

ཡང་དངོས་པོའི་རྒྱ་ལ་དབྱེ་ན། གཉིས་ཡོད་དེ། དངོས་པོའི་ཉར་ལེན་དང་དངོས་པོའི་
ལྷན་ཅིག་བྱེད་རྒྱུ་གཉིས་ཡོད་པའི་ཕྱིར།

Causes for working things can also be divided into another two types, which are (1) material causes for working things and (2) contributing factors for working things.

དངོས་པོའི་ཉར་ལེན་གྱི་མཚན་ཉིད་ཡོད་དེ། དངོས་པོ་རང་གི་རྒྱས་རྒྱུ་དུ་གཙོ་བོར་
སྐྱེད་བྱེད་དེ་དེ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར། མཚན་གཞི་ཡོད་དེ། དངོས་པོའི་རྒྱར་གྱུར་པའི་བྱས་
པ་དེ་དེ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

There does exist a definition for the material cause of a working thing, because it is the following:

Anything that brings about a working thing primarily as a
continuation of the same material.

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There does exist a classical example of this kind of cause, because it is the following: the thing which is made and which acts as a cause for a working thing, [meaning here the working thing as it was the moment before—such as clay for a pot].

དངོས་པོའི་ལྷན་ཅིག་བྱེད་ཀྱིན་གྱི་མཚན་ཉིད་ཡོད་དེ། དངོས་པོ་རང་གི་རྫས་རྒྱུ་མ་
ཡིན་པར་རྫས་སུ་གཙོ་བོར་སྐྱེད་བྱེད་དེ་དེ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར། མཚན་གཞི་ཡོད་དེ།
དངོས་པོའི་རྒྱུ་རྒྱུར་པའི་གང་ཟག་དེ་དེ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

There does exist a definition of the contributing factor for a working thing, because it is the following:

Anything that brings about a working thing, but not primarily as
a continuation of the same material.

There does exist a classical example of this kind of cause, because it is the following: a person who acts as a cause for a particular working thing; [such as a potter for a pot].

འབྲས་བུའི་མཚན་ཉིད་ཡོད་དེ། བསྐྱེད་བྱ་དེ་དེ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

There does exist a definition of a result, because it is the following:

Something which is brought about.

དངོས་པོའི་འབྲས་བུའི་མཚན་ཉིད་ཡོད་དེ། དངོས་པོའི་བསྐྱེད་བྱ་དེ་དེ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།
མཚན་གཞི་ཡོད་དེ། དངོས་པོའི་ཕྱི་ལོགས་སུ་བྱུང་བ་དེ་དེ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

There does exist a definition of a result of a working thing, because it is the following:

Something which is brought about by a working thing.

There does exist a classical example of this kind of result, because it is the following:

A working thing as it will be the moment after it.

དངོས་པོའི་འབྲས་བུ་ལ་དབྱེ་ན་གཉིས་ཡོད་དེ། དངོས་པོའི་དངོས་འབྲས་དང་དངོས་
པོའི་བརྒྱུད་འབྲས་གཉིས་ཡོད་པའི་ཕྱིར།

Results of working things can be divided into two different types: direct results of working things and indirect results of working things.

དངོས་པོའི་དངོས་འབྲས་ཀྱི་མཚན་ཉིད་ཡོད་དེ། དངོས་པོའི་དངོས་སུ་བསྐྱེད་བྱ་དེ་
ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར། མཚན་གཞི་ཡོད་དེ། དངོས་པོའི་ཕྱི་ལོགས་སུ་བྱུང་བ་དེ་དེ་ཡིན་པའི་
ཕྱིར།

There does exist a definition for the direct result of a working thing, because it is the following:

Something which is brought about by a working thing directly.

There does exist a classical example of this same result, because it is the following:

A working thing as it will be the moment after it.

དངོས་པོའི་བརྒྱུད་འབྲས་ཀྱི་མཚན་ཉིད་ཡོད་དེ། དངོས་པོའི་བརྒྱུད་ནས་བསྐྱེད་བྱ་དེ་
དེ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར། མཚན་གཞི་ཡོད་དེ། དངོས་པོའི་ཕྱི་ལོགས་སུ་བྱུང་བའི་ཕྱི་ལོགས་
སུ་བྱུང་བ་དེ་དེ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར། དེས་དངོས་པོ་གཞན་གྱི་དངོས་འབྲས་དང་བརྒྱུད་
འབྲས་ལ་རིགས་འབྲེ།

There does exist a definition for the indirect result of a working thing, because it is the following:

Something which is brought about by a working thing indirectly.

There does exist a classical example of this same result, because it is the following:

A working thing as it will be the moment after the working thing
as it will be the moment after it.

These same patterns apply to the direct and indirect results of all kinds of working things.

གསུམ་པ་རྩོད་སྤྱོད་ལ། ཁ་ཅིག་ན་རེ། དངོས་པོའི་ཉར་ལེན་མེད་པར་ཐལ། དངོས་
པོའི་སྔ་ལོགས་སུ་བྱུང་བ་དེ་དེ་མ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

Here is the third major part in our presentation, which is where we eliminate our opponents' rebuttal.

Suppose someone comes and makes the following claim:

So is it then the case that there exist no material causes for working things at all? Because it is the case that a working thing as it was the moment before it is no such cause.

མ་གྲུབ་ན། དངོས་པོའི་སྔ་ལོགས་སུ་བྱུང་བ་ཆོས་ཅན། དངོས་པོའི་ཉར་ལེན་མ་ཡིན་
པར་ཐལ། ཁྱོད་དངོས་པོར་འགྱུར་ངེས་མ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[It's not correct to say that a working thing as it was the moment before it is not a material cause for it.]

Suppose you say that it's not correct [to say that a working thing as it was the moment before it is not a material cause for it].
Consider a working thing as it was the moment before it.
It is so true, that it is no material cause for the working thing,
Because there is no certainty that it will become the working thing.

མ་གྲུབ་ན། དངོས་པོའི་སྔ་ལོགས་སུ་བྱུང་བ་ཆོས་ཅན། དངོས་པོར་འགྱུར་ངེས་མ་
ཡིན་པར་ཐལ། དངོས་པོར་གྱུར་ཟིན་པའི་ཕྱིར། ཟེར་ན་མ་ཁྱབ།

[It's not correct to say that there is no certainty that a working thing as it was the moment before it will become the working thing.]

Suppose you say that it's not correct [to say that there's no certainty that a working thing as it was the moment before it will become the working thing].
Consider a working thing as it was the moment before it.

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It is so true, that there's no certainty that a working thing as it was the
moment before it will become the working thing,
Because it has already become the working thing.

Our answer to this is, "It doesn't necessarily follow."

མ་གྲུབ་ན། དངོས་པོའི་སྔ་ལོགས་སུ་བྱུང་བ་ཆོས་ཅན། དངོས་པོར་གྱུར་ཟིན་པར་
ཐལ། དངོས་པོ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[It's not correct to say that a working thing as it was the moment before
it has already become the working thing.]

Suppose you say that it's not correct [to say that a working thing as it was the
moment before it has already become the working thing].
Consider a working thing as it was the moment before it.
It has so already become the working thing,
Because it is a working thing.

ཁ་ཅིག་ན་རེ། ཀ་བུམ་གཉིས་ཆོས་ཅན། ཁྱོད་ཀྱི་ཉར་ལེན་ཡོད་པར་ཐལ། ཁྱོད་
དངོས་པོ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར། བྱུང་བ་ཁས།

Suppose someone comes and makes the following claim:

Consider the two of a pillar and a water pitcher.
It is so true, that they have their material causes,
Because they are working things.

Remember, you already agreed that it follows.

འདོད་ན། ཀ་བུམ་གཉིས་ཆོས་ཅན། ཁྱོད་དུ་འགྱུར་ངེས་ཡོད་པར་ཐལ། ཁྱོད་ཀྱི་ཉར་
ལེན་ཡོད་པའི་ཕྱིར། དྲགས་ཁས།

[We agree that the two of a pillar and a water pitcher have their material
causes.]

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Suppose you agree [that the two of a pillar and a water pitcher have their material causes].

Consider the two of a pillar and a water pitcher.

So is it then the case, that there is something which will with certainty become them?

Because they have their material causes.

Remember, you have agreed to our statement [that the two of a pillar and a water pitcher have their material causes].

འདོད་ན། ཀ་བུམ་གཉིས་ཆོས་ཅན། ཁྱོད་ཀྱི་ཡིན་པ་ཡོད་པར་ཐལ། ཁྱོད་དུ་འགྱུར་
ངེས་ཡོད་པའི་ཕྱིར་ཟེར་ན། གོང་དུ་མ་ཁྱབ།

Suppose you agree [that it is the case that there are things which will with certainty become them.]

Consider the two of a pillar and a water pitcher.

So is there then a thing which is them?

Because there are things which will with certainty become them.

To this we answer: "We respond 'It doesn't necessarily follow' to the last one."

དངོས་པོ་ཡིན་ན། རང་གི་རྒྱུའི་འབྲས་བུ་ཡིན་པས་ཁྱབ། བྱས་པ་ལ་ཁོ་ན་རེ། རང་
གི་རྒྱུ་ཆོས་ཅན། དེར་ཐལ། དེའི་ཕྱིར་ཟེར་ན།

We have stated that, if something is a working thing, then it is always a result of its cause. Suppose someone comes and makes the following claim concerning this statement:

Consider "its cause."

So is it then a result of its cause?

Because it is a working thing.

རྟགས་མ་གྲུབ་སྟེ། རང་གི་རྒྱུ་མེད་པའི་ཕྱིར་ཏེ། རང་རྟག་པ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

It's not correct [to say that "its cause" is a working thing],

Because it has no cause;

And this is true because it's an unchanging thing.

ཁོ་ན་རེ། བྱམ་པ་ཆོས་ཅན། རྒྱ་འབྲས་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ། རྒྱ་འབྲས་གཉིས་ཀ་ཡིན་པའི་
ཕྱིར། ཟེར་ན།

Suppose someone comes and makes the following claim:

Consider a water pitcher.
So is it then the cause and the result?
Because it is both a cause and a result.

མ་ཁྲུབ་སྟེ། བྱམ་པ་ཆོས་ཅན། རྒྱ་འབྲས་མ་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ། བ་དད་མ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར་
ཏེ། གཅིག་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

Our answer is, "It doesn't necessarily follow":

Consider a water pitcher.
It is not so, that it is the cause and the result,
Because it is not separate things;
And this is true because it is one thing.

ཁ་ཅིག །རྟག་པ་མ་ཡིན་པའི་རྒྱ་ཡོད་པར་ཐལ། རྒྱ་ཡིན་ན་རྟག་པ་མ་ཡིན་པའི་རྒྱ་
ཡིན་པས་ཁྲུབ་པའི་ཕྱིར་ཟེར་ན།

Suppose someone comes and makes the following claim:

It is so true, that there exists a cause of what is not
unchanging,
Because anything which is a cause is always a cause for
what is not unchanging.

མི་འཐད་དེ། རྒྱ་ཡིན་ན་རྟག་པ་མ་ཡིན་པའི་རྒྱ་མ་ཡིན་པས་ཁྲུབ་པའི་ཕྱིར།

But this is incorrect,
Because nothing which is a cause is ever a cause for what is not unchanging.

དེར་ཐལ། གཞི་གྲུབ་ན། ཏྲག་པ་མ་ཡིན་པའི་རྒྱ་མ་ཡིན་པས་བྱུང་པའི་ཕྱིར།

And this is so the case, because nothing which can be established as existing can ever be a cause for what is not unchanging.

དེར་ཐལ། གཞི་གྲུབ་ན། ཏྲག་པ་མ་ཡིན་པ་འབྲས་བུ་མ་ཡིན་པས་བྱུང་པའི་ཕྱིར།

And this is so the case, because it is always true of everything that can be established as existing that what is not unchanging could never be a result.

དེར་ཐལ། གཞི་གྲུབ་ན། ཏྲག་པ་མ་ཡིན་པ་དངོས་པོ་མ་ཡིན་པས་བྱུང་པའི་ཕྱིར།

And this is so the case, because it is always true of everything that can be established as existing that what is not unchanging could never be a working thing.

ཡང་ཁོ་ན་རེ། དངོས་པོའི་རྒྱ་དང་། དངོས་པོའི་འབྲས་བུའི་གཞི་མཐུན་ཡོད་པར་
ཐལ། དངོས་པོའི་རྒྱར་གྱུར་པའི་དངོས་པོའི་འབྲས་བུ་ཡོད་པའི་ཕྱིར་ཟེར་ན།

Suppose someone comes once more, and makes the following claim:

Isn't it the case, that there does exist one thing which can be both (1) the cause of a working thing and (2) a result of the working thing?
Because there does exist the result of a working thing that serves as the cause of a working thing.

མ་བྱུང་སྟེ། དངོས་པོའི་རྒྱར་གྱུར་པའི་དངོས་པོའི་འབྲས་བུ་ཡོད་པར་ཐལ། དངོས་
པོའི་རྒྱར་གྱུར་པའི་དངོས་པོ་རྒྱ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར། དེར་ཐལ། དེ་དངོས་པོ་ཡིན་པའི་
ཕྱིར།

To this we answer, "It doesn't necessarily follow."

It is so by the way true that there does exist the result of a working thing that serves as the cause of a working thing,
Because the working thing that acts as the cause for a working thing is a cause.
And this is so,
Because it is a working thing.

གཞན་ཡང་། དངོས་པོའི་རྒྱུ་རྒྱུར་པའི་དངོས་པོའི་འབྲས་བུ་ཡོད་པར་ཐལ། དངོས་
པོ་དེ། དངོས་པོའི་རྒྱུ་རྒྱུར་པའི་དངོས་པོའི་འབྲས་བུ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར་ཏེ། དེ་དངོས་
པོའི་རྒྱུ་རྒྱུར་པའི་དངོས་པོའི་ཕྱི་ལོགས་སུ་བྱུང་བ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

It is moreover true that there exists a result of a working thing which acts as
the cause of a working thing,
Because a working thing is a result of a working thing which acts as the cause
of a working thing;
And this is true because it is a working thing as it will be the moment after it
which acts as the cause of a working thing.

མ་གྲུབ་ན། དངོས་པོ་ཆོས་ཅན། ཁྱོད་ཁྱོད་ཀྱི་རྒྱུ་རྒྱུར་པའི་དངོས་པོའི་ཕྱི་ལོགས་སུ་
བྱུང་བ་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ། ཁྱོད་འདུས་བྱས་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[It's not correct to say that a working thing is a working thing as it will
be the moment after it which acts as the cause of a working
thing.]

Suppose you say that it's not correct [to say that a working thing is a working
thing as it will be the moment after it which acts as the cause of a
working thing.]

Consider a working thing.

It is so [a working thing as it will be the moment after it which acts as its
cause],

Because it is a produced thing.

བྱས་པ་ལ། ཁོ་ན་རེ། དངོས་པོ་ཆོས་ཅན། ཁྱོད་ཀྱི་རྒྱུ་རྒྱུར་པའི་ཁྱོད་ཀྱི་འབྲས་བུ་
མེད་པར་ཐལ། ཁྱོད་ཀྱི་རྒྱ་དང་ཁྱོད་ཀྱི་འབྲས་བུའི་ཡིན་པ་མེད་པའི་ཕྱིར་ཟེར་ན།

Suppose that someone comes and makes the following claim with regard to
our last argument:

Consider a working thing.

Isn't it the case that there doesn't even exist a result of it which is its
cause?

Because isn't it true that there exists no object which is both its cause
and its result?

མ་ཁྱབ་སྟེ། དངོས་པོ་ཆོས་ཅན། བྱོད་ཀྱི་རྒྱུར་གྱུར་པའི་བྱོད་ཀྱི་འབྲས་བུ་ཡོད་པར་
ཐལ། བྱོད་ཀྱི་རྒྱུར་གྱུར་པའི་བྱོད་ཡོད་པ་གང་ཞིག་དེ་དྲག་པ་མ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

Our answer here is: "It doesn't necessarily follow":

Consider a working thing.

It is so true, that there exists a result of it which acts as its cause,

Because (1) there exists a version of it which acts as its cause, and (2) this
version is not something unchanging.

*Formal logic subject:
The definition of a correct logical statement,
and the three relations*

གཉིས་པ་དྲགས་ཡང་དག་གི་མཚན་ཉིད་བཤད་པ་ལ། ཚུལ་གསུམ་ཡིན་པ། དེའི་
མཚན་ཉིད། ཚུལ་གསུམ་གང་ཞེ་ན། ཕྱོགས་ཆོས། ཟླེས་བྱལ། ཟློག་བྱལ་གསུམ་
མོ། །དེ་ནམས་སོ་སེའི་མཚན་ཉིད། མཚན་གཞི། སྒྲུབ་བྱེད་ཀྱི་རིགས་པ་དང་
གསུམ།

Here secondly we will explain the definition of a correct reason.

A correct reason is defined as:

A reason where the three relationships hold.

What are the three relationships? They are the following three: the relationship
between the subject and the reason; the positive necessity between the reason
and the quality to be proven; and the reverse necessity between the reason and
the quality to be proven. Here now we will give the definition, classical
examples, and supporting arguments for each.

དང་པོ་ནི། དེ་སྒྲུབ་ཀྱི་ཤེས་འདོད་ཆོས་ཅན་སྟོན་མེད་ཀྱི་སྟངས་དུ་འགོད་ཚུལ་དང་མཐུན་
པར་ཡོད་པ་ཉིད་དུ་ཆད་མས་ངས་པ། དེ་སྒྲུབ་ཀྱི་ཕྱོགས་ཆོས་ཀྱི་མཚན་ཉིད།

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Here is the first. The "relationship between the subject and the reason" in any particular proof is defined as holding when:

The reason is ascertained through valid perception to be something that only applies to the subject of the proof—the object about which the opponent entertains his doubt—in the way asserted.

དེ་སྐབ་ཀྱི་མཐུན་ཕྱོགས་ཁོ་ན་ལ་འགོད་ཚུལ་དང་མཐུན་པར་ཡོད་པ་ཉིད་དུ་ཚད་མས་
ངེས་པ་དེ། དེ་སྐབ་ཀྱི་རྗེས་བྱུང་ཀྱི་མཚན་ཉིད།

The "positive necessity between the reason and the quality to be proven" in any particular proof is defined as holding when:

The reason is ascertained through valid perception to be something that only applies to the group of similar cases for the proof, in the way asserted.

དེ་སྐབ་ཀྱི་དངོས་ཀྱི་བསྐབ་བྱའི་ཆོས་ཀྱི་དོན་ལྡན་དང་འབྲེལ་སྟོབས་ཀྱིས་དེ་སྐབ་ཀྱི་མི་
མཐུན་ཕྱོགས་ལ་འགོད་ཚུལ་དང་མཐུན་པར་མེད་པ་ཉིད་དུ་ཚད་མས་ངེས་པ་དེ། དེ་
སྐབ་ཀྱི་ལྡན་བྱུང་ཀྱི་མཚན་ཉིད།

The "reverse necessity between the reason and the quality to be proven" in any particular proof is defined as holding when:

The reason is ascertained through valid perception to be something that only fails to apply to the group of dissimilar cases for the proof, in the way asserted, due to its relationship to the general type represented by the explicit form of the quality to be proven.

འོན་ཀྱང་མཚན་ཉིད་དེ་དག་ནི་གོ་བ་གཙོ་བོར་བྱས་པ་ཡིན་གྱི་དེར་ངེས་པ་ནི་མ་ཡིན་ཏེ།
སྐྱོད་སྐྱོ་མི་ཏྲག་པར་སྐབ་པར་བྱེད་པའི་མཚན་ཉིད་དེ་གསུམ་ཀ་ཡིན་ཀྱང་མཚན་བྱེད་
ནམས་རེ་རེ་ནས་མ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

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These definitions, however, are only meant to convey the principal sense of what each relationship is; something can, however, satisfy one of them and still not be a correct reason. Sound, for example, satisfies all three of these definitions in a proof that sound is a changing thing, but is none of the things defined by any of the three.

གཞི་ལ་སྒྱུར་ཏེ་རྒྱུ་པར་འགོད་ན། སྒྲ་དེ་བྱོད་ཀྱི་དྲགས་ཀྱིས་སྒྲ་མི་དྲག་པར་སྒྱུབ་
པའི་ཤེས་འདོད་ཆོས་ཅན་སྒྲོན་མེད་ཀྱང་ཡིན། བྱོད་སྒྲ་དང་པན་རྒྱུན་ཐ་དད་པའི་རྒྱུ་
ཀྱིས་སྒྲའི་སྤང་དུ་འགོད་རྒྱུ་དང་མཐུན་པར་ཡོད་པ་ཉིད་དུ་ཆད་མས་ངེས་པ། བྱོད་
སྒྲ་མི་དྲག་པར་སྒྱུབ་པའི་ཕྱོགས་ཆོས་ཡིན་པའི་མཚན་ཉིད།

Suppose we now relate these in more detail, to specific applications. The holding of the "relationship between the subject and the reason in a proof where sound is proven to be a changing thing" can be defined as:

The reason is such that—

- (1) "Sound" provides the subject about which the opponent entertains doubt, in a proof where the particular thing is being used as a reason in the proof that sound is a changing thing; and
- (2) This particular thing is also ascertained by a valid perception only to apply to sound, in the way asserted—while it is also the case that it and sound are separate from each other.

བྱོད་ཀྱི་དྲགས་ཀྱིས་སྒྲ་མི་དྲག་པར་སྒྱུབ་པའི་དྲགས་ཆོས་གཉིས་ལྔན་གྱི་མཐུན་དཔེ་
ཡང་དག་ཡོད། བྱོད་མི་དྲག་པ་ལ་འབྲེལ། བྱོད་སྒྲ་མི་དྲག་པར་སྒྱུབ་པའི་མཐུན་
ཕྱོགས་ཁོན་ལ་འགོད་རྒྱུ་དང་མཐུན་པར་ཡོད་པ་ཉིད་དུ་ཆད་མས་ངེས་པ། བྱོད་སྒྲ་མི་
དྲག་པར་སྒྱུབ་པའི་རྗེས་བྱུང་ཡིན་པའི་མཚན་ཉིད།

The holding of the "positive necessity between the reason and the quality to be proven in a proof where sound is proven to be a changing thing" can be defined as:

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The reason is such that—

- (1) There does exist a correct "similar example," incorporating both the reason and the quality to be proven;
- (2) The reason is related to "changing thing"; and
- (3) The reason is ascertained through valid perception to be something that only applies to the group of similar cases in the way asserted, in a proof where sound is proven to be an unchanging thing.

བྱོད་ཀྱི་དྲགས་ཀྱིས་སྒྲིམ་མི་དྲག་པར་སྒྲུབ་པའི་དྲགས་ཚོས་གཉིས་དང་ལྷན་པའི་མི་
མཐུན་དཔེ་ཡང་དག་ཡོད། བྱོད་མི་དྲག་པ་ལ་འབྲེལ། བྱོད་དེ་སྒྲུབ་ཀྱི་མི་མཐུན་
ཕྱོགས་ལ་མེད་པ་ཁོ་ནར་ཚད་མས་ངས་པ། བྱོད་དེ་སྒྲུབ་ཀྱི་ཕྱོག་བྱུང་ཡིན་པའི་མཚན་
ཉིད།

The holding of the "negative necessity between the reason and the quality to be proven in a proof where sound is proven to be a changing thing" can be defined as:

The reason is such that—

- (1) There does exist a correct "dissimilar example," involving both the reason and the quality to be proven;
- (2) The reason is related to "changing thing"; and
- (3) The reason is ascertained through valid perception to be something that only fails to apply to the group of dissimilar cases in the way asserted, in a proof where sound is proven to be an unchanging thing.

མཚན་གཉི་ནི། བྱས་པ་དེ་བྱས་པའི་དྲགས་ཀྱིས་སྒྲིམ་མི་དྲག་པར་སྒྲུབ་པའི་ཕྱོགས་ཚོས་།
རྗེས་བྱུང་། ཕྱོག་བྱུང་གསུམ་ཀ་ཡིན།

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Here is the classical example. "Something which is made" is an example where, in a proof where "something which is made" is being used as the reason to prove that sound is something changing, all three hold: the relationship between the subject and the reason; the positive necessity between the reason and the quality to be proven; and the negative necessity between the reason and the quality to be proven.

སྐྱབ་བྱེད་ཀྱི་རིགས་པ་ནི། བྱས་པ་ཆོས་ཅན། སྐྱ་མི་དྭག་པར་སྐྱབ་པའི་ཕྱོགས་ཆོས་
ཡིན་པར་ཐལ། མཚན་ཉིད་དེ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

Here next are the supporting arguments.

Consider "something which is made."

It is so a case where the relationship between the subject and the reason holds,
in a proof that sound is something changing,
Because it fits the definition given.

ཅ་དྭགས་དང་པོ་མ་གྲུབ་ན། སྐྱ་ཆོས་ཅན། བྱས་པའི་དྭགས་ཀྱིས་སྐྱ་མི་དྭག་པར་
སྐྱབ་པའི་ཤེས་འདོད་ཆོས་ཅན་སྒྲིན་མེད་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ། བྱེད་བྱས་པའི་དྭགས་ཀྱིས་
སྐྱ་མི་དྭགས་པར་སྐྱབ་པའི་རྩོད་གཞིར་བཟུང་བ་གང་ཞིག །བྱེད་བྱས་པར་ཆད་མས་
ངེས་ནས་བྱེད་མི་དྭག་པ་ཡིན་མིན་ལ་ཤེས་འདོད་ཞུགས་པའི་གང་ཟག་སྤྱིད་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[The first part of your original statement on this point is not correct: it is incorrect to say that "sound" provides the subject about which the opponent entertains doubt, in a proof where "a thing which is made" is being used as the reason in a proof that sound is a changing thing.]

Suppose you say that the first part of our original statement is not correct,
[which is to say, it is incorrect to say that "sound" provides the subject about which the opponent entertains doubt, in a proof where "a thing which is made" is being used as a reason in the proof that sound is a changing thing].

Consider sound.

It does so provide the subject about which the opponent entertains doubt, in a proof where "a thing which is made" is being used as a reason in the proof that sound is a changing thing,

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Because (1) it is considered the basis of contention in a proof where "a thing which is made" is being used as a reason in the proof that sound is a changing thing; and (2) it is possible that there exists a person who, once they have ascertained through valid perception that sound is something made, still doubts whether or not sound is a changing thing.

དང་པོ་དེར་ཐལ། སྒྲ་ཆོས་ཅན། མི་དྲག་སྟེ། བྱས་པའི་ཕྱིར་ཞེས་པའི་སྟོར་བ་ཡོད་
པའི་ཕྱིར།

[The first part of your reason is not correct.]

The first part of our reason is so correct,
Because the following logical statement does exist:

Consider sound.
It is a changing thing,
Because it is made.

གཉིས་པ་དེར་ཐལ། སྒྲ་བྱས་པར་ཆད་མས་ངེས་ནས་སྒྲ་མི་དྲག་པར་ཆད་མས་མ་
ངེས་པའི་གང་ཟག་ཡོད་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[The second part of your reason is not correct.]

The second part of our reason is so correct,
Because there do exist people who, once they have ascertained through valid
perception that sound is something made, still doubt whether or not
sound is a changing thing.

ཅ་དྲགས་གཉིས་པ་མ་གྲུབ་ན། བྱས་པ་ཆོས་ཅན། དེར་ཐལ། བྱིད་སྒྲ་དང་ཕན་ཚུན་
ཐ་དད་གང་ཞིག་བྱིད་སྒྲ་འི་སྟེང་དུ་འགོད་ཚུལ་དང་མཐུན་པར་ཡོད་པ་ཉིད་དུ་ཆད་མས་
ངེས་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[The second part of your original statement is not correct: it is not
correct to say that "something which is made" is also ascertained
by a valid perception only to apply to sound, in the way
asserted; and that it is also the case that "something which is
made" and sound are separate from each other.]

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Suppose you say that the second part of our original statement is not correct. Consider "something which is made."

It is so [also ascertained by a valid perception only to apply to sound, in the way asserted; and it is so moreover the case that "something which is made" and sound are separate from each other],

Because (1) "something which is made" and sound are separate from each other, and (2) "something which is made" can be ascertained by a valid perception only to apply to sound, in the way asserted.

གཞིས་པ་དེར་ཐལ། ཁྱོད་ཀྱི་དྲགས་ཀྱིས་དེ་སྟུབ་ཀྱི་འགོད་ཚུལ་ཡིན་འགོད་ཡིན། སྟེ་
ཁྱོད་ཡིན། སྟེ་ཆོས་ཅན་གྱི་སྟེང་དུ་ཁྱོད་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར། དྲགས་ནམས་སྟེ།

[The second part of your last reason is not correct: it's not correct to say that "something which is made" can be ascertained by a valid perception only to apply to sound, in the way asserted.]

The second part of our last reason is so true,

Because (1) the way in which the reason is set forth utilizes the verb "is"; (2) sound is something made, and (3) "something which is made" applies to the subject, "sound." All the parts of this reason are easy to accept.

བྱས་པ་ཆོས་ཅན། ཁྱོད་སྟེ་མི་དྲག་པར་སྟུབ་པའི་ཇེས་བྱ་པ་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ། མཚན་
ཉིད་དེ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

Consider "something which is made."

It is so a case where the positive relationship between the reason and the quality to be proven holds, in a proof that sound is something changing, Because it fits the definition given.

ཅེ་དྲགས་དང་པོ་དེར་ཐལ། བྱས་པ་དེ་ཁྱོད་ཀྱི་དྲགས་ཀྱིས་སྟེ་མི་དྲག་པར་སྟུབ་པའི་
དྲགས་ཆོས་གཞིས་ལྡན་གྱི་མཐུན་དཔེ་ཡང་དག་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[The first part of your original statement on this point is not correct—which is to say, there does not exist a correct "similar example," incorporating both the reason and the quality to be proven, in the proof where "something which is made" is used as the reason in a proof that sound is a changing thing.]

The first part of our original statement on this point is so correct,

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Because "water pitcher" is a correct "similar example," incorporating both the reason and the quality to be proven, in the proof where "something which is made" is used as the reason in a proof that sound is a changing thing.

མ་གྲུབ་ན། ལུས་པ་ཆོས་ཅན། ཁྱོད་བྱས་པའི་དྲགས་ཀྱིས་དེ་སྐྱབ་ཀྱི་དྲགས་ཆོས་
གཉིས་ལྡན་གྱི་མཐུན་དཔེ་ཡང་དག་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ། ཁྱོད་བྱས་པའི་དྲགས་ཀྱིས་དེ་
སྐྱབ་ཀྱི་མཐུན་དཔེར་བཟུང་བ་གང་ཞིག །སྒྲིའི་སྣང་དུ་བྱས་ན་མི་དྲག་པས་བྱབ་པ་ཆད་
མས་མ་ངེས་པའི་སྒྲ་རོལ་དུ་ཁྱོད་ཀྱི་སྣང་དུ་བྱས་ན་མི་དྲག་པས་བྱབ་པ་ཆད་མས་ངེས་
པའི་དེ་སྐྱབ་ཀྱི་ཕྱི་ཆོལ་ཡང་དག་ཡོད་པའི་ཕྱིར་ཏེ། དེ་བྱས་པའི་བྱེ་བྲག་ཡིན་པའི་
ཕྱིར།

[It's not correct to say that "water pitcher" is a correct "similar example," incorporating both the reason and the quality to be proven, in the proof where "something which is made" is used as the reason in a proof that sound is a changing thing.]

Suppose you say that it's not correct [to say that "water pitcher" is a correct "similar example," incorporating both the reason and the quality to be proven, in the proof where "something which is made" is used as the reason in a proof that sound is a changing thing].

Consider a water pitcher.

It is so a correct similar example, incorporating both the reason and the quality to be proven, in the proof where "something which is made" is used as the reason in a proof that sound is a changing thing,

Because (1) it can be considered a similar example in the proof where "something which is made" is used as the reason in a proof that sound is a changing thing; and (2) there does exist a correct opponent for the particular proof who—before he ascertains with valid perception that the fact that "something which is made must always be something which is changing" applies to sound—has already ascertained, with valid perception, that the fact that "something which is made must always be something which is changing" applies to it [that is, to the similar example: a water pitcher].

དང་པོ་དེར་ཐལ། སྒྲ་ཆོས་ཅན། མི་ཏྲག་སྟེ། བྱས་པའི་ཕྱིར། དཔེར་ན་བྱུང་པ་
བཞིན་ཞེས་པའི་སྒྲུང་བ་ཡོད་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[The first part of your last reason is not correct.]

The first part of our last reason is so correct,
Because the following logical statement does exist:

Consider sound.
It is a changing thing,
Because it is made.
It's like, for example, a water pitcher.

གཉིས་པ་མ་གྲུབ་ན། ཞེས་བྱ་ཆོས་ཅན། དེར་ཐལ། སྒྲ་མི་ཏྲག་པར་ཆད་མས་མ་
ངས་པའི་སྒྲ་རོལ་དུ་བྱུང་པ་མི་ཏྲག་པར་ཆད་མས་ངས་པའི་དེ་སྒྲུབ་ཀྱི་ཕྱི་ཕྱོགས་ཡང་
དག་ཡོད་པའི་ཕྱིར། སྒྲ་མི་ཏྲག་པར་སྒྲུབ་པའི་ཕྱི་ཕྱོགས་ཡང་དག་ཡོད་པའི་ཕྱིར། སྒྲ་
མི་ཏྲག་པར་སྒྲུབ་པའི་ཕྱི་ཕྱོགས་ཡང་དག་དེ་དེ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[The second part of your reason is not correct.]

Suppose you say that the second part of our reason is not correct.
Consider all knowable things.

There does so [exist a correct opponent for the particular proof who—before
he ascertains with valid perception that the fact that "something which
is made must always be something which is changing" applies to
sound—has already ascertained, with valid perception, that the fact that
"something which is made must always be something which is
changing" applies to it (that is, to the similar example: a water pitcher),.

Because there does exist a correct opponent for the particular proof
who—before he ascertains with valid perception that the fact that
"something which is made must always be something which is
changing" applies to sound—has already ascertained, with valid
perception, the fact that a water pitcher is a changing thing.

And this is true because there does exist a correct opponent for the proof that
sound is a changing thing.

And this is true because what it means to be a correct opponent for the proof
that sound is a changing thing is exactly what we just mentioned.

དེ་སྐབ་ཀྱི་ཕྱི་ཕྱོད་ཡང་དག་དེས་སྒྲིམ་མི་དག་པར་ཚད་མས་མ་ངེས་པ་གང་ཞིག །དེ་
བུམ་པ་མི་དག་པར་ཚད་མས་ངེས་པའི་གང་ཟག་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར། དགས་གཉིས་ཆོས་
ཅན་གྱིས་སྒྲུབ།

And this is true because a correct opponent for this particular proof is a person who (1) has not yet ascertained, with a valid perception, that sound is something changing; and who (2) has already ascertained, with a valid perception, that a water pitcher is a changing thing.

The two points of the reason are established by the very subject at hand.

ཅ་དགས་གཉིས་པ་དེར་ཐལ། བྱོད་མི་དག་པ་ལ་བདག་གཅིག་ཏུ་འབྲེལ་བའི་ཕྱིར།

[The second part of your original statement is incorrect: the reason is not related to "changing thing."]

The second part of our original statement is so correct,
Because the reason is related to "changing thing" in such a way that to be the reason is to automatically be a changing thing.

ཅ་དགས་གསུམ་པ་དེར་ཐལ། བྱོད་ཀྱི་དགས་ཀྱིས་དེ་སྐབ་ཀྱི་འགོད་ཚུལ་ཡིན་འགོད་
གང་ཞིག །སྐབ་ཚུལ་ཡིན་སྐབ་ཡིན། བྱོད་མི་དག་པ་ཡིན། བྱོད་ཡིན་ན། མི་དག་
པ་ཡིན་དགོས་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[The third part of your original statement is incorrect: the reason is not ascertained through valid perception to be something that only applies to the group of similar cases in the way asserted, in a proof where sound is proven to be an unchanging thing.]

The third part of our original statement is so correct,
Because (1) the proof in which "something made" appears as a reason is one where "is" is used as the verb with the reason; and (2) the verb used with the quality to be proven is "is," (3) the reason given is a changing thing, and (4) anything which is something made is automatically a changing thing.

དང་པོ་སྟེ། གཉིས་པ་དེར་ཐལ། བྱོད་ཀྱི་དྲགས་ཀྱིས་དེ་སྟབ་ཀྱི་སྟབ་ཚུལ་ཡིན་སྟབ་
དང་། ཡོད་སྟབ་གང་རུང་གང་ཞིག ། བྱི་མ་མ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

The first point is easy.

The second is so true,

Because (1) it appears as a reason in a proof where the verb used with the
quality to be proven could have been either "is" or "exists," and (2) here
it is not the latter.

དང་པོ་དེར་ཐལ། བྱོད་དེ་སྟབ་ཀྱི་དྲགས་སུ་བཀོད་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[The first of these two points is not correct: it's not correct to say that "it
is something made" appears as a reason in a proof where the
verb used with the quality to be proven could have been either
"is" or "exists."]

The first of the two points is so true,

Because it has been set forth as a reason in the proof.

གཉིས་པ་མ་གྲུབ་ན། བྱས་པ་སྟེ་མི་དྲག་པར་ཡོད་པར་སྟབ་པའི་མཐུན་ཕྱོགས་ལ་བྱབ་
བྱེད་དུ་འཇུག་པའི་དྲགས་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ། དེ་སྟབ་ཀྱི་མཐུན་ཕྱོགས་ལ་བྱབ་བྱེད་དུ་
འཇུག་པའི་དྲགས་ཡོད་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[The second of these two points is not correct: it's not correct to say that
here it is not the latter.]

Suppose you say that the second of the two points is not correct.

So is it then the case that "something which is made" is used here as a reason
which covers the entire group of similar cases in a proof where
"changing things exist" is being proven about sound?

Because there does exist a reason which covers the entire group of similar
cases in the particular proof.

འདོད་ན། ཤེས་བྱ་ཆོས་ཅན། བྱས་པ་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ། མི་དྲག་པ་ཡོད་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[I agree to your statement that "something which is made" is used here
as a reason which covers the entire group of similar cases in a
proof where "changing things exist" is being proven about
sound.]

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Suppose you agree with our statement.
Consider all knowable things.
So are they then something which is made?
Because changing things exist with them.

དྲགས་གསུམ་པ་དེར་ཐལ། བྱས་པ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[The third part of your reason above is incorrect: the reason given is not a changing thing.]

The third part of our reason above is so correct,
Because the reason given is "something which is made."

དྲགས་བཞི་པ་འབྱུང་དོ།

And we can throw out any objection to the fourth part of our reason, [which states that anything which is something made is automatically a changing thing].

བྱས་པ་ཆོས་ཅན། སྒྲ་མི་དྲག་པར་སྐྱབ་པའི་ལྷོག་བྱབ་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ། མཚན་ཉིད་དེ་
ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

Consider [the reason] "something which is made."
It is so true, that the negative necessity holds with it in a proof that sound is
a changing thing,
Because it fits the given definition.

ཙ་དྲགས་དང་པོ་གྲུབ་ཏེ། འདུས་མ་བྱས་ཀྱི་ནམ་མཁའ་དེ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[It's not correct to say that it fits the first part of the original definition;
that is, there does not exist a correct "dissimilar example,"
involving both the reason and the quality to be proven.]

It does fit the first part [of the original definition of whether the negative
necessity holds],
Because "empty space, an unproduced thing" is just such an example.

ཙ་དྲགས་གཉིས་པ་སྐྱབ་ཟེན། ཙ་དྲགས་གསུམ་པ་གྲུབ་སྟེ། མི་དྲག་པ་མ་ཡིན་པ་ལ་
བྱས་པ་མེད་པའི་ཕྱིར།

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We have already established that it fits the second part [of the original definition; that is, the reason ("something made") does relate to "changing thing"].

It does fit the third part [of the original definition; that is, "something which is made" is ascertained through valid perception to be something that only fails to apply to the group of dissimilar cases in the way asserted, in a proof where sound is proven to be an unchanging thing],
Because nothing which is made ever applies to those things which are not changing.

The forms of debate:
Formulating a statement of necessity

One of the most powerful tools in logic, and in the debate ground, is called the "statement of necessity," which is *telngyur* in Tibetan (*thal-'gyur*) and *prasaṅgika* in Sanskrit. This form of logical statement is believed by the highest school of Buddhism, the upper half of the Madhyamika or Middle-Way Group of philosophers, to have the power to give an opponent a correct understanding of emptiness even before going on to a standard assertion—and because of this belief, the school is called the "Madhyamika Prasangika," or the "Necessity" School of the Middle-Way Group.

The word "necessity" here most often implies an absurdity which would be a necessary consequence if the opponent's incorrect statement were true. As such, the name of the highest school is sometimes rendered into English as the "Consequence" School of the Middle-Way Group.

In debate, a statement of necessity is most often used right after the opponent has objected to a standard assertion, such as in the following example. We have just given the statement,

Consider sound.
It is a changing thing,
Because it is a thing which is made.

སྒྲ་ཆོས་ཅན།
མི་རྟག་སྟེ།
བྱས་པའི་ཕྱིར།

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The opponent then answered,

Your reason is incorrect. (Which is to say, "Sound is not
a thing which is made.")

རྟགས་མ་བྱུང།

We then reply with a statement of necessity, in this case pointing out an
absurd consequence of our opponent's position:

Let's consider sound again.
So is it then something which is unchanging?

སྒྲ་ཆོས་ཅན།

རྟག་པ་ཡིན་པར་བྲལ།

Whenever we are using a statement of necessity in the sense of pointing out
an absurd consequence of the opponent's position, our voice in the Tibetan
descends at the end of the statement, on the word *tel*. In Tibetan this is the
equivalent of a sarcastic statement like "Oh, so I suppose you're telling me then
that sound is an unchanging thing?"

There are however also times when we use a statement of necessity to express
something that we *do* believe is necessarily true. An example would be the
following statement, which we might use in debate if the opponent has said
"That's right" to our last statement above. (In other words, he has said, "It's
right that sound is something which is unchanging.")

Let's consider sound again.
It is *not* the case that it is something which is unchanging,
Because it is a working thing.

སྒྲ་ཆོས་ཅན།

རྟག་པ་མ་ཡིན་པར་བྲལ།

དངོས་པོ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

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In this case, because we believe in the statement, our voice in Tibetan rises at the end of the statement, again on the word *tel*. This is the equivalent in Tibetan of something like "I told you so! Sound could never be something which is unchanging!"

A statement of necessity in debate, finally, often follows a statement of a general truth, such as the following. Suppose an opponent comes and says,

If something is the color of a flower, it must always be a
white color.

མི་ཏོག་གི་ཁ་དོག་ཡིན་ན། ཁ་དོག་དཀར་པོ་ཡིན་པའི་བྱ་བ།

We would then retaliate with,

Consider the color of a red rose.
So is it then a white color?
Because it is the color of a flower.

རྒྱུ་ལ་སྤྲས་མི་ཏོག་དམར་པོའི་ཁ་དོག་ཆོས་ཅན།
ཁ་དོག་དཀར་པོ་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ།
མི་ཏོག་གི་ཁ་དོག་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

Of course in this case our voice would drop on the *tel*, indicating that we ourselves would never believe this absurd consequence of our opponent's position. In the next lesson, we will learn about the traditional responses to a statement of necessity.

READING FIVE WAS NOT TRANSLATED.

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Course XIII: The Art of Reasoning

Reading Six: Negative and Positive

Selection from the collected topics:
Negative and Positive

The selection here is from a monastic textbook popularly known as The Collected Topics of the Spiritual Son (Sras bsdus-grva), by Master Ngawang Trashi, the spiritual son of the great Jamyang Shepa (1648-1721).

Please note that indented statements are usually those given by the opponent. Responses within brackets are those that are usually left unwritten in the Tibetan text, and are understood to be there because of the context following each.

༩ །དགག་སྒྲུབ་ཀྱི་ནམ་བཞག་བཤད་པ་ལ། ཁ་ཅིག་ན་རེ། དངོས་པོ་ཡིན་ན་སྒྲུབ་
པ་ཡིན་པས་བྱུང་བེད་ན།

Here next is a presentation on the concepts of negative and positive. We will first refute the position of our opponents, then present our own position, and then finally eliminate their rebuttal.

Suppose someone comes and makes the following claim:

Anything which is a working thing must always be something positive.

སྒྲིམ་ཏྲག་པ་ཆོས་ཅན། སྒྲུབ་པ་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ། དངོས་པོ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར། བྱུང་པ་
ཁས།

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Consider the fact that sound is not unchanging.
So is it then something positive?
Because it is a working thing.

[It doesn't necessarily follow.]

But you already agreed that it does necessarily follow.

འདོད་ན། སྒྲ་མི་དྲག་པ་ཆོས་ཅན། སྒྲ་བ་པ་མ་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ། དགག་པ་ཡིན་པའི་
ཕྱིར།

[Then I agree to your original statement: the fact that sound is not unchanging is something positive.]

Suppose you agree to our original statement.
Consider the fact that sound is not unchanging.
It is not so, that it is something positive,
Because it is something negative.

དེར་ཐལ། རང་དངོས་སུ་དྲགས་པའི་སྒྲ་རང་གི་དགག་བྱ་དངོས་སུ་བཅད་ནས་
དྲགས་དགོས་པའི་ཆོས་ཡིན་པ་གང་ཞིག །རང་ཞེས་བཟྱེད་པའི་སྒྲ་རང་གི་
དགག་བྱ་དངོས་སུ་བཅད་ནས་བཟྱེད་དགོས་པའི་ཆོས་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[It's not correct to say that the fact that sound is not unchanging is something negative.]

It is so,

Because (1) it is a thing which must be perceived by the state of mind that perceives it directly through the process of eliminating, directly, the thing that it denies; and (2) it is a thing which must be expressed through a process where the wording used to express it does so through a process of eliminating, directly, the thing that it denies.

དྲགས་གཉིས་པ་བྱུང་སྟེ། སྒྲ་མི་དྲག་ཅེས་བཟྱེད་པའི་སྒྲ་སྒྲ་དྲག་པ་ཡིན་པ་ཆོག་ཟེན་
ལ་དངོས་སུ་བཅད་ནས་སྒྲ་མི་དྲག་པར་བཟྱེད་པར་བྱ་བ་དེ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར། དེ་འཛིན་
པའི་སྟོ་ལ་ཡང་རིགས་འདྲ།

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[The second part of your last statement is not correct: the fact that sound is not unchanging is not a thing which must be expressed through a process where the actual wording used to express it does so through a process of eliminating, directly, the thing that it denies.]

The second part of our last statement is so true,
Because the expression "sound is not unchanging" is one where the fact that sound is not unchanging is expressed through eliminating, directly, the idea that sound is something unchanging—by saying so explicitly.

ཁ་ཅིག་ན་རེ། རང་གི་དངོས་མིང་གི་མཐར་མེད་ཆོག་སྒྱུར་བའི་ཆོས་ཡིན་ན། མེད་
དགག་ཡིན་པས་བྱུང་བེད་ན།

Suppose someone comes and makes the following claim:

Whenever the actual name for something incorporates a word for the absence of something, then the thing is always a negative thing in the sense of being the absence of something.

སངས་རྒྱས་ཆོ་དཔག་མེད་ཆོས་ཅན། དེར་ཐལ། དེའི་ཕྱིར། བྱུང་པ་ཁས།

Consider the Buddha known as "Limitless Life" (Amitayus).
So is he [a negative thing in the sense of being the absence of something]?
Because he is [something where his actual name incorporates a word for the absence of something].

[It doesn't necessarily follow.]

But you already agreed that it does necessarily follow.

མ་གྲུབ་ན། སངས་རྒྱས་ཆོ་དཔག་མེད་ཆོས་ཅན། དེར་ཐལ། སངས་རྒྱས་ཆོ་དཔག་
མེད་ཅེས་བརྗོད་པའི་སྒྲ་དེ་བྱོད་ཀྱི་དངོས་མིང་ཡིན་པ་གང་ཞིག དེའི་མཐར་མེད་
ཆོག་སྒྱུར་བ་མངོན་སུམ་དུ་གྲུབ་པ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

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[It's not correct to say that the Buddha known as "Limitless Life" is something where his actual name incorporates a word for the absence of something.]

Suppose you say that it's not correct.

Consider the Buddha known as "Limitless Life."

He is so [something where his actual name incorporates a word for the absence of something],

Because (1) the term "the Buddha known as 'Limitless Life'" is his actual name, and (2) the fact that his name incorporates a word for the absence of something is an example of the obvious level of reality.

ཕྱི་བར་འདོད་ན་སངས་རྒྱས་ཆོ་དཔག་མེད་ཆོས་ཅན། མེད་དགག་མ་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ།
དངོས་པོ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[I agree to your original statement: the Buddha known as "Limitless Life" is a negative thing in the sense of being the absence of something.]

Suppose you agree to our original statement.

Consider the Buddha known as "Limitless Life."

It is not so, that he is a negative thing in the sense of being the absence of something,

Because he is a working thing.

མ་ཁྲུབ་ན་ཁྲུབ་པ་ཡོད་པར་ཐལ། མེད་དགག་ཡིན་ན་དྲག་པ་ཡིན་པས་ཁྲུབ་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[It doesn't necessarily follow.]

Suppose you say that it doesn't necessarily follow.

It does so necessarily follow,

Because anything which is a negative thing in the sense of being the absence of something is always an unchanging thing.

ཁ་ཅིག་ན་རེ། དགག་པ་ཡིན་ན་རང་གི་དངོས་མིང་ལ་དགག་ཆོག་སྐྱར་བའི་ཆོས་
ཡིན་པས་ཁྲུབ་ཟེར་ན།

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Suppose someone comes and makes the following claim:

Anything which is a negative thing is always a thing which has
a term of negation incorporated into its actual name.

ནམ་མཁའ་ཚེས་ཅན། རང་གི་དངོས་མིང་ལ་དགག་ཚིག་སྒྱུར་བའི་ཚེས་ཡིན་པར་
ཐལ། དགག་པ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར། བྱུང་པ་ཁས།

Consider space.

So is it then a thing which has a term of negation incorporated into its actual
name?

Because it is a negative thing.

[It doesn't necessarily follow.]

But you already agreed that it does necessarily follow.

མ་གྲུབ་ན། རམ་མཁའ་ཚེས་ཅན། དགག་པ་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ། མིང་དགག་ཡིན་པའི་
ཕྱིར།

[It's not correct to say that space is a negative thing.]

Suppose you say that it's not correct.

Consider space.

It is so a negative thing,

Because it is a negative thing in the sense of being the absence of something.

མ་གྲུབ་ན། རམ་མཁའ་ཚེས་ཅན། མིང་དགག་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ། ཐོག་རིག་བཅད་ཅམ་
གྱི་མིང་དགག་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[It's not correct to say that space is a negative thing in the sense of
being the absence of something.]

Suppose you say it's not correct.

Consider space.

It is so a negative thing in the sense of being the absence of something,

Because, by being the simple elimination of all obstruction, it is a negative
thing in the sense of being the absence of something.

དེར་ཐལ། འདུས་མ་གུས་ཀྱི་ནམ་མཁའ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[It's not correct to say that space, by being the simple elimination of all obstruction, it is a negative thing in the sense of being the absence of something.]

Suppose you say that it's not correct.

It is so,

Because it is that space which is an unproduced thing.

རྩ་བར་འདོད་ན། ནམ་མཁའ་ཆོས་ཅན། རང་གི་དངོས་མིང་ལ་དགག་ཆོག་སྟུར་
བའི་ཆོས་མ་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ། བྱོད་ཀྱི་དངོས་མིང་གི་ཟུར་དུ་དགག་ཆོག་མེད་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[I agree to your original statement: space is a thing which has a term of negation incorporated into its actual name.]

Suppose you agree to our original statement.

Consider space.

It is not so a thing which has a term of negation incorporated into its actual name,

Because there is no term of negation that forms a part of its actual name.

མ་གྲུབ་ན། ནམ་མཁའ་ཆོས་ཅན། བྱོད་ཀྱི་དངོས་མིང་གི་ཟུར་དུ་དགག་ཆོག་མེད་
པར་ཐལ། ནམ་མཁའ་ཞེས་པའི་སྒྲ་དེ་བྱོད་ཀྱི་དངོས་མིང་ཡིན་པ་གང་ཞིག །ནམ་
དང་མཁའ་ཞེས་པ་གཉིས་གང་ཡང་དགག་ཆོག་མ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[It's not correct to say that there is no term of negation that forms a part of the actual name of "space."]

Suppose you say that it's not correct.

Consider space.

It is so true, that there is no term of negation that forms a part of its actual name,

Because (1) the expression "space" (*nam-ka*) is its actual name, and (2) neither of the two parts of this expression, *nam* or *ka*, is a term of negation.

གཞན་ཡང་། ཆོས་ཉིད་ཆོས་ཅན། རང་གི་དངོས་མིང་གི་མཐར་དགག་ཆོག་སྟུར་

བའི་ཆོས་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ། དགག་པ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར། བྱེད་པ་ཁས།

We can also make this point another way.

Consider the nature of things.

So is this then a thing where its actual name incorporates a term of negation?

Because it is a negative thing.

[It doesn't necessarily follow.]

But you already agreed that it does necessarily follow.

རྟགས་གྲུབ་སྟེ། མེད་དགག་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[It's not correct to say that the nature of things is a negative thing.]

It is correct,

Because the nature of things is a negative thing in the sense of being the absence of something.

རྩ་བར་འདོད་མི་རྣམས་ཏེ། རང་གི་དངོས་མིང་གི་མཐར་དགག་ཆོག་མ་སྒྱུར་གྱུར་།
རང་དངོས་སུ་རྟགས་པའི་སྒྲོས་རང་གི་དགག་བྱ་དངོས་སུ་བཅད་ནས་རྟགས་དགོས་
པའི་ཆོས་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[I agree with your original statement: the nature of things is a thing where its actual name incorporates a term of negation.]

But you can't agree with our original statement,

Because—even though it is a thing where its actual name incorporates no term of negation—the nature of things is a thing which must be perceived by the state of mind that perceives it directly through the process of eliminating, directly, the thing that it denies.

བྱེད་སྟེ། རང་དངོས་སུ་རྟགས་པའི་སྒྲོས་རང་གི་དགག་བྱ་དངོས་སུ་བཅད་ནས་
རྟགས་དགོས་པའི་ཆོས་ཡིན་ན་དགག་པ་ཡིན་པས་བྱེད་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[It doesn't necessarily follow.]

But it does necessarily follow,

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Because anything which a thing which must be perceived by the state of mind that perceives it directly through the process of eliminating, directly, the thing that it denies is always a negative thing.

དེ་ལ་ཁ་ཅིག་ན་རེ། གཞུགས་ཆོས་ཅན། དགག་པ་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ། རང་དངོས་སུ་
ཏྲོགས་པའི་སྒྲོས་རང་གི་དགག་བྱ་དངོས་སུ་བཅད་ནས་ཏྲོགས་དགོས་པའི་ཆོས་ཡིན་
པའི་ཕྱིར།

Suppose that, on this point, someone comes and makes the following claim:

Consider physical things.

Are they then negative things?

Because they are things which must be perceived by the state of mind that perceives them directly through the process of eliminating, directly, the thing that they deny.

མ་གྲུབ་ན། གཞུགས་ཆོས་ཅན། དེར་ཐལ། རང་དངོས་སུ་ཏྲོགས་པའི་ཏྲོག་པས་
རང་གི་དགག་བྱ་དངོས་སུ་བཅད་ནས་ཏྲོགས་དགོས་པའི་ཆོས་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

Suppose you say that it's not correct [to say that physical things are things which must be perceived by the state of mind that perceives them directly through the process of eliminating, directly, the thing that they deny].

Consider physical things.

They are so such things,

Because they are things which must be perceived by the conceptualization which perceives them directly through the process of eliminating, directly, the thing that they deny.

མ་གྲུབ་ན། གཞུགས་ཆོས་ཅན། དེར་ཐལ། རང་འཇིན་པའི་ཏྲོག་པས་རང་མ་ཡིན་
པ་ནམ་པར་བཅད་ནས་ཏྲོགས་དགོས་པའི་ཆོས་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར་ཟེར་ན་མ་ཁྱབ།

Suppose you say that it's not correct [to say that physical things are things which must be perceived by the conceptualization which perceives them directly through the process of eliminating, directly, the thing that they deny].

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Consider physical things.

They are so such things,

Because they are things which must be perceived by the conceptualization which perceives them directly through the process of eliminating, directly, all that they are not.

To this last we answer, "It doesn't necessarily follow."

མ་གྲུབ་ན། གཟུགས་ཆོས་ཅན། ཁྱོད་འཛིན་པའི་རྟོག་པས་ཁྱོད་མ་ཡིན་པ་རྣམ་པར་
བཅད་ནས་རྟོགས་དགོས་པའི་ཆོས་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ། ཁྱོད་གཞི་གྲུབ་པའི་ཕྱིར།

And suppose you said that it wasn't correct [to say that physical things are things which must be perceived by the conceptualization which perceives them directly through the process of eliminating, directly, all that they are not].

Consider physical things.

They are so things which must be perceived through the process of eliminating, directly, all that they are not,

Because they can be established as existing.

ཁ་ཅིག་ན་རེ། བུམ་པ་ཆོས་ཅན། སྒྲུབ་པ་མ་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ། དགག་པ་ཡིན་པའི་
ཕྱིར།

Suppose someone comes and makes the following claim:

Consider a water pitcher.

It is not so true, that it is something positive,

Because it is something negative.

མ་གྲུབ་ན། བུམ་པ་ཆོས་ཅན། དགག་པ་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ། རང་དངོས་སུ་རྟོགས་པའི་
རྟོག་པས་རང་མ་ཡིན་པ་རྣམ་པར་བཅད་ནས་རྟོགས་དགོས་པའི་ཆོས་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར་
ཟེར་ན་མ་བྲལ།

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Suppose you say that it's not correct [to say that a water pitcher is something negative].

Consider a water pitcher.

It is so something negative,

Because it is a thing which must be perceived by the conceptualization which perceives it directly through the process of eliminating, directly, all that it is not.

To this we answer, "It doesn't necessarily follow."

མ་གྲུབ་ན། ལུ་མ་པ་ཆོས་ཅན། ཁྱོད་དངོས་སུ་རྟོགས་པའི་རྟོག་པས་ཁྱོད་མ་ཡིན་པ་
རྣམ་པར་བཅད་ནས་རྟོགས་དགོས་པའི་ཆོས་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ། ཁྱོད་གཞི་གྲུབ་པའི་ཕྱིར།

And suppose you say that it's not correct [to say that a water pitcher is a thing which must be perceived by the conceptualization which perceives it directly through the process of eliminating, directly, all that it is not].

Consider a water pitcher.

It is so a thing which must be perceived by the conceptualization which perceives it directly through the process of eliminating, directly, all that it is not,

Because it is something which can be established as existing.

རྩ་བར་འདོད་ན། ལུ་མ་པ་ཆོས་ཅན། དགག་པ་མ་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ། ལྷུབ་པ་ཡིན་པའི་
ཕྱིར།

And suppose you did agree to that original statement [that a water pitcher is something negative].

Consider a water pitcher.

It is not so true, that it is a negative thing,

Because it is a positive thing.

མ་གྲུབ་ན། ལུ་མ་པ་ཆོས་ཅན། ལྷུབ་པ་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ། ལུ་མ་པ་དང་གཅིག་ཡིན་པའི་
ཕྱིར།

[It's not correct to say that a water pitcher is a positive thing.]

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Consider a water pitcher.
It is so a positive thing,
Because it is one and the same as a water pitcher.

ཁ་ཅིག་ན་རེ། མ་ཡིན་དགག་ཡིན་ན། རང་ཞེས་བཟོད་པའི་སྒྲིམ་རང་གི་དགག་བྱ་
བཞག་ཤུལ་དུ་ཆོས་གཞན་མ་ཡིན་དགག་དང་སྒྲིབ་པ་གང་རུང་དངོས་སུ་འཕྱེན་པའི་
ཆོས་ཡིན་པས་བྱུང་བེད་ན།

Suppose someone comes and makes the following claim:

If something is a negative in the sense of not being something,
then it is always a thing where the term which expresses it
directly implies something else—either a negative in the same
sense or a positive—incidental to denying what it denies.

ལྷས་སྒྲིན་ཆོན་པོ་ཉིན་པར་བས་མི་བ་ཆོས་ཅན། དེར་ཐལ། དེའི་ཕྱིར། བྱུང་པ་
ཁས།

Consider the fact that John Smith, who is chubby, never eats during the day.
So is it then [a thing where the term which expresses it directly implies
something else—either a negative in the sense of not being something,
or a positive—incidental to denying what it denies]?
Because it is [something negative in the sense of not being something].

[It doesn't necessarily follow.]

But you already agreed that it does necessarily follow.

མ་གྲུབ་ན། ལྷས་སྒྲིན་ཆོན་པོ་ཉིན་པར་བས་མི་བ་ཆོས་ཅན། མ་ཡིན་དགག་ཡིན་
པར་ཐལ། རང་ཞེས་བཟོད་པའི་སྒྲིམ་རང་གི་དགག་བྱ་ཆོག་ཟིན་ལ་དངོས་སུ་བཞག་
ནས་ཆོས་གཞན་མ་ཡིན་དགག་དང་སྒྲིབ་པ་གང་རུང་འཕྱེན་པར་བྱེད་པ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

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[It's not correct to say that the fact that John Smith, who is chubby, never eats during the day is something negative in the sense of not being something.]

Suppose you say that it's not correct.

Consider the fact that John Smith, who is chubby, never eats during the day. It is so a negative in the sense of not being something, because it is a thing where the term which expresses it implies something else—either a negative in the sense of not being something, or a positive—incidental to denying what it denies directly in the actual wording.

དེར་ཐལ། རང་ཞེས་བརྗོད་པའི་སྐྱེས་ཉིན་པར་ཟས་ཟ་བ་དངོས་སུ་བཀག་ནས་མཚན་
མོ་ཟ་བ་ཤུགས་ལ་འཕངས་པ་གང་ཞིག། །མཚན་མོ་ཟ་བ་སྐྱབ་པ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[It's not correct to say that the fact that John Smith, who is chubby, never eats during the day is a thing where the term which expresses it implies something else—either a negative in the sense of not being something, or a positive—incidental to denying what it denies.]

It is so,

Because (1) the term which expresses it directly denies that he eats during the day, and implies indirectly that he eats at night; and (2) the fact that he eats at night is something positive.

ཅུ་བར་འདོད་མི་རྒྱས་ཏེ། ལྷས་སྐྱིན་ཚོན་པོ་ཉིན་པར་ཟས་མི་ཟ་བ་ཞེས་པའི་སྐྱེ་འདིས་
རང་གི་དགག་བྱ་ཆོག་ཟིན་ལ་དངོས་སུ་བཀག་ནས་ཚོས་གཞན་མ་ཡིན་དགག་དང་
སྐྱབ་པ་གང་རུང་དངོས་སུ་མི་འཕེན་ཀྱང་ཤུགས་ལ་འཕེན་པར་བྱེད་པ་དེ་ཡིན་པའི་
ཕྱིར།

[I agree to your original statement: The fact that John Smith, who is chubby, never eats during the day is a thing where the term which expresses it directly implies something else—either a negative in the sense of not being something, or a positive—incidental to denying what it denies directly in the actual wording.]

You can't agree to our original statement,

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Because even though the expression "John Smith, who is chubby, never eats during the day" does not directly imply something else—either a negative in the sense of not being something, or a positive—incidental to denying what it denies, it nonetheless does do so indirectly.

དེར་ཐལ། ལྷས་སྤྱིན་ཚོན་པོ་ཉིན་པར་ཟས་མི་བྱ་བ་ཞེས་པའི་སྒྲ་འདིས་ཉིན་པར་ཟས་
བྱ་བ་དངོས་སུ་བཀག་ནས་མཚན་མོ་བྱ་བ་ཤུགས་ལ་འཕྱེན་པ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[It's incorrect to say that, even though the expression "John Smith, who is chubby, never eats during the day" does not directly imply something else—either a negative in the sense of not being something, or a positive—incidental to denying what it denies, it nonetheless does do so indirectly.]

It is so,

Because the expression "John Smith, who is chubby, never eats during the day" directly denies that he eats during the day, and indirectly implies that he eats at night.

བྱས་པ་ལ་ཁོན་རེ། ལྷས་སྤྱིན་ཚོན་པོ་ཉིན་པར་ཟས་མི་བྱ་བ་ཞེས་པའི་སྒྲ་འདིས་རང་
གི་དགག་བྱ་ཚིག་ཟིན་ལ་དངོས་སུ་བཀག་ནས་ཚོས་གཞན་མ་ཡིན་དགག་དང་སྒྲུབ་པ་
གང་རུང་ཤུགས་ལ་འཕྱེན་པར་བྱེད་པ་མ་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ། བྲམ་ཟེ་ཆང་མི་འཐུང་བ་
ཞེས་པའི་སྒྲ་འདིས་རང་གི་དགག་བྱ་ཚིག་ཟིན་ལ་དངོས་སུ་བཀག་ནས་ཚོས་གཞན་མ་
ཡིན་དགག་དང་སྒྲུབ་པ་གང་རུང་ཤུགས་ལ་འཕྱེན་པ་མ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར་ཟེར་ན་མ་ཁྲུབ།

On this point, someone may come and make the following claim:

It is not so, that the expression "John Smith, who is chubby, never eats during the day" indirectly implies something else—either a negative in the sense of not being something, or a positive—incidental to denying what it denies directly in the actual wording,

Because it is not true that the expression "The Brahmin drinks no alcohol" indirectly implies something else—either a negative in the sense of not being something, or a positive—incidental to denying what it denies directly in the actual wording.

Our answer to this is, "It doesn't necessarily follow."

རྟགས་བྱུང་སྟེ། བྲམ་ཟེ་ཆང་མི་འཐུང་བ་ཞེས་པའི་སྒྲ་འདིས་རང་གི་དགག་བྱ་ཆོག་
ཟིན་ལ་དངོས་སུ་བཀག་ནས་ཆོས་གཞན་མ་ཡིན་དགག་དང་སྒྲ་བ་པ་གང་རུང་དངོས་
ཤུགས་གང་རུང་དུ་མི་འཕྲིན་པ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

And it is correct to say that it is correct [to say that the expression "The Brahmin drinks no alcohol" indirectly implies something else—either a negative in the sense of not being something, or a positive—incidental to denying what it denies directly in the actual wording],

Because the expression "The Brahmin drinks no alcohol" neither indirectly nor directly implies something else—neither a negative in the sense of not being something, nor a positive—incidental to denying what it denies directly in the actual wording.

དེར་ཐལ། བྲམ་ཟེ་ཆང་མི་འཐུང་བ་ཞེས་པའི་སྒྲ་འདིས་བྲམ་ཟེ་ཆང་འཐུང་བ་ཆོག་ཟིན་
ལ་དངོས་སུ་བཀག་ནས་ཆོས་གཞན་མ་ཡིན་དགག་དང་སྒྲ་བ་པ་གང་རུང་མི་འཕྲིན་
པར་བྱེད་པ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

And this is so,

Because the expression "The Brahmin drinks no alcohol" implies nothing else—neither a negative in the sense of not being something, nor a positive—incidental to denying what it denies directly in the actual wording.

དེར་ཐལ། བྲམ་ཟེ་ཆང་མི་འཐུང་བ་མེད་དགག་ཏུ་འཇོག་དགོས་པ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

And this is so,

Because the expression "The Brahmin drinks no alcohol" must be considered a negative thing in the sense of an absence of something.

ཁ་ཅིག་ན་རེ། མ་ཡིན་དགག་ཡིན་ན། རང་ཞེས་བརྗོད་པའི་སྒྲས་རང་གི་དགག་བྱ་

ཆོག་ཟིན་ལ་དངོས་སུ་བཀག་ནས་ཆོས་གཞན་མ་ཡིན་དགག་དང་སྒྲུབ་པ་གང་རུང་
འཕྲིན་པར་བྱེད་པ་ཡིན་པས་བྱུང་བའོ།

Suppose someone comes and makes the following claim:

If something is a negative thing in the sense of not being something, then it is always such that the term which expresses it implies something else—either a negative in the sense of not being something, or a positive—incidental to denying what it denies directly in the actual wording.

རྟག་པ་ཆོས་ཅན། དེར་ཐལ། དེའི་ཕྱིར། བྱུང་པ་ཁས།

Consider an unchanging thing.

So is it then [always such that the term which expresses it implies something else—either a negative in the sense of not being something, or a positive—incidental to denying what it denies directly in the actual wording]?

Because it is [a negative thing in the sense of not being something].

[It doesn't necessarily follow.]

But you already agreed that it does necessarily follow.

མ་གྲུབ་ན། རྟག་པ་ཆོས་ཅན། མ་ཡིན་དགག་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ། དགག་པ་གང་ཞིག
ཁེད་དགག་མ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[It's not correct to say that an unchanging thing is a negative thing in the sense of not being something.]

Suppose you say that it's not correct.

Consider an unchanging thing.

It is so a negative thing in the sense of not being something,

Because (1) it is a negative thing, and (2) it is not a negative thing in the sense of being the absence of something.

རྟག་ས་དང་པོ་མ་གྲུབ་ན། རྟག་པ་ཆོས་ཅན། དགག་པ་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ། རྟག་པ་ཡིན་
པའི་ཕྱིར།

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[The first part of your reason is not correct: it is not correct to say that an unchanging thing is a negative thing.]

Suppose you say that the first part of our reason is not correct.
Consider an unchanging thing.
It is so a negative thing,
Because it is unchanging.

མ་ཁྱབ་ན་ཁྱབ་པ་ཡོད་པར་ཐལ། ཏྲག་པར་གྱུར་པའི་སྐྱབ་པ་རང་དབང་བ་མེད་པའི་
ཕྱིར།

[It's not necessarily the case that something is unchanging just because it is a negative thing.]

Suppose you say that it's not necessarily the case.
It is so necessarily the case,
Because there is no such thing as a discrete object which is a positive thing and still unchanging.

དེར་ཐལ། སྐྱབ་པ་རང་དབང་བ་ཡིན་ན་དངོས་པོ་ཡིན་པས་ཁྱབ་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[It's not correct to say that there is no such thing as a discrete object which is a positive thing and still unchanging.]

It is so,
Because anything that is a discrete object which is a positive thing must always be a working thing.

གོང་དུ་འདོད་མི་རྒྱས་ཏེ། རང་ཞེས་བརྗོད་པའི་སྐྱས་ཆོས་གཞན་མ་ཡིན་དགག་དང་
སྐྱབ་པ་གང་རུང་འཕེན་པར་བྱེད་པ་ཡིན་ཀྱང་། རང་གི་དགག་བྱ་ཆོག་ཟིན་ལ་འགོག་
པར་བྱེད་པ་མ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[I agree with the original statement above: an unchanging thing is always such that the term which expresses it implies something else—either a negative in the sense of not being something, or a positive—incidental to denying what it denies directly in the actual wording.]

You can't agree with the original statement above,

Because even though an unchanging thing is such that the term which expresses it implies something else—either a negative in the sense of not being something, or a positive—it is not something that does so incidental to denying what it denies directly in the actual wording.

དེར་ཐལ། རྟག་པ་ཞེས་པའི་ཚིག་འདི་ལ་དགག་ཚིག་སྐྱར་བ་མེད་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[It's not correct to say that, even though an unchanging thing is such that the term which expresses it implies something else—either a negative in the sense of not being something, or a positive—it is not something that does so incidental to denying what it denies directly in the actual wording.]

It is so,

Because [in the Tibetan] the expression "unchanging" [*takpa*] does not incorporate a negative term.

ཁ་ཅིག་ན་རེ། རང་ཞེས་བརྗོད་པའི་སྐྱེས་ཚེས་གཞན་མ་ཡིན་དགག་དང་སྐྱབ་པ་གང་
རུང་འཕེན་པར་བྱེད་པ་ཡིན་ན། རང་ཉིད་དགག་པ་ཡིན་པས་བྱབ་ཟེར་ན།

Suppose someone comes and makes the following claim:

Anything which is such that the term which expresses it implies something else—either a negative in the sense of not being something, or a positive—must always be a negative thing.

བྱས་པ་ཚེས་ཅན། རང་ཉིད་དགག་པ་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ། རང་ཞེས་བརྗོད་པའི་སྐྱེས་
ཚེས་གཞན་མ་ཡིན་དགག་དང་སྐྱབ་པ་གང་རུང་འཕེན་པར་བྱེད་པ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།
བྱབ་པ་ཁས།

Consider a thing which is made.

So is it then a negative thing?

Because it is such that the term which expresses it implies something else—either a negative in the sense of not being something, or a positive.

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[It doesn't necessarily follow.]

But you already agreed that it does follow.

མ་གྲུབ་ན། བྱས་པ་ཆོས་ཅན། ཁྱོད་ཅེས་བརྗོད་པའི་སྐྱེས་ཆོས་གཞན་མ་ཡིན་དགག་
དང་སྐྱབ་པ་གང་རུང་འཕེན་པར་བྱེད་པ་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ། ཁྱོད་ཅེས་བརྗོད་པའི་སྐྱེས་
ཁྱོད་ཀྱི་རྒྱ་རྒྱུ་རྒྱུན་འཕེན་པར་བྱེད་པ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[It's not correct to say that a thing which is made is such that the term which expresses it implies something else—either a negative in the sense of not being something, or a positive].

Suppose you say it's not correct.

Consider a thing which is made.

It is so such that the term which expresses it implies something else—either a negative in the sense of not being something, or a positive,

Because the term which expresses it implies that it had causes and conditions.

རྩ་བར་འདོད་ན། བྱས་པ་ཆོས་ཅན། དགག་པ་མ་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ། སྐྱབ་པ་ཡིན་པའི་
ཕྱིར།

[I agree to your original statement: a thing which is made is a negative thing.]

Suppose you agree to our original statement.

Consider a thing which is made.

It is not so, that it is a negative thing,

Because it is a positive thing.

མ་གྲུབ་ན། བྱས་པ་སྐྱབ་པ་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ། དངོས་པོ་སྐྱབ་པ་ཡིན་པ་གང་ཞིག དེ་
གཉིས་འདྲ་བའི་ཕྱིར།

[It's not correct to say that a thing which is made is a positive thing.]

Suppose you say that it's not correct.

A thing which is made is so a positive thing,

Because working things are positive things, and the two are similar cases.

ཁ་ཅིག་ན་རེ། བྱས་པ་ཆོས་ཅན། སྐྱབ་པ་མ་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ། དགག་པ་ཡིན་པའི་
ཕྱིར།

Suppose someone comes and makes the following claim:

Consider a thing which is made.
It is not so, that it is a positive thing,
Because it's a negative thing.

མ་གྲུབ་ན། བྱས་པ་དགག་པ་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ། སྐྱ་བྱས་པ་དགག་པ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

Suppose you say that it's not correct [that a thing which is made is a
negative thing].
A thing which is made is so a negative thing,
Because the fact that sound is something which is made is a negative
thing.

མ་གྲུབ་ན། དེར་ཐལ། སྐྱ་བྱས་པ་ཡིན་ཀོ་ཞེས་པའི་སྐྱ་འདིས་སྐྱ་བྱས་པ་མ་ཡིན་པ་
ནམ་པར་བཅད་ནས་བརྗོད་དགོས་པའི་ཆོས་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར་ཟེར་ན་མ་བྱུང།

And suppose you say that it's not correct [to say that the fact that sound
is something which is made is a negative thing].
It is so,
Because the expression "sound is something which is made" is a thing
which must be expressed in such a way that eliminates the
possibility that sound could not be something which is made.

Our answer to this is, "It doesn't necessarily follow" [that, because the
expression "sound is something which is made" is a thing which must
be expressed in such a way that eliminates the possibility that sound
could not be something which is made, then the fact that sound is
something which is made must be a negative thing].

འོ་ན། ཁྱོད་རང་ལ་གཟུགས་དགག་པ་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ། གཟུགས་ཞེས་བརྗོད་པའི་
སྐྱས་གཟུགས་མ་ཡིན་པ་ནམ་པར་བཅད་ནས་བརྗོད་དགོས་པའི་ཆོས་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

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Well then, according to you physical things must be negative things,
Because physical things are things such that the expression "physical things"
must be expressed in such a way that eliminates everything which is not
a physical thing.

འདོད་ན། སྐབ་པ་མེད་པར་ཐལ། གཟུགས་སྐབ་པ་མ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།
[I agree physical things must be negative things.]

Suppose you agree.
So are there then no positive things at all?
Because physical things are not positive things.

འདོད་ན། གཞི་གྲུབ་ན། དགག་པ་ཡིན་པས་ཁྲབ་པར་ཐལ། སྐབ་པ་མེད་པའི་ཕྱིར།
[I agree that there are no positive things at all.]

Suppose you agree.
So is it then the case that anything which can be established as existing is
always something negative?
Because there exist no positive things.

དྲགས་ཁས། འདོད་མི་རུས།

You already agreed to what we just stated as our reason.
And you cannot agree to our first statement, [that anything which can be
established as existing is always something negative].

ཁ་ཅིག་ན་རེ། གཟུགས་དེ་གཟུགས་ཞེས་བརྗོད་པའི་སྒྲ་འདིས་གཟུགས་མ་ཡིན་པ་
རྣམ་པར་བཅད་ནས་བརྗོད་དགོས་པའི་ཆོས་མིན་ཟེར་ན།

Suppose someone comes and makes the following claim:

It's not true of physical things that they are things such that the
expression "physical things" must be expressed in such a way
that eliminates everything which is not a physical thing.

དེ་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ། གཞུགས་དེ་གཞུགས་ཞེས་བརྗོད་པའི་སྒྲ་གཞུགས་མ་ཡིན་པ་
ནམ་པར་བསལ་ནས་བརྗོད་དགོས་པའི་ཆོས་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

They are so,

Because it is true of physical things that they are things such that the expression "physical things" must be expressed in such a way that excludes everything which is not a physical thing.

དེར་ཐལ། གཞུགས་ཞེས་བརྗོད་པའི་སྒྲ་གཞུགས་ལ་སེལ་འཇུག་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[It's not correct that physical things are such that the expression "physical things" must be expressed in such a way that excludes everything which is not a physical thing.]

It is so,

Because the expression "physical things" applies to physical things in an exclusive way.

བྱུང་སྟེ། སེལ་འཇུག་ཅིས་པའི་སེལ་བའི་དོན་ནི་ཆོས་དེ་མ་ཡིན་པ་ནམ་པར་སེལ་བ་
ལ་ལྟོས་དགོས་པ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

And this is necessarily so,

Because the words "in an exclusive way" in the expression "apply to something in an exclusive way" mean that one must rely on excluding all that the particular thing is not.

༥ །རང་གི་ལུགས་ལ། དགག་པའི་མཚན་ཉིད་ཡོད་དེ། རང་དངོས་སུ་རྟོགས་པའི་
སྟོས་རང་གི་དགག་བྱ་དངོས་སུ་བཅད་ནས་རྟོགས་དགོས་པའི་ཆོས་དེ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

Here secondly is the presentation of our own position. There does exist a definition of a negative thing, because it is the following:

A thing which must be perceived by the state of mind which perceives it directly through a process of eliminating, directly, that which it denies.

དགག་པ་དང་། སེལ་བ་དང་། གཞན་སེལ་དང་། ལྷོག་པ་བཞི་དོན་གཅིག

The four terms "negative thing," "exclusion," "exclusion of all other," and "reversal" all refer to the same thing.

དགག་པ་ལ་དབྱེན་གཉིས་ཡོད་དེ། མ་ཡིན་དགག་དང་མེད་དགག་གཉིས་ཡོད་པའི་
ཕྱིར།

Negative things may be divided into two different types: things that are negative in the sense of not being something, and things that are negative in the sense of the absence of something.

མ་ཡིན་དགག་གི་མཚན་ཉིད་ཡོད་དེ། རང་ཞེས་བཟོད་པའི་སྒྲུལ་རང་གི་དགག་བྱ་
བཀག་ཤུལ་དུ་ཚེས་གཞན་མ་ཡིན་དགག་དང་སྒྲུབ་པ་གང་རུང་འཕྲེན་པའི་དགག་པ་དེ་
ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

There does exist a definition for a "negative thing in the sense of not being something," because it is the following:

A negative thing such that the term which expresses it implies something else—either a negative in the sense of not being something, or a positive—incidental to denying what it denies.

མཚན་གཞི་ནི་ཡོད་དེ། སྒྲུལ་མི་དྲག་པ་དེ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

There does exist a classic example of a negative thing in the sense of not being something, for it is "sounds are [always] changing things."

མེད་དགག་གི་མཚན་ཉིད་ཡོད་དེ། རང་ཞེས་བཟོད་པའི་སྒྲུལ་རང་གི་དགག་བྱ་བཀག་
ཤུལ་དུ་ཚེས་གཞན་མ་ཡིན་དགག་དང་སྒྲུབ་པ་གང་རུང་མི་འཕྲེན་པའི་དགག་པ་དེ་
ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

There does exist a definition for a negative thing in the sense of being an absence of something, for it is the following:

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A negative thing such that the term which expresses it does not imply something else—either a negative in the sense of not being something, or a positive—incidental to denying what it denies.

མཚན་གཞི་ནི་ཡོད་དེ། གང་ཟག་གི་བདག་མིང་དེ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

There does exist a classical example of a negative thing in the sense of being an absence of something, for it is the fact that no person has any nature of their own.

དགག་པ་ལ་དབྱེ་ན་ལྟ་ཡོད་དེ། རང་ཞེས་བརྗོད་པའི་སྐྱེས་རང་གི་དགག་བྱ་ཚིག་ཟེན་ལ་དངོས་སུ་བཀག་ནས་ཆོས་གཞན་མ་ཡིན་དགག་དང་སྐྱབ་པ་གང་རུང་དངོས་སུ་འཕེན་པ་དང་། ལྷགས་ལ་འཕེན་པ་དང་། དངོས་ལྷགས་གཉིས་ཀར་འཕེན་པ་དང་། སྐྱབས་ཐོབ་ཀྱིས་འཕེན་པ་དང་། རང་ཞེས་བརྗོད་པའི་སྐྱེས་རང་གི་དགག་བྱ་ཚིག་ཟེན་ལ་བཀག་ནས་ཆོས་གཞན་མ་ཡིན་དགག་དང་སྐྱབ་པ་གང་རུང་མི་འཕེན་པ་དང་ལྟ་ཡོད་པའི་ཕྱིར།

Negative things may be divided into five different types:

- 1) Those which are such that the term which expresses them directly implies something else—either a negative in the sense of not being something, or a positive—incidental to denying what it denies directly in the actual wording;
- 2) Those where the term which expresses them does this implying indirectly;
- 3) Those where the term which expresses them does this implying both directly and indirectly;
- 4) Those where the term which expresses them does this implying by context;
- 5) Those which are such that the term which expresses them implies nothing else—neither a negative in the sense of not being something, nor a positive—incidental to denying what it denies directly in the actual wording.

དང་པོ་རང་ཞེས་བརྗོད་པའི་སྒྲུབ་རང་གི་དགག་བྱ་ཚིག་ཟིན་ལ་དངོས་སུ་བཀག་ནས་
ཚོས་གཞན་མ་ཡིན་དགག་དང་སྒྲུབ་པ་གང་རུང་དངོས་སུ་འཕེན་པའི་དགག་པ་ཡོད་
དེ། བྱམ་པ་གང་ཟག་གི་བདག་མེད་ཡོད་པ་དེ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

There does exist the first type, the kind which are such that the term which expresses them directly implies something else—either a negative in the sense of not being something, or a positive—incidental to denying what it denies directly in the actual wording, because one would be the fact that the fact that no person has any nature of their own is true of a water pitcher.

མ་གྲུབ་ན། དེ་ཚོས་ཅན། རང་ཞེས་བརྗོད་པའི་སྒྲུབ་རང་གི་དགག་བྱ་ཚིག་ཟིན་ལ་
དངོས་སུ་བཀག་ནས་ཚོས་གཞན་མ་ཡིན་དགག་དང་སྒྲུབ་པ་གང་རུང་དངོས་སུ་འཕེན་
པའི་དགག་པ་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ། རང་ཞེས་བརྗོད་པའི་སྒྲུབ་རང་གི་དགག་བྱ་ཚིག་ཟིན་
ལ་དངོས་སུ་བཀག་པ་གང་ཞིག ཚོས་གཞན་མ་ཡིན་དགག་དང་སྒྲུབ་པ་གང་རུང་
དངོས་སུ་འཕེན་པ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

Suppose you say that this is not correct.
Consider this same thing.

It is so true that it is the kind of negative thing which is such that the term which expresses it directly implies something else—either a negative in the sense of not being something, or a positive—incidental to denying what it denies directly in the actual wording,

Because (1) the term which expresses it denies what it denies directly in the actual wording; and (2) it also directly implies something else—either a negative in the sense of not being something, or a positive.

རྟགས་དང་པོ་གྲུབ་སྟེ། བྱམ་པ་གང་ཟག་གི་བདག་མེད་ཡོད་པ་ཞེས་བརྗོད་པའི་སྒྲུབ་
འདིས་བྱམ་པ་གང་ཟག་གི་བདག་ཚིག་ཟིན་ལ་འགོག་པར་བྱེད་པ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[The first part of the reason you gave is incorrect: it is not correct to say that the term which expresses the fact that the fact that no person has any nature of their own is true of a water pitcher denies what it denies directly in the actual wording.]

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But the first part of our reason is correct,
Because the expression "the fact that the fact that no person has any nature of their own is true of a water pitcher" denies, in its actual wording, the possibility that any nature of their own that belonged to some person could ever be true of a water pitcher.

རྟགས་གཉིས་པ་གྲུབ་སྟེ། བུམ་པ་གང་ཟག་གི་བདག་མིང་ཡོད་པ་ཞེས་བརྗོད་པའི་སྒྲ་
འདིས་བུམ་པ་གང་ཟག་གི་བདག་མིང་ཡོད་པ་དངོས་སུ་འཕངས་པ་གང་ཞིག །བུམ་
པ་གང་ཟག་གི་བདག་མིང་ཡོད་པ་མ་ཡིན་དགག་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[The second part of the reason you gave is incorrect: it is not correct to say that the term which expresses the fact that the fact that no person has any nature of their own is true of a water pitcher also directly implies something else—either a negative in the sense of not being something, or a positive.]

But the second part of our reason is correct,
Because the expression "the fact that the fact that no person has any nature of their own is true of a water pitcher" (1) directly implies that the fact that no person has any nature of their own exists, and (2) the fact that the fact that no person has any nature of their own is true of a water pitcher is a negative thing in the sense of not being something.

རྟགས་དང་པོ་སྟེ། གཉིས་པ་མ་གྲུབ་ན། བུམ་པ་གང་ཟག་གི་བདག་མིང་ཆོས་ཅན།
ཁྱོད་ཡོད་པ་མ་ཡིན་དགག་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ། ཁྱོད་གཞི་གྲུབ་པའི་ཕྱིར།

The first part of our reason is easy to accept.

Suppose you say that the second part is not correct.
Consider the fact that no person has any nature of their own.
The fact that it is true of a water pitcher is so a negative thing in the sense of not being something,
Because it can be established as existing.

གཉིས་པ་རང་ཞེས་བརྗོད་པའི་སྒྲ་རང་གི་དགག་བྱ་ཆོག་ཟིན་ལ་དངོས་སུ་བགག་
ནས་ཆོས་གཞན་མ་ཡིན་དགག་དང་སྒྲུབ་པ་གང་རུང་ཤུགས་ལ་འཕེན་པའི་དགག་པ་

བཞག་ཏུ་ཡོད་དེ། ལྷས་སྒྱིན་ཚོན་པོ་ཉིན་པར་ཟས་མི་བྱ་བ་དེ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

There does exist the second type of negative, the kind which are such that the term which expresses them indirectly implies something else—either a negative in the sense of not being something, or a positive—incidental to denying what it denies directly in the actual wording, because one would be the fact that John Smith, who is chubby, never eats during the day.

དེར་ཐལ། ལྷས་སྒྱིན་ཚོན་པོ་ཉིན་པར་ཟས་མི་བྱ་བ་ཞེས་པའི་ཚིག་འདིས་རང་གི་
དགག་བྱ་ཉིན་པར་ཟས་བྱ་བ་དངོས་སུ་བཀག་ནས་མཚན་མོ་བྱ་བ་ཤུགས་ལ་འཕངས་
པ་གང་ཞིག་ མཚན་མོ་བྱ་བ་སྒྲུབ་པ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[It's not correct to say that the fact that John Smith, who is chubby, never eats during the day is an example of this kind of negative.]

It is so,

Because (1) the expression "John Smith, who is chubby, never eats during the day" indirectly implies that he eats at night, incidental to denying directly what it denies: that he eats during the day; and (2) his eating at night is a positive thing.

དེར་ཐལ། ཟས་བྱ་བ་སྒྲུབ་པ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

It is so,

Because eating is a positive thing.

གསུམ་པ་རང་ཞེས་བཞེད་པའི་སྒྲས་རང་གི་དགག་བྱ་ཚིག་ཟིན་ལ་དངོས་སུ་བཀག་
ནས་ཚོས་གཞན་མ་ཡིན་དགག་དང་སྒྲུབ་པ་གང་རུང་དངོས་ཤུགས་གཉིས་ཀར་འཕེན་
པའི་དགོས་པ་བཞག་ཏུ་ཡོད་དེ། ལྷས་སྒྱིན་ཚོན་པོ་ཉིན་པར་ཟས་མི་བྱ་བ་ལུས་རིད་པ་
མ་ཡིན་པ་ཡོད་པ་དེ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

There does exist the third type of negative, the kind which are such that the term which expresses them both directly and indirectly implies something else—either a negative in the sense of not being something, or a positive—incidental to denying what it denies directly in the actual wording, because one would be the fact that there exists a John Smith who is chubby, who doesn't eat during the day, and who is not thin.

དེར་ཐལ། ལྷ་ས་སྤྱིན་ཚོན་པོ་ཉིན་པར་ཟས་མི་ཟ་བ་ལུས་རིད་པ་མ་ཡིན་པ་ཡོད་པ་
ཞེས་པའི་སྒྲ་འདིས་ཉིན་པར་ཟས་ཟ་བ་དངོས་སུ་བཀག་ནས་མཚན་མོ་ཟ་བ་ལྷགས་ལ་
འཕངས། ལུས་རིད་པ་མ་ཡིན་པ་ཡོད་པ་དངོས་སུ་འཕངས་པ་གང་ཞིག །མཚན་མོ་
ཟ་བ་སྒྲུབ་པ་དང་། ལུས་རིད་པ་མ་ཡིན་པ་ཡོད་པ་མ་ཡིན་དགག་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[It's not correct to say that the fact that there exists a John Smith who is chubby, who doesn't eat during the day, and who is not thin, is the kind of negative thing such that the term which expresses it both directly and indirectly implies something else—either a negative in the sense of not being something, or a positive—incidental to denying what it denies directly in the actual wording.]

It is so correct to say just this,

Because (1) the expression "There exists a John Smith who is chubby, who doesn't eat during the day, and who has a body that is not a thin one," indirectly implies that he eats at night—and directly implies that there is a body which is not thin—incidental to denying directly that he eats during the day; and (2) the fact that there is a body which is not thin is a negative in the sense of not being something.

བཞི་པ་རང་ཞེས་བརྗོད་པའི་སྒྲ་ས་རང་གི་དགག་བྱ་ཚིག་ཟིན་ལ་དངོས་སུ་བཀག་ནས་
ཚོས་གཞན་མ་ཡིན་དགག་དང་སྒྲུབ་པ་གང་རུང་སྐབས་ཐོབ་ཀྱིས་འཕེན་པའི་དགག་པ་
བཞག་ཏུ་ཡོད་དེ། གང་ཟག་གཅིག་རྒྱལ་རིགས་དང་བྲམ་ཟེའི་རིགས་གང་རུང་དུ་
ངས་ནས་བྱད་པར་མ་ངས་པའི་ཚོ་འདི་ནི་བྲམ་ཟེ་མ་ཡིན་པ་ཞེས་པའི་སྒྲ་འདིས་བྲམ་ཟེ་
ཡིན་པ་ཚིག་ཟིན་ལ་དངོས་སུ་བཀག་ནས་རྒྱལ་རིགས་ཡིན་པ་སྐབས་ཐོབ་ཀྱིས་
འཕངས་པ་ངས་ཤེས་དགོས་པ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

There does exist the fourth type of negative, the kind which is such that the term which expresses it implies through the context something else—either a negative in the sense of not being something, or a positive—incidental to denying what it denies directly in the actual wording, because one would be

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where you had determined that a particular person must be either of the royal caste or the Brahmin caste, but were unsure of which; and then someone says "They are not a Brahmin." The actual wording here directly denies, in its actual wording, that they are a Brahmin, and then implies—through the context—that they are of the royal caste; and this is the process you have to go through to determine which they are.

རང་ཞེས་བརྗོད་པའི་སྤྲུལ་རང་གི་དགག་བྱ་ཚིག་ཟིན་ལ་དངོས་སུ་བཀག་ནས་ཚོས་
གཞན་མ་ཡིན་དགག་དང་སྤྲུབ་པ་གང་རུང་མི་འཕེན་པའི་དགག་པ་བཞག་ཏུ་ཡོད་དེ།
བྲམ་ཟེ་ཆང་མི་འཕུང་བ་དེ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

There does exist finally that kind of negative where the term which expresses it implies nothing else—neither a negative in the sense of not being something, nor a positive—incidental to denying what it denies directly in the actual wording, because one would be the fact that a certain Brahmin does not drink alcohol.

དེར་ཐལ། བྲམ་ཟེ་ཆང་མི་འཕུང་བ་ཞེས་པའི་སྤྲུལ་འདིས་བྲམ་ཟེ་ཆང་འཕུང་བ་ཚིག་ཟིན་
ལ་དངོས་སུ་བཀག་ནས་ཚོས་གཞན་མ་ཡིན་དགག་དང་སྤྲུབ་པ་གང་རུང་དངོས་སུ་
ཡང་མི་འཕེན་ཤུགས་ལ་ཡང་མི་འཕེན། སྤྲུབ་སྟོབ་ཀྱིས་ཡང་མི་འཕེན་པ་ཡིན་པའི་
ཕྱིར།

[It's not correct to say that the fact that a certain Brahmin does not drink alcohol is a kind of negative where the term which expresses it implies nothing else—neither a negative in the sense of not being something, nor a positive—incidental to denying what it denies directly in the actual wording.]

It is so,

Because the expression "The Brahmin does not drink alcohol" implies neither directly, nor indirectly, nor by context, anything else—neither a negative in the sense of not being something, nor a positive—incidental to denying what it denies directly in the actual wording: that is, that the Brahmin did drink alcohol.

དེ་དག་མ་ཡིན་དག་དང་མེད་དག་གཉིས་སུ་འདྲ་ཚུལ་ཡོད་དེ། དང་པོ་བཞི་པོ་མ་
ཡིན་དག་དང་། སྟེ་མ་མེད་དག་ཏུ་འཛོག་དགོས་པ་ཡིན་པའི་སྟེར།

These five can be grouped into two categories: negatives in the sense of not being something, and negatives in the sense of the absence of something. This is because the first four should be considered negatives in the sense of not being something, and the last should be considered a negative in the sense of the absence of something.

དག་པ་ཡིན་ན་རང་ཞེས་བརྗོད་པའི་སྒྲུལ་རང་གི་དག་གུ་ཚིག་ཟིན་ལ་འགོག་པས་
མ་བྱུང་པ་ཡིན་ཏེ། མ་ཡིན་དག་ལ་མ་བྱུང་པ་གང་ཞིག་མེད་དག་ལ་ཡང་མ་
བྱུང་པའི་སྟེར།

It is not necessarily the case that, just because something is a negative thing, the term which expresses it denies what it denies in the actual wording. This is because this is neither necessarily the case with negatives in the sense of not being something, nor the case with negatives in the sense of being an absence of something.

རྟགས་དང་པོ་གྲུབ་སྟེ། རྟག་པ་དང་ཤེས་བྱ་གཉིས་མ་ཡིན་དག་ཡིན་ཀྱང་། རང་
ཞེས་བརྗོད་པའི་སྒྲུལ་རང་གི་དག་གུ་ཚིག་ཟིན་ལ་འགོག་པར་བྱེད་པ་མ་ཡིན་པའི་
སྟེར།

[The first part of your reason is not correct: it's not correct to say that it is not necessarily the case with negatives in the sense of not being something that the term which expresses them denies what it denies in the actual wording.]

But the first part of our reason is correct,
Because—even though the two of unchanging things and knowable things are negatives in the sense of not being something—they are not such that the terms which express them [in Tibetan] deny what they deny in the actual wording.

རྟགས་གཉིས་པ་གྲུབ་སྟེ། རྟག་པ་དང་ཤེས་བྱ་གཉིས་མེད་དག་ཡིན་ཀྱང་རང་

ཞེས་བཟོད་པའི་སྒྲུབ་རང་གི་དགག་བྱ་ཚིག་ཟིན་ལ་འགོག་པར་བྱེད་པ་མ་ཡིན་པའི་
སྟེར།

[The second part of your reason is not correct: it's not correct to say that it is not necessarily the case with negatives in the sense of being an absence of something that the term which expresses them denies what it denies in the actual wording.]

But the second part of our reason is correct,
Because—even though the two of space and the true nature of things are negatives in the sense of being an absence of something—they are not such that the terms which express them deny what they deny in the actual wording.

Formal logic subject:
Logical Statements that Use Natures

The following selection is from the monastic textbook entitled An Explanation of the Art of Reasoning (rTags-rigs), by the Tutor of His Holiness the Dalai Lama, Purbuchok Jampa Tsultrim Gyatso (1825-1901).

།གཉིས་པ་རང་བཞིན་གྱི་རྟགས་ཡང་དག་བཤད་པ་ལ། མཚན་ཉིད། དབྱེ་བ།
མཚན་གཞི་དང་གསུམ།

Here secondly is our explanation of correct reasons of the type that use natures. We will proceed in three steps: the definition, the divisions, and the classical examples.

དང་པོ་ནི། རང་བཞིན་གྱི་ཚུལ་གསུམ་ཡིན་པ། རང་བཞིན་གྱི་རྟགས་ཡང་དག་གི་
མཚན་ཉིད། དེ་སྐྱབ་གྱི་རང་བཞིན་གྱི་ཚུལ་གསུམ་ཡིན་པ། དེ་སྐྱབ་གྱི་རང་བཞིན་གྱི་
རྟགས་ཡང་དག་གི་མཚན་ཉིད།

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Here is the first. The definition of a correct reason of the type that uses a nature is as follows:

A reason where the three relationships hold, and which utilizes a nature.

The definition of a correct reason of the type that uses a nature in any particular proof is as follows:

A reason where the three relationships hold, and which utilizes a nature, in any particular proof.

ཡང་ན་སྟོང་དེ་སྐྱབ་གྱི་དྭགས་ཡང་དག་གང་ཞིག སྟོང་གི་དྭགས་གྱིས་དེ་སྐྱབ་གྱི་
དངོས་གྱི་བསྐྱབ་བྱའི་ཆོས་སུ་བཟུང་བྱ་ཡིན་ན། སྟོང་དང་བདག་ཉིད་གཅིག་ཡིན་
དགོས་པའི་ཆ་ནས་བཞག་པ་དེ། སྟོང་དེ་སྐྱབ་གྱི་རང་བཞིན་གྱི་དྭགས་ཡང་དག་གི་
མཚན་ཉིད།

The definition of a correct reason of the type that uses a nature in any particular proof can also be defined as follows:

A reason which is (1) a correct reason in any particular proof, and (2) which is established as being this kind of reason [one that uses a nature] by virtue of the fact that anything considered the explicit quality to be proven for the particular proof in which it serves as the reason is necessarily such that to be it [the reason] is to be the quality.

གཉིས་པ་དེ་ལ་དབྱེ་ན། དེ་སྐྱབ་གྱི་སྟོང་པར་སྟོན་པ་བའི་རང་བཞིན་གྱི་དྭགས་ཡང་
དག་དང་། དེ་སྐྱབ་གྱི་སྟོང་པར་དག་པ་བའི་རང་བཞིན་གྱི་དྭགས་ཡང་དག་གཉིས།

Here is the second step. Correct reasons that utilize a nature can be divided into two different types: correct reasons that utilize a nature and which are such that they depend on a certain distinction, [of suggesting the thing that made it]; and correct reasons that utilize a nature and which are such they are free of dependency on a certain distinction, [of suggesting the thing that made it].

དང་པོའི་མཚན་ཉིད་ནི། དེ་སྐྱབ་གྱི་རང་བཞིན་གྱི་རྟགས་ཡང་དག་གང་ཞིག རང་
བཟོད་པའི་སྐྱུ་རང་གི་བྱེད་པ་པོ་འཕེན་པའི་ཆ་ནས་བཞག་པ། དང་པོའི་མཚན་ཉིད།

Here is the definition of the first:

A reason which is (1) a correct reason for any particular proof which utilizes a nature; and (2) which is established as being this kind of reason by virtue of the fact that the term which expresses it suggests the thing that made it.

དེ་གང་ཞིག རང་བཟོད་པའི་སྐྱུ་རང་གི་བྱེད་པ་པོ་མི་འཕེན་པའི་ཆ་ནས་བཞག་པ།
གཉིས་པའི་མཚན་ཉིད།

The definition of the second is as follows:

A reason which is (1) the same as the first part just given; and (2) which is established as being this kind of reason by virtue of the fact that the term which expresses it does not suggest the thing that made it.

དང་པོ་ལ་ཡང་། རང་གི་བྱེད་པ་པོ་དངོས་སུ་འཕངས་པ་དང་། དེ་ཤུགས་ལ་འཕངས་
པ་གཉིས་ཡོད།

The first type may be further divided into two: those which suggest the thing that made them directly, and those which do so indirectly.

གསུམ་པ་མཚན་གཞི་ནི། ཚུལ་བྱུང་དང་། སྐྱུ་པ། རྟེན་སྐྱུ་མི་རྟག་པར་སྐྱབ་པའི་
དང་པོ་དང་། བྱས་པ་སྐྱུ་མི་རྟག་པར་སྐྱབ་པའི་གཉིས་པ། དངོས་པོ་སྐྱུ་མི་རྟག་པར་
སྐྱབ་པའི་བྱེད་པར་དག་པ་བའི་རང་བཞིན་གྱི་རྟགས་ཡང་དག་གོ །

Here thirdly are the classical examples. "A thing which is produced by conscious effort" and "a thing which is brought about" are examples of the first type of reason, in a proof that the sound of a ritual horn is a changing thing. "A thing which is made" is an example of the second type of reason, in a proof that sound is a changing thing. "A working thing" is an example of a correct reason which utilizes a nature and which is such it is free of dependency on a certain distinction, [of suggesting the thing that made it].

ཡང་སྒྲིམ་མི་ཏྲག་པར་སྒྲུབ་པའི་རང་བཞིན་གྱི་ཏྲགས་ཡང་དག་ལ་དབྱེ་ན། དེ་སྒྲུབ་གྱི་
མཐུན་ཕྱོགས་ལ་བྱུང་བྱེད་དུ་འཇུག་པའི་དེ་སྒྲུབ་གྱི་རང་བཞིན་གྱི་ཏྲགས་ཡང་དག་
དང་། དེ་སྒྲུབ་གྱི་མཐུན་ཕྱོགས་ལ་ནམ་གཉིས་སུ་འཇུག་པའི་དེ་སྒྲུབ་གྱི་རང་བཞིན་གྱི་
ཏྲགས་ཡང་དག་གཉིས།

A correct reason which utilizes a nature and which is employed in the proof that sound is a changing thing can also be divided in a different way. This division would be into the two of (1) correct reasons which utilize a nature and which apply to the entire group of similar cases for the proof; and (2) correct reasons which utilize a nature and which both apply and fail to apply to the group of similar cases for the proof.

མཚན་གཞི་རིམ་པ་ལྟར། བྱས་པ་དང་པོ་དང་། བྱས་པའི་བྱེ་བྲག་གཉིས་པ་ཡིན།

Respective examples would be the reason "a thing which is made," and the reason "something characteristic of the quality of being made."

དེ་གཉིས་སྒྲུབ་པ་ནི། བྱས་པ་དེ་དང་པོ་ཡིན་ཏེ། དེ་དེ་སྒྲུབ་གྱི་རང་བཞིན་གྱི་ཏྲགས་
ཡང་དག་གང་ཞིག་མི་ཏྲག་པ་ཡིན་ན། དེ་ཡིན་པས་བྱུང་བྱེད་ཕྱིར།

Here is a demonstration for each of these.

"A thing which is made" is the first kind of reason,

Because it is (1) a correct reason for the particular proof which utilizes a nature; and (2) it is such that, if something is a changing thing, it must always be it [that is, a thing which is made].

བྱས་པའི་བྱེ་བྲག་གཉིས་པ་ཡིན་ཏེ། དེ་དེ་སྒྲུབ་གྱི་རང་བཞིན་གྱི་ཏྲགས་ཡང་དག་གང་
ཞིག་ མི་ཏྲག་པ་ཡིན་ན། དེ་ཡིན་པས་མ་བྱུང་བྱེད་ཕྱིར།

"Something characteristic of the quality of being made" is the second kind of reason,

Because it is (1) a correct reason for the particular proof which utilizes a nature; and (2) it is such that, if something is a changing thing, it is not necessarily it [that is, something characteristic of the quality of being made].

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The forms of debate:
Using Scriptural Authority

In Buddhist debate, we can prove a thing in two ways: we can prove it with logic, and we can prove it with scriptural authority; that is, by quoting a scripture which is accepted by the opponent. In Tibetan these two are known, respectively, as *rikpa* (*rigs-pa*) and *lung* (*lung*)—and the idea is so important that some monks (such as Khen Rinpoche's devoted attendant) are give the name "Lungrik." Quoting scripture must obviously be used with care when attempting to demonstrate something to a person who is not yet a Buddhist, since they may very well deny the authority you are quoting.

Favorite texts to quote in the monastery are the older scriptures from India: either the word of Lord Buddha himself, or the word of one of the great early Indian masters, as found in the Kangyur and Tengyur collections of the great classics of India translated into Tibetan. These are accepted by all schools of Tibetan Buddhism. In a debate between monasteries which are all of the Gelukpa tradition—such as the annual winter debates attended primarily by monks of the "Great Three" monasteries of Sera, Ganden, and Drepung—the favorite works to cite would be those of Je Tsongkapa or one of his major disciples: Gyaltsab Je, Kedrup Je, or His Holiness the First Dalai Lama.

In everyday debates at your own home monastery, you would normally quote from one of the monastic textbooks that are unique to the curriculum of each individual monastery; these are known as *yikcha* (*yig-cha*). These textbooks have developed over the last five hundred years much in the same way as the ACI course notebooks, and similar courses in the West.

The ammunition for using a quotation in the debate ground must of course be prepared in advance: no one can bring a scrap of paper into the area, and all quotations must be recited from memory. One way to get a good booing from the assembled crowd is to start a quotation and then flounder, unable to finish it from memory!

A scriptural citation is normally used to back up an assertion just given as a reason in a proof, and it is often introduced with a great flourish, emphasizing the indisputability and greatness of the source you have selected. You might see, for example, the following, where we start out with:

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Consider sound.

སྒྲ་ཚུལ་ཅན།

It is a changing thing,

མི་དྲག་སྟེ།

Because it is something which is made.

བྱས་པའི་ཕྱིར།

The opponent replies with:

Your reason is wrong!

དྲགས་མ་གྲུབ།

Meaning, sound is not a thing which is made. We then reply with,

Consider sound.

སྒྲ་ཚུལ་ཅན།

It is so something which is made,

བྱས་པ་ཡིན་པར་བཤམ།

Because it was spoken to be that way by the High and Holy One, the Good and Glorious Kedrup Tenpa Dargye, a Master (*Ke*) Who has Found All Attainments (*Drup*), and Whose Kindness to All of Us is Infinitely High; and because His words are something that you must accept!

བདག་ཅག་ནམས་ལ་བཀའ་ངེན་བྱད་པར་དུ་འཕགས་པ་མཁས་ཤིང་གྲུབ་པ་

ཉིད་པ་ཇི་བཅུན་མཁས་གྲུབ་བསྟན་པ་དར་རྒྱས་དཔལ་བཟང་པོས་དེ་

ལྟར་གསུངས་པ་གང་ཞིག ཁས་ལེན་དགོས་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

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And he did so speak it be this way, because he did so in his *Overview of the Perfection of Wisdom*, with the following words: "When we use 'something which is made' as a reason to prove that sound is a changing thing."

ཡིན་པར་ཐལ། དེ་ཉིད་ཀྱིས་བརྩོམས་པའི་ཕར་ཕྱིན་སྒྲི་དོན་ལས། བྱས་པའི་
རྟགས་ལ་བརྟེན་ནས་སྒྲི་མི་རྟག་པ་རྟགས་པ་ཞིས་སོགས་གསུངས་པའི་
ཕྱིར།

Kedrup Tenpa Dargye (1493-1568) is the principal author of the textbook series of Sera Mey; he is therefore, for the monks of Sera Mey, an indisputable authority, and his words must be accepted.

A typical strategy once an opponent has resorted to scriptural authority is to respond that, despite the fact that such a statement *was* once made by that authority, it does not necessarily prove what the opponent claims that it does. In such a case, the other side in the debate just described might come back with:

"It doesn't necessarily follow!"

བྱབ་པ་མ་བྱུང་།

Whenever someone contradicts scripture, it's time to pull out the unique response used by monks from Sera Mey. (Other monasteries have their own slightly different version.) Here you scream the following at the top of your lungs, and then go on to the formula above:

You contradict the scriptures! You contradict the holy scriptures!

དཔེ་ཆ་དང་འགལ། ཕྱག་དཔེ་དང་འགལ།

The Asian Classics Institute Course XIII: The Art of Reasoning

Reading Seven: Contradiction and Relationship

Selection from the collected topics:
Contradiction and Relationship

The following reading consists of the Presentation of the Concepts of Contradiction and Relationship ('Gal-'brel gyi rnam-bzhag), from An Explanation of the Intermediate Path of Reasoning (Rigs-lam 'bring-gi rnam-par bshad-pa), by the Master Tutor Purbuchok Jampa Tsultrim Gyatso (1825-1901), who in his day held the position of Tutor to the Dalai Lama.

Please note that indented statements are usually those given by the opponent. Responses within brackets are those that are usually left unwritten in the Tibetan text, and are understood to be there because of the context following each.

དང་པོ་འགའ་འབྲེལ་ལ་དགག་བཞག་སྟོང་གསུམ་ལས། དང་པོ་ནི། ཁ་ཅིག་ན་རེ།
དངོས་པོ་དང་འགའ་བ་ཡིན་ན། དངོས་པོ་དང་འགའ་བ་དང་འགའ་བ་ཡིན་པས་
བྱུང་བ་རེ།

Here is the first section: an explanation of the concepts of contradiction and relationship. For this presentation we will first refute the position of our opponents, then present our own position, and then finally eliminate their rebuttal.

Suppose someone comes and makes the following claim:

Anything which is such that being it is contradictory to being a working thing is always something which is such that being it is contradictory to being something which is such that being it is contradictory to being a working thing.

དྲག་པའི་ལྷོག་པ་ཆོས་ཅན། དེར་ཐལ། དེའི་ཕྱིར།

Consider the exclusion of all that is not an unchanging thing.

So is being it then [something which is such that being it is contradictory to being something which is such that being it is contradictory to being a working thing]?

Because being it is [something which is such that being it is contradictory to being a working thing].

མ་གྲུབ་ན། དེར་ཐལ། ཁྱོད་དངོས་པོ་དང་ཐ་དད་གང་ཞིག །ཁྱོད་ཀྱང་ཡིན་དངོས་པོ་
ཡང་ཡིན་པའི་གཞི་མཐུན་མེད་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[It's not correct to say that the exclusion of all that is not an unchanging thing is something which is such that being it is contradictory to being a working thing.]

Suppose you say it's not correct.

It is so correct,

Because (1) it [the exclusion of all that is not an unchanging thing] is something distinct from a working thing, and (2) there exists no one thing which is both it [the exclusion of all that is not an unchanging thing] and a working thing.

དང་པོ་མ་གྲུབ་ན། དེ་ཆོས་ཅན། དངོས་པོ་དང་ཐ་དད་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ། དྲག་པ་ཡིན་
པའི་ཕྱིར།

[The first part of your statement is not correct: it's not correct to say that the exclusion of all that is not an unchanging thing is something distinct from a working thing.]

Suppose you say that the first part of our statement is not correct.

Consider this same thing.

It is so distinct from being a working thing,

Because it is an unchanging thing.

གཉིས་པ་མ་གྲུབ་ན། དྲག་པ་ཆོས་ཅན། ཁྱོད་ཀྱི་ལྷོག་པ་ཡང་ཡིན། དངོས་པོ་ཡང་
ཡིན་པའི་གཞི་མཐུན་མེད་པར་ཐལ། ཁྱོད་དྲག་པ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

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[The second part of your statement is not correct: it's not correct to say that there exists no one thing which is both the exclusion all that is not an unchanging thing, and also a working thing.]

Suppose you say that the second part of our statement is not correct.
Consider an unchanging thing.
It is so true that there exists no one thing which is both the exclusion of all that is not it, and also a working thing,
Because it is unchanging.

ཕྱི་བར་འདོད་ན། ཉམ་པའི་ལྷོག་པ་ཆོས་ཅན། དངོས་པོ་དང་འགལ་བ་དང་འགལ་བ་
མ་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ། དངོས་པོ་དང་འགལ་བ་དང་མི་འགལ་བ་ཡིན་པའི་བྱིར།

[Then I agree to your original statement: the exclusion of all that is not an unchanging thing is such that being it is contradictory to being something which is such that being it is contradictory to being a working thing]

Consider the exclusion of all that is not an unchanging thing.
It is not so true, that it is such that being it is contradictory to being something which is such that being it is contradictory to being a working thing,
Because being it is something which is such that being it is not contradictory to being something which such that being it is contradictory to being a working thing.

མ་གྲུབ་ན། དེ་ཆོས་ཅན། དེར་ཐལ། བྱིད་ཀྱང་ཡིན། དངོས་པོ་དང་འགལ་བ་ཡང་
ཡིན་པའི་གཞི་མཐུན་ཡོད་པའི་བྱིར།

[It's not correct to say that the exclusion of all that is not an unchanging thing is such that being it is not contradictory to being something which is such that being it is contradictory to being a working thing.]

Suppose you say it's not correct.
Consider this same thing.
It is so,
Because there does exist one thing which is both it, and which is also such that being it is contradictory to being a working thing.

རྟག་པ་དེ། དེ་འདྲའི་གཞི་མཐུན་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

And this is because an unchanging thing is just such a thing.

ཁ་ཅིག་ན་རེ། མི་རྟག་པ་དང་འགལ་བ་དང་འགལ་བ་ཡིན་ན། མི་རྟག་པ་དང་
འགལ་བ་ཡིན་པས་བྱུང་བའོ་ཅན།

Suppose someone comes and makes the following claim:

If something is such that being it is contradictory to being something which is such that being it is contradictory to being something which is unchanging, then it is always something such that being it is contradictory to being something which is changing.

ཀ་བའི་ལྷོག་པ་ཆོས་ཅན། དེར་ཐལ། དེའི་ཕྱིར།

Consider the exclusion of all that is not a pillar.

So is it then [something such that being it is contradictory to being something which is changing]?

Because it is [something which is such that being it is contradictory to being something which is such that being it is contradictory to being something which is unchanging].

མ་གྲུབ་ན། དེ་ཆོས་ཅན། དེར་ཐལ། མི་རྟག་པ་དང་འགལ་བ་དང་ཐ་དད་གང་ཞིག
བྱུང་བྱུང་ཡིན། མི་རྟག་པ་དང་འགལ་བ་ཡང་ཡིན་པའི་གཞི་མཐུན་མེད་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[It's not correct to say that the exclusion of all that is not a pillar is something such that being it is contradictory to being something which is such that being it is contradictory to being something which is unchanging.]

Suppose you say it's not correct.

Consider this same thing.

It is so,

Because it is (1) distinct from that which is such that being it is contradictory to being a changing thing, and (2) such that there does not exist a single

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thing which is both it [the exclusion of all that is not a pillar] and also something which is such that being it is contradictory to being a changing thing.

མ་གྲུབ་ན། ཀ་བ་ཚུལ་ཅན། བྱོད་ཀྱི་ལྷོག་པ་ཡང་ཡིན། མི་དྭག་པ་དང་འགལ་བ་
ཡང་ཡིན་པའི་གཞི་མཐུན་མེད་པར་ཐལ། བྱོད་ཀྱི་ལྷོག་པ་ཡིན་ན། མི་དྭག་པ་དང་མི་
འགལ་བ་ཡིན་པས་བྱུང་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[It's not correct to say that the exclusion of all that is not a pillar is (1) distinct from that which is such that being it is contradictory to being a changing thing, and (2) such that there does not exist a single thing which is both the exclusion of all that is not a pillar and also something which is such that being it is contradictory to being a changing thing.]

Suppose you say that it's not correct.

Consider a pillar.

It is so true that there does not exist a single thing which is both the exclusion of all that is not a pillar and also something which is such that being it is contradictory to being a changing thing,

Because anything which is the exclusion of all that is not it [a pillar] is always such that being it is not contradictory to being a changing thing.

རྩ་བར་འདོད་ན། ཀ་བའི་ལྷོག་པ་ཚུལ་ཅན། མི་དྭག་པ་དང་འགལ་བ་མ་ཡིན་པར་
ཐལ། མི་དྭག་པ་དང་མི་འགལ་བ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[Then I agree to your original statement: the exclusion of all that is not a pillar is such that being it is contradictory to being something which is changing.]

Suppose you agree to our original statement.

Consider the exclusion of all that is not a pillar.

It is not such, that being it is contradictory to being a changing thing,

Because it is such that being it is not contradictory to being a changing thing.

མ་གྲུབ་ན། དེ་ཚུལ་ཅན། དེར་ཐལ། བྱོད་ཀྱང་ཡིན། མི་དྭག་པ་ཡང་ཡིན་པའི་གཞི་
མཐུན་ཡོད་པའི་ཕྱིར་ཏེ། ཀ་བ་དེ་དེ་འདྲའི་གཞི་མཐུན་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར། དྭགས་སྒྲ།

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[It's not correct to say that the exclusion of all that is not a pillar is such that being it is not contradictory to being a changing thing.]

Suppose you say it's not correct.

Consider this same thing.

It is so this way,

Because there does exist one thing which is both it [the exclusion of all that is not a pillar] and also a changing thing;

And this is true because a pillar itself is just such a thing.

This reason is easy to accept.

ཁ་ཅིག་ན་རེ། དངོས་པོ་དང་མི་འགལ་བ་ཡིན་ན། དངོས་པོ་དང་མི་འགལ་བ་དང་མི་
འགལ་བ་ཡིན་པས་བྱུང་བ་ཅེས་ན།

Suppose someone comes and makes the following claim:

If something is such that being it is not contradictory to being a working thing, then it is always such that being it is not contradictory with being something which is not contradictory to being a working thing.

ཀ་བྱུམ་གཉིས་དང་གཅིག་ཚུལ་ཅན། དེར་ཐལ། དེའི་ཕྱིར།

Consider that which is one and the same as the two of a pillar and a water pitcher.

So is it then [such that being it is not contradictory with being something that is not contradictory to being a working thing]?

Because it is [such that being it is not contradictory to being a working thing].

མ་བྱུང་ན། དེ་ཚུལ་ཅན། དེར་ཐལ། བྱུང་གྲང་ཡིན། དངོས་པོ་ཡང་ཡིན་པའི་གཞི་
མཐུན་ཡོད་པའི་ཕྱིར་ཏེ། ཀ་བྱུམ་གཉིས་པོ་དེ་དེ་འདྲའི་གཞི་མཐུན་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[It's not correct to say that that which is one and the same as the two of a pillar and a water pitcher is such that being it is not contradictory to being a working thing.]

Suppose you say it's not correct.

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Consider this same thing.

It is so,

Because there does exist one thing which is both it [that which is one and the same as the two of a pillar and a water pitcher] and also a changing thing;

And this is because the two of a pillar and a water pitcher is just such a thing.

མ་གྲུབ་ན་སྒྲ། ཙ་བར་འདོད་ན། ཀ་བྱུམ་གཉིས་དང་གཅིག་ཚུ་ཅན། དངོས་པོ་དང་
མི་འགལ་བ་དང་། མི་འགལ་བ་མ་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ། དངོས་པོ་དང་མི་འགལ་བ་དང་
འགལ་བ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

If you say it's not correct, the answer is easy.

Suppose though you agree to our original statement, [saying that that which is one and the same as the two of a pillar and a water pitcher is such that being it is not contradictory with being something which is not contradictory to being a working thing].

Consider that which is one and the same as the two of a pillar and a water pitcher.

It is so not something which is such that being it is not contradictory to being something which is not contradictory to being a working thing,

Because it is something such that being it is contradictory to being something which is not contradictory to being a working thing.

མ་གྲུབ་ན། དེ་ཚུ་ཅན། དེར་ཐལ། དངོས་པོ་དང་མི་འགལ་བ་དང་ཐ་དད་གང་ཞིག
བྱོད་ཀྱང་ཡིན། དངོས་པོ་དང་མི་འགལ་བ་ཡང་ཡིན་པའི་གཞི་མཐུན་མེད་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[It's not correct to say that that which is one and the same as the two of a pillar and a water pitcher is such that being it is contradictory to being something which is not contradictory to being a working thing.]

Suppose you say that it's not correct.

Consider this same thing.

It is so,

Because (1) it is distinct from that which is such that being it is not contradictory with being a working thing, and (2) there exists no one thing which is both it [that which is one and the same as the two of a pillar and a water pitcher] and also something such that being it is not contradictory to being a working thing.

མ་གྲུབ་ན། ཀ་བྱམ་གཉིས་ཆོས་ཅན། ཁྱོད་དང་གཅིག་ཀྱང་ཡིན། དངོས་པོ་དང་མི་
འགལ་བ་ཡང་ཡིན་པའི་གཞི་མཐུན་མེད་པར་ཐལ། ཁྱོད་ཡིན་པ་མི་སྲིད་པའི་ཤེས་བྱ་
ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[It's not correct to say that that which is one and the same as the two of
a pillar and a water pitcher is such that there exists no one thing
which is both it and also something such that being it is not
contradictory to being a working thing.]

Suppose you say that it's not correct.
Consider the two of a pillar and a water pitcher.
It is so true that there exists no one thing which is both it and also something
such that being it is not contradictory to being a working thing,
Because it is something which no one thing can be.

ཁ་ཅིག་ན་རེ། དངོས་པོ་དང་མི་འགལ་བ་དང་མི་འགལ་བ་ཡིན་ན། དངོས་པོ་དང་མི་
འགལ་བ་ཡིན་པས་ཁྱབ་ཅེར་ན།

Suppose someone comes and makes the following claim:

If something is such that being it is not contradictory to
something which is not contradictory to being a working thing,
then it is always such that being it is not contradictory to being
a working thing.

དངོས་མེད་ཆོས་ཅན། དེར་ཐལ། དེའི་ཕྱིར།

Consider a thing which does no work.
Is it then [such that being it is not contradictory to being a working thing]?
Because it is [such that being it is not contradictory to something which is not
contradictory to being a working thing].

མ་གྲུབ་ན། དེ་ཆོས་ཅན། དེར་ཐལ། ཁྱོད་ཀྱང་ཡིན། དངོས་པོ་དང་མི་འགལ་བ་
ཡང་ཡིན་པའི་གཞི་མཐུན་ཡོད་པའི་ཕྱིར་ཏེ། ཤེས་བྱ་དེ་དེ་འདྲའི་གཞི་མཐུན་ཡིན་པའི་

ཕྱིར།

[It's not correct to say that a thing which does no work is such that being it is not contradictory to something which is not contradictory to being a working thing.]

Suppose you say it's not correct.

Consider this same thing.

It is so,

Because there does exist one thing which is both it, and which is also such that being it is not contradictory to being a working thing;

And this is true because "knowable thing" is just such a thing.

ཕྱིར་བར་འདོད་ན། དངོས་མེད་ཆོས་ཅན། དངོས་པོ་དང་མི་འགལ་བ་མ་ཡིན་པར་
ཐལ། དངོས་པོ་དང་འགལ་བ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[Then I agree with your original statement: a thing which does no work is such that being it is not contradictory to being a working thing.]

Consider a thing which does no work.

It is not so a thing which is such that being it is not contradictory to being a working thing,

Because it is a thing such that being it is contradictory to being a working thing.

ཁ་ཅིག་ན་རེ། ཡོད་པ་དང་འགལ་བ་དང་མི་འགལ་བ་ཡིན་ན། ཉམས་པ་དང་འགལ་
བ་ཡིན་པས་བྱུང་བ་ཅེས་ན།

Suppose someone comes and makes the following claim:

If something is such that being it is not contradictory to being a thing which is contradictory to being a existing thing, then it is always such that being it is contradictory to being an unchanging thing.

མ་གྲུས་པ་ཆོས་ཅན། དེར་ཐལ། དེའི་ཕྱིར།

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Consider a thing which is not made.

Is it then [such that being it is contradictory to being an unchanging thing]?
Because it is [such that being it is not contradictory to being a thing which is
contradictory to being a existing thing].

མ་གྲུབ་ན། དེ་ཆོས་ཅན། དེར་ཐལ། ཁྱོད་ཀྱང་ཡིན། ཡོད་པ་དང་འགལ་བ་ཡང་
ཡིན་པའི་གཞི་མཐུན་པ་ཡོད་པའི་ཕྱིར་ཏེ། ཏྲག་དངོས་གཉིས་པོ་དེ་དེ་འདྲའི་གཞི་
མཐུན་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[It's not correct to say that a thing which is not made is such that being
it is not contradictory to being a thing which is contradictory to
being a existing thing.]

Suppose you say it's not correct.

Consider this same thing.

It is so,

Because there does exist one thing which is both (1) it [that is, a thing which
is not made] and (2) such that being it is contradictory to being an
existing thing;

And this is true because the two of unchanging things and changing things is
just such a thing.

རྩ་བར་འདོད་ན། མ་གྲུས་པ་ཆོས་ཅན། ཏྲག་པ་དང་འགལ་བ་མ་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ། དེ་
དང་མི་འགལ་བ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[Then I agree with your original statement: a thing which is not made
is such that being it is contradictory to being an unchanging
thing.]

Suppose you agree to our original statement.

It is not so, that it is such that being it is contradictory to being an unchanging
thing,

Because it is such that being it is not contradictory to being just such a thing.

མ་གྲུབ་ན། དེ་ཆོས་ཅན། དེར་ཐལ། ཏྲག་པ་ཡིན་ན། ཁྱོད་དང་ཏྲག་པའི་གཞི་
མཐུན་ཡིན་པས་བྱུང་པའི་ཕྱིར།

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[It's not correct to say that a thing which is not made is such that being it is not contradictory to being an unchanging thing.]

Suppose you say it's not correct.

Consider this same thing.

It is so,

Because anything which is an unchanging thing is such that it is one thing which is both itself and unchanging.

ཁ་ཅིག་ན་རེ། དངོས་པོ་དང་འབྲེལ་བ་ཡིན་ན། དངོས་པོ་དང་འབྲེལ་བ་དང་འབྲེལ་བ་
ཡིན་པས་བྱུང་བ་ཟེར་ན།

Suppose someone comes and makes the following claim:

Anytime something is such that it is sharing a relationship with a working thing, it must also always be such that it shares a relationship with what is sharing a relationship with a working thing.

དངོས་པོ་དང་འབྲེལ་བ་ཆོས་ཅན། དེར་ཐལ། དེའི་ཕྱིར།

Consider sharing a relationship with a working thing.

So is it then [such that it shares a relationship with what is sharing a relationship with a working thing]?

Because it is [such that it is sharing a relationship with a working thing].

མ་གྲུབ་ན། དེ་ཆོས་ཅན། དེར་ཐལ། དངོས་པོ་དང་བདག་གཅིག་ཏུ་འབྲེལ་བ་ཡིན་
པའི་ཕྱིར།

[It's not correct to say that sharing a relationship with a working thing is such that it is sharing a relationship with a working thing.]

Suppose you say that it's not correct.

Consider this same thing.

It is so,

Because it shares a relationship with "working thing" such that to be it is to automatically be a working thing.

མ་གྲུབ་ན། དངོས་པོ་ཚེས་ཅན། བྱོད་དང་འབྲེལ་བ་དེ། བྱོད་དང་བདག་གཅིག་ཏུ་
འབྲེལ་བ་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ། བྱོད་དང་འབྲེལ་བ་བྱོད་དང་ཐ་དད་གང་ཞིག། བྱོད་དང་
འབྲེལ་བ་ཡོད་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[It's not correct to say that sharing a relationship with a working thing
is sharing a relationship with "working thing" such that to be it
is to automatically be a working thing.]

Suppose you say that it's not correct.

Consider a working thing.

Sharing a relationship with it is so sharing a relationship with it such that to
be it is to automatically be it,

Because sharing a relationship with it is (1) distinct from it, and (2) sharing a
relationship with it exists.

རྩ་བར་འདོད་ན། དངོས་པོ་དང་འབྲེལ་བ་ཚེས་ཅན། བྱོད་བྱོད་དང་འབྲེལ་བ་མ་ཡིན་
པར་ཐལ། བྱོད་གང་ཟག་གི་བདག་མེད་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[Then I agree with your original statement: sharing a relationship with
a working thing is such that it shares a relationship with what is
sharing a relationship with a working thing.]

Consider sharing a relationship with "working thing."

It is not so, that it is what shares a relationship with it,

Because it is one example of the truth that the person has no nature of his
own.

ཁ་ཅིག་ན་རེ། དངོས་པོ་དང་འབྲེལ་བ་ཡིན་ན། དངོས་པོ་དང་བདག་གཅིག་འབྲེལ་
ཡིན་པས་བྱུང་བའོ་ན།

Suppose someone comes and makes the following claim:

Anything that shares a relationship with a working thing always
shares a relationship with the working thing such that to be it is
to automatically be the working thing.

དངོས་པོའི་ཕྱི་ལོགས་སུ་བྱུང་བ་ཆོས་ཅན། དེར་ཐལ། དེའི་ཕྱིར།

Consider a working thing in the moment after it.

Does this then [share a relationship with the working thing such that to be it is to automatically be the working thing]?

Because it does [share a relationship with the working thing].

མ་གྲུབ་ན། དེ་ཆོས་ཅན། དེར་ཐལ། དངོས་པོ་དང་དེ་བྱུང་འབྲེལ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[It's not correct to say that a working thing in the moment after it shares a relationship with the working thing.]

Suppose you say it's not correct.

Consider this same thing.

It does so,

Because it shares a relationship with the working thing such that it came from it.

མ་གྲུབ་ན། དེ་ཆོས་ཅན། དེར་ཐལ། དངོས་པོའི་འབྲས་བུ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[It's not correct to say that a working thing in the moment after it shares a relationship with the working thing such that it came from it.]

Suppose you say it's not correct.

Consider this same thing.

It does so,

Because it is a result of the working thing.

རྩ་བར་འདོད་ན། དེ་ཆོས་ཅན། དངོས་པོ་དང་བདག་གཅིག་འབྲེལ་མ་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ།

དངོས་པོ་དང་དེ་བྱུང་འབྲེལ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར། ཉམས་བསྐྱབས་ཟེན།

[Then I agree to your original statement: a working thing in the moment after it does share a relationship with the working thing such that to be it is to automatically be the working thing.]

Suppose you agree to our original statement.

Consider this same thing.

It is not so, that it shares a relationship with the working thing such that to be it is to automatically be the working thing,

Because it shares a relationship with the working thing such that it came from the working thing.

Our reason has already been proven.

ཁ་ཅིག་ན་རེ། ཀ་བྱུམ་གཉིས་དང་གཅིག་དང་འགལ་བ་དང་འགལ་བ་ཡང་ཡིན། ཀ་
བྱུམ་གཉིས་དང་གཅིག་དང་མི་འགལ་བ་དང་མི་འགལ་བ་ཡང་ཡིན་པའི་གཞི་མཐུན་
མེད་ཟེར་ན།

Suppose someone comes and makes the following claim:

There exists no one thing which is both (1) something which is such that being it is contradictory to being something which is such that being it is contradictory to being one and the same as the two of a pillar and a water pitcher; and also (2) something which is such that being it is not contradictory to being something which is such that being it is not contradictory to being one and the same as the two of a pillar and a water pitcher.

དེ་ཡོད་པར་ཐལ། ཤེས་བྱའི་རྣམ་ཡོད་ཆོས་གསུམ་ཆང་བ་དེ་དེ་ལྟར་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

But such a thing does so exist,
Because the presence of all three of the material qualities for "existing thing"
is just such a thing.

[The "presence of all three of the material qualities" for any particular thing is, as we will see in Class Eight, the definition of its definition. The three material qualities are: (1) generally speaking, the thing is a definition; (2) it does apply to a typical example; and (3) it is the definition of no other thing than what it defines.]

དང་པོ་གྲུབ་སྟེ། དེ་ཡང་ཡིན། ཀ་བྱུམ་གཉིས་དང་གཅིག་དང་འགལ་བ་ཡང་ཡིན་
པའི་གཞི་མཐུན་མེད་པའི་ཕྱིར་ཏེ། སྟོང་ཡུལ་དུ་བྱ་རུང་དེ། དེ་དང་མི་འགལ་བ་ཡིན་
པའི་ཕྱིར།

[It's not correct to say that the first part of your reason applies to your example: it's not correct to say that the presence of all three of the material qualities for "existing thing" is the kind of thing such that being it is contradictory to being something which is such that being it is contradictory to being one and the same as the two of a pillar and a water pitcher.]

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But the first part of our reason is correct,
Because there exists no one thing which is both (1) it and (2) also something
such that being it is contradictory with being that which is one and the
same as the two of a pillar and a water pitcher;
And this is true because "that which can be made an object of the mind,"
[which is the definition of "knowable thing",] is something which is such
that being it [the presence of all three of the material qualities for
"existing thing"] is not contradictory to being it [one and the same as the
two of a pillar and a water pitcher].

ཅ་དྭགས་གཉིས་པ་མ་གྲུབ་ན། དེའི་རྒྱུ་ཡོད་ཆོས་གསུམ་ཚང་བ་ཆོས་ཅན། ཀ་བུམ་
གཉིས་དང་གཅིག་དང་མི་འགལ་བ་དང་མི་འགལ་བ་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ། ཁྱོད་ཀྱང་ཡིན།
ཀ་བུམ་གཉིས་དང་གཅིག་དང་མི་འགལ་བ་ཡང་ཡིན་པའི་གཞི་མཐུན་ཡོད་པའི་ཕྱིར་
ཏི། སློའི་ཡུལ་དུ་བྱ་རུང་དེ་དེ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[It's incorrect to say that the second part of your reason applies to your
example: it's not correct to say that the presence of all three of the
material qualities for "knowable thing" is the kind of thing such
that being it is not contradictory to being something which is
such that being it is not contradictory to being one and the same
as the two of a pillar and a water pitcher.]

Suppose you say that it's not correct to say that the second part of our reason
applies to our example.

Consider the presence of all three of the material qualities for this same thing.
It is so something which is such that being it is not contradictory to being
something which is such that being it is not contradictory to being
something which is one and the same as the two of a pillar and a water
pitcher,

Because there does exist one thing which is both (1) it [the presence of all three
qualities for "knowable thing"] and (2) something which is such that
being it is not contradictory to being one and the same as the two of a
pillar and a water pitcher;

And this is true because "that which can be made an object of the mind" is just
such a thing.

ཁ་ཅིག་ན་རེ། དངོས་པོ་དང་འགལ་བ་དང་འགལ་བ་ཡང་ཡིན། དངོས་པོ་དང་མི་
འགལ་བ་དང་མི་འགལ་བ་ཡང་ཡིན། དངོས་པོ་དང་འབྲེལ་བ་དང་འབྲེལ་བ་ཡང་
ཡིན། དངོས་པོ་དང་མ་འབྲེལ་བ་དང་མ་འབྲེལ་བ་ཡང་ཡིན་པའི་གཞི་མཐུན་པ་ཡོད་
ཟེར་ན།

Suppose someone comes and makes the following claim:

There does exist one thing which is a combination of all of the following: (1) something which is such that being it is contradictory to being something which is such that being it is contradictory to being a working thing; (2) something which is such that being it is not contradictory to being something which is such that being it is not contradictory to being a working thing; (3) something which shares a relationship with something which shares a relationship with a working thing; and (4) something which does not share a relationship with something which does not share a relationship with a working thing.

དངོས་པོ་དང་མི་འགལ་བ་དེ། དེ་འདྲ་བའི་གཞི་མཐུན་པ་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ། དེ་འདྲའི་
གཞི་མཐུན་པ་ཡོད་པ་གང་ཞིག །དངོས་པོ་དང་མ་འབྲེལ་བ་དེ། དེ་འདྲ་བའི་གཞི་
མཐུན་པ་མ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

So is something which is such that being it is not contradictory to being a working thing then just such a combination?

Because (1) there does exist one thing which is all of those and (2) that which does not share a relationship with a working thing is not such a combination.

གཞིས་པ་མ་གྲུབ་ན། དངོས་པོ་དང་མ་འབྲེལ་བ་ཆོས་ཅན། དངོས་པོ་དང་འགལ་བ་
དང་འགལ་བ་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ། དེ་འདྲའི་གཞི་མཐུན་པ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར། རྟགས་དངོས།

[The second part of your reason is not correct: it's not correct to say that that which does not share a relationship with a working thing is not such a combination.]

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Suppose you say that the second part of our reason is not correct.
Consider that which does not share a relationship with a working thing.
Is it then something which is such that being it is contradictory to being
something which is such that being it is contradictory to being a
working thing?
Because it is just such a thing; [that is, one thing which is a combination of all
the above].

[It's not correct to say it is just such a combination.]

But the reason is what you've already said directly.

འདོད་མི་རྒྱས་ཏེ། དེ་དང་མ་འབྲེལ་བ་ཡང་ཡིན། དེ་དང་འགལ་བ་ཡང་ཡིན་པའི་
གཞི་མཐུན་པ་ཡོད་པའི་ཕྱིར་ཏེ། དངོས་པོའི་རྒྱུར་རྒྱུར་པའི་ཚད་མ་དང་དབྱུང་ཤེས་
གཉིས་དེ་ལྟར་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[Then I agree with your original statement: that which does not share
a relationship with a working thing is something which is such
that being it is contradictory to being something which is such
that being it is contradictory to being a working thing.]

But you can't agree to our original statement,
Because there does exist one thing which is both not related to it [to a working
thing] and which is also not such that being it is contradictory to being
the working thing;
And this is true because the two of a valid perception and a recollection which
act as a cause for a working thing are just such a combination.

མ་གྲུབ་ན། དེ་གཉིས་ཆོས་ཅན། དེར་ཐལ། དེ་དང་མ་འབྲེལ་བ་ཡིན་པ་གང་ཞིག
|དེ་དང་འགལ་བ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[It's not correct to say that the two of a valid perception and a
recollection which act as a cause for a working thing are just such
a combination.]

Suppose you say that it's not correct.
Consider these two.
They are so,
Because they are something which is both (1) not related to a working thing,

and (2) also such that being them is contradictory to being a working thing.

དང་པོ་གྲུབ་སྟེ། དེའི་རྒྱ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[The first part of your reason is not correct: it is not correct to say that the two of a valid perception and a recollection which act as a cause for a working thing are not related to the working thing.]

But the first part of our reason is correct,
Because they are its cause.

གཉིས་པ་གྲུབ་སྟེ། ཡིན་པ་མི་སྲིད་པའི་ཤེས་བྱ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[The second part of your reason is not correct: it is not correct to say that the two of a valid perception and a recollection which act as a cause for a working thing are such that being them is contradictory to being a working thing.]

But the second part of our reason is correct,
Because they are a knowable thing which cannot be.

ཁ་ཅིག་ན་རེ། རྟག་པ་དང་འགལ་བ་དང་འགལ་བ་ཡང་ཡིན། རྟག་པ་དང་མི་འགལ་བ་དང་མི་འགལ་བ་ཡང་ཡིན། རྟག་པ་དང་འབྲེལ་བ་དང་འབྲེལ་བ་ཡང་ཡིན། རྟག་པ་དང་མ་འབྲེལ་བ་དང་མ་འབྲེལ་བ་ཡང་ཡིན་པའི་གཞི་མཐུན་མེད་ཟེར་ན།

Suppose someone comes and makes the following claim:

There is no one thing which is all of the following: (1) such that being it is contradictory to being something such that being it is contradictory to being a thing which is unchanging; (2) such that being it is not contradictory with being something such that being it is not contradictory to being a thing which is unchanging; (3) related to something which is related to a thing which is unchanging; and (4) not related to something which is not related to a thing which is unchanging.

དེ་འདྲའི་གཞི་མཐུན་ཡོད་པར་ཐལ། རྟག་པ་དང་མ་འབྲེལ་བ་དེ། དེ་འདྲའི་གཞི་
མཐུན་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

But there does exist one thing which is all of the above,
Because that which is not related to an unchanging thing is just such a thing.

མ་གྲུབ་ན། དེ་ཆོས་ཅན། དེ་འདྲའི་གཞི་མཐུན་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ། རྟག་པ་དང་འགལ་
བ་དང་འགལ་བ་ཡིན་པ་གང་ཞིག །དེ་དང་མི་འགལ་བ་དང་མི་འགལ་བ་ཡིན། དེ་
དང་འབྲེལ་བ་དང་འབྲེལ་བ་ཡིན། དེ་དང་མ་འབྲེལ་བ་དང་མ་འབྲེལ་བ་ཡིན་པའི་
ཕྱིར།

[It's not correct to say that that which is not related to an unchanging
thing is just such a thing.]

Suppose you say it's not correct.

Consider this same thing.

It is so just such a thing, one that combines all four;

Because it is something which is (1) such that being it is contradictory to being
something that is such that being it is contradictory to being an
unchanging thing; and (2) it is such that being it is not contradictory to
being something which is such that being it is not contradictory to being
this [unchanging thing]; it is related to what is related to this
[unchanging thing]; and it is unrelated to what is unrelated to this
[unchanging thing].

དང་པོ་མ་གྲུབ་ན། དེ་ཆོས་ཅན། དེར་ཐལ། དེ་དང་ཐ་དད་གང་ཞིག །བྱོད་ཡིན་ན།
རྟག་པ་དང་མི་འགལ་བ་ཡིན་དགོས་པའི་ཕྱིར་ཏེ། བྱོད་ཡིན་ན་རྟག་པ་དང་ཐ་མི་དད་
ཡིན་དགོས་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[The first part of your reason is not correct: it is incorrect to say that
that which is not related to an unchanging thing is such that
being it is contradictory to being something that is such that
being it is contradictory to being an unchanging thing.]

Suppose you say that the first part of our reason is not correct.

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Consider this same thing.

It is so,

Because it is (1) distinct from this [thing that is such that being it is contradictory to being an unchanging thing], and (2) if something is it [that is, if something is something which is not related to an unchanging thing], then it must be such that being it is not contradictory with being an unchanging thing;

And this is true because if something is it [that is, if something is something which is not related to an unchanging thing], then it cannot be distinct from an unchanging thing.

ཅ་རྟགས་གཉིས་པ་མ་གྲུབ་ན། དེ་དང་མ་འབྲེལ་བ་ཆོས་ཅན། བྱེད་དེ་དང་མི་འགལ་
བ་དང་མི་འགལ་བ་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ། བྱེད་ཀྱང་ཡིན། དེ་དང་མི་འགལ་བ་ཡང་ཡིན་
པའི་གཞི་མཐུན་ཡོད་པའི་ཕྱིར་ཏེ། རྟག་པ་དེ་དེ་ལྟར་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[The second part of your original reason is not correct: it is not correct to say that that which is not related to an unchanging thing is such that being it is not contradictory to being something which is such that being it is not contradictory to being an unchanging thing; it is related to what is related to an unchanging thing; and it is unrelated to what is unrelated to an unchanging thing.]

Suppose you say that the second part of our original reason is not correct.

Consider that which is not related to it [that is, to an unchanging thing].

It is so such that being it is not contradictory with being something which is such that being it is not contradictory with being it [an unchanging thing],

Because there does exist one thing which is both (1) it [that is, something which is not related to an unchanging thing], and (2) something which is such that being it is not contradictory to being it [an unchanging thing];

And this is true because an unchanging thing is just that.

ཅ་རྟགས་གསུམ་པ་མ་གྲུབ་ན། དེ་དང་མ་འབྲེལ་བ་ཆོས་ཅན། དེ་དང་འབྲེལ་བ་དང་
འབྲེལ་བ་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ། དེ་དང་འབྲེལ་བ་དང་ཐ་དད་གང་ཞིག། དེ་དང་འབྲེལ་བ་
མེད་ན། བྱེད་མེད་དགོས་པའི་ཕྱིར།

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[The third part of your original reason is not correct: it is not correct to say that that which is not related to an unchanging thing is related to something which is related to a thing which is unchanging.]

Suppose you say that the third part of our original reason is not correct. Consider that which is not related to it [to an unchanging thing]. It is so something which is related to something which is related to a thing which is unchanging, Because it is (1) distinct from that which is related to it [to a thing which is unchanging], and (2) if there existed no things which were related to it [to a thing which is unchanging], then it could not exist either.

ཅ་རྟགས་བཞི་པ་མ་གྲུབ་ན། རྟག་པ་དང་མ་འབྲེལ་བ་ཚུལ་ཅན། བྱོད་བྱོད་དང་མ་
འབྲེལ་བ་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ། བྱོད་བདག་མེད་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[The fourth part of your original reason is not correct: it is not correct to say that that which is not related to an unchanging thing is not related to something which is not related to a thing which is unchanging.]

Suppose you say that the fourth part of our original reason is not correct. Consider that which is not related to an unchanging thing. It is so true, that it is not related to itself, Because it is an example of a thing which has no nature of its own.

ཁ་ཅིག་ན་རེ། ཤེས་བྱ་དང་འགལ་བ་དང་མི་འགལ་བ་ཡང་ཡིན། ཤེས་བྱ་དང་མི་
འགལ་བ་དང་འགལ་བ་ཡང་ཡིན། ཤེས་བྱ་དང་འབྲེལ་བ་དང་མ་འབྲེལ་བ་ཡང་
ཡིན། ཤེས་བྱ་དང་མ་འབྲེལ་བ་དང་འབྲེལ་བ་ཡང་ཡིན་པའི་གཞི་མཐུན་ཡོད་ཟེར་ན།

Suppose someone comes and makes the following claim:

There does exist one thing which combines all the following: (1) something which is such that being it is not contradictory to being something which is such that being it is contradictory to being a knowable thing; (2) something which is such that being it is contradictory to being something which is such that being it

is not contradictory to being a knowable thing; (3) something which does not share a relationship with something which shares a relationship with a knowable thing; and (4) something which shares a relationship with something which does not share a relationship with a knowable thing.

ཤེས་བྱ་དང་མི་འགལ་བ་དེ། དེ་འདྲ་བའི་གཞི་མཐུན་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ། དེ་འདྲ་བའི་
གཞི་མཐུན་ཡོད་པ་གང་ཞིག། ཤེས་བྱ་དང་འབྲེལ་བ་དེ། དེ་འདྲའི་གཞི་མཐུན་མ་
ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

So then is something which is such that being it is not contradictory to being a knowable thing this kind of combination?

Because (1) there does exist just such a combination, and (2) something which shares a relationship with a knowable thing is not such a combination.

དང་པོ་དངོས། གཞིས་པ་མ་གྲུབ་ན། ཤེས་བྱ་དང་འབྲེལ་བ་ཆོས་ཅན། ཤེས་བྱ་དང་
མི་འགལ་བ་དང་འགལ་བ་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ། དེ་འདྲ་བའི་གཞི་མཐུན་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

You have already agreed directly to the first part of our reason.
Suppose then you say that the second part is not correct.

Consider something which shares a relationship with a knowable thing.
So is it then something which is such that being it is contradictory to being something which is such that being it is not contradictory to being a knowable thing?

Because it is just such a combination.

རྟགས་དངོས། འདོད་མི་རྒྱས་ཏེ། དེ་དང་མི་འགལ་བ་དང་མི་འགལ་བ་ཡིན་པའི་
ཕྱིར་ཏེ། ཁྱོད་ཀྱང་ཡིན། དེ་དང་མི་འགལ་བ་ཡང་ཡིན་པའི་གཞི་མཐུན་ཡོད་པའི་
ཕྱིར་ཏེ། བྱམ་པ་དང་གཅིག་དེ་དེ་ལྟར་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

You have already agreed directly to the reason.
But you cannot agree to our original statement here,
Because it [something which shares a relationship with a knowable thing] is something which is such that being it is not contradictory to being something which is such that being it is not contradictory to being this thing;

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And this is true because there does exist something which is both (1) it [that is, something which shares a relationship with a knowable thing] and (2) something which is such that being it is not contradictory to being that [knowable thing];

And this is true because that which is one and the same as a water pitcher is just such a combination.

རྩ་བར་འདོད་ན། ཤེས་བྱ་དང་མི་འགལ་བ་ཆོས་ཅན། ཤེས་བྱ་དང་འབྲེལ་བ་དང་མ་
འབྲེལ་བ་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ། དེ་འདྲའི་གཞི་མཐུན་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[Then I agree to your original statement: something which shares a relationship with a knowable thing is something which is such that being it is contradictory to being something which is such that being it is not contradictory to being a knowable thing.]

Consider something which is such that being it is not contradictory to being a knowable thing.

So is it then something which does not share a relationship with something which does share a relationship with a knowable thing?

Because it is just such a combination.

རྟགས་དངོས། འདོད་མི་རྣམས་ཏེ། དེ་དང་འབྲེལ་བ་དང་འབྲེལ་བ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར་ཏེ།
དེ་དང་འབྲེལ་བ་དང་ཐ་དད་གང་ཞིག། དེ་དང་འབྲེལ་བ་མེད་ན། ཁྱོད་མེད་དགོས་
པའི་ཕྱིར།

You've already agreed directly to the reason.

You can't agree to our original position,

Because it [something which is such that being it is not contradictory to being a knowable thing] is something which does share a relationship with something which does share a relationship with a knowable thing;

And this is because (1) it is distinct from something which does share a relationship with a knowable thing, and (2) if the thing with which it shares a relationship ceased to exist, then it would itself cease to exist.

རྟགས་སྒྲ། བྱས་པ་ལ་ཁོ་ན་རེ། དེ་འདྲའི་གཞི་མཐུན་ཡོངས་ཚུགས་དེ་ཡོད་པར་ཐལ།
ཀ་བ་དང་འགལ་བ་དང་མི་འགལ་བ་ཡང་ཡིན། དེ་དང་མི་འགལ་བ་དང་འགལ་བ་

ཡང་ཡིན། དེ་དང་འབྲེལ་བ་དང་མ་འབྲེལ་བ་ཡང་ཡིན། དེ་དང་མ་འབྲེལ་བ་དང་
འབྲེལ་བ་ཡང་ཡིན་པའི་གཞི་མཐུན་ཡོད་པའི་ཕྱིར་ན། འདིར་མ་བྱུང་། རྟགས་གྲུབ་
སྟེ། ཀ་བ་དང་འགལ་བ་དེ་དེ་ལྟར་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར་།

The reason we've given is easy to accept.

Suppose, relative to this same point, someone comes and says:

It is so, that there does exist a typical example which incorporates all the conditions stated.

Because there does exist one thing which is (1) something which is such that being it is not contradictory to being something which is such that being it is contradictory to being a pillar; (2) something which is such that being it is contradictory to being something which is such that being it is not contradictory to being this same thing; (3) something which does not share a relationship with something which does share a relationship with this same thing; and (4) something which does share a relationship with something which does not share a relationship with this same thing.

Our answer to this is, "It doesn't necessarily follow."

The reason, by the way, is itself true, for something which is such that being it is contradictory to being a pillar is just this kind of combination.

མ་གྲུབ་ན། ཀ་བ་དང་འགལ་བ་ཆོས་ཅན། དེ་འདྲའི་གཞི་མཐུན་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ། ཀ་
བ་དང་འགལ་བ་དང་མི་འགལ་བ་ཡིན་པ་གང་ཞིག །དེ་དང་མི་འགལ་བ་དང་
འགལ་བ་ཡིན། དེ་དང་འབྲེལ་བ་དང་མ་འབྲེལ་བ་ཡིན། དེ་དང་མ་འབྲེལ་བ་དང་
འབྲེལ་བ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར་།

[It's not correct to say that something which is such that being it is contradictory to being a pillar is just this kind of combination.]

Suppose you say it's not correct.

Consider something which is such that being it is contradictory to being a pillar.

It is so just such a combination,

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Because it is (1) something which is such that being it is not contradictory to being something which is such that being it is contradictory to being a pillar; and (2) it is something which is such that being it is contradictory to being something which is such that being it is not contradictory with being this thing [a pillar], (3) it is something which does not share a relationship with what does share a relationship with this thing [a pillar], and (4) it is something which shares a relationship with what does not share a relationship with this thing [the pillar].

རྟགས་དང་པོ་དང་གཉིས་པ་སྟེ། རྟགས་གསུམ་པ་མ་གྲུབ་ན། དེ་ཚེས་ཅན། དེ་དང་
འབྲེལ་བ་དང་མ་འབྲེལ་བ་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ། དེ་དང་འབྲེལ་བ་མེད་ན་སྟོང་མེད་མི་
དགོས་པའི་ཕྱིར་ཏེ། ཀ་བའི་དགག་གཞི་དེ་དེ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

The first and second elements in our reason are easy to accept.
Suppose you say that the third is not correct.

Consider this same thing [something which is such that being it is contradictory to being a pillar].
It is so something which does not share a relationship with something which does share a relationship with this thing [the pillar],
Because it is not necessarily the case that, if something which did have such a relationship ceased to exist, it too would have to cease to exist;
And this is true because a place where there is no pillar is an example of that.

རྟགས་བཞི་པ་མ་གྲུབ་ན། ཀ་བ་དང་འགལ་བ་ཚེས་ཅན། དེ་དང་མ་འབྲེལ་བ་དང་
འབྲེལ་བ་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ། དེ་དང་མ་འབྲེལ་བ་དང་ཐ་དད་གང་ཞིག །དེ་དང་མ་
འབྲེལ་བ་མེད་ན། སྟོང་མེད་དགོས་པའི་ཕྱིར། རྟགས་སྟེ།

Suppose you say that the fourth element in our reason is not correct.
Consider something which is such that being it is contradictory to being a pillar.
It is so something which shares a relationship with something which shares no relationship with a pillar,
Because (1) it is distinct from something which shares no relationship with a pillar; and (2) if something which shares no relationship with a pillar ceased to exist, it too would have to cease to exist.

ཁ་ཅིག་ན་རེ། མི་འགལ་བ་དང་འགལ་བ་དང་མི་འགལ་བ་ཡིན་ན། འགལ་བ་དང་
མི་འགལ་བ་ཡིན་པས་བྱུང་བ་ཟེར་ན།

Suppose someone comes and makes the following claim:

If something is such that being it is not contradictory to being something which is such that being it is contradictory to being something which is not contradictory, then it must always be something which is such that being it is not contradictory to being something which is contradictory.

འགལ་བའི་ལྷོག་པ་ཆོས་ཅན། དེར་ཐལ། དེའི་ཕྱིར།

Consider the exclusion of all that is not something which is contradictory.

So is it then [something which is such that being it is not contradictory to being something which is contradictory]?

Because it is [something which is such that being it is not contradictory to being something which is such that being it is contradictory to being something which is not contradictory].

མ་གྲུབ་ན། དེ་ཆོས་ཅན། དེར་ཐལ། བྱོད་ཀྱང་ཡིན། མི་འགལ་བ་དང་འགལ་བ་
ཡང་ཡིན་པའི་གཞི་མཐུན་པ་ཡོད་པའི་ཕྱིར། འགལ་བ་དེ་དེ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[It's not correct to say that the exclusion of all that is not something which is contradictory is something which is such that being it is not contradictory to being something which is such that being it is contradictory to being something which is not contradictory.]

Suppose you say it's not correct.

Consider this same thing.

It is so,

Because there does exist one thing which is both it, and also a thing which is such that being it is contradictory to being something which is not contradictory.

And this is because being something which is contradictory is just such a thing.

རྩ་བར་འདོད་ན། དེ་ཆོས་ཅན། འགལ་བ་དང་མི་འགལ་བ་མ་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ།

འགལ་བ་དང་ཐ་དད་གང་ཞིག ། རྟོད་དང་འགལ་བའི་གཞི་མཐུན་མི་སྲིད་པའི་ཕྱིར་
དེ། འགལ་བ་འགལ་བ་མ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[Then I agree with your original statement: the exclusion of all that is not something which is contradictory is such that being it is not contradictory to being something which is contradictory.]

Suppose you agree with our original statement.
Consider this same thing [the exclusion of all that is not something which is contradictory].
It is not so something which is such that being it is not contradictory to being something which is contradictory,
Because (1) it is distinct from something which is contradictory, and (2) there is no one thing which can be both it and something which is contradictory;
And this is because being contradictory is not something which is contradictory.

གཉིས་པ་རང་ལུགས་བཞག་པ་ལ། འགལ་བ་ལ་མཚན་ཉིད་དང་དབྱེ་བ་གཉིས།

Here is the second part, where we present our own position. We proceed in two steps, covering the definition of what it is to be in contradiction, and then the different types of contradiction.

དང་པོ་ནི། རྟོད་ཐ་དད་ཀྱང་ཡིན། རྟོད་ཡིན་པ་མི་སྲིད་པ་ཡང་ཡིན་པའི་གཞི་མཐུན་
དུ་དམིགས་པ་དེ། རང་ཉིད་འགལ་བ་ཡིན་པའི་མཚན་ཉིད།

Here is the definition of what it is for two things to be in contradiction:

The two things must (1) be distinct from each other, and then they must be such that (2) it is impossible for any one thing to be both of them.

གཉིས་པ་འགལ་བ་ལ་དབྱེ་ན། ཕན་ཚུན་སྤང་འགལ་དང་། ལྷན་ཅིག་མི་གནས་
འགལ་གཉིས།

There are two different ways of being in contradiction: contradictory in the sense of being mutually exclusive; and contradictory in the sense of being diametrically opposed.

དང་པོ་ནི། རྣམ་བཅད་ཡོངས་གཅོད་ཀྱི་སྒྲོ་ནས་མི་མཐུན་པར་གནས་པ། ཕན་ཚུན་
སྤང་འགལ་གྱི་མཚན་ཉིད། དེ་དང་འགལ་བ་གཉིས་དོན་གཅིག

The definition of the first of these, to be contradictory in the sense of being mutually exclusive, is as follows:

Two things which conflict with each other in such a way that the presence of one automatically means the absence of the other.

The two terms "contradictory in the sense of being mutually exclusive" and "contradictory" refer to the same thing.

དེ་ལ་དབྱེ་ན། དངོས་འགལ་དང་། བརྒྱད་འགལ་གཉིས། ཕན་ཚུན་དངོས་སུ་མི་
མཐུན་པར་གནས་པ། དངོས་འགལ་གྱི་མཚན་ཉིད། དངོས་སུ་གཞོད་བྱ་གཞོད་བྱེད་
མ་ཡིན་ཞིང་། གཞི་མི་མཐུན་པར་གནས་པ། བརྒྱད་འགལ་གྱི་མཚན་ཉིད།

Things which are contradictory in the sense of being mutually exclusive may be further divided into two types: those which contradict each other in this way directly; and those which contradict each other in this way indirectly.

The definition of things which contradict each other in this way directly is "Two things which conflict with each other directly." The definition of things which contradict each other in this way indirectly is "Two things which are such that no one thing can be both, but which are not such that one immediately obviates the other."

དང་པོའི་མཚན་གཞི་ནི། དངོས་པོ་དང་དངོས་མེད་གཉིས་ལྟ་བུ། གཉིས་པའི་མཚན་
གཞི་ནི། ཚ་བྲང་གཉིས་དང་། བདག་འཇོན་དང་བདག་མེད་ཉོགས་པའི་ཤེས་རབ་
གཉིས་ལྟ་བུ།

A typical example of the first would be something like the two of "working thing" and "a thing which does no work." A typical example of the second

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would be "heat" and "coldness," or else "the state of mind which holds that things have some nature of their own" and "the wisdom which realizes that nothing has a nature of its own."

གཉིས་པ་ནི། རྒྱུན་བཅད་བྱ་གཅོད་བྱེད་ཀྱི་སྒྲོ་ནས་མི་མཐུན་པར་གནས་པ། ལྷན་ཅིག་
མི་གནས་འགལ་གྱི་མཚན་ཉིད།

Here is the definition of the second kind of contradiction—of things which are contradictory in the sense of being diametrically opposed:

Two things which conflict with each other in such a way that each one acts to stop the continued existence of the other.

མཚན་གཞི་ནི། གཉིན་པོ་དང་སྤང་བྱ་གཉིས་ལྟ་བུ།

A typical example would be a spiritual antidote and the negative personal quality which it allows you to eliminate.

ཆོས་དེ་དང་བདག་གཅིག་འབྲེལ་གྱི་མཚན་ཉིད་ཡོད་དེ། བྱོད་ཆོས་དེ་དང་བདག་ཉིད་
གཅིག་པའི་སྒྲོ་ནས་ཐ་དད། ཆོས་དེ་མེད་ན་བྱོད་མེད་དགོས་པའི་ཆོས་དེ་དེ་ཡིན་པའི་
ཕྱིར།

The definition of what it is to share a relationship with something else in such a way that to be the first is to automatically be the other is as follows:

Whenever two existing things are such that, to be the first is by nature to be the second, but in such a way that they are separate things; and where—if the second were to cease to exist—then the first would have to cease to exist as well.

མཚན་གཞི་ནི། བུམ་པ་དང་བུམ་པའི་ལྷོག་པ་ལྟ་བུ།

An example would be the relation between a vase and the exclusion of all that is not the vase.

གཞི་ལ་སྒྱུར་ན། དངོས་པོ་དང་བདག་ཉིད་གཅིག་པའི་སྒྲོ་ནས་ཐ་དད། དངོས་པོ་མེད་

ན་བྱོད་མེད་དགོས་པ་དེ་དངོས་པོ་དང་བདག་གཅིག་འབྲེལ་གྱི་མཚན་ཉིད། མཚན་གཞི་ནི། བུམ་པ་ལྷ་བུ།

Here is an actual application of the concept. The definition of what it is to share a relationship with "working things" in such a way that to be a particular thing is to automatically be a working thing is "something which is such that to be it is by nature to be a working thing, but in such a way that they are separate things; and where—if 'working things' were to cease to exist, then the particular thing would have to cease to exist as well." A typical example here would be a water pitcher.

དེ་བྱང་འབྲེལ་གྱི་མཚན་ཉིད་ཡོད་དེ། ཆོས་དེ་དང་རྗེས་ཐ་དད་པའི་སྒོ་ནས་ཆོས་དེའི་འབྲས་བུའི་རིགས་སུ་གནས་པ། ཆོས་དེ་དང་དེ་བྱང་འབྲེལ་གྱི་མཚན་ཉིད་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

The definition of what it is to share a relationship with something else in such a way that the first has come from the second is as follows:

Whenever two things are such that to be the first is to be the kind of thing which is the result of the second, in such a way that to be the first is not to be, by its very essence, the second.

མཚན་གཞི་ཡོད་དེ། དངོས་པོའི་ཕྱི་ལོགས་སུ་བྱང་བ་ནམས་དངོས་པོ་དང་དེ་བྱང་འབྲེལ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

A typical example would be the relationship of one coming from the other between those things which are a working thing the moment after it, and the original working thing.

གསུམ་པ་རྩོད་པ་སྒྲོང་བ་ལ། ཁ་ཅིག་ན་རེ། ཡོད་པ་དང་མེད་པ་གཉིས་ཆོས་ཅན། ཐ་དད་ཅིང་གཞི་མཐུན་མི་སྲིད་པ་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ། འགལ་བ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར་ཟེར་ན།

རྟགས་མ་གྲུབ་བོ།

Here is the final part: eliminating our opponent's rebuttal. Suppose someone comes and makes the following claim:

Consider the two of existence and non-existence.
So are these then two things which are discrete from one
another, and which are such that no one thing can
be both?
Because they are two things which are contradictory.

To this we answer, "The statement you gave as your reason is not correct."

འདོད་ན། ཡོད་པ་དང་མེད་པ་གཉིས་ཆོས་ཅན། ཡོད་པར་ཐལ། ཐ་དད་ཡིན་པའི་
ཕྱིར།

Suppose you do agree [that the two of existence and non-existence were two things which are both discrete from one another, and which are such that no one thing can be both].

Consider the two of existence and non-existence.
Are they then something which exists?
Because they are discrete from one another.

ཁ་ཅིག་ན་རེ། ཏུ་བ་ཆོས་ཅན། དེ་བྱུང་འབྲེལ་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ། མེ་དང་དེ་བྱུང་འབྲེལ་
ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར་ཟེར་ན་མ་གྲུབ།

Suppose someone comes and makes the following claim:

Consider smoke.
It is so then a relationship where one thing has come from
another,
Because it shares a relationship with fire such that it has
come from the other.

To this we answer, "It doesn't necessarily follow."

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[Please note that this section continues,
but was not translated due to the quantity of material.]

Formal logic subject:
**Logical Statements Used to Prove an Absence of Something,
and the First Category of this Type of Statement**

The following selection is from the monastic textbook entitled An Explanation of the Art of Reasoning (rTags-rigs), also by the Tutor of His Holiness the Dalai Lama, Purbuchok Jampa Tsultrim Gyatso.

༥ གསུམ་པ་མ་དམིགས་པའི་དྲགས་ཡང་དག་བཤད་པ་ལ། མཚན་ཉིད། དབྱེ་བ།
མཚན་གཞིའི་སྒྲིབ་དུ་མཚན་ཉིད་ངེས་བྱེད་གྱི་ཚད་མ་བཤད་པ་དང་གསུམ།

Here thirdly is our discussion of correct reasons of the type used to prove the absence of something. We will proceed in three parts: the definition, an explanation of the divisions, and a description of the valid perception where we confirm that the definition applies to a typical example.

དང་པོ་ནི། བྱོད་དེ་སྒྲིབ་གྱི་དྲགས་ཡང་དག་གང་ཞིག །བྱོད་གྱི་དྲགས་གྱིས་དེ་སྒྲིབ་
གྱི་དངོས་གྱི་སྒྲིབ་བྱའི་ཚེས་སུ་བཟུང་བྱ་ཡང་ཡིན། དགག་པ་ཡང་ཡིན་པའི་གཞི་
མཐུན་སྲིད་པ་དེ། བྱོད་དེ་སྒྲིབ་གྱི་མ་དམིགས་པའི་དྲགས་ཡང་དག་གི་མཚན་ཉིད།

Here is the first. The definition of a correct reason used to prove the absence of something in any particular proof is as follows:

Any reason which is (1) a correct reason for the particular proof;
and (2) such that there can exist one thing which is both (a) the
explicit version of the thing which is considered the quality to be
proven in the particular proof in which it acts as the reason, and
also (b) a negative thing.

གཉིས་པ་མ་དམིགས་པའི་དྲགས་ཡང་དག་ལ་དབྱེ་ན། མི་སྣང་བ་མ་དམིགས་པའི་
དྲགས་ཡང་དག་དང་། སྣང་རུང་མ་དམིགས་པའི་དྲགས་ཡང་དག་གཉིས།

Correct reasons to prove the absence of something can be divided into two types: correct reasons for the absence of something involving a thing which is imperceptible [to the particular opponent], and correct reasons for the absence of something involving a thing which is perceptible [to the particular opponent].

དང་པོ་ནི། མདོ་ལས། གང་ཟག་གིས་གང་ཟག་གི་ཚད་གཟུང་བར་མི་བྱ་སྟེ། ཉམས་
པར་གྱུར་ཏེ་རེ། ཞེས་རང་ལ་མི་སྣང་བ་ཙམ་གྱིས་གཞན་ལ་ཡོན་ཏན་དེ་ལྟ་བུ་མེད་
ཅེས་འཆད་མི་རིགས་པའི་དོན་སྟོན་པ་ལ། རྣམ་འབྲེལ་ལས། ཚད་མ་རྣམས་ནི་མི་
འཕྲུག་པ། མེད་ལ་མི་འཕྲུག་འབྲས་བུ་ཅན། ཞེས་སོགས་གྱིས་བསྟན།

Here is the first. Now there is a sutra where it says,

No person should ever judge another; those who try will fall.

The point of these words is to show us how wrong it is for us to say that someone else lacks any particular good quality, only because it does not appear to us that they do. This same point is made in the *Commentary* with lines such as the following:

In a case where valid perception has yet
To engage in the object, the result obtained
Is that they don't: they didn't engage.

དེ་སྐབས་ཀྱི་མ་དམིགས་པའི་དྲགས་ཡང་དག་གྱང་ཡིན། རང་ཉིད་ཀྱི་དྲགས་ཀྱིས་དེ་
སྐབས་ཀྱི་དགག་བྱའི་ཆོས་སུ་བདྲགས་པའི་དོན་དེ་སྤྱིར་ཡོད་གྱང་། རང་ཉིད་དེ་སྐབས་ཀྱི་
ཕྱོགས་ཆོས་ཅན་དུ་སོང་བའི་གང་ཟག་གི་ཚད་མ་ལ་མི་སྣང་བ་དེ། བྱོན་དེ་སྐབས་ཀྱི་མི་
སྣང་བ་མ་དམིགས་པའི་དྲགས་ཡང་དག་གི་མཚན་ཉིད།

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The definition of a correct reason used to prove the absence of something involving a thing which is imperceptible in any particular proof is as follows:

Any reason which is first of all a correct reason used to prove the absence of something for the particular proof, and which is secondly such that—even though the thing which is considered the main element of all which is denied by the proof in which it serves as the reason does generally exist—this thing is imperceptible to the valid perceptions of a person for whom this same reason fulfills its role in the relationship between the subject and the reason.

དེ་ལ་དབྱེ་ན། དེ་སྐབ་ཀྱི་མི་སྒྲུང་བའི་འབྲེལ་ལྷན་མ་དམིགས་པའི་དྲགས་ཡང་དག
།དེ་སྐབ་ཀྱི་མི་སྒྲུང་བའི་འགལ་ལྷན་དམིགས་པའི་དྲགས་ཡང་དག་གཉིས།

This kind of reason can be further divided into two types: a correct reason used to prove the absence of something in a particular proof, by virtue of the absence of a corollary which possesses a relationship [with whatever is denied]; and a correct reason used to prove the absence of something in a particular proof, by virtue of the presence of a corollary which is contradictory [to whatever is denied].

མཚན་ཉིད་རིམ་པ་ལྟར། ཁྱོད་དེ་སྐབ་ཀྱི་མི་སྒྲུང་བ་མ་དམིགས་པའི་དྲགས་ཡང་དག་
ཀྱང་ཡིན། མེད་དགག་ཀྱང་ཡིན་པའི་གཞི་མཐུན་པ། དང་པོའི་མཚན་ཉིད།

Here are the respective definitions. The first is defined as:

Anything which is first of all a correct reason in a particular proof for the absence of something involving a thing which is imperceptible, and which is secondly a negative in the sense of being the absence of something.

དེ་སྐབ་ཀྱི་མི་སྒྲུང་བ་མ་དམིགས་པའི་དྲགས་ཡང་དག་ཀྱང་ཡིན། མ་ཡིན་དགག་དང་
སྐབ་པ་གང་རུང་ཡང་ཡིན་པའི་གཞི་མཐུན་པ། གཉིས་པའི་མཚན་ཉིད།

The second is defined as:

Anything which is first of all a correct reason in a particular proof for the absence of something involving a thing which is

imperceptible, and which is secondly either a negative in the sense of not being something, or a positive.

དང་པོ་ལ་དབྱེ་ན། མི་སྣང་བའི་རྒྱ། བྱབ་བྱེད། རང་བཞིན་མ་དམིགས་པའི་དྲགས་
ཡང་དག་གསུམ།

The first of these can be divided into three types: those which are correct reasons used to prove the absence of something which represent (1) a cause for something involving a thing which is imperceptible; (2) a greater set than something involving a thing which is imperceptible; and (3) a nature of something involving a thing which is imperceptible.

མཚན་གཞི་རིམ་པ་ལྟར། མདུན་གྱི་གཞི་འདིར་ཆོས་ཅན། ཤ་བ་བསྐྱལ་དོན་དུ་སོང་
བའི་གང་ཟག་གི་རྒྱད་ལ་ཤ་བ་ངེས་པའི་དབྱེད་ཤེས་དོན་མཐུན་མེད་དེ། ཤ་བ་བསྐྱལ་
དོན་དུ་སོང་བའི་གང་ཟག་གི་རྒྱད་ལ་ཤ་བ་དམིགས་བྱེད་གྱི་ཚད་མ་མེད་པའི་ཕྱིར།
ཞེས་བཀོད་པའི་ཆོ། ཤ་བ་བསྐྱལ་དོན་དུ་སོང་བའི་གང་ཟག་གི་རྒྱད་ལ་ཤ་བ་དམིགས་
བྱེད་གྱི་ཚད་མ་མེད་པ་དེ། མདུན་གྱི་གཞི་འདིར་ཤ་བ་བསྐྱལ་དོན་དུ་སོང་བའི་གང་
ཟག་གི་རྒྱད་ལ་ཤ་བ་ངེས་པའི་དབྱེད་ཤེས་དོན་མཐུན་མེད་པར་སྐྱབ་པའི་དང་པོ་ཡིན།

Here are respective typical examples for the three. Suppose someone sets forth the following logical statement:

Consider the place in front of us.

There cannot exist here, in the mental continuum of a person for whom flesheater spirits [another word for a *preta*, or tormented spirit] are still abstruse objects, a recollection whose object corresponds to reality, and which is used to ascertain the existence of a flesheater spirit;

Because there does not exist, in the mental continuum of this same person, any valid perception wherein he or she perceives any flesheater spirit.

Think of this fact: that there does not exist, in the mental continuum of this same person, any valid perception wherein he or she perceives any flesheater

spirit. This represents the first type of reason just listed—for proving the fact that, in the place in front of us, there cannot exist, in the mental continuum of a person for whom flesheater spirits are still abstruse objects, a recollection whose object corresponds to reality, and which is used to ascertain the existence of a flesheater spirit.

ཤ་ཟ་ཡོད་པ་ལ་བསྐྱལ་དོན་དུ་སོང་བའི་གང་ཟག་གིས་ཤ་ཟ་ཡོད་པ་ཚད་མས་མ་
དམིགས་པ་དེ། མདུན་གྱི་གཞི་འདིར་ཤ་ཟ་བསྐྱལ་དོན་དུ་སོང་བའི་གང་ཟག་གིས་ཤ་
ཟ་ཡོད་ཅེས་དམ་བཅའ་མི་རིགས་པར་སྐྱབ་པའི་གཉིས་པ་ཡིན།

Think now of the fact that a person for whom flesheater spirits are still abstruse objects has not yet perceived, with a valid perception, the fact that flesheater spirits exist. This represents the second type of reason just listed—for proving the fact that, in the place in front of us, it would be improper for a person for whom flesheater spirits are still abstruse objects to swear that flesheater spirits do exist.

ཤ་ཟ་བསྐྱལ་དོན་དུ་སོང་བའི་གང་ཟག་གི་རྒྱུད་ལ་ཤ་ཟ་ངེས་བྱེད་ཀྱི་དཔྱད་ཤེས་དོན་
མཐུན་ཚད་མས་མ་དམིགས་པ་དེ། མདུན་གྱི་གཞི་འདིར་དེ་འདྲའི་གང་ཟག་གི་རྒྱུད་
ལ་ཤ་ཟ་ངེས་བྱེད་ཀྱི་དཔྱད་ཤེས་དོན་མཐུན་མེད་པར་སྐྱབ་པའི་གསུམ་པ་ཡིན།

Think finally of the fact that—in the mental continuum of a person for whom flesheater spirits are still abstruse objects—there cannot be perceived, with any valid perception, a recollection whose object corresponds to reality, and which is used to ascertain the existence of a flesheater spirit. This represents the third type of reason just listed—for proving the fact that, in the place in front of us, there does not exist, in the mental continuum of just such a person, any recollection whose object corresponds to reality, and which is used to ascertain the existence of a flesheater spirit.

དགོས་པ་ནི། མདུན་གྱི་གཞི་འདིར་ལྟའི་བར་སྲིད་དང་། ཤ་ཟ་ཡོད་མེད་ཐེ་ཚོམ་ཟ་
བའི་སྒོ་ནས་བསྐྱལ་དོན་དུ་སོང་བའི་གང་ཟག་གིས་གཞི་འདིར་དེ་གཉིས་ཡོད་ཅེས་
སམ་མེད་ཅེས་ཐག་གཅོད་དུ་མི་རུང་བ་དཔེར་མཛད་ནས། དོན་ལ་གང་ཟག་གང་དང་

གང་གི་སྒྲིན་ཡོན་རང་གི་ཚད་མས་མ་ངེས་བཞིན་དུ་སྒྲོ་བཀྱར་བྱས་མི་རུང་བར་ཤེས་
པའི་ཆེད་དུ་འོ།།

There is a specific purpose to these kinds of proofs. We are demonstrating here that, if a person still doubted whether flesheater spirits existed (and if they were thus still objects which were abstruse for them), then it would be inappropriate for them to come to some definite conclusion in their own minds about whether these spirits existed or not. We are meant by this example to realize how inappropriate it is for us to either overestimate or underestimate any particular person we may encounter, unable as we still are to confirm—through a valid perception—whether or not they do in reality possess a particular positive or negative personal quality.

དེ་སྐབས་ཀྱི་དགག་བྱའི་ཆོས་སུ་བཏགས་པའི་དོན་ཡིན་ན། དེ་སྐབས་ཀྱི་དགག་བྱའི་ཆོས་
ཡིན་པས་མ་བྱུང་སྟེ། མདུན་གྱི་གཞི་འདིར་ཤ་ཟ་བསྐྱལ་དོན་དུ་སོང་བའི་གང་ཟག་གི་
རྒྱུ་ལ་ཤ་ཟ་ངེས་བྱེད་ཀྱི་དབྱུང་ཤེས་དོན་མཐུན་ཡོད་པ་དེ་དེ་འདྲའི་དབྱུང་ཤེས་དོན་
མཐུན་མེད་པར་སྐབས་པའི་དགག་བྱའི་ཆོས་སུ་བཏགས་པའི་དོན་དང་དེའི་དགག་བྱའི་
ཆོས་གཉིས་ཀ་ཡིན་གྱི། ཤ་ཟ་དང་དེ་ངེས་པའི་དབྱུང་ཤེས་དོན་མཐུན་གཉིས་རེ་རེ་
ནས་དེ་སྐབས་ཀྱི་དགག་བྱའི་ཆོས་སུ་བཏགས་པའི་དོན་ཡིན་ཀྱང་དེའི་དགག་བྱའི་ཆོས་
མ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

It is not necessarily the case, by the way, that if something is what we consider the main element in all that we deny in a particular logical statement, then it is also all that we deny in the same statement. Think of the possibility that there did exist, in the mental continuum of a person for whom flesheater spirits are still abstruse objects, a recollection whose object corresponds to reality, and which is used to ascertain the existence of a flesheater spirit. This is both what we consider the main element in all that we deny, and also all that we deny, in a proof that there does not exist any such recollection whose object corresponds to reality. The two of (1) flesheater spirits themselves, and (2) states of recollection whose objects correspond to reality, and which are used to ascertain the existence of such spirits, are—each of them separately—a kind of case where something is what we consider the main element in all that we deny in the particular logical statement, but not all that we deny in the particular logical statement.

དང་པོ་སྟེ། སྤྱི་མ་མ་གྲུབ་ན། ཤ་ཟ་དང་དེ་ངེས་པའི་དབྱེད་ཤེས་དོན་མཐུན་གཉིས་རེ་
རེ་ནས་དེ་སྐྱབ་གྱི་དགག་བྱའི་ཆོས་སུ་བཏགས་པའི་དོན་ཡིན་ཏེ། དེ་སྐྱབ་གྱི་སྤྱི་ཆོལ་
ཡང་དག་དེས་མདུན་གྱི་གཞི་འདིར་ཤ་ཟ་ཡོད་མེད་ཐེ་ཆོམ་ཟ་བའི་ཕྱིར་དང་། དེས་དེ་
འདྲ་བའི་དབྱེད་ཤེས་དོན་མཐུན་ཡོད་མེད་ཐེ་ཆོམ་ཟ་བའི་ཕྱིར།

The former example is easy. Suppose though that you say that the latter two are incorrect.

Consider then (1) flesheater spirits themselves, and (2) states of recollection whose objects correspond to reality, and which are used to ascertain the existence of such spirits.

These are so—each one of them separately—things that we consider the main element in all that we deny in the particular logical statement,

Because a correct opponent for this particular proof doubts whether or not flesheater spirits exist in the place in front of us, and also doubts whether or not there exists any such kind of recollection whose object corresponds to reality.

དེ་གཉིས་རེ་རེ་ནས་དེ་སྐྱབ་གྱི་དགག་བྱའི་ཆོས་མ་ཡིན་ཏེ། སྤྱིར་ཤ་ཟ་ཡོད་པའི་ཕྱིར་
དང་། དུ་བ་དེ་མཚན་མེད་ཀྱི་མཚོར་དུ་བ་མེད་པར་སྐྱབ་པའི་དགག་བྱའི་ཆོས་མ་ཡིན་
པའི་ཕྱིར།

Neither one of these is though, by itself, all that we deny in the particular logical statement, because generally speaking there do exist flesheater spirits; and because smoke is not all that we deny in a proof that there exists no smoke upon the nighttime ocean.

ཡོད་པ་དེ། མདུན་གྱི་གཞི་འདིར་ཤ་ཟ་བསྐལ་དོན་དུ་སོང་བའི་གང་ཟག་གི་རྒྱུད་ལ་ཤ་
ཟ་ངེས་བྱེད་གྱི་དབྱེད་ཤེས་དོན་མཐུན་མེད་པར་སྐྱབ་པའི་མི་སྣང་བའི་འགལ་ལྷ་
དམིགས་པའི་དྭགས་ཡང་དག་ཡིན་ནོ།

Course XIII: The Art of Reasoning
Reading Seven

Consider the fact that [the person described here] exists. This is an example of a correct reason used to prove the absence of something in a particular proof, by virtue of the presence of a corollary which is contradictory [to whatever is denied], for proving that a person for whom flesheater spirits are still abstruse objects still has no recollection which ascertains the existence of such spirits, and whose object corresponds to reality.

སྤྱིར་སློལ་ལྟོས་པའི་བསྐྱལ་དོན་ལ་གསུམ་ཡོད་དེ། ཡུལ་དང་དུས་དང་ངོ་བོའི་
བསྐྱལ་དོན་གསུམ་ཡོད་པའི་ཕྱིར། དང་པོ་ནི། རང་དང་ཕྱོགས་ཐག་ཤིན་ཏུ་རིང་བ་ན་
ཡོད་པའི་སྣོད་བཅུད་ཀྱི་བྱུང་པར་ལྟ་བུ། གཉིས་པ་ནི། བསྐྱལ་པ་འདས་ཟེན་པ་དང་
འབྱུང་བའི་དུས་ན་ཇི་འདྲ་བྱུང་བ་དང་འབྱུང་བའི་བྱུང་པར་ལྟ་བུ་སྟེ། དེ་རྣམས་ནི་སྤྱིར་
བསྐྱལ་དོན་མིན་ཡང་རང་གི་སློལ་ལྟོས་པའི་བསྐྱལ་དོན་ནོ། །གསུམ་པ་ནི། རང་
དང་ཉེ་བ་ན་ཡོད་ཀྱང་ངོ་བོ་སྤྱི་བའི་དབང་གིས་བསྐྱལ་དོན་དུ་སོང་བ་མདུན་གྱི་ཤ་ཟ་ལྟ་
བུ་དང་། ལྟ་མིའི་བར་སྤྱིད་པ་རྣམས་དང་དེའི་ཕུང་པོ་ལྟ་བུ་འོ།

Generally speaking, there are three different ways in which an object can be abstruse, relative to your state of mind. These are objects which are abstruse by virtue of the place, time, and nature. The first would be something like the details of particular beings or realms which are situated at a great distance from your particular location. The second would be something like the details of events which have occurred or are going to occur at times which are eons away in the past or future. These things are not abstruse in their own general right, but only relative to a given state of mind. The third would be something which is abstruse by virtue of being very subtle in nature, even though it may exist in the immediate proximity. Examples of this would be things like a flesheater spirit, or a being between death and rebirth who is headed towards birth as a human or pleasure being, and their various heaps.

The forms of debate:
Some Debating Tactics

The exquisite boxing style of Muhammed Ali showed the value of distracting and harassing your opponet before even throwing a punch, and we use some of the same tactics in a Buddhist debate. Again remember though, that the goal is not to defeat your opponent, but to help him and yourself and the audience listening; to sharpen his ability to concentrate under pressure, and to raise challenging questions that will clarify everyone's understanding of the life-saving Dharma.

Almost every normal debate begins with the attacker taking a mistaken position, and this is perhaps the most important tactic of all. The greatest geshe and debaters in the monastery have overcome any kind of pride, and are fearless in taking a position which is mistaken—a position where they will eventually have to "lose"—if this means that the defender and the audience will learn some important point. The goal here is to take a position which is *almost* correct, and very subtly mistaken: this will make for a fun debate, and clear up this point for everyone.

Feigning is another common tactic in boxing and debate. Hutzpah is essential: even if you're not sure your answer is correct, act like it is. Let the other person prove you wrong logically, and you'll both learn something valuable. Even if you can't hear the opponent's position clearly (which is a common occurrence in the incredibly noisy debate grounds!), or you don't have much clue of what he's talking about, take a shot! It starts a lively debate, which sooner or later clarifies every detail of the issue. The point is: always work from what you honestly think, answer to the best of your current understanding, and don't be afraid to go on a journey with your opponent, even through some dark or fuzzy places in your understanding, to reach to the higher ground of knowledge.

Don't be afraid to use the audience to help you distract or disrupt your opponent. Many an unbeatable position is overthrown in the monastery simply by the (mistaken) boos of the audience, egged on by the attacker. Here there are a whole repertoire of distracting taunts, which are fair game in the rules of debate. We will list a few of them following—please note though that the exact meaning of the words used has often been obscured over the centuries; the meanings given here are sometimes "best guesses" offered to us in an informal interview by the most qualified master in the world, Khen Rinpoche Geshe Lobsang Tharchin.

One common taunt is *Whoa!* The attacker either feels or feigns great surprise at a position taken by the defender, and begins a loud *whoa* sound. This is

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picked up by the monks in the immediate vicinity who are following the argument, and quickly spreads to the "deadheads" in the back (who are often engaged in some conversation of their own and not listening) and even to monks in other debate groups in the compound—all of whom have no idea what the defender even said that he deserves a *whoa*! This *whoa*! generally means "Uh-oh! Now you're in trouble!"

In the winter debates, the *whoa* can be followed by a loud *chir*! This is most often used when an argument has been presented to a defender and he finds himself unable to formulate an answer; it has the meaning of "Come on! We want an answer!" A common corrolary in smaller groups is for the attacker himself to say to a speechless defender, *labda*!—"Come on! Say something!" Some people say that the *chir*! is *che*!—meaning "Your argument has stalled now!" The spellings of these three in Tibetan are:

ཕྱིར། ལའ་ད། ཆད།

A screamed *ha*! has the same meaning as in English, "Wow! What a joke! Are you kidding?" It is often accompanied by throwing your hands up in the air.

Tsa! is one of the most common taunts; it comes from the word *ngo-tsa*, meaning "You should be ashamed to have said such a stupid thing!" and is typically used when someone is forced to retract a position they have taken themselves earlier. This is most often accompanied with a slap of the back of one hand in the palm of another, with everything repeated a few times for emphasis: *Tsa! Ooooh tsa! Tsa chik!* ("You should be ashamed! Ashamed, man! What a disgrace!"). At this point a debater might scowl at his opponent and jam his finger in his own cheek, meaning: "Time for you to blush, man!" Some people say the *tsa* is the *tsar* in *ngo-tsar*, meaning, "Man! That was a weird thing to say!" These words in Tibetan are:

ཆ། རྩོཆ། རྩོམ་ཆར།

Two more taunts are more based in formal logic than in tactics. The first is *kyappa long*, which literally means, "Give me your statement of necessity then!" This is used in a context like the following, with the indented portion from the opponent:

Consider sound.
It must so be a changing thing,
Because it's a thing which is made.
And that's true because anything which is made is always a changing thing.

སྒྲ་ཆོས་ཅན།
མི་དྭག་པ་ཡིན་པར་བཤད།
བྱས་པ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།
བྱས་ན་མི་དྭག་པ་ཡིན་པས་བྱབ་པའི་ཕྱིར།

It's incorrect to say that.

དྭགས་མ་གྲུབ།

Give me your statement of necessity then!

བྱབ་པ་ལོངས།

At this point, the opponent would be forced to give the following absurd statement of necessity:

Just because something is a thing which is made doesn't prove that it's a changing thing.

བྱས་ན་མི་དྭག་པ་ཡིན་པས་མ་བྱབ།

A final rejoinder is *korsum!* or *kordhi korsum!* This means "You have just made a circular argument," or "Now you have contradicted yourself completely!" A typical case would be where the opponent accepts that sound is a made thing, and accepts that if something is made it must be a changing thing, but stubbornly asserts still that sound is an unchanging thing. In the second version of this statement, the root syllable for the mantra of Gentle Voice (Manjushri, or Jampel Yang) is interjected. The Tibetan spellings for these are:

འཁོར་གསུམ། འཁོར་རྗེེ་འཁོར་གསུམ།

Defenders have a few tactics of their own, one of the most useful being *ah?* or *la?*—meaning "Whaddya say? I couldn't catch what you said." Then you put your cupped palm up to your ear as if you're having a problem hearing the attacker in all the mayhem of the debate ground. This is a great way to buy a few extra moments while you formulate your answer!

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Course XIII: The Art of Reasoning

Reading Eight: Definitions and the Things They Define

Selection from the collected topics:
Definitions and the Things They Define

The following reading consists of the Presentation of Definitions and the Things They Define (mTsan-mtson gyi rnam-bzhag), from An Explanation of the Elementary Path of Reasoning (Rigs-lam chung-gi rnam-par bshad-pa), by the Master Tutor Purbuchok Jampa Tsultrim Gyatso (1825-1901), who in his day held the position of Tutor to the Dalai Lama.

གཉིས་པ་རང་ལུགས་ལ། མཚན་བྱེ་མཚན་ཉིད་ཡོད་དེ། བཏགས་ཡོད་ཆོས་
གསུམ་ཚང་བ་དེ་དེ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

Here secondly is our own position. There is a definition of something defined, because it is the following:

A case where all three of the nominal qualities are present.

བཏགས་ཡོད་ཆོས་གསུམ་འདྲིན་ཚུལ་ཡོད་དེ། སྒྱིར་མཚན་བྱེ་ཡིན་པ། རང་གི་
མཚན་གཞིའི་སྟངས་དུ་གྲུབ་པ། རང་གི་མཚན་ཉིད་གང་ཡིན་པ་གཅིག་པོ་དེ་ལས་
གཞན་པ་གང་གི་ཡང་མཚན་བྱེ་མ་ཡིན་པ་དང་གསུམ་འདྲིན་རིགས་པའི་ཕྱིར།

There is a way of enumerating these three "nominal qualities," because the following is a correct list of the three:

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- 1) Generally speaking, the thing should be something to be defined;
- 2) It should apply to some definitive example for it; and
- 3) It should be something defined only for whatever its definition is, and not for any other.

མཚན་ཉིད་ཀྱི་མཚན་ཉིད་ཡོད་དེ། རྗེས་ཡོད་ཆོས་གསུམ་ཚང་བ་དེ་དེ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

There is a definition of a definition, because it is the following:

A case where all three of the material qualities are present.

རྗེས་ཡོད་ཀྱི་ཆོས་གསུམ་འདྲེན་ཚུལ་ཡོད་དེ། སྤྱིར་མཚན་ཉིད་ཡིན་པ། རང་གི་
མཚན་གཞིའི་སྤྱིང་དུ་བྱུང་པ། རང་གི་མཚན་གྱི་གང་ཡིན་པ་དེ་ལས་གཞན་པ་གང་གི་
ཡང་མཚན་ཉིད་མ་ཡིན་པ་དང་གསུམ་པོ་དེ་འདྲེན་རིགས་པའི་ཕྱིར།

There is a way of enumerating these three "material qualities," because the following is a correct list of the three:

- 1) Generally speaking, the thing should be a definition;
- 2) It should apply to some definitive example for it; and
- 3) It should be a definition for nothing other than the thing it defines.

དོན་བྱེད་རྒྱས་པའི་མཚན་གྱི་མཚན་ཉིད་ཡོད་དེ། དོན་བྱེད་རྒྱས་པའི་བཏགས་ཡོད་
ཆོས་གསུམ་ཚང་བ་དེ་དེ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

There does exist a definition of what "that which performs a function" defines, because it is the following:

That case where all three of the nominal qualities pertaining to "that which performs a function" are present.

དངོས་པོའི་མཚན་ཉིད་ཀྱི་མཚན་ཉིད་ཡོད་དེ། དངོས་པོའི་རྣམ་ཡོད་ཆོས་གསུམ་ཚང་
བ་དེ་དེ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

There does exist a definition of the definition of a working thing, because it is the following:

That case where all three of the material qualities pertaining to "working thing" are present.

དོན་བྱེད་རྣམ་པའི་བཏགས་ཡོད་ཆོས་གསུམ་ཚང་བའི་མཚན་གཞིའི་མཚན་ཉིད་ཡོད་
དེ། དོན་བྱེད་རྣམ་པའི་བཏགས་ཡོད་ཆོས་གསུམ་ཚང་བའི་དོན་བྱེད་རྣམ་པ་དེ་དེ་ཡིན་
པའི་ཕྱིར།

There does exist a definition for a definitive example where all three of the nominal qualities for "that which performs a function" are present, because it is the following:

That case of "that which performs a function" where all three of the nominal qualities for "that which performs a function" are present.

དེའི་མཚན་གཞི་ཡོད་དེ། དངོས་པོ་དེ་དེ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

There is a definitive example of such a thing, because a working thing would be one.

ཡང་ན་མཚོན་བྱའི་མཚན་ཉིད་ཡོད་དེ། རྣམ་པར་བཞག་བྱ་ཆོས་གསུམ་ཚང་བ་དེ་དེ་
ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

There is an alternate definition for something to be defined, because it is the following:

A case where all three of the qualities for being establishing as something are present.

རྣམ་པར་བཞག་བྱའི་ཆོས་གསུམ་འདྲིན་ཚུལ་ཡོད་དེ། མཚོན་བྱ་ཡིན་པ། རང་གི་

མཚན་ཉིད་ལས་གཞན་པའི་མཚན་གྱི་མ་ཡིན་པ། མཚན་གཞིར་གང་བཟུང་བ་ལ་སྲིད་
པ་སྟེ་གསུམ་པོ་དེ་འདྲིན་རིགས་པའི་ཕྱིར།

There is a way of enumerating these three qualities for being established as something, because the following is a correct list of the three:

- 1) The thing should be something to be defined;
- 2) It should not be something defined for any other definition than its definition; and
- 3) It should be possible with whatever we are considering a definitive example.

མཚན་ཉིད་ཀྱི་མཚན་ཉིད་ཡོད་དེ། རྣམ་པར་འཛོག་བྱེད་ཆོས་གསུམ་ཚང་བ་དེ་དེ་ཡིན་
པའི་ཕྱིར།

There is also such a definition for a definition, for it is the following:

A case where all three of the qualities for establishing something are present.

རྣམ་པར་འཛོག་བྱེད་ཀྱི་ཆོས་གསུམ་པོ་དེ་འདྲིན་ཚུལ་ཡོད་དེ། མཚན་ཉིད་ཡིན་པ།
རང་གི་མཚན་གྱི་ལས་གཞན་པའི་མཚན་ཉིད་མ་ཡིན་པ། མཚན་གཞིར་གང་བཟུང་བ་
ལ་སྲིད་པ་སྟེ་གསུམ་པོ་དེ་འདྲིན་རིགས་པའི་ཕྱིར།

There is a way of enumerating these three qualities for establishing something, because the following is a correct list of the three:

- 1) The thing should be a definition;
- 2) It should not be a definition for any object to be defined other than the one it defines; and
- 3) It should be possible with whatever we are considering a definitive example.

མཚན་གཞིའི་མཚན་ཉིད་ཡོད་དེ། མཚན་ཉིད་ཀྱི་སྐབས་སུ་བབ་པའི་མཚན་གྱི་མཚན་
པའི་གཞིར་གྱུར་པ་དེ་དེ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

There is also such a definition for a definitive example, because it is the following:

An example which typifies the object to be defined for the particular definition in question.

དེ་ཡང་གཞི་གཅིག་ལ་མཚན་ན། དོན་བྱེད་རྒྱས་པའི་མཚན་གྱི་མཚན་ཉིད་ཡོད་དེ།
དོན་བྱེད་རྒྱས་པའི་རྣམ་པར་བཞག་གྱི་ཆོས་གསུམ་ཚང་བ་དེ་དེ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

We can illustrate these with a specific case. There is a definition for the object defined by "that which performs a function," because it is the following:

A case where all three of the qualities for establishing something through "that which performs a function" are present.

དོན་བྱེད་རྒྱས་པའི་རྣམ་པར་བཞག་གྱི་ཆོས་གསུམ་འདྲན་ཚུལ་ཡོད་དེ། དོན་བྱེད་
རྒྱས་པའི་མཚན་གྱི་ཡིན་པ། དོན་བྱེད་རྒྱས་པ་ལས་གཞན་པའི་ཆོས་གང་གི་ཡང་
མཚན་གྱི་མ་ཡིན་པ། དོན་བྱེད་རྒྱས་པའི་མཚན་གྱི་མཚན་གཞིར་གང་བཟུང་བ་ལ་
སྲིད་པ་སྟེ་གསུམ་པོ་དེ་འདྲན་རིགས་པའི་ཕྱིར།

There is a way of enumerating these three qualities for being established as something by "that which performs a function," because the following is a correct list of the three:

- 1) The thing should be something to be defined by "that which performs a function";
- 2) It should not be something defined for any other definition than "that which performs a function"; and
- 3) It should be possible with whatever we are considering a definitive example of the thing to be defined by "that which performs a function."

དངོས་པོའི་མཚན་ཉིད་ཀྱི་མཚན་ཉིད་ཡོད་དེ། དངོས་པོའི་རྣམ་པར་འཛོག་བྱེད་ཆོས་
གསུམ་ཚང་བ་དེ་དེ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

There is a definition for the definition of a working thing, for it is the following:

A case where all three of the qualities for establishing something as a working thing are present.

དངོས་པོའི་རྣམ་པར་འཛོག་བྱེད་ཀྱི་ཆོས་གསུམ་འབྲེན་ཚུལ་ཡོད་དེ། དངོས་པོའི་
མཚན་ཉིད་ཡིན་པ། དངོས་པོ་ལས་གཞན་པའི་ཆོས་གང་གི་ཡང་མཚན་ཉིད་མ་ཡིན་
པ། དངོས་པོའི་མཚན་ཉིད་ཀྱི་མཚན་གཞིར་གང་བཟུང་བ་ལ་སྟོན་པ་སྟེ་གསུམ་པོ་དེ་
འབྲེན་རིགས་པའི་ཕྱིར།

There is a way of enumerating these three qualities for establishing something as a working thing, because the following is a correct list of the three:

- 1) The thing should be a definition for "working thing";
- 2) It should not be a definition for any object to be defined other than "working thing"; and
- 3) It should be possible with whatever we are considering a definitive example for the definition of a working thing.

དངོས་པོའི་མཚན་གཞིའི་མཚན་ཉིད་ཡོད་དེ། དོན་བྱེད་རྣམ་པས་དངོས་པོ་མཚོན་པའི་
གཞིར་གྱུར་པ་དེ་དེ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

There is also such a definition for a definitive example of a working thing, because it is the following:

An example which typifies the working thing defined by "that which performs a function."

མཚན་གཞི་ཡོད་དེ། བུམ་པ་དེ་དེ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

There does exist a definitive example, since a water pitcher would be one.

སྒྲིར་མཚན་ཉིད་ལ་དབྱེ་ན་གཉིས་ཡོད་དེ། རིགས་མི་མཐུན་དང་། འོག་ཏོག་སེལ་
བའི་མཚན་ཉིད་གཉིས་ཡོད་པའི་ཕྱིར།

Generally speaking, definitions may be divided into two types: (1) definitions which disallow dissimilar types; and (2) definitions which disallow wrong ideas.

དེ་གཉིས་ཀའི་མཚན་གཞི་ཡོད་དེ། གསར་དུ་མི་སྒྲུབ་པའི་ཤེས་པ་གང་ཞིག། ཏོག་
བྲལ་མ་འབྲུལ་བའི་ཤེས་པ་ལྟ་བུ་དེ་དེ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

An example of both of these would be something like:

A state of mind which is (1) a fresh, unerring perception, and (2)
which is free of conceptualization and also unmistaken.

དེ་རིགས་མི་མཐུན་སེལ་བའི་མཚན་ཉིད་དང་། འོག་ཏོག་སེལ་བའི་མཚན་ཉིད་
གཉིས་ཀ་ཡིན་ཏེ། རིགས་མི་མཐུན་སེལ་བའི་མཚན་ཉིད་ཡིན་པ་གང་ཞིག། ཏོག་
སེལ་བའི་མཚན་ཉིད་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

This is a definition which is both kinds: one which disallows dissimilar types, and one which disallows wrong ideas. And this is because it is (1) a definition which disallows dissimilar types, and (2) a definition which disallows wrong ideas.

དང་པོ་གྲུབ་སྟེ། མངོན་སུམ་ཚད་མའི་རིགས་མི་མཐུན་ལ་ཚད་མིན་དང་ཇེས་དཔག་
ཚད་མ་གཉིས་སུ་ངེས་ལ། ཚད་མིན་ནི་དེའི་ཟུར་གྱི་གསར་དུ་མི་བསྒྲུབ་བཞིན་པས་
སེལ་རྒྱས་ཤིང་། ཇེས་དཔག་ཚད་མ་ནི་དེའི་ཟུར་གྱི་ཏོག་བྲལ་དང་མ་འབྲུལ་བ་གང་
རུང་རི་ངེས་སེལ་རྒྱས་པའི་ཕྱིར།

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The first element mentioned is correct, because those states of mind which are dissimilar to direct valid perception are limited to precisely two: perceptions which are not valid, and deductive valid perceptions; while perceptions which are not valid are disallowed by the part of the definition that says, "fresh, unerring perception," and deductive perceptions are disallowed both by the reference in the definition to "free of conceptualization" and also by the reference to "unmistaken."

གཉིས་པ་གྲུབ་སྟེ། རྟོག་བྲལ་དང་མ་འབྲུལ་བ་གང་རུང་རི་རིས་རིགས་མི་མཐུན་
སེལ་གྱང་། རྟོག་བྲལ་དང་མ་འབྲུལ་བ་གཉིས་ཀ་སྟོས་པ་ལོག་རྟོག་སེལ་བའི་དབང་
དུ་བྱས་པ་ཡིན་ལ། དེ་ཡང་ཟླ་གཅིག་ཟླ་གཉིས་སུ་སྒྲིབ་བའི་དབང་ཤེས་ལྟ་བུའང་རྟོག་
བྲལ་ཡིན་པས་མངོན་སུམ་ཡིན་ནམ་སྟམ་པའི་ལོག་རྟོག་སེལ་བའི་དབང་དུ་བྱས་ནས་
མ་འབྲུལ་བ་སྟོས་ཤིང་། རིགས་པ་ཅན་པ་སོགས་མངོན་སུམ་རྟོག་པར་འདོད་པ་
ནམས་ཀྱི་ལོག་རྟོག་སེལ་བའི་ཕྱིར་དུ་རྟོག་བྲལ་སྟོས་པ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར་།

The second element mentioned is correct, because—although the references to "free of conceptualization" and to "unmistaken" each by themselves disallow dissimilar types—they each address a different wrong idea, and so both "free of conceptualization" and "unmistaken" are mentioned, to disallow these wrong ideas. Something like the sense perception where one moon appears to be two is also a state of mind free of conceptualization, and so someone might wonder whether it's a direct valid perception; and so the part about "unmistaken" is added to disallow this wrong idea. The [non-Buddhist] Logician School (the Nyayika) believe that direct perception is a kind of conceptualization; the part about "free of conceptualization" is added to disallow their wrong idea.

Formal logic subject:
***Reasons for the Absence of Something
Which Involve Something Perceptible***

The following selection is taken from An Explanation of the Art of Reasoning (rTags-rigs), also by the great tutor, Purbuchok Jampa Tsultrim Gyatso.

།སྒྲུབ་རྒྱུ་མ་དམིགས་པའི་དྲགས་ཡང་དག་ལ་མཚན་ཉིད་དབྱེ་བ་གཉིས།

There are two parts to our explanation of a correct reason for the absence of something which involves something perceptible [to the opponent]: the definition, and the divisions.

དང་པོ་ནི། དེ་སྒྲུབ་གྱི་མ་དམིགས་པའི་དྲགས་ཡང་དག་གྱུང་ཡིན། དེ་སྒྲུབ་པ་ལ་
ཕྱོགས་ཚོས་ཅན་དུ་སོང་བའི་གང་ཟག་ལ་དེ་སྒྲུབ་གྱི་དགག་བྱའི་ཚོས་སུ་བདགས་པའི་
དོན་བསྐུལ་དོན་མིན་པ་ཡང་ཡིན་པའི་གཞི་མཐུན་པ། དེའི་མཚན་ཉིད།

Here is the first. The definition of a correct reason for the absence of something which involves something perceptible is the following:

That thing which is both (1) a correct reason for the absence of something in a particular proof; and (2) such that the thing which is considered the main element of all which is denied by the proof is not an abstruse object to the person for whom this same reason fulfills its role in the relationship between the subject and the reason.

དེ་ལ་དབྱེ་ན། སྒྲུབ་རྒྱུ་གི་འབྲེལ་ལྷན་མ་དམིགས་པའི་དྲགས་ཡང་དག་དང་། སྒྲུབ་
རྒྱུ་གི་འགལ་ལྷན་དམིགས་པའི་དྲགས་ཡང་དག་གཉིས།

This type of reason may be divided into two types: a correct reason used to prove the absence of something perceptible in a particular proof, by virtue of the absence of a corollary which possesses a relationship [with whatever is denied]; and a correct reason used to prove the absence of something perceptible in a particular proof, by virtue of the presence of a corollary which is contradictory [to whatever is denied].

མཚན་ཉིད་རིམ་བཞིན། དེ་སྒྲུབ་གྱི་སྒྲུབ་རྒྱུ་མ་དམིགས་པའི་དྲགས་ཡང་དག་གྱུང་
ཡིན། མེད་དགག་གྱུང་ཡིན་པའི་གཞི་མཐུན་པ། དང་པོའི་མཚན་ཉིད།

Here are the respective definitions of these two different types. The definition of the first is:

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That thing which is both (1) a correct reason used to prove the absence of something perceptible in a particular proof and (2) a negative thing in the sense of being an absence of something.

དེ་སྐྱབ་ཀྱི་སྣང་རུང་མ་དམིགས་པའི་དྲགས་ཡང་དག་ཀྱང་ཡིན། མ་ཡིན་དགག་དང་
སྐྱབ་པ་གང་རུང་ཡང་ཡིན་པའི་གཞི་མཐུན་པ། གཉིས་པའི་མཚན་ཉིད།

The definition of the second is:

That thing which is both (1) a correct reason used to prove the absence of something perceptible in a particular proof and (2) either a negative thing in the sense of not being something, or a positive thing.

དང་པོ་ལ་དབྱེ་ན། སྣང་རུང་གི་རྒྱ། བྱབ་བྱེད། རང་བཞིན། དངོས་འབྲས་མ་
དམིགས་པའི་དྲགས་ཡང་དག་དང་བཞི།

The first may be divided into four different types: those reasons for the absence of something where the reason involves a cause, a comprehensive set, a nature, or an immediate result.

མཚན་ཉིད་རིམ་པ་ལྟར། སྣང་རུང་གི་རྒྱ་མ་དམིགས་པའི་རྒྱལ་གསུམ་ཡིན་པ། དང་
པོའི་མཚན་ཉིད། དེས་འོག་མ་རྣམས་ལ་རིགས་འབྲ།

Respective definitions of these four are as follows. The first is defined as "A reason for the absence of something perceptible where the three relationships hold, and where this reason represents a cause." This same pattern holds for the other three.

མཚན་གཞི་རིམ་པ་ལྟར། མེ་མེད་པ་དེ་མཚན་མེའི་རྒྱ་མཚོར་དུ་བ་མེད་པར་སྐྱབ་པའི་
དང་པོ་དང་།

Respective typical examples of the four are as follows. The first would be "there is no fire there," used as a reason to prove that there is no smoke on the surface of a [totally dark] nighttime ocean.

ཤིང་མེད་པ་དེ། ཤིང་ཚད་མས་མ་དམིགས་པའི་བྲག་ཇོང་དུ་ཤ་པ་མེད་པར་སྐྱབ་པའི་
གཉིས་པ་ཡིན།

An example of the second would be "there are no trees there," used as a reason to prove that there are no juniper trees on the surface of a barren rock crag where no trees can be perceived by a valid perception.

བུམ་པ་ཚད་མས་མ་དམིགས་པ་དེ། བུམ་པ་ཚད་མས་མ་དམིགས་པའི་ས་ཕྱོགས་སུ་
བུམ་པ་མེད་པར་སྐྱབ་པའི་གསུམ་པ་དང་།

An example of the third would be "no water pitchers can be perceived there by a valid perception," used as a reason to prove that there are no water pitchers in a particular place where no water pitchers can be perceived with a valid perception.

དངོས་འབྲས་དུ་བ་མེད་པ་དེ། དུ་བས་དབེན་པའི་རྩིག་སྒོར་དུ་དུ་བའི་དངོས་རྒྱ་མེད་
པར་སྐྱབ་པའི་བཞི་པ་ཡིན་ནོ།

An example of the fourth would be "there is no smoke, its immediate result, there"—used as a reason to prove that there the immediate cause of some smoke does not exist atop a particular wall which is totally devoid of any smoke.

The forms of debate:
Different Types of Ceremonial Debates

The setting for debate in Tibetan Buddhism ranges from the intimate to highly ceremonial debates before thousands of assembled monks. Walking around Sera Mey Monastery at any given time of the day or night, you can hear the sound of heated arguments and the slap of hands floating out of any window, or from atop any of the flat roofs of most of the buildings, as friends or classmates challenge each other in spontaneous debates that go wherever their fancy takes them. Khen Rinpoche Geshe Lobsang Tharchin has often said that the reason he attained the highest standing among the highest ranks of geshe in the year he graduated was because of the constant exchange between him and his roommate, the great geshe Jampel Sengge, who went on in later years

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to become the teacher of Guiseppe Tucci, one of the greatest Tibetologists of history.

Debate is often used in a private scripture class. Student monks in a Tibetan monastery may visit the classes of different teachers throughout their career, and choose the one who most fits their own needs. At any given time for the sophomore class, for example, there may be three or four great teachers instructing different groups of its members. Classes normally take place early in the day—the teacher reads through a few pages of scripture with the students, constantly throwing in pieces of debate about difficult questions. It is very common for the teacher to take the role of the attacker, and then all the students to yell back in unison, as a defender. Then by evening the students are prepared to debate the topic of the day, having reviewed it themselves in their own rooms during the afternoon.

As mentioned before, the first debate of the evening for any particular monk in the geshe program is a "one-on-one" with another young monk, chosen by wandering around the monastery debate park until you catch the eye of someone you think might be good. (It feels much like a high-school dance!) If the other monk is from a lower class, you get to review what you learned before; if he's from a higher class, you get to explore something you will be studying within a year or two.

Later on in the evening the monks bunch up into class groups, clustered around a single attacker and one to three defenders. The subject here will follow the readings of your class for the week, whether it be the perfection of wisdom (*prajnya paramita*), middle-way philosophy (*madhyamika*), vowed ethics (*vinaya*), logic (*pramana*), or higher knowledge (*abhidharma*).

Once a week, two entire classes challenge each other on a rotating basis, in a debate called *damcha* (*dam-bca'*), a word which literally means "a position taken." One class selects two of their best members to defend; and they come first and seat themselves on a special platform at the head of the debate park. These two will be the only defenders for the whole night, although their classmates are allowed to shout out helpful answers, and jibes at the attackers from the other class.

The attack begins with one of the senior members of the other class, who rises and raises the first question. He continues to a certain point, often decided by the debate master, when the next member of the class by seniority rises to pose a different question. If the debate is particularly hot, other members of the class leap up to throw in their own points, and before long there is a wonderful scene of a whole row of students screaming great questions, often in perfect unison. (It looks a little like a chorus line!)

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This again is a great opportunity for the older class to review their knowledge, while members of the younger class get to hear arguments inevitably referring to the more advanced subject which the older class is on at the time. *Damcha* debates can continue into the wee hours of the night, until the debate master pulls the debaters off each other. Most of the monks wander home, while a group of diehards might go on in a cluster in some corner of the debate park, sometimes until dawn.

Two or three times a year, all monks in the geshe program are required to attend a *gyuktru* (*rgyugs-sprod*) or "examination" debate. This is to test their progress in their studies before a board made up of the abbot, the debate master, and a number of senior geshe. Each monk will have an opportunity both to defend on one question, and to attack on another. These debates are very brief and heated, since each side knows they only have a few minutes to demonstrate their ability before the debate master calls a truce and the next pair begins (there are hundreds of students to get through in only a few days). The question of who will qualify for the geshe and other degree examinations is primarily based on the scores from these regular exams.

The degree examinations are the most critical and ritualized debates, and all of them are also called *damcha*. The first major degree exam in a monk's career is the *rikchung* examination; appearing for such an examination is known as *rikchung tsoklang*. The meaning of the word *rikchung* (*rigs-chung*) is somewhat uncertain, but Khen Rinpoche states that it probably refers to the level of a student's ability in the science of reasoning (*rigs-pa*), which at this point (after twelve or thirteen years of debating) is considered "lesser" (*chung*).

The expression *tsoklang* (*tsogs-lang*) most likely refers to the fact that the student must stand up (*lang*) in the entire assembly of monks (*tsok*) from his own monastery to defend his understanding. It also may ultimately be a corruption of the expression *tsulen* (*tsod-len*), meaning to "judge the ability or capacity" of the candidate's knowledge of the art of reasoning (*rigs-pa'i tsod len*).

A *rikchung* debate is rigorous, requiring many months of training by one's teacher. Each candidate must prepare, with his teacher's help, a formalized debate on a topic assigned by seniority—the "best" topics, such as compassion, being awarded in advance to the best debaters. The opponent will be another member of the class, and there are also large chunks of scripture to be memorized for the required chanting section.

Practically the entire debate, down to *whoa's* and *tsa's*, must be memorized in advance. Flowcharts are prepared showing all the possible appropriate responses to every possible answer. The flowchart splits, and half becomes totally useless, when the opponent during the actual debate answers, for

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example, "wrong!" (*tak ma drup*) or "not necessarily!" (*kyappa ma jung*). After the rough flowchart has been prepared by the candidate and his teacher, it is handed over to a calligrapher, who prepares a huge banner with all possible exchanges (even though the actual debate will ultimately only go down one branch).

This banner is pasted to door of the candidate's room, where he can review it frequently. He will also spend many months out in the cornfields, practicing by himself, out of earshot of the opponent or his buddies (who are always trying to find out in advance what issues he plans to raise).

Here he will also practice, over and over, every move of the entire debate: how to bow to the abbot at the beginning; when to put on or remove the high, peaked ritual hat; when to stand, when to sit; when to wave what arm; how to wear the (incredibly heavy and hot) ritual robes and other accoutrements.

The *rikchung* debate is a very serious moment in a student monk's life; if he fails to be among the small number of qualifying candidates (perhaps only 12 of the entire class), he will not be eligible for the *geshe* examinations much later. After a successful *rikchung* debate there is usually a big party: mom and dad, sister and brother, are usually down from other refugee camps in India to see the big event; and the opponent, your teacher, and all your classmates show up with gifts and silk scarves to help you celebrate.

The *rikchen* (*chen* meaning "greater" ability to reason) debate is the next big step, and immediately precedes the *geshe* exams for higher ranks of geshe. It is basically the same as the *rikchung* exam, except that it takes place in the *tsokchen* (the great hall shared by the two monasteries involved, such as Sera Mey and Sera Jey Monasteries), and the opponent comes from the sister monastery. The audience now is not only all the monks of your monastery (over a thousand now at Sera Mey, for example), but also all the monks of the opponent's (Sera Jey, for example).

Both the *rikchung* and *rikchen* debates also call for a night of defending your ability at your own college, or *kangtsen* (*khang-tsan*). Sera Mey, for example, is divided into some twelve surviving colleges; and the one which ACI students are affiliated with is that of our root lama, Khen Rinpoche Geshe Lobsang Tharchin. This is Gyalrong College, home also to the illustrious Pabongka Rinpoche. The *kangtsen* defense is mostly a dry-run among friends, to get the student ready for the pressure of the other, larger debates to come.

The debates for a geshe candidate are, of course, the most rigorous. There are many levels of geshe, and different kinds of geshe even among different monasteries of the same tradition. A candidate for the *lingse* (*gling-bsres*) or

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lower rank of geshe need only defend himself in the midst (*se*) of the assembled monks of his own monastery (*ling*). Debates for this rank of geshe are held about twice per year, and the number of candidates in each case is typically restricted to two.

The *lingse* candidate first defends himself in open debate against each member of his college, one-on-one, before the assembled college. The next step is a defense before each member of every one of the classes in the geshe program, which means every monk attending the debate park, each evening for about a week. Finally comes a grand defense before the assembled monks of the entire monastery, including all geshe and other monks who have graduated from the debate park already. The other details of the *lingse* debate are similar to the *rikchung* and *rikchen* debates, with a large amount of scripture to be memorized and recited also.

The debates for the *hlarampa* or highest rank of geshe are much more difficult, in the old days requiring an open defense before the assembled monks of every one of the six major Gelukpa monasteries. The opponent here is another highly qualified candidate selected by one of these other monasteries; normally, only one or two candidates are "fielded" by each monastery per year.

The final debates between *hlarampa* (*hla rams-pa*) geshe occur during the great prayer festival at the Tibetan new year; this was held in Lhasa (*Hla-sa*), and the candidates had to have mastered a veritable myriad (*rab-'byams*, shortened to *rams*) of scriptures. (This etymology comes from the *Great Dictionary of the Tibetan Language*.) The most successful of the *hlarampa* debaters were awarded "honors" (called *anggi* or "number") by His Holiness the Dalai Lama at the Potala Palace—and our root lama, Khen Rinpoche, was awarded highest honors in the year he completed his geshe.

In recent years, an extended series of intensive debate examinations before a special board of abbots and their assistants, as well as written examinations, have been added to the process, lengthening the entire wait of a candidate who has already completed his class work, in some cases, up to eight or more years.

A final special form of debate is the Winter Debates, called *Jang Gunchu*, a sort of annual Olympics between the great Gelukpa monasteries. *Jang* ('*Jang*) is the name of a small monastery where these debates were held in Tibet, and *gunchu* (*dgun-chos*) means "Dharma event held in the winter." In India, the debates are sometimes mistakenly referred to as the *Jamyang Gunchu* ("Winter Debates of Manjushri").

Traditionally, a small group of hand-picked students in the geshe program—perhaps 50 from a monastery of thousands—was sent to Jang

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Monastery to participate. The monks would prepare a backpack and sleeping roll, and walk to the town of Jang, a good distance to the southwest of Lhasa. The sponsoring monastery of the debate was Rato, known for its tradition of masters of debate and logic. Here the monks would debate the very subjects of this course series—logic and Buddhist perceptual theory—from the great *Commentary on Valid Perception* of Master Dharmakirti. Special attention was given to its most famous Tibetan commentary, an extraordinary masterpiece by Gyaltsab Je, one of the principal disciples of Je Tsongkapa.

The Winter Debates would continue for an entire month, with nearly non-stop debating on a personal, class, and inter-monastery level for the entire day and—during special debates called *tsenpe damcha*—the entire night as well. (According to Khen Rinpoche, the word *tsenpe* is a corruption of the word *tsenbu* (*mtsan-bud*), meaning "all night long.")

The invasion of Tibet marked the end of the Winter Debates. After a long hiatus, they were re-instituted in India, with the help of Khen Rinpoche and his students. They are now back to their original glory, attended by hundreds of the best young debaters and rotating each year between the "Big Three" monasteries of Sera, Drepung, and Ganden. They provide an excellent opportunity for the cream of the monasteries to get to know one another and "cross-fertilize" their thinking, making the entire tradition stronger.

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Supplement to Reading Eight

རིགས་པའི་འགྲོ་སྒྲུངས།

Rikpay Drotang
Debating Format, Part One

བུམ་པ་རྟག་པ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

Bumpa tokpa yinpay chir.

...Because a water pitcher is an unchanging thing.

རྟགས་མ་གྲུབ།

Tak madrup!

Wrong!

བུམ་པ་རྟག་པ་མ་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ།

Bumpa takpa mayinpar tel.

Are you telling me a water pitcher is *not* an unchanging thing?

འདྲོད།

Du!

Right!

མ་ཡིན་ཏེ།

Mayinte!

And why not?

བུམ་པ་མི་དྭག་པ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

Bumpa mitakpa yinpay chir.

Because a water pitcher is a changing thing.

བུམ་པ་མི་དྭག་པ་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ།

Bumpa mitakpa yinpar tel.

Are you telling me a water pitcher is a changing thing?

འདྲོད།

Du!

Right!

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Reading Nine: The Concept of Exclusion in Perception

Selection from the collected topics:
The Concept of Exclusion in Perception

The selection here is from a monastic textbook popularly known as The Collected Topics of the Spiritual Son (Sras bsdus-grva), by Master Ngawang Trashi, the spiritual son of the great Jamyang Shepa (1648-1721).

Please note that indented statements are usually those given by the opponent. Responses within brackets are those that are usually left unwritten in the Tibetan text, and are understood to be there because of the context following each.

༩ །གཞན་སེལ་གྱི་རྣམ་བཞག་བཤད་པ་ལ། ཁ་ཅིག་ན་རེ། ཁྱོད་གྱི་གཞན་སེལ་
གསུམ་པོ་གང་རུང་ཡོད་ན། ཁྱོད་གྱི་གཞན་སེལ་ཡོད་པས་བྱབ་ཟེར་ན།

Here next is a presentation on the concept of exclusion. On this point, someone may come and make the following claim:

If any one or number of the three kinds of exclusion exists for something, then the exclusion for that thing always exists.

རི་བོང་རྩ་ཆོས་ཅན། ཁྱོད་གྱི་གཞན་སེལ་ཡོད་པར་བཟུམ། ཁྱོད་གྱི་གཞན་སེལ་གསུམ་
པོ་གང་རུང་ཡོད་པའི་ཕྱིར། བྱབ་པ་ཁས།

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Consider the horns of a rabbit.
Does an exclusion then exist for them?
Because any one or number of the three kinds of exclusion exist for them.

[It doesn't necessarily follow.]

But you already agreed that it does necessarily follow.

མ་གྲུབ་ན། རི་བོང་རྩ་ཚེས་ཅན། བྱོད་ཀྱི་གཞན་སེལ་གསུམ་པོ་གང་རུང་ཡོད་པར་
ཐལ། བྱོད་ཀྱི་སྒྲུའི་གཞན་སེལ་ཡོད་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[It's not correct to say that there exist any one or number of the
three kinds of exclusion for the horns of a rabbit.]

Suppose you say that it's not correct.

Consider the horns of a rabbit.
Any one or number of the three kinds of exclusion does so exist for them,
Because there does exist the mental kind of exclusion for them.

མ་གྲུབ་ན། རི་བོང་རྩ་ཚེས་ཅན། བྱོད་ཀྱི་སྒྲུའི་གཞན་སེལ་ཡོད་པར་ཐལ། བྱོད་
འཛིན་རྟོག་པ་ལ་བྱོད་མ་ཡིན་པ་ལས་ལོག་པར་སྣང་བ་དེ་བྱོད་ཀྱི་སྒྲུའི་གཞན་སེལ་
ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[It's not correct to say that the mental kind of exclusion exists for the
horns of a rabbit.]

Suppose you say that it's not correct.

Consider the horns of a rabbit.
The mental kind of exclusion does so exist for them,
Because the mental kind of exclusion for them is the image of the reverse of
all that is not them which appears to the conceptualization which grasps
to them.

མ་གྲུབ་ན། རི་བོང་རྩ་ཚེས་ཅན། བྱོད་འཛིན་རྟོག་པ་ལ་བྱོད་མ་ཡིན་པ་ལས་ལོག་
པར་སྣང་བ་དེ་བྱོད་ཀྱི་སྒྲུའི་གཞན་སེལ་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ། བདག་མེད་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

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[It's not correct to say that the mental kind of exclusion for the horns of a rabbit is the image of the reverse of all that is not them which appears to the conceptualization which grasps to them.]

Suppose you say that it's not correct.

Consider the horns of a rabbit.

The mental kind of exclusion for them is so the image of the reverse of all that is not them which appears to the conceptualization which grasps to them,

Because they are something that has no nature of its own.

ཕྱི་བར་འདོད་ན། རི་བོང་རྩ་ཚས་ཅན། བྱོད་གྱི་གཞན་སེལ་མེད་པར་ཐལ། བྱོད་གྱི་
དོན་རང་མཚན་གྱི་གཞན་སེལ་མེད་པའི་ཕྱིར། དེར་ཐལ། བྱོད་དངོས་པོ་མ་ཡིན་པའི་
ཕྱིར།

[Then I agree to your original statement: an exclusion does exist for the horns of a rabbit.]

Suppose you agree to our original statement.

Consider the horns of a rabbit.

It is not so, that an exclusion exists for them,

Because there exists for them no exclusion of the kind which is the objectification of a specific instance;

And this is so true, because they are not a working thing.

ཁ་ཅིག་ན་རེ། དངོས་པོ་ཡིན་ན། དོན་རང་མཚན་གྱི་གཞན་སེལ་ཡིན་པས་བྱབ་ཟེར་
ན།

Suppose someone comes and makes the following claim:

If something is a working thing, then it is always an exclusion of the kind which is the objectification of a specific instance.

བུམ་པ་ཚེས་ཅན། རྟོན་རང་མཚན་གྱི་གཞན་སེལ་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ། དངོས་པོ་ཡིན་
པའི་ཕྱིར། བྱུང་པ་ཁས།

Consider a water pitcher.

So is it then an exclusion of the kind which is the objectification of a specific instance?

Because it is a working thing.

[It doesn't necessarily follow.]

But you already agreed that it does necessarily follow.

འདྲོད་ན། བུམ་པ་ཚེས་ཅན། གཞན་སེལ་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ། རྟོན་རང་མཚན་གྱི་གཞན་
སེལ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[Then I agree to your original statement: a water pitcher is an exclusion of the kind which is the objectification of a specific instance.]

Suppose you agree to our original statement.

Consider a water pitcher.

So is it then an exclusion?

Because it is an exclusion of the kind which is the objectification of a specific instance.

འདྲོད་ན། བུམ་པ་ཚེས་ཅན། དགག་པ་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ། གཞན་སེལ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[I agree that a water pitcher is an exclusion.]

Suppose you do agree.

So is a water pitcher then a negative thing?

Because it is an exclusion.

མ་བྱུང་ན་བྱུང་པ་ཡོད་པར་ཐལ། གཞན་སེལ་དང་དགག་པ་གཉིས་དོན་གཅིག་ཡིན་
པའི་ཕྱིར།

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[It doesn't necessarily follow.]

But it does necessarily follow,
Because "exclusion" and "negative thing" are terms that refer to the same thing.

ཅུ་བར་འདོད་མི་རུས་ཏེ། སྒྲུབ་པ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[Then I agree to your original statement: a water pitcher is a negative thing.]

But you can't agree to our original statement,
Because a water pitcher is a positive thing.

ཁ་ཅིག་ན་རེ། བྱམ་པ་མ་ཡིན་པ་ལས་ལོག་པ་དེ་བྱམ་པའི་དོན་རང་མཚན་གྱི་གཞན་
སེལ་ཡིན་ཟེར་ན།

Suppose someone comes and makes the following claim:

The reverse of all that is not a water pitcher is, for a water pitcher, an exclusion of the kind which is the objectification of a specific instance.

བྱམ་པ་མ་ཡིན་པ་ལས་ལོག་པ་ཆོས་ཅན། བྱམ་པའི་དོན་རང་མཚན་གྱི་གཞན་སེལ་
མ་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ། བྱམ་པའི་དོན་རང་མཚན་གྱི་ཆོས་མ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

Consider the reverse of all that is not a water pitcher.
It is not so true that it is, for a water pitcher, an exclusion of the kind which
is the objectification of a specific instance,
Because it is not that existing thing which represents the objectification of a
specific instance.

མ་གྲུབ་ན། བྱམ་པ་མ་ཡིན་པ་ལས་ལོག་པ་ཆོས་ཅན། བྱམ་པའི་དོན་རང་མཚན་གྱི་
ཆོས་མ་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ། རང་མཚན་གྱི་ཆོས་མ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

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[It's not correct to say that the reverse of all that is not a water pitcher is not that existing thing which represents the objectification of a specific instance.]

Suppose you say that it's not correct.

Consider the reverse of all that is not a water pitcher.

It is so true that it is not that existing thing which represents the objectification of a specific instance,

Because it is not an existing object which represents the objectification of a specific instance.

མ་བྱུང་ན། བྱམ་པ་མ་ཡིན་པ་ལས་ལོག་པ་ཆོས་ཅན། དངོས་པོ་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ།
རང་མཚན་གྱི་ཆོས་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར། ཉགས་ཁས།

[It's not correct to say that the reverse of all that is not a water pitcher is not an existing object which represents the objectification of a specific instance.]

Suppose you say that it's not correct.

Consider the reverse of all that is not a water pitcher.

So is it then a working thing?

Because it is an existing object which represents the objectification of a specific instance.

You already agreed to this reason.

མ་བྱུང་ན་བྱུང་པ་ཡོད་པར་ཐལ། རང་མཚན་གྱི་ཆོས་དང་དངོས་པོ་གཉིས་དོན་གཅིག་
ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[It doesn't necessarily follow that, just because something is an existing object which represents objectification of a specific instance, it must always be a working thing.]

But it does necessarily follow,

Because the terms "existing object which represents the objectification of a specific instance" and "working thing" both refer to the same thing.

ཕྱི་བར་འདོད་ན། བྱམ་པ་མ་ཡིན་པ་ལས་ལོག་པ་དངོས་པོ་མ་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ། བྱམ་
པ་མ་ཡིན་པ་མ་ཡིན་པ་དངོས་པོ་མ་ཡིན་པ་གང་ཞིག །དེ་གཉིས་ལ་བྱད་པར་མེད་
པའི་ཕྱིར།

[Then I agree to your original statement: the reverse of all that is not a
water pitcher is a working thing.]

Suppose you agree to our original statement.

It is not so, that the reverse of all that is not a water pitcher is a working thing,
Because (1) all that is not all that is not a water pitcher is not a working thing,
and (2) there's no difference between this and the other.

ཁ་ཅིག་ན་རེ། བྱོད་ཀྱི་དོན་རང་མཚན་གྱི་གཞན་སེལ་ཡོད་ན། བྱོད་མ་ཡིན་པ་ལས་
ལོག་པ་ཡོད་པས་བྱབ་ཟེར་ན།

Suppose someone comes and makes the following claim:

If there exists for something an exclusion of the kind which is the
objectification of a specific instance of the particular object, then
there must always exist the reverse of all that it is not.

ཀྱ་བྱམ་གཉིས་ཆོས་ཅན། བྱོད་མ་ཡིན་པ་ལས་ལོག་པ་ཡོད་པར་ཐལ། བྱོད་ཀྱི་དོན་
རང་མཚན་གྱི་གཞན་སེལ་ཡོད་པའི་ཕྱིར། བྱབ་པ་ཁས།

Consider the two of a pillar and a water pitcher.
So does there exist the reverse of all that they are not?
Because there does exist for them an exclusion of the kind which is the
objectification of a specific instance.

[It doesn't necessarily follow.]

But you already agree that it does necessarily follow.

མ་གྲུབ་ན། ཀླ་བུམ་གཉིས་ཆོས་ཅན། བྱོད་ཀྱི་དོན་རང་མཚན་གྱི་གཞན་སེལ་ཡོད་
པར་ཐལ། བྱོད་དོན་རང་མཚན་གྱི་ཆོས་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[It's not correct to say that there does exist for the two .]

Suppose you say that it's not correct.

Consider the two of a pillar and a water pitcher.

There does so exist for them an exclusion of the kind which is the
objectification of a specific instance,

Because it would be the existing objects which are the objectification of a
specific instance of them.

རྩ་བར་འདོད་ན། ཀླ་བུམ་གཉིས་ཆོས་ཅན། བྱོད་མ་ཡིན་པ་ལས་ལོག་པ་མེད་པར་
ཐལ། བྱོད་ཡིན་པ་མི་སྲིད་པའི་ཤེས་བྱ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[Then I agree to your original statement: there does exist the reverse of
all that a pillar and a water pitcher is not.]

Suppose you agree to our original statement.

Consider the two of a pillar and a water pitcher.

It is not so true, that there does exist the reverse of all that a pillar and a water
pitcher is not,

Because they are a knowable thing which nothing can be.

ཁ་ཅིག་ན་རེ། ཀླ་བུམ་གཉིས་ཆོས་ཅན། བྱོད་ཀྱི་དོན་རང་མཚན་གྱི་གཞན་སེལ་མེད་
པར་ཐལ། ཀླ་བུམ་གཉིས་དེ་དེ་མ་ཡིན་པ་གང་ཞིག །དེ་ལས་ཐ་དད་པ་གཅིག་མེད་
པའི་ཕྱིར་ཟེར་ན་རྟགས་ཕྱི་མ་མ་གྲུབ་པ་ཡིན་ཏེ། རྟག་དངོས་གཉིས་ཀྱིས་སྟོང་པའི་ཀླ་
བུམ་གཉིས་དེ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

Suppose someone comes and makes the following claim:

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Consider the two of a pillar and a pitcher.

There does not so exist for them an exclusion of the kind which is the objectification of a specific instance,

Because (1) the two of a pillar and a pitcher is no such thing, and (2) there exists no single such thing which would be distinct from them.

Our answer to this would be, "The latter part of your statement is not correct." And this is true because an example of such a thing would be the two of a pillar and a pitcher which is devoid of being both an unchanging and a changing thing.

ཁ་ཅིག་ན་རེ། བྱམ་པའི་དོན་རང་མཚན་གྱི་གཞན་སེལ་འཛོག་པའི་ཆོ་ན། ཉག་
དངོས་གཉིས་ཀྱིས་སྟོང་པའི་བྱམ་པ་དེ་འཛོག་དགོས་པ་ཡིན་ཟེར་ན།

Suppose someone comes and makes the following claim:

Whenever you establish something as being, for a water pitcher, an exclusion of the kind which is the objectification of a specific instance, then you must establish a water pitcher which is devoid of being both an unchanging and a changing thing.

དེ་མི་འབྲད་པར་ཐལ། བྱམ་པ་མ་ཡིན་པ་ལས་འོག་པའི་བྱམ་པ་དེ་བྱམ་པའི་དོན་རང་
མཚན་གྱི་གཞན་སེལ་ལ་བཞག་ཆོག་པ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

But it's not so that this is the case,
Because it is allowable to establish the reverse of all that is not a water pitcher as being, for a water pitcher, an exclusion of the kind which is the objectification of a specific instance.

མ་གྲུབ་ན། དེ་ཆོས་ཅན། བྱམ་པའི་དོན་རང་མཚན་གྱི་གཞན་སེལ་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ།
བྱམ་པའི་གཞན་སེལ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[It's not correct to say that it is allowable to establish the reverse of all that is not a water pitcher as being, for a water pitcher, an exclusion of the kind which is the objectification of a specific instance.]

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Suppose you say that it's not correct.

Consider this same thing.

It is so, for a water pitcher, an exclusion of the kind which is the objectification
of a specific instance,

Because it is, for the pitcher, an exclusion.

ཁ་ཅིག་ན་རེ། བྱམ་པའི་མེད་དགག་གི་གཞན་སེལ་འཛོག་པའི་ཆོ་ན། བྱམ་པ་གང་
ཟག་གི་བདག་མེད་དེ་འཛོག་ཟེར་ན།

Suppose someone comes and makes the following claim:

Whenever we establish something as being, for a water pitcher,
an exclusion of the kind which is a negative that involves the
absence of something, then we always establish, for a water
pitcher, the lack of any self-nature to the person.

དེ་མི་འཐད་པ་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ། བྱམ་པ་ལ་བྱམ་པ་མ་ཡིན་པ་མེད་པ་དེ་བྱམ་པའི་མེད་
དགག་གི་གཞན་སེལ་ལ་འཛོག་དགོས་པ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

But this cannot be the case,

Because we must always establish the exclusion of the kind which is a negative
that involves the absence of something, with regard to a water pitcher,
as the condition that a water pitcher has nothing about it which is part
of all that is not a water pitcher.

དེར་ཐལ། བ་ལང་ལ་བ་ལང་མ་ཡིན་པ་མེད་པ་བ་ལང་གི་མེད་དགག་གི་གཞན་སེལ་
ལ་འཛོག་དགོས་པ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

And this is so the case,

Because we must establish the exclusion of the kind which is a negative that
involves the absence of something, with regard to a cow, as the
condition that a cow has nothing about it which is a part of all that is
not a cow.

དེར་ཐལ། ཚད་ཆེན་ལས་བཤད་པ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

And this is so the case,
Because this is how the *Great Book on Valid Perception* explains it.

ཁ་ཅིག་ན་རེ། སློ་མ་ཡིན་པ་ལས་ལོག་པའི་སློ་དེ་སློའི་དོན་རང་མཚན་གྱི་གཞན་སེལ་
ཡིན་པར་ཐལ། བུམ་པ་མ་ཡིན་པ་ལས་ལོག་པའི་བུམ་པ་དེ་བུམ་པའི་དོན་རང་མཚན་
གྱི་གཞན་སེལ་ཡིན་པ་གང་ཞིག །དེ་གཉིས་འདྲ་བའི་ཕྱིར།

Suppose someone comes and makes the following claim:

It must be the case that the state of mind which is the reverse of
all that is not the state of mind is, for the state of mind, an
exclusion of the kind which is the objectification of a
specific instance,

Because (1) that water pitcher which is the reverse of all that is not the
water pitcher is, for a water pitcher, an exclusion of the kind
which is a specific instance of the water pitcher, and (2) the two
are similar cases.

འདྲོད་ན། སློ་མ་ཡིན་པ་ལས་ལོག་པའི་སློ་ཆོས་ཅན། སློའི་གཞན་སེལ་ཡིན་པར་
ཐལ། སློའི་དོན་རང་མཚན་གྱི་གཞན་སེལ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར་ཟེར་ན་མ་བྱུང་།

Suppose you agree to our statement.

Consider that state of mind which is the reverse of all that is not the state of
mind.

It must then be the mental kind of exclusion,

Because it is, for the state of mind, an exclusion of the kind which is the
objectification of a specific instance.

To this we answer, "It doesn't necessarily follow."

ཁོ་ན་རེ། སློ་ཆོས་ཅན། བྱེད་མ་ཡིན་པ་ལས་ལོག་པའི་བྱེད། བྱེད་ཀྱི་གཞན་སེལ་
ཡིན་པར་ཐལ། བྱེད་ཡིན་པ་སྲིད་པའི་དངོས་པོ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར་ཟེར་ན་འདོད་ལན་
ཐེབས་པ་ཡིན་ཏེ། ཕྱི་བའི་ཆོ་ན། སློ་མ་ཡིན་པ་ལས་ལོག་པའི་སློ་དེ་སློ་དེའི་གཞན་
སེལ་ཡིན་པར་འདོད་ཅེས་ཕྱི་རིགས་པ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

Suppose someone comes and makes the following claim:

Consider a state of mind.

That state of mind which is the reverse of all that it is not is so, for it,
an exclusion;

Because it is an existing thing which can be.

Our answer to this is, "We agree." And this is because, when you are determining how to read this point, it is correct to read it in such a way that you would answer "we agree" to the fact that the state of mind which is the reverse of all that a state of mind is not would be an exclusion *for that mind*, [and not a "mental kind of exclusion"].

བྱས་པ་ལ་ཁོ་ན་རེ། སློ་མ་ཡིན་པ་ལས་ལོག་པའི་སློ་སློའི་གཞན་སེལ་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ།
སློ་མ་ཡིན་པ་ལས་ལོག་པའི་སློ་དེ་སློ་དེའི་གཞན་སེལ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར་ཟེར་ན་མ་བྱུང་།
འདོད་མི་རྒྱས་ཏེ། སློའི་གཞན་སེལ་ཡིན་ན་དྲག་པ་ཡིན་པས་བྱུང་པའི་ཕྱིར།

On this particular point, someone might come and make the following claim:

That state of mind which is the reverse of all that is not
the state of mind is so a mental kind of exclusion,

Because that state of mind which is the reverse of all that
is not the state of mind is an exclusion for that state
of mind.

To this we answer, "It doesn't necessarily follow."

One could though never agree to the statement,

Because anything which is an exclusion for a state of mind is always an
unchanging thing.

ཁ་ཅིག་ན་རེ། རྟག་པ་མ་ཡིན་པ་ལས་ལོག་པའི་རྟག་པ་དེ་རྟག་པའི་གཞན་སེལ་ཡིན་
པར་ཐལ། བྱམ་པ་མ་ཡིན་པ་ལས་ལོག་པའི་བྱམ་པ་དེ་བྱམ་པའི་གཞན་སེལ་ཡིན་
པའི་ཕྱིར་ཟེར་ན་མ་བྱུག།

Suppose someone comes and makes the following claim:

It is so true that that unchanging thing which is the reverse of all
that is not the unchanging thing is the exclusion for that
unchanging thing,
Because that water pitcher which is the reverse of all that
is not the water pitcher is exclusion for a water
pitcher.

Our answer to this is, "It doesn't necessarily follow."

འདོད་ན། དེ་ཆོས་ཅན། རྟག་པའི་གཞན་སེལ་མ་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ། རྟག་པའི་དོན་རང་
མཆན་གྱི་གཞན་སེལ་མ་ཡིན། རྟག་པའི་མེད་དགག་གི་གཞན་སེལ་ཡང་མ་ཡིན།
རྟག་པའི་སློང་གཞན་སེལ་ཡང་མ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

And suppose you agree to that statement.

Consider that unchanging thing which is the reverse of all that is not the
unchanging thing.

It is not so true, that it is the exclusion for that unchanging thing,
Because it is neither the type of exclusion which is a specific instance of the
unchanging thing; nor the type of exclusion for the unchanging thing
which is a negative that involves the absence of something; nor the
mental type of exclusion.

རྟགས་དང་པོ་མ་གྲུབ་ན། དེ་ཆོས་ཅན། རྟག་པའི་དོན་རང་མཆན་གྱི་གཞན་སེལ་མ་
ཡིན་པར་ཐལ། གང་ཟག་གི་བདག་མེད་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[The first part of your reason is not correct: it's not correct to say that an
unchanging thing which is the reverse of all that is not an
unchanging thing is not the type of exclusion which is a specific
instance of the unchanging thing.]

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Suppose you say that the first part of our reason is not correct.

Consider this same thing.

It is not so true, that it is the type of exclusion which is a specific instance of the unchanging thing,

Because it is one example of the lack of any self-nature of the person.

ཁ་ཅིག་ན་རེ། འདྲུ་མ་བྱས་ཀྱི་ན་མ་མཁའ་ཚེས་ཅན། མིང་དགག་གི་དོན་རང་མཚན་
གྱི་གཞན་སེལ་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ། མིང་དགག་གི་གཞན་སེལ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར་ཟེར་ན་མ་
བྱུང།

Suppose someone comes and makes the following claim:

Consider unproduced, empty space.

It is so true, that it is the type of exclusion which is a specific instance of a negative thing which involves the absence of something,

Because it is a type of exclusion which is a negative that involves the absence of something.

To this we answer, "It doesn't necessarily follow."

[Please note that this text uses the above unusual spelling for "unproduced" several times, so we have left it as is.]

བྱས་པ་ལ་ཁོ་ན་རེ། མིང་དགག་ཚེས་ཅན། བྱུང་གི་གཞན་སེལ་ཡིན་ན་བྱུང་གི་དོན་
རང་མཚན་གྱི་གཞན་སེལ་ཡིན་པས་བྱུང་པར་ཐལ། བྱུང་གི་གཞན་སེལ་ཡོད་པའི་
ཕྱིར་ཟེར་ན་

Suppose someone else, in response to this exchange, comes and makes the following claim:

Consider a negative thing which involves an absence.

It is so true, that anything which is an exclusion for it is that type of exclusion which is a specific instance for it,

Because there does exist an exclusion for it.

དྲགས་མ་བྱུང་པ་ཡིན་ཏེ། བརྩི་བའི་ཆོ་ན་མེད་དགག་དེའི་གཞན་སེལ་ཡོད་པར་
དྲགས་མ་བྱུང་ཅེས་ཕྱི་དགོས་པ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

To this we answer, "It's not correct to say that." And this is because, when you read this statement, you would have to read it as "there does exist an exclusion for this particular negative involving an absence," and would therefore have to answer, "It's not correct to say that."

ཁ་ཅིག་ན་རེ། འདུ་མ་བྱས་ཀྱི་ནམ་མཁའ་དེ་མེད་དགག་གི་གཞན་སེལ་མིན་ཟེར་ན།

Suppose someone comes and makes the following claim:

Unproduced, empty space is not an exclusion which is a negative thing that involves the absence of something.

འདུ་མ་བྱས་ཀྱི་ནམ་མཁའ་ཆོས་ཅན། མེད་དགག་གི་གཞན་སེལ་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ།
མེད་དགག་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

Consider unproduced, empty space.
It is so an exclusion which is a negative thing that involves the absence of something,

Because it is a negative thing which involves the absence of something.

མ་བྱུང་ན་བྱུང་པ་ཡོད་པར་ཐལ། མེད་དགག་གི་གཞན་སེལ་དང་མེད་དགག་གཉིས་
དོན་གཅིག་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[It doesn't necessarily follow.]

But it does necessarily follow,
Because "an exclusion which is a negative thing that involves the absence of something" and "a negative thing which involves the absence of something" both refer to the same thing.

རང་གི་ལུགས་ལ། གཞན་སེལ་དང་དགག་པ་གཉིས་དོན་གཅིག་ཡིན་པས་མཚན་
ཉིད་འཛིག་མི་དགོས།

Here secondly is our own position. Because the terms "exclusion" and "negative thing" refer to the same thing, there is no need to posit a definition for exclusion.

དངོས་པོ་ཡིན་ན་སྟོང་གི་དོན་རང་མཚན་གྱི་གཞན་སེལ་ཡོད་པས་བྱུང་ལ། དངོས་
པོར་གྱུར་པའི་དགག་པ་དང་དོན་རང་མཚན་གྱི་གཞན་སེལ་གཉིས་དོན་གཅིག་

If something is a working thing, then there always exists an exclusion for it which is the objectification of a specific instance. The terms "negative thing which is a working thing" and "an exclusion which is the objectification of a specific instance" both refer to the same thing.

བདག་མེད་ཡིན་ན་སྟོང་གི་སྟོང་གཞན་སེལ་ཡོད་པས་བྱུང་ལ། སྟོང་གཞན་སེལ་དང་
ཉོག་པའི་སྒྲུང་ཡུལ་གཉིས་དོན་གཅིག་

There is always a mental kind of exclusion for anything which is such that it possesses no nature of its own. The terms "mental kind of exclusion" and "object which appears to a conceptualization" refer to the same thing.

གཞི་བྱུང་ན་སྟོང་གི་མེད་དགག་གི་གཞན་སེལ་ཡོད་པས་བྱུང་ལ། མེད་དགག་གི་
གཞན་སེལ་དང་མེད་དགག་གཉིས་དོན་གཅིག་ཡིན་ནོ།

If a thing can be established as existing, then there is always an exclusion of it which is a negative thing that involves the absence of something. And the terms "exclusion which is a negative thing that involves the absence of something" and "negative thing which involves the absence of something" refer to the same thing.

Formal logic subject:
**Identifying Elements of a Logical Statement,
and Some Different Classifications of Correct Logical Statements**

The following selection is taken from An Explanation of the Art of Reasoning (rTags-rigs), composed by the great tutor of His Holiness the Thirteenth Dalai Lama named Purbuchok Jampa Tsultrim Gyatso (1825-1901).

རྟགས་ཚུལ་དོན་གསུམ་ངོས་བཟུང་བ་ལ། དམ་བཅའ་བཞག་པ་དང་། སྒྲུབ་བྱིང་
འགོད་པ་གཉིས་དང་པོ་ནི།

This brings us to the section where we identify the reason, the quality to be proven, and the subject. We proceed in two steps: presenting our position, and then putting forth proofs to support our position. Here is the first.

མི་མེད་པ་དེ། མི་མེད་པའི་རྟགས་ཀྱིས་མཚན་མེད་ཀྱི་མཚོར་དུ་བ་མེད་པར་སྒྲུབ་པའི་
གཏན་ཚིགས་ཡིན། མི་མེད་དེ་དེའི་རྟགས་ཀྱིས་དེ་སྒྲུབ་ཀྱི་གཏན་ཚིག་མ་ཡིན།

The expression "because there is no fire" is a logical reason for proving that there is no smoke on the surface of an ocean in the middle of the night in a proof where "because there is no fire" serves as the reason in the proof. "Because *there's* no fire" is not a logical reason for the same proof where that same term serves as the reason in the proof.

དུ་བ་མེད་པ་དེ། མི་མེད་པའི་རྟགས་ཀྱིས་དེ་སྒྲུབ་ཀྱི་སྒྲུབ་བྱིང་ཚུལ་དང་། དེ་སྒྲུབ་ཀྱི་
དངོས་ཀྱི་སྒྲུབ་བྱིང་ཚུལ་སུ་བཟུང་བྱ་གཉིས་ཀ་ཡིན། དུ་མེད་དེ་དེ་གཉིས་ཀ་མ་ཡིན།
དེས་ཤིང་མེད་སོགས་ལ་རིགས་འདྲེའོ།

The expression "there is no smoke" is both (1) the quality to be proven in that same proof, where "because there is no fire" serves as the reason; and (2) that which is considered the explicit form of the quality to be proven for the same proof. The expression "it's smokeless" is neither of the two. This same pattern applies for the expressions such as "there are no trees" and so on.

བུམ་པ་ཚད་མས་མ་དམིགས་པ་དེ། བུམ་པ་ཚད་མས་མ་དམིགས་པའི་ས་ཕྱོགས་སུ་
བུམ་པ་མེད་པར་སྒྲུབ་པའི་གཏན་ཚིགས་ཡིན། བུམ་པ་མེད་པ་དེ། བུམ་པ་ཚད་མས་
མ་དམིགས་པའི་དྲགས་ཀྱིས་དེ་སྒྲུབ་ཀྱི་དངོས་ཀྱི་སྒྲུབ་བྱའི་ཚེས་དང་། དེ་སྒྲུབ་ཀྱི་
དངོས་ཀྱི་སྒྲུབ་བྱའི་ཚེས་སུ་བཟུང་བྱ་གཉིས་ཀ་ཡིན། དེས་གཞན་ནུམས་ལ་རིགས་
འགྲོའོ།

The expression "because there is no water pitcher perceived to be there by any valid perception" is a logical reason for proving that there exists no water pitcher in a particular location where no water pitcher is perceived by any valid perception to be present. The expression "there exists no water pitcher there" is both (1) the explicit form of the quality to be proven in the same proof, where "because there is no water pitcher perceived to be there by any valid perception" is acting as the reason; and (2) that which is considered the explicit form of the quality to be proven in the same proof. This pattern follows for other cases as well.

ཤ་ཟ་དེ། མདུན་གྱི་གཞི་འདིར་ཤ་ཟ་བསྐལ་དོན་དུ་སོང་བའི་གང་ཟག་གི་རྒྱད་ལ་ཤ་ཟ་
ངེས་པའི་དབྱད་ཤེས་དོན་མཐུན་མེད་པར་སྒྲུབ་པའི་དགག་བྱའི་ཚེས་སུ་བཏགས་པའི་
དོན་ཡིན་ཀྱང་། དེ་སྒྲུབ་ཀྱི་དགག་བྱའི་ཚེས་མ་ཡིན།

A "flesheater spirit" [a *preta*, or tormented spirit] is a main element in the quality which is denied in a proof that, in the location before us, there can exist no recollection whose perception corresponds to reality, and which ascertains a flesheater spirit, in the mind of a person for whom flesheater spirits are abstruse objects. This same term though is not the "quality which is denied" itself.

ཤ་ཟ་བསྐལ་དོན་དུ་སོང་བའི་གང་ཟག་གི་རྒྱད་ལ་ཤ་ཟ་ངེས་པའི་དབྱད་ཤེས་དོན་
མཐུན་ཡོད་པ་དེ། དེ་སྒྲུབ་ཀྱི་དགག་བྱའི་ཚེས་དང་། དེ་སྒྲུབ་ཀྱི་དགག་བྱའི་ཚེས་སུ་
བཏགས་པའི་དོན་གཉིས་ཀ་ཡིན།

Course XIII: The Art of Reasoning
Reading Nine

The existence, in the mind of a person for whom flesheater spirits are abstruse objects, of a recollection whose perception corresponds to reality, and which ascertains a flesheater spirit, is both (1) the quality which is denied in this particular proof, and (2) a main element in the quality which is denied in the same proof.

དུ་བ་དེ་མཚན་མའི་རྒྱ་མཚོར་དུ་བ་མེད་པར་སྐྱབ་པའི་དགག་བྱའི་ཆོས་སུ་བཏགས་
པའི་དོན་ཡིན་ཀྱང་། དེ་སྐྱབ་ཀྱི་དགག་བྱའི་ཆོས་མ་ཡིན།

The term "smoke" is a main element in the quality which is denied in a proof that there is no smoke on the surface of the nighttime ocean, but it is not the quality denied in the same proof.

དེར་དུ་བ་ཡོད་པ་དེ། མཚན་མའི་རྒྱ་མཚོར་དུ་བ་མེད་པར་སྐྱབ་པའི་དགག་བྱའི་ཆོས་
སུ་བཏགས་པའི་དོན་དང་། དེ་སྐྱབ་ཀྱི་དགག་བྱའི་ཆོས་གཉིས་ཀ་ཡིན།

The "existence of smoke in that particular place" is both (1) a main element in the quality which is denied in a proof that there is no smoke on the surface of the nighttime ocean, and (2) the quality which is denied in the same proof.

རྟག་པ་དེ། སྒྲ་རྟག་པ་མ་ཡིན་པར་སྐྱབ་པའི་དགག་བྱའི་ཆོས་སུ་བཏགས་པའི་དོན་
ཡིན་ཀྱང་། དེ་སྐྱབ་ཀྱི་དགག་བྱའི་ཆོས་མ་ཡིན་ནོ།

"An unchanging thing" is a main element in the quality which is denied in a proof that sound is not an unchanging thing, but it is not the quality which is denied in the same proof.

༥ གཉིས་པ་རྟགས་ཡང་དག་ལ་བསྐྱབ་བྱའི་ཆོས་ཀྱི་སྒྲོ་ནས་དབྱེ་ན། སྐྱབ་རྟགས་
ཡང་དག་དང་། དགག་རྟགས་ཡང་དག་གཉིས།

Here next is the second major point from above. Correct reasons may also be classified according to the quality to be proven. Here there are two types: correct positive reasons, and correct negative reasons.

མཚན་ཉིད་རིམ་པ་ལྟར། ཁྱོད་དེ་སྐྱབ་ཀྱི་རྟགས་ཡང་དག་གང་ཞིག ཁྱོད་ཀྱི་

རྟགས་ཀྱིས་དེ་སྟབས་ཀྱི་དངོས་ཀྱི་བསྟུབ་བྱའི་ཆོས་སུ་བཟུང་བྱ་ཡང་ཡིན། སྟབས་པ་ཡང་
ཡིན་པའི་གཞི་མཐུན་སྲིད་པ། བྱོད་དེ་སྟབས་ཀྱི་སྟབས་རྟགས་ཡང་དག་གི་མཚན་ཉིད།

Here are their respective definitions. First comes the definition of a correct positive reason for any particular proof:

Something which is (1) a correct reason for a particular proof;
and (2) which is such that there can exist one thing which is both
(a) the object which is considered the explicit form of the quality
to be proven in the proof where it acts as the reason, and (b) a
positive thing.

དེ་ལ་དབྱེ་ན། འབྲས་རྟགས་ཡང་དག་དང་། རང་བཞིན་གྱི་རྟགས་ཡང་དག་གཉིས་
ཡོད། དེ་གཉིས་གང་རུང་ཡིན་ན། སྟབས་རྟགས་ཡང་དག་ཡིན་པས་བྱུང་།

These kinds of reasons may be divided into two types of their own: correct reasons that involve a result, and correct reasons that involve a nature. Anything which is one of these two types of reasons is always a positive reason.

བྱོད་དེ་སྟབས་ཀྱི་རྟགས་ཡང་དག་གང་ཞིག ། བྱོད་ཀྱི་རྟགས་ཀྱིས་དེ་སྟབས་ཀྱི་དངོས་
ཀྱི་བསྟུབ་བྱའི་ཆོས་སུ་བཟུང་བྱ་ཡང་ཡིན་དགག་པ་ཡང་ཡིན་པའི་གཞི་མཐུན་སྲིད་པ།
བྱོད་དེ་སྟབས་ཀྱི་དགག་རྟགས་ཡང་དག་ཡིན་པའི་མཚན་ཉིད།

The definition of a correct negative reason for any particular proof is as follows:

Something which is (1) a correct reason for a particular proof;
and (2) which is such that there can exist one thing which is both
(a) the object which is considered the explicit form of the quality
to be proven in the proof where it acts as the reason, and (b) a
negative thing.

དགག་རྟགས་ཡང་དག་དང་། མ་དམིགས་པའི་རྟགས་ཡང་དག་གཉིས་དོན་གཅིག

The terms "correct negative reason" and "correct reason for proving the absence of something" both refer to the same thing.

དེ་སྐབ་ཀྱི་དགག་རྟགས་ཡང་དག་དང་། དེ་སྐབ་ཀྱི་སྐབ་རྟགས་ཡང་དག་འགལ་
ཡང་། དགག་རྟགས་ཡང་དག་དང་། སྐབ་རྟགས་ཡང་དག་མི་འགལ་ཏེ། བྱས་པ་
དེ་དེ་གཉིས་ཀ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར་ཏེ། དེ་སྐབ་རྟག་པ་མ་ཡིན་པར་སྐབ་པའི་དགག་རྟགས་
ཡང་དག་དང་། སྐབ་མི་རྟག་པར་སྐབ་པའི་སྐབ་རྟགས་ཡང་དག་གཉིས་ཀ་ཡིན་པའི་
ཕྱིར་།

It is contradictory for one thing to be both a correct negative reason for a particular proof and also a correct positive reason for the same proof. It is not contradictory though for one thing to be both a correct negative reason and a correct positive reason. And this is because the expression "a thing which is made" can be both: it is both a correct negative reason for proving that sound is not an unchanging thing, and it is a correct positive reason for proving that sound is a changing thing.

གསུམ་པ་རྟགས་ཡང་དག་ལ་སྐབ་ཚུལ་གྱི་སྐོར་སྐབ་དབྱེ་ན། དོན་སྐབ་ཀྱི་རྟགས་ཡང་
དག། ཐ་སྙད་སྐབ་ཀྱི་རྟགས་ཡང་དག། དོན་འབའ་ཞིག་སྐབ་ཀྱི་རྟགས་ཡང་དག།
ཐ་སྙད་འབའ་ཞིག་སྐབ་ཀྱི་རྟགས་ཡང་དག། དོན་དང་ཐ་སྙད་གཉིས་ཀ་སྐབ་ཀྱི་རྟགས་
ཡང་དག་དང་ལྔ་ལས། དེ་རྣམས་སོ་སོའི་མཚན་ནི། མཚན་གཞི། སྐབ་བྱེད་ཀྱི་
རིགས་པ་དང་གསུམ།

Next is the third major point from above. Correct reasons may also be classified by according to how the proof is made. Here there are five different types:

- 1) Correct reasons for proving the meaning;
- 2) Correct reasons for proving the term;
- 3) Correct reasons for proving the meaning alone;
- 4) Correct reasons for proving the term alone; and
- 5) Correct reasons for proving both the meaning and the term.

We will discuss these reasons in three parts: their definition, typical example, and supporting logic.

ཁྱོད་དེ་སྐྱབ་ཀྱི་དྭགས་ཡང་དག་གང་ཞིག ཁྱོད་ཀྱི་དྭགས་ཀྱིས་དེ་སྐྱབ་ཀྱི་དངོས་ཀྱི་
བསྐྱབ་བྱའི་ཆོས་སུ་བཟུང་བྱ་ཡང་ཡིན། མཚན་ཉིད་ཀྱང་ཡིན་པའི་གཞི་མཐུན་སྲིད་
པ། ཁྱོད་དེ་སྐྱབ་ཀྱི་དོན་སྐྱབ་ཀྱི་དྭགས་ཡང་དག་གི་མཚན་ཉིད།

Here first is the definition of a correct reason for proving the meaning in any particular proof:

Something which is both (1) a correct reason for a particular proof; and (2) which is such that there can exist one thing which is both (a) the explicit form of the thing considered the quality to be proven for the particular proof in which it serves as the reason, and (b) a definition.

དེ་གང་ཞིག ཁྱོད་ཀྱི་དྭགས་ཀྱིས་དེ་སྐྱབ་ཀྱི་དངོས་ཀྱི་བསྐྱབ་བྱའི་ཆོས་སུ་བཟུང་བྱ་
ཡང་ཡིན། མཚན་བྱ་ཡང་ཡིན་པའི་གཞི་མཐུན་སྲིད་པ། ཁྱོད་དེ་སྐྱབ་ཀྱི་ཐ་སྙད་སྐྱབ་
ཀྱི་དྭགས་ཡང་དག་གི་མཚན་ཉིད།

The definition of a correct reason for proving the term in any particular proof is as follows:

Something which is both (1) the same as the first part above; and (2) which is such that there can exist one thing which is both (a) the explicit form of the thing considered the quality to be proven for the particular proof in which it serves as the reason, and (b) something which is defined.

དེ་གང་ཞིག ཁྱོད་ཀྱི་དྭགས་ཀྱིས་དེ་སྐྱབ་ཀྱི་དངོས་ཀྱི་བསྐྱབ་བྱའི་ཆོས་སུ་བཟུང་བྱ་
ཡང་ཡིན། མཚན་བྱ་ཡང་ཡིན་པའི་གཞི་མཐུན་མི་སྲིད། མཚན་ཉིད་ཀྱང་ཡིན་པའི་
གཞི་མཐུན་སྲིད་པ། ཁྱོད་དེ་སྐྱབ་ཀྱི་དོན་འབར་ཞིག་སྐྱབ་ཀྱི་དྭགས་ཡང་དག་གི་
མཚན་ཉིད།

The definition of a correct reason for proving the meaning alone in any particular proof is as follows:

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Something which is both (1) the same as the first part above; and (2) which is such that there cannot exist one thing which is both (a) the explicit form of the thing considered the quality to be proven for the particular proof in which it serves as the reason, and (b) something which is a thing defined—but which is though such that there can exist one thing which is both (a) the same as part "a" above and (b) something which is a definition.

དེ་གང་ཞིག ། བྱོད་ཀྱི་དྲགས་ཀྱིས་དེ་སྐྱབ་ཀྱི་བསྐྱབ་བྱའི་ཚེས་སུ་བཟུང་བྱ་ཡང་ཡིན།
མཚན་ཉིད་ཀྱང་ཡང་ཡིན་པའི་གཞི་མཐུན་མི་སྲིད། མཚན་བྱ་ཡང་ཡིན་པའི་གཞི་
མཐུན་སྲིད་པ། བྱོད་དེ་སྐྱབ་ཀྱི་ཐ་སྙད་འབའ་ཞིག་སྐྱབ་ཀྱི་དྲགས་ཡང་དག་གི་མཚན་
ཉིད།

The definition of a correct reason for proving the term alone in any particular proof is as follows:

Something which is both (1) the same as the first part above; and (2) which is such that there cannot exist one thing which is both (a) the explicit form of the thing considered the quality to be proven for the particular proof in which it serves as the reason, and (b) something which is a definition—but which is though such that there can exist one thing which is both (a) the same as part "a" above and (b) something which is a thing defined.

དེ་གང་ཞིག ། བྱོད་ཀྱི་དྲགས་ཀྱིས་དེ་སྐྱབ་ཀྱི་དངོས་ཀྱི་བསྐྱབ་བྱའི་ཚེས་སུ་བཟུང་བྱ་
ཡང་ཡིན། མཚན་ཉིད་ཀྱང་ཡིན་པའི་གཞི་མཐུན་སྲིད། མཚན་བྱ་ཡང་ཡིན་པའི་
གཞི་མཐུན་སྲིད་པ། བྱོད་དེ་སྐྱབ་ཀྱི་དོན་དང་ཐ་སྙད་གཉིས་ཀ་སྐྱབ་ཀྱི་དྲགས་ཡང་
དག་གི་མཚན་ཉིད།

The definition of a correct reason for proving both the meaning and the term in any particular proof is as follows:

Something which is both (1) the same as the first part above; and (2) which is such that there can exist one thing which is both (a) the explicit form of the thing considered the quality to be proven

for the particular proof in which it serves as the reason, and (b) something which is a definition—and there can also exist one thing which is both (a) the same as part "a" above and (b) something which is a thing defined.

སྐད་ཅིག་མ་དེ་སྒྲ་མི་དག་པར་སྒྲུབ་པའི་ཐ་སྙད་འབའ་ཞིག་སྒྲུབ་ཀྱི་དྲགས་ཡང་དག་
ཡིན་ཀྱང་། བྱས་པའི་དྲགས་ཀྱི་དེ་སྒྲུབ་ཀྱི་དྲགས་ཡང་དག་མ་ཡིན་ཏེ། དེ་འདྲའི་
དྲགས་ཡང་དག་ཡིན་ན། བྱས་པ་དང་གཅིག་ཡིན་དགོས་པའི་ཕྱིར།

"Something which only lasts a moment" is a correct reason for proving the term alone in a proof that sound is a changing thing; but it is not a correct reason in the same proof where "something which is made" is used as the reason. This is because, if something is a correct reason for this specific proof, it must be one and the same as "something which is made."

བྱས་པ་དེ་སྒྲ་སྐད་ཅིག་མར་ཚད་མས་བྱུང་བའི་ཐ་སྙད་ཀྱི་ཚུལ་བ་ཡང་དག་ཀྱི་དོར་སྒྲ་མི་དག་
པར་སྒྲུབ་པའི་ཐ་སྙད་འབའ་ཞིག་སྒྲུབ་ཀྱི་དྲགས་ཡང་དག་ཡིན་ཀྱང་། སྒྲིར་དེ་སྒྲུབ་ཀྱི་
དོན་དང་ཐ་སྙད་གཉིས་ཀ་སྒྲུབ་ཀྱི་དྲགས་ཡང་དག་ཡིན་ཏེ། སྒྲ་སྐད་ཅིག་མར་ཚད་
མས་མ་ངེས་པའི་ཚུལ་བའི་དོར་དོན་དང་ཐ་སྙད་གཉིས་ཀ་སྒྲུབ་ཀྱི་དྲགས་ཡང་དག་
ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

"Something which is made" is a correct reason for proving the term alone in a proof that sound is a changing thing, when this proof is presented to a correct opponent who has already established, through a valid perception, that sound is a thing that only lasts a moment. Generally speaking though it is a correct reason for proving both the meaning and the term. This is because it is—when presented to an opponent who has not yet ascertained, through any valid perception, that sound is a thing that only lasts a moment—a correct reason for proving both the meaning and the term.

བཞི་པ་དྲགས་ཡང་དག་ལ་བསྒྲུབ་བྱའི་སྒྲོ་ནས་དབྱེ་ན། དངོས་སྟོབས་ཀྱི་དྲགས་ཡང་
དག་ །ཡིད་ཆེས་ཀྱི་དྲགས་ཡང་དག་ །བྲགས་པའི་དྲགས་ཡང་དག་དང་གསུམ།

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This brings us to the fourth major point, which is classifying correct reasons by the assertion to be proven. Here there are three different types: correct reasons involving deduction; correct reasons involving reasoned belief; and correct reasons involving convention.

དེ་སྐབས་ཀྱི་དྲགས་ཡང་དག་གང་ཞིག ། དེ་སྐབས་ཀྱི་བསྐབས་བྱ་ལ་དངོས་སྟོབས་ཀྱི་རྗེས་
དཔག་ཚད་མ་སྐྱེད་བྱེད་དེ། དང་པོའི་མཚན་ཉིད།

The definition of the first is as follows:

Something which (1) a correct reason for the particular proof; and
which (2) serves to produce a deductive type of valid perception
towards the assertion of the particular reason.

དེ་གང་ཞིག ། དེ་སྐབས་ཀྱི་བསྐབས་བྱ་ལ་ཡིད་ཆེས་ཀྱི་རྗེས་དཔག་ཚད་མ་བསྐྱེད་བྱེད་
གཉིས་པའི་མཚན་ཉིད།

The definition of the second is:

Something which (1) a correct reason for the particular proof; and
which (2) serves to produce a valid perception of the type which
involves reasoned belief, towards the assertion of the particular
reason.

དེ་གང་ཞིག ། དེ་སྐབས་ཀྱི་བསྐབས་བྱ་ལ་གྲགས་པའི་རྗེས་དཔག་ཚད་མ་བསྐྱེད་བྱེད་
དེ། གསུམ་པའི་མཚན་ཉིད།

The definition of the third is:

Something which (1) a correct reason for the particular proof; and
which (2) serves to produce a valid perception of the type which
involves convention, towards the assertion of the particular
reason.

དང་པོ་ལ། འབྲས་རང་མ་དམིགས་པའི་དྲགས་ཡང་དག་གསུམ་ལས། མཚན་གཞི་
རིམ་པ་ལྟར། ཏུ་བ་ཏུ་ལྟན་ལ་ལ་མེ་ཡོད་པར་སྐབས་པའི་དངོས་སྟོབས་ཀྱི་འབྲས་དྲགས་

ཡང་དག །བྱས་པ་སྐྱེ་མི་དྲག་པར་སྐྱབ་པའི་དངོས་སྟོབས་ཀྱི་རང་བཞིན་གྱི་དྲགས་
ཡང་དག །མེ་མེད་པ་དེ་མཚན་མེའི་རྒྱ་མཚོར་དུ་བ་མེད་པར་སྐྱབ་པའི་དངོས་
སྟོབས་ཀྱི་མ་དམིགས་པའི་དྲགས་ཡང་དག་ཡིན།

The first of these may be divided further into three types: correct reasons which involve a result, a nature, and the absence of something. Respective typical examples would be the following.

- 1) "Because there is smoke," a correct reason which involves deduction and is of the result type, for proving that fire exists in a smoky mountain pass;
- 2) "Because it is a thing which is made," a correct reason which involves deduction and is of the nature type, for proving that sound is a changing thing; and
- 3) "Because there is no fire there," a correct reason which involves deduction and is of the type relating to the absence of something, for proving that there is no smoke upon the surface of the nighttime ocean.

གཉིས་པ་ལ་ཡང་འབྲས་རང་མ་དམིགས་པའི་དྲགས་ཡང་དག་གསུམ་ལས། དཔྱད་
གསུམ་གྱིས་དག་པའི་ལུང་དེ། སྒྲིན་པས་ལོངས་སྟོད་བྲིམས་གྱིས་བདེ། ཞེས་པའི་
ལུང་རང་གི་བསྟན་བྱའི་དོན་དྲགས་པའི་ཚད་མ་སྒྲིན་དུ་སོང་བར་སྐྱབ་པའི་ཡིད་
ཆེས་ཀྱི་འབྲས་དྲགས་ཡང་དག །དེ་དེ་འབྲའི་ལུང་རང་གི་བསྟན་བྱའི་དོན་ལ་མི་
བསྐྱེ་བར་སྐྱབ་པའི་ཡིད་ཆེས་ཀྱི་རང་བཞིན་གྱི་དྲགས་ཡང་དག །དེ་དེ་འབྲའི་ལུང་
རང་གི་བསྟན་བྱའི་དོན་ལ་བསྐྱེ་བ་མ་ཡིན་པར་སྐྱབ་པའི་ཡིད་ཆེས་ཀྱི་མ་དམིགས་པའི་
དྲགས་ཡང་དག་ཡིན་ནོ།

There are also these same three types for the second kind here: those which involve a result, a nature, and the absence of something. Examples here would be:

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- 1) "Because it is scriptural authority which has withstood the three tests," a correct reason which involves reasoned belief and is of the result type, for proving that the citation "Giving leads to possessions, and morality to happiness" is scriptural authority which is such that the person who spoke it possessed, before he spoke, a valid perception in which he or she realized the truth of what the citation expresses;
- 2) The same reason, as a correct reason which involves reasoned belief and is of the kind which relates to a nature, for proving that the same citation is unerring about what it expresses; and
- 3) The same reason, as a correct reason which involves reasoned belief and is of the kind which relates to the absence of something, for proving that the same citation is not erring about what it expresses.

[The "three tests," by the way, are:

- 1) We have confirmed, with our own direct valid perceptions, those parts of the statement which correspond to "evident" reality;
- 2) We have confirmed, with our own logical, deductive form of valid perception, those parts of the statement which correspond to "hidden" reality; and
- 3) We have established that those parts of the statement which correspond to "deeply hidden" reality are free of any internal contradiction or similar faults.]

གསུམ་པ་ལ་གཉིས་ལས། རྟོག་ཡུལ་ན་ཡོད་པ་དེ། རི་བོང་ཅན་ལ་སྒྲ་བ་ཞེས་པའི་
སྒྲ་བ་ཐོད་རུང་དུ་སྒྲ་བ་པའི་གྲགས་པའི་རང་བཞིན་གྱི་དྭགས་ཡང་དག། རྟོག་
ཡུལ་ན་ཡོད་པ་དེ། རི་བོང་ཅན་ལ་དངོས་དབང་གིས་སྒྲ་བ་ཞེས་པའི་སྒྲ་བ་ཐོད་རུང་
མ་ཡིན་པར་སྒྲ་བ་པའི་གྲགས་པའི་མ་དམིགས་པའི་དྭགས་ཡང་དག་ཡིན་ནོ།

There are, finally, two types for the third kind here. "Because that's how people think," is an example of a correct reason which involves convention and which relates to a nature, to prove that it is nominally appropriate to speak of the moon as the "house of the rabbit." The same expression, "Because that's how people think," is also an example of a correct reason which involves

convention and which relates to the absence of something, to prove that it is not literally appropriate to speak of the moon as the "house of the rabbit."

ལྔ་པ་རྟགས་ཡང་དག་ལ་མཐུན་ཕྱོགས་ལ་འཇུག་ཚུལ་གྱི་སྒོ་ནས་དབྱེ་ན། མཐུན་
ཕྱོགས་ལ་བྱབ་བྱེད་དུ་འཇུག་པའི་རྟགས་ཡང་དག་དང་། དེ་ལ་རྣམ་གཉིས་སུ་འཇུག་
པའི་རྟགས་ཡང་དག་གཉིས་ལས།

The fifth point is the classification of correct reasons according to how they relate to the group of similar cases. Here there are two types: correct reasons where the set of similar cases and the reason subsume each other; and correct reasons where they relate to each other in two dissimilar ways, [subsuming in one direction, but not in the other].

སྒྲིམ་རྟག་པར་སྒྲུབ་པའི་མཐུན་ཕྱོགས་ལ་བྱབ་བྱེད་དུ་འཇུག་པའི་ཚུལ་གསུམ་ཡིན་པ།
དེ་སྒྲུབ་ཀྱི་དང་པོའི་མཚན་ཉིད།

The definition of the first in a proof that sound is a changing thing is:

A reason where the three relationships hold, and where it and the group of similar cases in that particular proof subsume each other.

དེ་ལ་རྣམ་གཉིས་སུ་འཇུག་པའི་ཚུལ་གསུམ་ཡིན་པ། དེ་སྒྲུབ་ཀྱི་གཉིས་པའི་མཚན་
ཉིད།

The definition of the second in the same proof is:

A reason where the three relationships hold, and where it and the group of similar cases in that particular proof relate to each other in two dissimilar ways.

བྱས་པ་དང་པོའི་མཚན་གཞི་དང་། བྱས་པའི་བྱེ་བྲག་གཉིས་པའི་མཚན་གཞི་ཡིན།

A definitive example of the first type would be "a made thing," while a definitive example of the second would be any particular kind of made thing.

༥ རྒྱལ་པ་རྟགས་ཡང་དག་ལ་སྟོལ་བའི་སྟོན་ས་དབྱེ་ན། རང་དོན་སྐབས་ཀྱི་རྟགས་
ཡང་དག་དང་། གཞན་དོན་སྐབས་ཀྱི་རྟགས་ཡང་དག་གཉིས།

The sixth and final division here is that critical one where the classification is made by correct opponent. Here there are two types: correct reasons to use in the context of oneself, and correct reasons to use in the context of others.

ཁྱེད་སྒྲུ་མི་རྟག་པར་སྒྲུབ་པའི་རྟགས་ཡང་དག་ཀྱང་ཡིན། ཁྱེད་ཀྱི་རྟགས་ཀྱིས་དེ་སྒྲུབ་
ཀྱི་ཕྱི་སྟོལ་ཡང་དག་མེད་པ་ཡང་ཡིན་པའི་གཞི་མཐུན་པ། དང་པོའི་མཚན་ཉིད།

The definition of the first is as follows:

Anything which is both (1) a correct reason for proving that sound is a changing thing; and (2) a case where there is no correct opponent for the particular proof in which it serves as the reason.

སྒྲུ་སྟོལ་རང་གིས་རང་ཉིད་ལ་བྱས་པ་སྒྲུ་མི་རྟག་པར་སྒྲུབ་པའི་རྟགས་སུ་བཀོད་དེ་
སྒྲུབ་པའི་ཆོ། བྱས་པ་སྒྲུ་མི་རྟག་པར་སྒྲུབ་པའི་རང་དོན་སྐབས་ཀྱི་རྟགས་ཡང་དག་
ཡིན།

Whenever the proponent seeks to establish something to his own mind, setting forth "because it's a made thing" to himself in order to prove that sound is a changing thing, then "because it's a made thing" is serving as a correct reason to use in the context of oneself, to prove that sound is a changing thing.

ཁྱེད་དེ་སྒྲུབ་ཀྱི་རྟགས་ཡང་དག་ཀྱང་ཡིན། ཁྱེད་ཀྱི་རྟགས་ཀྱིས་དེ་སྒྲུབ་ཀྱི་ཕྱི་སྟོལ་
ཡང་དག་ཡོད་པ་ཡང་ཡིན་པའི་གཞི་མཐུན་པ། གཉིས་པའི་མཚན་ཉིད།

The definition of the second type above is as follows:

Anything which is both (1) a correct reason for proving that sound is a changing thing; and (2) a case where there is a correct opponent for the particular proof in which it serves as the reason.

བྱས་པ་སྒྲིམ་མི་ཏྲག་པར་སྒྲུབ་པའི་གཞན་དོན་སྐབས་ཀྱི་ཏྲགས་ཡང་དག་ཡིན་ནོ།

"Because it's a made thing" is a correct reason to use in the context of others, in proving that sound is a changing thing.

ཁ་ཅིག་གིས། བྱས་པ་སྒྲིམ་མི་ཏྲག་པར་སྒྲུབ་པའི་རང་དོན་སྐབས་ཀྱི་ཏྲགས་ཡང་དག་
དང་། དེ་སྒྲུབ་ཀྱི་གཞན་དོན་སྐབས་ཀྱི་ཏྲགས་ཡང་དག་གཉིས་ཀ་ཡིན་ཟེར་ན།

Suppose someone comes and makes the following claim:

"Because it's a made thing" is both a correct reason to use in the context of oneself, and a correct reason to use in the context of others, in proving that sound is a changing thing.

བྱས་པ་ཆོས་ཅན། བྱོད་ཀྱི་ཏྲགས་ཀྱིས་སྒྲིམ་མི་ཏྲག་པར་སྒྲུབ་པའི་བྱི་རྒྱལ་ཡང་དག་
མེད་པར་ཐལ། བྱོད་དེ་སྒྲུབ་ཀྱི་རང་དོན་སྐབས་ཀྱི་ཏྲགས་ཡང་དག་ཡིན་པའི་བྱིར།

Consider "because it's a made thing."

So is it then the case that there is no correct opponent to whom it can be used as a reason to prove that sound is a changing thing?

Because it is a correct reason to use in the context of oneself.

འདོད་ན། དེ་ཆོས་ཅན། དེ་ཡོད་པར་ཐལ། བྱོད་དེ་སྒྲུབ་ཀྱི་གཞན་དོན་སྐབས་ཀྱི་
ཏྲགས་ཡང་དག་ཡིན་པའི་བྱིར།

Now suppose you agree to our statement.

Consider this same thing.

There is so such a correct opponent,

Because this is a correct reason to use in the context of others.

ཡང་ཁ་ཅིག་ །རང་དོན་སྐབས་ཀྱི་ཏྲགས་ཡང་དག་མེད་ཟེར་ན།

Once again someone may come, to make the following claim:

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There is no such thing as a correct reason to use in the context of oneself.

མི་འཐད་དེ། བྱས་པ་སྒྲིམ་མི་ཏྲག་པར་སྒྱབ་པའི་རང་དོན་སྐབས་ཀྱི་ཏྲགས་ཡང་དག་ཏུ་
སོང་པའི་ཆོ། བྱས་པ་སྒྲིམ་མི་ཏྲག་པར་སྒྱབ་པའི་རང་དོན་སྐབས་ཀྱི་ཏྲགས་ཡང་དག་
ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

But this is incorrect,
Because in a case where "because it's a made thing" has actually been
employed as a correct reason to use, in the context of oneself, for
proving that sound is a changing thing, then "because it's a made thing"
is then a correct reason to use in the context of oneself.

གཞན་ཡང་རང་དོན་སྐབས་ཀྱི་ཏྲགས་ཡང་དག་ཡོད་པར་ཐལ། སྒྲིམ་མི་ཏྲག་པར་སྒྱབ་
པའི་རང་དོན་སྐབས་ཀྱི་ཏྲགས་ཡང་དག་ཡོད་པའི་ཕྱིར།

We can moreover say that there do exist correct reasons to use in the context
of oneself, because there does exist a correct reason to use in the context of
oneself in order to prove that sound is a changing thing.

མ་གྲུབ་ན། ཤེས་བྱ་ཆོས་ཅན། སྒྲིམ་མི་ཏྲག་པར་སྒྱབ་པའི་ཏྲགས་ཡང་དག་ཡིན་ན།
དེ་སྒྱབ་ཀྱི་རང་དོན་སྐབས་ཀྱི་ཏྲགས་ཡང་དག་མ་ཡིན་པས་བྱུང་པར་ཐལ། མ་གྲུབ་པ་
དེའི་ཕྱིར།

[It's not correct to say that there does exist a correct reason to use in the
context of oneself in order to prove that sound is a changing
thing.]

Suppose you say that it's not correct.

Consider knowable things.

So is it then the case that, whenever anything is a correct reason for proving
that sound is a changing thing, it can never be a correct reason, to use
in the context of oneself, in order to prove that sound is a changing
thing?

Because you said it was not correct.

འདོད་ན། བྱས་པ་སྒྲིམ་མི་ཏྲག་པར་སྒྱབ་པའི་རང་དོན་སྐབས་ཀྱི་ཏྲགས་ཡང་དག་ཏུ་
སོང་བའི་ཆོ། བྱས་པ་ཆོས་ཅན། དེ་སྒྱབ་ཀྱི་རང་དོན་སྐབས་ཀྱི་ཏྲགས་ཡང་དག་མ་
ཡིན་པར་ཐལ། དེ་སྒྱབ་ཀྱི་ཏྲགས་ཡང་དག་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར། འཁོར་གསུམ།

Suppose you agree that it can never be.

Consider "because it's a made thing," in a case where "because it's a made thing" has actually been employed as a correct reason to use, in the context of oneself, for proving that sound is a changing thing.

So is it then not a correct reason to use in the context of oneself for this same proof?

Because it is a correct reason for this same proof.

Now all you can do is contradict yourself.

གཞན་ཡང་། བྱས་པ་སྒྲིམ་མི་ཏྲག་པར་སྒྱབ་པའི་རང་དོན་སྐབས་ཀྱི་ཏྲགས་ཡང་དག་མ་
ཡིན་པར་ཐལ། དེ་དེ་སྒྱབ་ཀྱི་གཞན་དོན་སྐབས་ཀྱི་ཏྲགས་ཡང་དག་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར་ཏེ།
སྒྲིམ་ཆོས་ཅན། མི་ཏྲག་སྟེ། བྱས་པའི་ཕྱིར། ཞེས་པའི་སྟོར་བ་དེ། གཞན་དོན་སྐབས་
ཀྱི་ཏྲགས་ཡང་དག་གི་སྟོར་བ་རྣམ་དག་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

Moreover, isn't it so that "because it's a made thing" cannot be a correct reason to use, in the context of oneself, for proving that sound is a changing thing?

Because isn't it a correct reason to use, in the context of others, to prove the same thing?

And isn't this the case, because the logical statement given immediately below is a correct logical statement involving a correct reason to use in the context of others?

Consider sound.

It is a changing thing,

Because it's a made thing.

དེ་ལ་ཁོ་ན་རེ། བྱས་པའི་ཏྲགས་ཀྱིས་སྒྲིམ་མི་ཏྲག་པར་སྒྱབ་པའི་ཕྱི་རྟོགས་ཡང་དག་མེད་

པའི་ཚེ། བྱས་པའི་དྲགས་ཀྱིས་སྒྲ་མི་དྲག་པར་སྒྱབ་པའི་ཕྱི་རྒྱུ་ལང་དག་ཡོད་པར་
ཐལ། བྱས་པ་སྒྲ་མི་དྲག་པར་སྒྱབ་པའི་རང་དོན་སྐབས་ཀྱི་དྲགས་ལང་དག་ཏུ་སོང་
བའི་ཚེ། བྱས་པ་སྒྲ་མི་དྲག་པར་སྒྱབ་པའི་གཞན་དོན་སྐབས་ཀྱི་དྲགས་ལང་དག་ཡིན་
པའི་ཕྱིར་ཟེར་ན་མ་གྲུབ་བོ།

On this point, someone may come and make the following claim:

So is it then true that—in a case where there is no correct opponent for a proof where "because it's a made thing" is used as a reason to prove that sound is a changing thing—there *is* in fact a correct opponent for a proof where "because it's a made thing" is used as a reason to prove that sound is a changing thing?

Because—in a case where "because it's a made thing" has actually been employed as a correct reason to use, in the context of oneself, for proving that sound is a changing thing—"because it's a made thing" is a correct reason to use, in the context of others, for proving that sound is a changing thing.

To this we answer, "Your reason is not correct."

འདོད་ན། བྱས་པ་མེད་པའི་ཚེ། བྱས་པ་ཡོད་པར་ཐལ། བྱས་པའི་དྲགས་ཀྱིས་སྒྲ་མི་
དྲག་པར་སྒྱབ་པའི་ཕྱི་རྒྱུ་ལང་དག་མེད་པའི་ཚེ། བྱས་པའི་དྲགས་ཀྱིས་སྒྲ་མི་དྲག་
པར་སྒྱབ་པའི་ཕྱི་རྒྱུ་ལང་དག་ཡོད་པའི་ཕྱིར། དྲགས་ཁས།

And suppose one did agree to your original statement.

So is it then the case that, where there is not something made, there is something made?

Because it is the case that—where there is no correct opponent for a proof in which "because it's a made thing" is used as a reason to prove that sound is a changing thing—there *is* in fact a correct opponent for a proof where "because it's a made thing" is used as a reason to prove that sound is a changing thing.

And you've already agreed that this reason is correct.

ཁ་ཅིག་གིས། རང་དོན་སྐབས་ཀྱི་རྟགས་ཡང་དག་མེད་ཀྱང་། བྱས་པ་སྒྲ་མི་རྟག་
པར་སྒྲུབ་པའི་རང་དོན་སྐབས་ཀྱི་རྟགས་ཡང་དག་ཏུ་སོང་བའི་ཆོ། བྱས་པ་སྒྲ་མི་རྟག་
པར་སྒྲུབ་པའི་རང་དོན་སྐབས་ཀྱི་རྟགས་ཡང་དག་ཡིན་ཟེར་ན་

Suppose someone comes and makes the following claim:

It is true that there does not exist any correct reason to use in the context of oneself. Nonetheless, "because it's a made thing" is a correct reason to use, in the context of oneself, to prove that sound is a changing thing—in a case where "because it's a made thing" has actually been employed as a correct reason to use, in the context of oneself, for proving that sound is a changing thing.

མི་འཐད་དེ། རང་དོན་སྐབས་ཀྱི་རྟགས་ཡང་དག་ཡོད་པར་ཐལ། སྒྲ་མི་རྟག་པར་
སྒྲུབ་པའི་རང་དོན་སྐབས་ཀྱི་རྟགས་ཡང་དག་ཡོད་པའི་ཕྱིར།

But this is incorrect,

Because there must then exist a correct reason to use in the context of oneself;
Because there does exist a correct reason to use, in the context of oneself, for
proving that sound is a changing thing.

བྱས་པ་སྒྲ་མི་རྟག་པར་སྒྲུབ་པའི་རང་དོན་སྐབས་ཀྱི་རྟགས་ཡང་དག་ཏུ་སོང་བའི་ཆོ།
བྱས་པ་ཡོད་པ་གང་ཞིག་། །དེའི་ཆོ་བྱས་པ་སྒྲ་མི་རྟག་པར་སྒྲུབ་པའི་རང་དོན་སྐབས་
ཀྱི་རྟགས་ཡང་དག་ཡོད་པའི་ཕྱིར། རྟགས་ཁས།

And this is true because—in an instance where "because it's a made thing" has actually been employed as a correct reason to use, in the context of oneself, for proving that sound is a changing thing—it is the case that (1) a made thing actually does exist, and (2) there does exist in this instance a correct reason to use, in the context of oneself, where "because it's a made thing" is employed to prove that sound is a changing thing.

You've already agreed that the reason is correct.

གཞན་ཡང་། སྒྲ་མི་རྟག་པར་སྒྲུབ་པའི་རང་དོན་སྐབས་ཀྱི་རྟགས་ཡང་དག་ཡོད་པར་

ཐལ། བྱས་པ་སྒྲིམ་ཏིག་པར་སྒྲུབ་པའི་རང་དོན་སྐབས་ཀྱི་ཏིགས་ཡང་དག་ཏུ་སོང་བ་
ཡོད་པའི་ཕྱིར།

It is moreover true that there does exist a correct reason to use, in the context of oneself, to prove that sound is a changing thing;
Because there is an instance where "because it's a made thing" has actually been employed as a correct reason to use, in the context of oneself, for proving that sound is a changing thing.

བྱས་པ་དེ་སྒྲུབ་ཀྱི་རང་དོན་སྐབས་ཀྱི་ཏིགས་ཡང་དག་ཏུ་སོང་བའི་གང་ཟག་ཡོད་པའི་
ཕྱིར་ཏེ། ཏུ་བ་ཏུ་ལྷན་ལ་ལ་མེ་ཡོད་པར་སྒྲུབ་པའི་རང་དོན་སྐབས་ཀྱི་ཏིགས་ཡང་དག་
ཏུ་སོང་བའི་གང་ཟག་ཡོད་པའི་ཕྱིར།

And this is true because there is a person for whom "because it's a made thing" has actually been employed as a correct reason to use, in the context of oneself, for this particular proof;
And this is true because there is a person for whom "because there is smoke there" has actually been employed as a correct reason to use, in the context of oneself, for proving that there is fire in a smoky mountain pass.

ཡང་སྐྱེ་བ་སྤྱི་ཡོད་པར་སྒྲུབ་པའི་ཏིགས་སྒྱུར་ནི། སོ་སྐྱེ་འཆི་ཁ་མའི་སེམས་སྐྱད་
ཅིག་ཐ་མ་ཆོས་ཅན། བྱོད་ཀྱི་ཉིར་འབྲས་སུ་གྱུར་པའི་རིག་པ་ཕྱི་མ་ཡོད་དེ། བྱོད་
ཆགས་བཅས་རྒྱན་ལྷན་གྱི་རིག་པ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར། དཔེར་ན། ད་ལྟའི་སློབ་ཆེན།

There is also the logical proof that we use to establish the existence of past and future lives:

Consider the mind of a common person [one who has not yet seen emptiness directly] who is just about to die.

There does exist, as its material result, a later state of mind;

Because it is a state of mind present in the being of a person who still possesses ignorant desire.

It is, for example, similar to the present state of mind.

གྱིས་པ་བཅས་མ་ཐག་པའི་སྒོ་ཚས་ཅན། རང་གི་རིགས་འདྲ་བའི་སྒོ་ལྔ་མ་སྒྲོན་དུ་སོང་
སྟེ། རིག་པ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར། དཔེར་ན། སྐན་པའི་སྒོ་བཞིན་ཞེས་པ་ལྟ་བུའོ།

And consider the mind of an infant who has just been
born.

A mind which is of exactly the same type as it has
preceded it,

Because it is a state of mind.

It is, for example, like the mind of a very old person.

The forms of debate:
The Traditional Debating Classes and Subjects

Over the centuries, each major Gelukpa monastery in Tibet has developed its own unique curriculum, all based on the study of the five great books of ancient Indian Buddhism. The structure of the different classes in the debate park is designed around the progressive study of a student in the geshe program through these five great classics, and this is where the core subjects and even the name of the Asian Classics Institute come from.

There are fourteen different debate classes going on simultaneously at Sera Mey Tibetan Monastery, and typically 20 to 22 years is required to pass through the fourteen. Each of the classes has its own special name—something like "freshman" or "sophomore" in the West. At any given night in the debate park, the classes will be huddled in different spots spread around the park. The best spots (under a couple of especially shady trees in the summer, or up against a protecting wall in windy, cold weather) are given to the higher classes. If a beginning class is very large, the debate master may choose to break it up for the night into two or even three separate groups. Each group starts out with a single attacker and, normally, two defenders; by the end of the night, this may have dissolved into melee of eight or ten attackers bearing down on the original two defenders, with a group of supporters huddled behind them shouting out answers too.

Typical classes at present in Sera Mey might start out with sixty or seventy young men, of whom only a handful—four or five—will actually make it to the end of the geshe program. There is a custom at an advanced point in the

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curriculum, around ten years into the program, to combine two of the classes from that point on, so that there are enough monks left to make the debates interesting.

The following is a list of the names, durations, and traditional subjects for each of the debate classes at Sera Mey. It was compiled with the help of Khen Rinpoche Geshe Lobsang Tharchin. It should be noted that this is the ideal curriculum, and in the refugee monasteries of southern India events like an unusually long monsoon season, an attack of tuberculosis, sudden changes of plan by monastic officials, extra monastic ceremonies to be attended, a public teaching by a great visiting Lama, or any number of other happenings can conspire to lengthen or shorten the time needed to complete one's geshe studies.

Year One

Class One: Beginning Class, Collected Topics

This class is Tibetan is known as *duchung* (*bsdus-chung*), since it is a beginning (*chung*) class on the collected topics (*bsdus-grva*) of Buddhist logic and perceptual theory, mostly according to the "Sutrist" (*Sautrantika* or *mDo-sde-pa*) School, which is considered the second of the four schools of ancient India. It is also the higher of the two schools of the Lower Way (Hinayana).

The original root text for this class is the *Commentary on Valid Perception* (*Pramana Varttika*, *Tsad-ma rnam-'grel*), written by Master Dharmakirti (*sLob-dpon Chos-kyi grags-pa*) around 650 AD. The principal monastic textbook is the *Collected Topics* (*Yongs-'dzin bsdus-grva*) of the Master Tutor, Purbuchok Jampa Tsultrim Gyatso (1825-1901).

The duration of the class is one year, and begins with a special ceremony of initiation into the debate park. The students are typically around 14 or 15 years old; they have completed some elementary study of the collected topics with their house teacher, and are already familiar with the format of debate (called *rikpay grotang* [*rigs-pa'i 'gro-stangs*]). These students have also already learned to read and write (in both the regular and cursive alphabets), and have memorized many of the shorter prayers and texts.

In a pattern which will continue throughout their careers as students in the geshe program, the class moves through a standard series of topics, each with its own name—such as *chokchu* (*phyogs-chos*): the study of the subject element in a logical statement, and its relationship to the reason. The class might remain on a particular topic for say one to six weeks, and then move on to the next, according to an undefined, organic schedule dependent on a constant

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assessment of their progress by the great lamas who are instructing different members of the class.

In the curriculum of the Asian Classics Institute, the topics of this and the next class are represented in the following courses:

Course XIII: The Art of Reasoning
Extension Course 3: Mind and Mental Functions

Year Two
Class Two: Advanced Class, Collected Topics

This class is a continuation of the previous, and lasts for a year. Its name is *duchen* (*bsdus-chen*), meaning the advanced (*chen-po*) class on the collected topics (*bsdus-grva*).

Year Three
Class Three: Beginning Class, First Chapter of the "Ornament"

The name of this class in Tibetan is *shungsar* (*gzhung-gsar*), indicating that these students are beginners (*gsar-pa*) in the first of the great classics (*gzhung*). The foundation root text here is the *Ornament of Realizations* (*Abhisamaya Alamkara*), dictated to the realized being Asanga (*'Phags-pa Thogs-med*) by the future Buddha, Maitreya (*rJe-btzun Byams-pa*) around 350 AD. The principal monastic textbook for this class is the *Analysis of the Perfection of Wisdom* (*Phar-phyin mtha'-dpyod*) by Kedrup Tenpa Dargye (*mKhas-grub bsTan-pa dar-rgyas*), a master from Sera Mey who lived 1493-1568.

These texts present the beliefs of the lower Middle-Way school (the lower half of the fourth or highest school of the four, which itself corresponds to the higher of the two schools of the Mahayana, or Greater Way). This school is known as the *Madhyamika Svatantrika* (*dBu-ma rang-rgyud pa*), or "Independent" branch of the Middle-Way, so named because of their belief that we must take an independent object and discuss it in common terms to bring another person to understand correct view. The entire study of this school is called, in the monastery, the "Perfection of Wisdom," or *parchin* (*phar-phyin*) in Tibetan—an abbreviation of the full term, *sherab kyi parul tu chinpa* (*shes-rab kyi pha-rol tu phyin-pa*, or *prajnya paramita*).

This class also lasts for a year, and is devoted to covering only the first third of the first chapter of the root text. (The first chapter is by far the most extensive.) The topics covered in this and the following five classes are

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represented in the following ACI courses:

Course II: Buddhist Refuge
Course XV: What the Buddha Really Meant

Year Four

Class Four: Intermediate Class, First Chapter of the "Ornament"

This class is a continuation of the preceding. It lasts for a year and is devoted to the second third of the first chapter of Lord Maitreya's root text. The name of the class in Tibetan is *shung-nying* (*gzhung-rnying*), meaning a study of this great classic (*gzhung*) by students who are now more advanced (*rnying-pa*).

Year Five

Class Five: Advanced Class, First Chapter of the "Ornament"

This class is again a continuation of the preceding. It too lasts for a year, and is devoted to the final third of the first chapter. Its name in Tibetan is *shung-nying gongma* (*gzhung-rnying gong-ma*), meaning an "even more" (*gong-ma*) advanced class of more experienced (*rnying-pa*) students of the great classic (*gzhung*).

Year Six

Class Six: Class on the Second and Third Chapters of the "Ornament"

This class is a continuation of the previous, and covers the second and third chapters of Lord Maitreya's text. It lasts for one year, and is named *kab nyipa* (*skabs gnyis-pa*), since it is devoted to the second (*gnyis-pa*) and third chapters (*skabs*) of the root text.

Years Seven and Eight

Class Seven: Class on the Fourth and Higher Chapters of the "Ornament"

The study of the *Ornament* continues in this class, dedicated to the fourth, fifth, sixth, seventh, and eighth chapters of the root text. The eighth chapter is considered especially important because it is dedicated to a thorough description of an enlightened being. The name of this class is *kab shipa* (*skabs bzhi-pa*), meaning the students have reached the fourth (*bzhi-pa*) and higher chapters (*skabs*) of the root text. Each of the courses from this point on to the end of the geshe program last for two years each.

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Years Nine and Ten
Class Eight: Class for Supplementary Topics
on the Perfection of Wisdom

The next class is named after and devoted to the study of supplementary topics on the perfection of wisdom known as *surkul* (*zur-bkol*), so called because they are extensive treatments of particular subjects which are "extracted" (*zur-du bkol-pa*) and expanded from much briefer references in the *Ornament*.

The four classic topics here are dependent origination (*rten-'brel*); the permutations of the flowchart that leads to enlightenment, known as the "community of the twenty" (*dge-'dun nyi-shu*); the levels of the form and formless realms, along with their corresponding meditational states (*bsam-gzugs*); and the very important study of the art of interpreting statements of the Buddha (*drang-nges*).

In conjunction with the last, the members of this class will also engage in a separate study of the "foundation consciousness" (*kun-gzhi*, or *alaya vijnyana*) concept accepted by the Mind-Only (*Citta Matra* or *Sems-tzam-pa*) School, the lower of the two Mahayana schools of ancient India, and third in the overall scheme of four schools. This will in fact be the most time ever spent on the beliefs of this particular school, although it is also touched upon later in the "Middle-Way" courses.

In Sera Mey, the principal monastic textbooks used for the supplementary topics are those on each particular subject composed by the masters Kedrup Tenpa Dargye and Panglung Lobsang Tukje (*sPang-lung Blo-bzang thugs-rje*, fl. 18th century).

Years Eleven and Twelve
Class Nine: Beginning Class on the Middle Way

Entrance to the ninth class, where a student debater begins his study of the higher half of the Middle-Way School, marks a major change in status. At Sera Mey, it is at this point that the monk earns the right to vote upon questions affecting the monastery at large during the regular assemblies. He has also normally just finished his *rikchung* examinations, which in effect qualify him to become, in time, a *geshe*.

In Tibet it was a custom at this juncture for the entire surviving class to approach sponsors and raise the funds to make an important gift to the monastery in appreciation of her kindness. The gift might be a set of rare and important books, new paintings or images for the temple altars, or even a

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building. Members of the class would also go into deep retreats, intended to accumulate the good karma necessary to grasp the very subtle points of higher Middle-Way philosophy, the next subject in the curriculum. It is considered auspicious if the student encounters difficulty during this retreat (as the sign of an effective attempt to eliminate previous bad karma), and our Root Lama, Khen Rinpoche, has said that he became dangerously ill during his retreat in Tibet at this time.

The name of this class is *uma sarpa* (*dbu-ma gsar-pa*), meaning "beginning" (*gsar-pa*) class on the beliefs of the higher part of the Middle-Way (*dbu-ma*) School. The root text is *Entering the Middle Way* (*Madhyamika Avatara*, *dBu-ma la 'jug-pa*), composed by Master Chandrakirti (*Slob-dpon Zla-ba grags-pa*) around 650 AD. The principal monastic textbooks used are the *Illumination of the True Thought of the Middle Way* (*dBu-ma dgongs-pa rab-gsal*) of Je Tsongkapa, along with its commentary by Kedrup Tenpa Dargye entitled *Overview of the Middle Way* (*dBu-ma spyi-don*).

The higher half of the Middle-Way School is known as the "Consequence" (*Prasangika*, or *Thal-'gyur-ba*) group, due to their belief that a logical statement utilizing a ridiculous but necessary consequence of an opponent's erroneous beliefs is especially effective in helping the opponent develop a correct view of emptiness. The entire study of this particular group is called "Middle Way" (*Uma*, or *dBu-ma*) in the monastery, although technically the beliefs of the Independent group, already studied, also qualify as "Middle Way."

The topics covered in this and the next class are represented in the following ACI courses:

Course VI: The Diamond-Cutter Sutra
Course VII: The Vows of the Bodhisattva
Courses X, XI, and XII: A Guide to the Bodhisattva's Way of Life—Parts One, Two, and Three
Extension Course 4: The Marriage of Emptiness and Karma

Years Thirteen and Fourteen
Class Ten: Advanced Class on the Middle Way

This class is a continuation of the preceding, and in Tibetan is known as *uma nyingpa* (*dbu-ma rnying-pa*), meaning "advanced" (*nying-pa*) class on the beliefs of the higher part of the Middle-Way (*dbu-ma*) School.

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Years Fifteen and Sixteen
Class Eleven: Beginning Class on Vowed Ethics

The class then graduates to the study of vowed ethics (*vinaya*, or '*dul-ba*'); here the curriculum of Sera Mey is unique, since the other major Gelukpa monasteries continue on to higher knowledge (*abhidharma*, or *chos mngon-pa*) at this point. This course will cover, extensively, the beliefs of certain groups within the first of the four schools—the Detailist—on the eight different types of vowed morality.

It is only here that a monk learns, in detail, the finer points of monastic rule. The debates of this class are a sharp contrast to the high theoretical dialectic of the Middle Way: here we are more likely to be quoting lists of monastic guidelines, and memorization of the versed summary on the subject is a "must." This is the *Versed Summary on Vowed Morality* by Kongpo Ngawang Tsultrim (*Shar-chen Kong-po Ngag-dbang tsul-khrims*), an eminent lama from the Kongpo College of Sera Mey.

The great commentary of the omniscient Tsonawa (*Kun-mkhyen mTso-sna-ba Shes-rab bzang-po*), a Kagyupa master from the latter part of the 14th century, will also be studied carefully. Both are based, as is the study of vowed morality throughout Tibet, upon the *Summary of Vowed Morality* (*Vinaya Sutra*, or '*Dul-ba mdo rtza-ba*'), by the Indian master Guna Prabha (*Slob-dpon Yon-tan 'od*), from about 500 AD.

The name of this particular class in Tibetan is *senkyang dangpo* (*gzan rkyang dang-po*), since in the old days in Tibet it was only (*rkyang*) by reaching this class that a student was first (*dang-po*) considered senior enough to wear a heavy sort of monastic shawl (*gzan*) or cloak called a *dagam*, on the (very cold) nights of winter in the Lhasa valley.

The topics covered in this and the next class are represented in ACI Course IX: The Ethical Life

Years Seventeen and Eighteen
Class Twelve: Advanced Class on Vowed Ethics

This class is a continuation of the preceding, and is given the name *dzindra sumpa* ('*dzin-grva gsum-pa*'), meaning third (*gsum-pa*) class ('*dzin-grva*) from the top.

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Years Nineteen and Twenty
Class Thirteen: Beginning Class on Higher Knowledge

Year nineteen marks the beginning of the final subject, higher knowledge (*abhidharma*, known simply as *dzu* [*mdzod*] in the monastery). The original root text here is the *Treasure House of Higher Knowledge* (*Abhidharma Kosha*, or *Chos mngon-pa mdzod*), written by Master Vasubandhu (*Slob-dpon dbyig-gnyen*) in about 350 AD. This work primarily presents the beliefs of the Kashmiri section of the Detailist (*Vaibhashika*, or *Bye-brag smra-ba*) School, the first of the four Indian schools, and lower of the two Hinayana schools.

Three monastic textbooks for this subject are featured in the curriculum of Sera Mey:

The commentary of His Holiness the First Dalai Lama, Gendun Drup (*rGyal-ba dGe-'dun grub*, 1391-1474) entitled *Light on the Path to Freedom, an Exposition of Higher Knowledge* (*Mdzod-tik thar-lam gsal-byed*);

A resolution of difficult points on higher knowledge popularly known as *The Book on Higher Knowledge by Gyalwang*, composed by Gyalwang Trinley Namgyal (*rGyal-dbang 'Phrin-las rnam-rgyal*, fl. 1850); and

An exquisite, highly detailed commentary from the Sakya tradition entitled *The Chim Book on Higher Knowledge*, written by Jampeyang of Chim (*mChims 'Jam-pa'i dbyangs*, c. 1280).

The name for this class in Tibetan is *dzindra nyipa* (*'dzin-grva gnyis-pa*), so called because it is the second (*gnyis-pa*) class (*'dzin-grva*) from the top.

The topics covered in this and the next class are represented in the following ACI courses:

Course V: How Karma Works

Course VIII: Death and the Realms of Existence

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Years Twenty-One and Twenty-Two
Class Fourteen: Advanced Class on Higher Knowledge

This class is a continuation of the preceding, and in Tibetan is called *dzindra dangpo* ('dzin-grva dang-po), meaning it is the first (*dang-po*) class ('dzin-grva), or the highest class of all. The minimum stay for a person in this class would be two years, but this could stretch out into three, four, or even more years, since a student is required to remain until he can complete his examinations for any of the ranks of a geshe.

Annually for the Entire Geshe Program
Special Winter Classes on Buddhist Logic and Perceptual Theory

Throughout the entire length of a monk's career in the geshe program, several months in the winter are reserved for special classes on Buddhist logic and perceptual theory, based upon the *Commentary on Valid Perception* (*Pramana Varttika*, *Tsad-ma rnam-'grel*) of Master Dharmakirti (*Slob-dpon Chos-kyi grags-pa*), who lived about 650 AD.

The principal monastic commentary here is *Light on the Path to Freedom, an Explanation of the "Commentary on Valid Perception,"* by one of the principal disciples of Je Tsongkapa, Gyaltsab Je Darma Rinchen (*rGyal-tsab rje Dar-ma rin-chen*, 1364-1432). At Sera Mey, a new commentary by Geshe Yeshe Wangchuk (*dGe-bshes Ye-shes dbang-phyug*, 1928-1997) is also very popular. Normally each class simply takes its name from whichever major topic it may be debating at the time.

One reason the text by Gyaltsab Je is so widely used is that it is studied in all of the major Gelukpa monasteries, and can thus be used as common scriptural authority during the annual Jang Gunchu, or Winter Debates—a kind of annual Olympic intensive where the best student monks from each of the major colleges can come together to study and debate, almost day and night, for an entire month.

Here all the students from each monastery who are debating the same subject join into a single class, which acts as an excellent preparation for the debates they will have with each other during the geshe examinations down the road. Back home, those from each monastery who did not qualify for the Winter Debates continue on these same general subject; this provides a good opportunity for students of medium or lesser ability to take center stage at the debate park and improve themselves.

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The topics for the Winter Debates are represented in the following ACI Courses:

Course IV: The Proof of Future Lives
Course XIII: The Art of Reasoning

Special Teachings by Eminent Lamas

Throughout the geshe program, a student will also attend special teachings given by eminent Lamas, both inside and outside their home monasteries. Actual recent examples at Sera Mey, for example, would be a one month teaching on the steps of the path to Buddhahood (*lam-rim*) presented by Geshe Yeshe Wangchuk, or a teaching by His Holiness the Dalai Lama on emptiness. The most frequent subjects of these teachings are either *lam-rim* or *lojong*: developing the good heart. The content of these special teachings often comes up later in the debate park, in conjunction with almost every other subject. For this reason, the teachings on *lam-rim* and *lojong* have been organized into a sixth subject in the ACI curriculum, and are represented in the following courses:

Course I: The Principal Teachings of Buddhism
Course III: Applied Meditation
Course XIV: Lojong, Developing the Good Heart
Extension Course 1: Offering of the Mandala
Extension Course 2: Contemplations on the Practice of Giving and Taking (Tong-Len)
Extension Course 5: Lord Atisha's *Lamp for the Path to Enlightenment*
Extension Course 6: The Garden—Discussions with the Great Masters of Buddhism

The invasion of Tibet led to a great deal of disruption in the debate classes. For twelve years after the fall of Tibet in 1959, the surviving monks from all of the major Gelukpa monasteries were thrown together in the Buxall refugee camp in northeastern India. Only several hundred of over 10,000 student monks from Lhasa lived through the invasion and subsequent horrors of the Buxall camp, to reach their new home in south India.

In the early 1970's, land was found in the Karnataka area of south India for the re-establishment of these major monasteries. (Khen Rinpoche's older brother, a Tibetan government official, was instrumental in locating and securing the

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land.) The debating classes and geshe examinations continued throughout this time in a very tenuous way, and by the mid 1970's it looked as though there would not be enough support for them to be carried on at Sera Mey.

This is when Khen Rinpoche began the food fund for students in the geshe program, which proved to be a deciding factor in their survival. Khen Rinpoche and his students also provided a great deal of the support needed to revive the Winter Debates in India. The debate classes throughout the great Gelukpa monasteries of south India now thrive, and the level of study is said to rival that of Old Tibet.

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Supplement to Reading Nine

རིགས་པའི་འགྲོ་སྤངས།

Rikpay Drotang
Debating Format, Part Two

(Continued from the previous reading:)

བུམ་པ་མི་རྟག་པ་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ།

Bumpa mitakpa yinpar tel.

Are you telling me a water pitcher is a changing thing?

འདྲོད།

Du!

That's right!

མ་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ།

Mayinpar tel,

No it's not,

བུམ་པ་ཆོས་ཡིན་པའི་བྱིར།

Bumpa chu yinpay chir.

Because a water pitcher is a dharma—an existing thing.

བྱུང་བ་མ་བྱུང་།

Kyappa ma jung.

It doesn't necessarily follow.

ཆོས་ཡིན་ན། མི་རྟག་བ་མ་ཡིན་པས་མ་བྱུང་བར་ཐལ།

Chu yinna, mitakpa mayinpe makyappar tel!

Are you telling me that, just because something is an existing thing, it doesn't have to be a changing thing?

འདྲོད།

Du!

That's right!

ག་རེ་བཞག

Gare shak?

Then show me something like that!

སྟོང་པ་ཉིད་ཆོས་ཅན།

Tongpa nyi chu chen.

Consider emptiness.

མི་རྟག་བ་མ་ཡིན་སྟེ།

Mitakpa mayin te,

It's not a changing thing,

རྟག་བ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

Takpa yinpay chir.

Because it's an unchanging thing.

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Reading Ten: The Concept of Time

Selection from the collected topics:
The Concept of Time

The following selections on the concept of time (Dus-gsum gyi rnam-bzhag), are excerpted from The Collected Topics of Rato (Rva-stod bsdus-grva), by Master Chok-hla U-ser, a great master of Rato Monastery who lived about 1500 AD. This particular book is considered the "grandfather" of what came to be a separate genre of literature in Tibet: the dura (bsdus-grva), or "selected topics from the Commentary on Valid Perception (Pramana Varttika, or Tsad-ma rnam-'grel) of Master Dharmakirti (circa 650 AD).

Please note that indented statements are usually those given by the opponent. Responses within brackets are those that are usually left unwritten in the Tibetan text, and are understood to be there because of the context following each.

མཇུག་པོ་ཅིག་ན་རེ། རྒྱུ་ལ་འགགས་པ། འདས་པའི་མཚན་ཉིད། རྒྱུ་ལ་མ་
འགགས་པ། ད་ལྟར་བའི་མཚན་ཉིད། རྒྱུ་པའི་རྒྱ་ཡོད་ཀྱང་མ་རྒྱུ་པའི་ཆ། མ་
འདས་པའི་མཚན་ཉིད།

Suppose someone comes again, and makes the following claim:

The definition of the past is: "That which has begun and stopped." The definition of the present is: "That which has begun and not yet stopped." The definition of the future is: "That condition of having not yet begun, although the causes for beginning are present."

མཚན་གཞི་རིམ་པ་ལྟར། ན་ནིང་གི་ལོ་ཉོག་། དང་པོའི་མཚན་གཞི། ད་ལོའི་ལོ་ཉོག་
།གཉིས་པའི་མཚན་གཞི། དོན་གཞི་གི་ལོ་ཉོག་། གསུམ་པའི་མཚན་གཞི་ཟེར་ན།

Respective examples would be the following. For the first, the example would be last year's crops. For the second, it would be this year's crops; and, for the third, crops soon to grow.

དང་པོ་ལ། འདས་པའི་མཚན་ཉིད་དང་མཚན་གཞི་དེ་མི་འཐད་པར་ཐལ། འདས་
པའི་མཚན་ཉིད་མེད་པའི་ཕྱིར་ཏེ། འདས་པ་མེད་པའི་ཕྱིར་ཏེ། གཞི་གྲུབ་ན། ད་ལྟར་
བ་ཡིན་པས་བྱུང་པའི་ཕྱིར།

Concerning the first of these, we answer as follows.

Aren't your definition and example for the past though incorrect?
Because there is no definition for the past,
And this is because the past doesn't even exist,
And this is because anything which can be established as existing is always
something of the present.

བྱས་པ་ལ་ཁོ་ན་རེ། འདས་པ་ཡོད་པར་ཐལ། འདས་པའི་དུས་ཡོད་པའི་ཕྱིར་ཏེ།
འདས་པའི་དུས་དང་། མ་འོངས་པའི་དུས་དང་། ད་ལྟར་བའི་དུས་གསུམ་ཡོད་པའི་
ཕྱིར་ཏེ། དུས་གསུམ་ཡོད་པའི་ཕྱིར་ན། མ་བྱུང་།

On this point, someone may come and make the following claim:

But there must be things that are past,
Because past time exists;
And this is because all three—past time, and future time, and present
time—exist.
And this is because the three times exist.

To this we answer, "It doesn't necessarily follow."

འོ་ན། ཁོ་རང་ལ། འདས་པ་འདས་པ་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ། འདས་པ་ཡོད་པའི་ཕྱིར།

དྲགས་ཁས།

And we also ask this person,

So is the past the past?
Because the past exists.

You already agreed to the reason here.

འདྲོད་ན། འདས་པ་ཆོས་ཅན། འདས་པ་མ་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ། འགགས་པ་མ་ཡིན་
པའི་ཕྱིར་ཏེ། ཞིག་པ་མ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[Then I agree to your original statement: the past is the past.]

Suppose you agree to our original statement.

Consider the past.
It is not so the past,
Because it is not something which has stopped;
And this is true because it is not something which has been destroyed.

བྱུང་སྟེ། འདས་པ་འགགས་པ་ཞིག་པ་གསུམ་དོན་གཅིག་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར་ཏེ། དེ་
གསུམ་ཀ་ཡོད་པའི་ཕྱིར་ཏེ། འདས་པ་ཡོད་པའི་ཕྱིར། དྲགས་ཁས།

[It doesn't necessarily follow.]

But it does necessarily follow,
Because "the past," "that which has stopped," and "that which has been
destroyed" all refer to the same thing.
And this is true because all three of them exist;
And this is true because the past exists.

You already agreed that the reason is true.

མ་བྱུང་འཆོམས་ལ་མ་བྱུང་ན། འདས་པ་ཆོས་ཅན། ཞིག་པ་མ་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ།
དངོས་པོ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

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Reading Ten

Suppose that, instead of "it doesn't necessarily follow," the opponent says "it's incorrect."

Consider the past.

It is not so something which has been destroyed,
Because it is a working thing.

བྱུང་སྟེ། ཞིག་པ་དང་དངོས་པོའི་གཞི་མཐུན་མེད་པའི་ཕྱིར་ཏེ། ལེགས་བཤད་གསེར་
གྱི་འཕྲིང་བ་ལས། རང་བཞིན་གྱིས་གྲུབ་པར་འཛིན་པའི་ཕྱོགས་ཐམས་ཅད་ལ། ཞིག་
པ་དངོས་པོར་ནི་མི་བཞེད་ལ། ཞེས་གསུངས་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[It doesn't necessarily follow.]

But it does necessarily follow,

Because there exists no one thing which is both (1) something that has been
destroyed but which is still (2) a working thing.

And this is true because the *Golden Necklace of Good Explanation* says,

None of the schools that belong to the side that believe that
things exist through some nature of their own accept the idea
that something which has been destroyed could be a working
thing.

[The *Golden Necklace* is a famed commentary by Je Tsongkapa upon the
Ornament of Realizations, spoken to the realized being Asanga by Lord
Maitreya.]

སྔ་མ་ལ་མ་གྲུབ་ན། འདས་པ་ཆོས་ཅན། དངོས་པོ་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ། བྱས་པ་ཡིན་
པའི་ཕྱིར།

[Then I disagree to your earlier statement.]

Suppose you say that the earlier one is not correct.

Consider the past.

It is so a working thing,
Because it is something made.

མ་གྲུབ་ན། དེ་ཚོས་ཅན། ༄ དེར་ཐལ། རྟེན་པ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[It's not correct to say that the past is something made.]

Suppose you say that it's not correct.
Consider this same thing.
It is so,
Because it's something that started.

བྱུང་སྟེ། རྟེན་པ་བྱས་པའི་མཚན་ཉིད་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[It doesn't necessarily follow.]

But it does necessarily follow,
Because "something that started" is the definition of "something made."

སྔ་མར་མ་གྲུབ་ན། འདས་པ་ཚོས་ཅན། རྟེན་པ་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ། རྟེན་ལ་འགགས་
པ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར་ཏེ། འདས་པ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[The earlier point is not correct.]

Suppose you say that the earlier point is not correct.

Consider the past.
It is so something that started,
Because it is something that started and then stopped.
And this is true because it's the past.

དྭགས་གསལ་ཁས་སྤངས། བྱུང་པ་མཚན་ཉིད་ཀྱི་སྟངས་དུ་དངོས། གཞན་ཡང་།
ཞིག་པ་དངོས་པོ་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ། འདས་པ་དངོས་པོ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

You've agreed both to the reason and to what we're asserting must be so, and
the necessity is something that does apply to the definition.

It must moreover be true that that which has been destroyed is a working
thing,
Because the past is a working thing.

རྟགས་བསྐྱབས་ཅིན། འདོད་ན། དངོས་པོ་ཞིག་པ་དངོས་པོ་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ། དངོས་
པོ་ཞིག་པ་ཡོད་པ་གང་ཞིག །ཞིག་པ་དངོས་པོ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

We've already established that the reason is true.

Suppose you do agree.

Is it then the case that a working thing which has been destroyed is still a
working thing?

Because (1) there does exist a working thing which has been destroyed, and (2)
that which has been destroyed is a working thing.

རྟགས་ཕྱི་མ་ཁས། དང་པོ་གྲུབ་སྟེ། དངོས་པོ་འདས་པ་ཡོད་པའི་ཕྱིར།

You've already agreed to the latter part of the reason.

Suppose now you say that the first part is not correct.

The first is too correct,

Because there does exist a working thing which is past.

མ་གྲུབ་ན། དངོས་པོ་ཆོས་ཅན། ཁྱོད་འདས་པ་ཡོད་པར་ཐལ། ཁྱོད་འདུས་བྱས་
ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[It's not correct to say that there does exist a working thing which is
past.]

Suppose you say that it's not correct.

Consider a working thing.

There does too exist it past,

Because it is something that has been produced.

རྩ་བའི་ཐལ་འགྱུར་གཉིས་པ་ལ་འདོད་ན། ཤིང་ཞིག་པ་ཤིང་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ། དངོས་
པོ་ཞིག་པ་དངོས་པོ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར། རྟགས་ཁས།

[Then I agree to your second original statement: it is the case that a
working thing which has been destroyed is still a working thing.]

Suppose you agree to our second original statement.

So is a tree that was already destroyed still a tree?

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Because a working thing which has been destroyed is still a working thing.

You've already accepted the reason.

འདོད་ན། ཤིང་མེས་ཚིག་གི་འོག་རྩ་དུ་ཤིང་ཡོད་པར་ཐལ། ཤིང་ཞིག་པ་ཤིང་གང་
ཞིག ཤིང་མེས་ཚིག་པའི་འོག་རྩ་དུ་ཤིང་ཞིག་པ་ཡོད་པའི་ཕྱིར་ཏེ། ཤིང་མེས་
ཚིག་པའི་ཚེ་ཤིང་ཞིག་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[Then I agree to your original statement: a tree that was already
destroyed is still a tree.]

Suppose you agree to our original statement.

So is it then true that when a tree has been burned up by fire there is still a
tree?

Because (1) a tree that was already destroyed is a tree; and (2) there exists a
destroyed tree subsequent to the burning up of a tree by a fire.

And this is so because—when a tree has been burned up by fire—there is a
tree destroyed.

གོང་དུ་འདོད་ན། ཤིང་མེས་ཚིག་པའི་འོག་རྩ་དུ་ཤིང་མིག་ཤེས་ཀྱིས་མཐོང་བར་
ཐལ། དེའི་འོག་རྩ་དུ་ཤིང་ཡོད་པའི་ཕྱིར། ཏྲགས་ཁས།

[I agree to your statement above.]

Suppose you agree to our statement above.

Is it then the case that—subsequent to the burning up of a tree by a fire—you
can still see a tree by using your visual consciousness?

Because there does exist a tree subsequent to that point.

You already agreed to the reason.

བྱུང་པ་བྱུང་ཅིང་། འདོད་མི་རུས་ཏེ། རྣམ་འགྲུལ་ལས། སྐྱེ་ཕྱིར་འཇིག་པ་འཇིག་
ཅན་འགྱུར། །དེ་ལྟར་ན་འང་ཤིང་མཐོང་འགྱུར། །ཞེས་པའི་གཞུང་དེ་ཞིག་པ་དངོས་
པོར་འདོད་པ་ལ་ཏེ་ཅང་ཐལ་བའི་སྐྱོན་འཕྲིན་པའི་གཞུང་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

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If the one is the case, then the other is necessarily so. [That is, if there does exist a tree subsequent to that point, then you must be able to see it by using your visual consciousness.]

And you cannot agree to this last statement;

Because the following quotation from the *Commentary on Valid Perception* was meant to point out—to those who asserted that something which was destroyed could ever be a working thing—what very absurd consequences their position entailed:

Because it has started, then the destruction
Must be destroyed; and then the tree
Would have to be seen once more.

ཅུ་བའི་མཚན་ཉིད་གཉིས་པ་ལ། ཤེས་བྱ་ཚེས་ཅན། སྐྱེས་ལ་མ་འགགས་པ་ཡིན་
པར་ཐལ། ད་ལྟར་བ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར། བྱེད་པ་ཁས།

Concerning the second of the original definitions, [that the definition of the present is "that which has begun and not yet stopped,"] we pose the following:

Consider "knowable things."
So is it something which has begun and not yet stopped?
Because it is something of the present.

[It doesn't necessarily follow.]

But you already agree that it does necessarily follow.

རྟགས་བྱུང་སྟེ། གཞི་བྱུང་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[It's not correct to say that "knowable things" is something of the present.]

It is so correct,
Because it can be established as existing.

གོང་དུ་འདོད་ན། ཤེས་བྱ་ཚེས་ཅན། སྐྱེས་པར་ཐལ། སྐྱེས་ལ་མ་འགགས་པའི་ཕྱིར།
རྟགས་ཁས།

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[Then I agree to your statement above: "knowable things" is something that has begun and not yet stopped.]

Suppose you agree to our statement above.

Consider "knowable things."
So is it something which ever began?
Because it has begun and not yet stopped.

You already agreed to the reason.

འདོད་ན། དེ་ཚེས་ཅན། མ་སྐྱེས་པར་ཐལ། ཏྲག་པ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར། འདོད་ན།
དངོས།

[Then I agree to your statement.]

Suppose you agree to our statement.

Consider this same thing..
It is not so, that it is something which ever began,
Because it is an unchanging thing.

If you agreed [that an unchanging thing could begin], then what we would answer to you is obvious.

རྩ་བའི་མཚན་ཉིད་གསུམ་པ་ལ། མ་འོངས་པ་ཡོད་པར་ཐལ། དེའི་མཚན་ཉིད་ཡོད་
པའི་ཕྱིར་ཏེ། སྐྱེ་བའི་རྩུ་ཡོད་ཀྱང་མ་སྐྱེས་པའི་ཆ་དེ། མ་འོངས་པའི་མཚན་ཉིད་ཡིན་
པའི་ཕྱིར། ཏྲགས་ཁས།

Concerning the third of the original definitions, [that the definition of the future is: "that condition of having not yet begun, although the causes for beginning are present,"] we pose the following:

So is it true then that the future exists?
Because it is something which has a definition;
Because "that condition of having not yet begun, although the causes for beginning are present" is the definition of the future.

You already agreed that the reason was true.

གོང་དུ་འདོད་ན། མ་འོངས་པ་ཁོ་ཁོ་རང་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ། དེ་ཡོད་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[Then I agree to your point above.]

Suppose you agree to the above.
So is it then the case that the future is itself?
Because it does exist.

འདོད་ན། མ་འོངས་པ་ཆོས་ཅན། སྐྱེ་བའི་རྒྱ་ཡོད་ཀྱང་མ་སྐྱེས་པའི་ཆ་ཡིན་པར་
ཐལ། མ་འོངས་པ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར། དྲགས་ཁས། བྱབ་པ་མཚན་ཉིད་ཀྱི་སྤང་དུ་
དངོས།

[I agree to your statement: the future is itself.]

Suppose you agree to our original statement.

Consider the future.
So is it then a condition of having not yet begun, although the causes for
beginning are present?
Because it is the future.

You already agreed to the reason,
And it is obvious that the necessity must apply to the definition.

འདོད་ན། ཕྱི་དང་བྱས་པས། ཁ་ཅིག །མ་འོངས་པ། སྐྱེ་བའི་རྒྱ་ཡོད་ཀྱང་མ་སྐྱེས་
པའི་ཆ་ཡིན་པར་འདོད་ཟེར། ཁ་ཅིག །ཕྱོད་གཞི་ཆ་དེ་ནས་སྐྱེ་བའི་རྒྱ་ཡོད་ཀྱང་མ་
སྐྱེས་པའི་ཆ་ཡིན་པ་འདོད་ཟེར།

[Then I agree.]

Suppose you agree.
Depending on how they read this definition [in the Tibetan], some people
claim, "I agree that the future is the condition of having not yet begun,
although the causes for beginning are present (Tib: *skye ba'i rgyu yod*)."
Others claim, "I agree that the object of our argument [the future] is the condition of
having not yet begun, even though it has cause to begin from this same
condition (Tib: *skye ba'i rgyu yod*)."

འོན། ཅི་ལྷགས་སྒྲ་མ་ལ། མ་འོངས་པ་སྐྱེ་བའི་རྒྱ་ཡོད་པར་ཐལ། དེ་སྐྱེ་བའི་རྒྱ་
ཡོད་ཀྱང་མ་སྐྱེས་པའི་ཆ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར། ཉགས་ཁས།

Well suppose then that you read it the first way.

So does there exist a cause that makes the future begin?
Because the future is the condition of having not yet begun, even though the
causes for beginning are present.

You've already accepted the reason.

འདྲོད་ན། མ་འོངས་པ་སྐྱེ་བའི་རྒྱ་དངོས་པོ་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ། དེ་ཡོད་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[I agree that there does exist a cause that makes the future begin.]

Suppose you agree.
So is this cause that makes the future begin a working thing?
Because it does exist.

འདྲོད་ན། མ་འོངས་པ་སྐྱེ་བའི་རྒྱ་ཆོས་ཅན། བྱས་པ་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ། དངོས་པོ་ཡིན་
པའི་ཕྱིར།

[I agree that it is.]

Suppose you agree.
Consider this cause that makes the future begin.
Is it something made?
Because it is a working thing.

འདྲོད་ན། དེ་ཆོས་ཅན། སྐྱེས་པ་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ། བྱས་པ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར། ཉགས་
ཁས།

[I agree that it is a working thing.]

Suppose you agree.
Consider this same thing.
Is it then something which has begun?
Because it is something made.

You already agreed to the reason.

འདོད་མི་བྱས་ཏེ། མ་སྐྱེས་པ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར་ཏེ། མ་སྐྱེས་པའི་ཆ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར་ཏེ།
ཡོད་ཀྱང་མ་སྐྱེས་པའི་ཆ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར། རྟགས་གསལ་ཁས་སྤངས།

But you cannot agree,
Because it is something which has not yet begun;
Because it is the condition of having not yet begun;
Because it is a condition where, even though [its cause] exists, it has not yet begun.

You've already agreed both to the reason and to what we're asserting must be so.

ཅུ་བའི་ཅི་ལྷགས་ཕྱི་མ་ལ་སྐྱོན་འདི་ལྟར། སྐྱེ་བའི་སྐུ་དངོས་པོ་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ། སྐྱེ་
བའི་སྐུ་ཡོད་པའི་ཕྱིར།

And the following problem applies to the latter way of reading the phrase.

Is it then the case that this cause that will make it begin is a working thing?
Because the cause that will make the future begin exists.

མ་བྱུང་ན། སྐྱེ་བའི་སྐུ་ཆོས་ཅན། ཡོད་པར་ཐལ། ཡོད་ཀྱང་མ་སྐྱེ་བའི་ཆ་ཡིན་པའི་
ཕྱིར། རྟགས་གསལ་ཁས།

[It's not correct to say that the cause that will make the future begin exists.]

Suppose you say that it's not correct.

Consider this cause that will make the future begin.

It does so exist,

Because [the future] is a condition where, even though [its cause exists], it has not yet begun.

You've already agreed both to the reason and to what we're asserting must be so.

མ་བྱུང་ན། རྟགས་བཞག་མ་ཆགས་སོ།

[It doesn't necessarily follow.]

If you say it doesn't necessarily follow, then your whole presentation collapses.

གོང་དུ་འདོད་ན། སྐྱེ་བའི་རྒྱ་ཚེས་ཅན། སྐྱེས་པར་ཐལ། དངོས་པོ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[Then I agree to your statement above.]

Suppose you agree to our statement above.
Consider the cause that makes [the future] begin.
It must then be something which has begun,
Because it is a working thing.

འདོད་ན། དེ་ཚེས་ཅན། མ་སྐྱེས་པར་ཐལ། མ་སྐྱེས་པའི་ཚེས་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར་ཏེ།
མ་སྐྱེས་པའི་ཆ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[I agree that the cause that makes the future begin is something which has begun.]

Suppose you agree.
Consider then this same thing.
It is not the case that it has already begun,
Because it is a thing which has yet to begin,
Because it is a condition of not having yet begun.

མ་གྲུབ་ན། སྐྱེ་བའི་རྒྱ་ཚེས་ཅན། མ་སྐྱེས་པའི་ཆ་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ། ཡོད་ཀྱང་མ་སྐྱེས་པའི་ཆ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[It's not correct to say that the cause which makes the future begin is a condition of not having yet begun.]

Suppose you say that it's not correct.

Consider this cause that makes the future begin.
It is so the condition of not having yet begun,
Because it is the condition of having not yet begun, even though it exists.

རྟགས་གསལ་གཉིས་ཀྱིས་ཀྱང་།

You've already both to the reason and to what we're asserting must be so.

༥ ཁ་ཅིག་གིས། རྟེན་པའི་རྒྱ་ཡོད་དམ་མེད་ཟེར་ན།

Suppose someone comes and makes the following claim:

Does there exist a cause for something to begin or not?

རང་རིས་ཡོད་བྱས་པ་ལ་ཁོ་ན་རེ། རྟེན་པའི་རྒྱ་མེད་པར་ཐལ། རྟེན་པ་མེད་པའི་ཕྱིར་ཏེ།
དངོས་པོ་ཡིན་ན། རྟེན་པ་མ་ཡིན་པས་བྱུང་པའི་ཕྱིར་ཏེ། དངོས་པོ་ཡིན་ན། རྟེན་ཟེན་
པས་བྱུང་པ་གང་ཞིག ། རྟེན་ཟེན་གྱི་དངོས་པོ་སྐར་ཡང་བཏབ་སྟེ་རྟེན་པ་མེད་པའི་
ཕྱིར་ཟེར་ན།

We answer that there does, and then someone comes and makes the following claim:

But isn't it the case that no cause for something to begin exists?
Because isn't it the case that nothing beginning exists?
Because isn't it the case that, if something is a working thing, it can
never be beginning?
Because (1) isn't it the case that, if something is a working thing, it must
be something that began already; and (2) isn't it the case that, if
a working thing has begun already, it cannot start all over again?

འདིར་མ་བྱུང་།

To this we answer, "It doesn't necessarily follow."

༥ ཡང་ཁོ་ན་རེ། རྟེན་པ་མེད་པར་ཐལ། རྟེན་འགྱུར་དང་། རྟེན་དགོས་དང་། རྟེན་ཁ་མ་
དང་། རྟེན་བཞིན་པ་རྣམས་རེ་རེ་ནས་མེད་པའི་ཕྱིར་ན།

Suppose someone comes again and claims,

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Reading Ten

So is it then the case that there are no beginnings at all?
Because none of the following exist: "something that's going to begin,"
"something that needs to begin," "something that's about to
begin," and "something that's in the act of beginning."

མ་བྱུང་པའི་ལན་བཏང་ནས། འདི་ལྟར། རྒྱུ་བ་ཡོད་པར་ཐལ། རྒྱུ་བ་སྔ་ཕྱི་ཡོད་པའི་
ཕྱིར་ཏེ། རྒྱུ་བ་སྔ་ཕྱི་དུ་མར་ཚོགས་གཉིས་གོམས་པ་ཡོད་པའི་ཕྱིར་ཏེ། རྒྱུ་བ་སྔ་ཕྱི་དུ་
མར་ཚོགས་གཉིས་གོམས་པ་ལས་ཚད་མའི་རྒྱུས་བྱར་འབྲུངས་པ་ཡོད་པའི་ཕྱིར་ཏེ།

To this we say, "It doesn't necessarily follow," and then we say:

It's like this. The beginning or the birth of something does too
exist,
Because past and future births exist.
And this is true because there exists the practice of amassing the two
collections over a great many births, past and future.
And this is true because there does exist the creation of an Infallible
Being, who comes from the practice of amassing the two
collections over a great many births, past and future.

སྐབ་བྱེད་ལ་ལྟོས་ཚད་ཡིན་རིགས། ཞེས་པ་དང་། སྐབ་བྱེད་ཐུགས་ཇི་གོམས་ལས་
ཏེ། ཞེས་པ་ནམས་གྱི་དོན་གྲུབ་པའི་ཕྱིར།

And this itself is true, because there is a point to the following
two quotations:

By relying on the various proofs
It's right to say "infallible."

And—

The proof is that it comes from the practice
Of the attitude of compassion.

*[Both quotations are from the Commentary on Valid Perception, and are used to
establish that an Enlightened Being is produced from many eons spent amassing the
two collections.]*

གཞན་ཡང་། རིགས་པའི་དབང་ཕྱག་ཡབ་སྐུ་གི་ལྷགས་དོར་ནས། སྤྱི་ལྷགས་
རྒྱུ་པའི་གྱི་རྒྱུ་སྤྱི་ལྷགས་པར་ཐལ། ཚད་མ་རྒྱུ་གྱུར་དོར་ཤེས་ཡིན། །དེ་
སྤྱི་ལྷགས་ཀྱང་མེད་པའི་ཕྱིར། །ནམ་ཉན་བྱེད་པ་ཡོད་མ་ཡིན། །ཞེས་ནི་ཁ་ཅིག་རབ་ཏུ་
བརྗོད། །ཞེས་པ་དང་། སྤྱི་ལྷགས་ལ་བརྗོད་པའི་ཕྱིར། །གོམས་པས་གྲུབ་པ་མེད་ཅེ་
ན། །ཞེས་པའི་ཕྱི་གས་སྤྱི་ལྷགས་སྤྱི་ལྷགས་ལེན་རིགས་པའི་ཕྱིར་ཏེ།

Are you saying, moreover, that it is proper to throw away the whole system
of those Lords of Reasoning, the Father and his spiritual Sons, and go
following the system of that non-Buddhist school, the Rejectionists
(Lokayata)?

Because you would have to accept the other side as our side in the following
verses:

"An Infallible One would have to know
Even things that are hidden, and there's
No proof that shows he can;
Neither is there a way to try."
Thus do a number of them
Make their presentation.

And—

Because the mind is something
That depends upon the body,
There is nothing you can achieve
Through practice [over many lifetimes].

སྤྱི་ལྷགས་སྤྱི་ལྷགས་ཀྱི་མཚན་གཉིས་གོམས་པའི་སངས་རྒྱུ་ལྷགས་པ་མི་སྤྱི་ལྷགས་
ལས་ལེན་རིགས་པའི་ཕྱིར་ཏེ། སྤྱི་ལྷགས་སྤྱི་ལྷགས་ཀྱི་མཚན་གཉིས་གོམས་པའི་སངས་རྒྱུ་ལྷགས་
ལས་ལེན་རིགས་པའི་ཕྱིར་ཏེ། སྤྱི་ལྷགས་སྤྱི་ལྷགས་ཀྱི་མཚན་གཉིས་གོམས་པའི་སངས་རྒྱུ་ལྷགས་
ལས་ལེན་རིགས་པའི་ཕྱིར་ཏེ། སྤྱི་ལྷགས་སྤྱི་ལྷགས་ཀྱི་མཚན་གཉིས་གོམས་པའི་སངས་རྒྱུ་ལྷགས་

And this is true because it would then be right for you to accept the position
that it's impossible for there to exist an enlightened realized being who has
practiced assembling the two collections over a great many births, past and
future.

༥ ཡང་ཁོ་ན་རེ། སྐྱེ་ཁ་མའི་དངོས་པོ་ཡོད་པར་ཐལ། མའི་མངལ་ནས་སྐྱེ་ཁ་མའི་
དངོས་པོ་ཡོད་པའི་ཕྱིར་ཟེར་ན།

Suppose someone comes again and claims,

There must too exist a working thing which is about to begin,
Because there exists a working thing which is about to
take birth from their mother's womb.

སྐྱེ་བཞིན་པའི་དངོས་པོ་ཡོད་པར་ཐལ། མའི་མངལ་ནས་སྐྱེ་བཞིན་པའི་དངོས་པོ་ཡོད་
པའི་ཕྱིར། བྱུང་པ་འགྲིག།

So does there exist then a working thing which is in the act of beginning?
Because there exists a working which is about to take birth from their mother's
womb.

The fact that it follows is something you find acceptable.

འདོད་མི་རྒྱས་ཏེ། དཔལ་ལྷན་ལྷ་བས། སྐྱེ་བཞིན་པ་ནི་སྐྱེ་ལ་ཕྱོགས་པས་ཡོད་མིན་
ཞིང་། །ཞེས་གསུངས་པའི་ཕྱིར།

But you cannot agree, because the glorious Chandrakirti has stated, "Since
something in the act of beginning is only approaching beginning, it is not
something which exists."

གཞན་ཡང་། མ་སྐྱེས་པའི་དངོས་པོ་ཡོད་པར་ཐལ། མའི་མངལ་ནས་མ་སྐྱེས་པའི་
དངོས་པོ་ཡོད་པའི་ཕྱིར།

And are you, furthermore, saying that there exists a working thing which
hasn't begun?
Because there exists a working thing which hasn't begun, from their mother's
womb.

ཁ་ཅིག །དྲགས་མ་གྲུབ་ཟེར་ན།

Suppose someone comes and says, "It's incorrect [to say that there exists a working thing which hasn't begun, from their mother's womb].

རྟགས་གྲུབ་སྟེ། མའི་མངལ་དུ་གནས་བཞིན་པའི་སྐྱེས་བྱ་ཡོད་པ་གང་ཞིག །རྟགས་
སྐྱེས་གྱི་དངོས་པོ་ཡང་ཡོད་པའི་ཕྱིར།

But it is correct, because (1) there does exist a person who is in the act of staying in their mother's womb, and (2) there also exists a working thing which is born complete.

ཡང་། སྐྱེས་ཟིན་གྱི་དངོས་པོ་སྤྲར་ཡང་སྐྱེ་བ་ཡོད་པར་ཐལ། སྐྱེས་ཟིན་གྱི་སེམས་
ཅན། སྤྲར་ཡང་སྐྱེ་བ་ཡོད་པའི་ཕྱིར་ཏེ། སྐྱེས་ཟིན་གྱི་སེམས་ཅན་སྤྲར་ཡང་འཁོར་
བར་སྐྱེ་བ་ཡོད་པའི་ཕྱིར་ཏེ། འཁོར་བར་སྐྱེས་ཟིན་གྱི་སེམས་ཅན་སྤྲར་ཡང་འཁོར་
བར་སྐྱེ་བ་ཡོད་པའི་ཕྱིར་ཏེ། མིར་སྐྱེས་ཟིན་གྱི་སེམས་ཅན་སྤྲར་ཡང་མིར་སྐྱེ་བ་ཡོད་
པ་གང་ཞིག །འདོད་པར་སྐྱེས་ཟིན་གྱི་སེམས་ཅན་སྤྲར་ཡང་འདོད་པར་སྐྱེ་བ་ཡོད་
པའི་ཕྱིར།

Are you saying, moreover, that a working thing which has already begun begins again?

Because there exists a living being who has already taken birth, and who has to take birth again.

And this is true because there exists a living being who has already taken birth, and who has to take birth again in the circle of suffering life.

And this is true because (1) there exists a living being who has already taken birth as a human, and who has to take birth again as a human; and (2) there exists a living being who has already taken birth into the desire realm, and who has to take birth into the desire realm again.

རྟགས་རེ་རེ་ནས་གྲུབ་སྟེ། མི་ནས་མིར་སྐྱེ་བ་དང་། འདོད་པ་ནས་འདོད་པར་སྐྱེ་བ་
ཡོད་པའི་ཕྱིར། རྟགས་སྟོང་།

Each of the reasons given is correct, because there do exist those who come from a birth as a human and are born as a human; and there do exist those

who come from a birth in the desire realm and are born into the desire realm.
It's easy to accept these reasons.

གཞན་ཡང་། འབྱུང་བ་མེད་པར་ཐལ། དངོས་པོ་ཡིན་ན། འབྱུང་བ་མ་ཡིན་པས་
སྒྲུབ་པའི་ཕྱིར་ཏེ། དངོས་པོ་ཡིན་ན། བྱུང་ཟིན་པས་སྒྲུབ་པའི་ཕྱིར། སྒྲུབ་པ་འགྲིག་པས།

And is it, moreover, the case that there exists nothing which is occurring?
Because nothing which is a working thing could ever be something which is
occurring.

And this is because anything which is a working thing is something which has
already occurred.

The fact that it follows is something you find acceptable.

རྟགས་གྲུབ་སྟེ། དངོས་པོ་ཡིན་ན། རང་རྒྱུ་ལས་བྱུང་ཟིན་པས་སྒྲུབ་པའི་ཕྱིར་ཏེ། དེ་
ཡིན་ན། རང་རྒྱུ་ལས་སྐྱེས་ཟིན་པས་སྒྲུབ་པའི་ཕྱིར།

The reason we've stated is correct, because anything which is a working thing
is something which has already occurred from its own causes.

And this is true because anything which is a working thing is something
which has already begun from its own causes.

རྩ་བར་འདོད་ན། འབྱུང་བ་ཡོད་པར་ཐལ། འབྱུང་བ་བཞི་ཡོད་པའི་ཕྱིར་ཏེ། འབྱུང་
བ་ཆེན་པོ་བཞི་ཡོད་པའི་ཕྱིར་ཏེ། ས་རྒྱ་མི་རླུང་བཞི་ཡོད་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[Then I agree to your original statement: it is the case that there exists
nothing which is occurring.]

Suppose you agree to our original statement.

There does too exist something which is occurring,

Because there exist the four great elements.

And this is because there do exist the four of earth, water, fire, and wind.

[Translator's note: This argument depends upon the fact that the Tibetan words for
"occurring" and for "element" have the same spelling ('byung ba).]

སྒྲུབ་སྟེ། དེ་བཞི་ལ། འབྱུང་བ་ཆེན་པོ་བཞིར་མཁས་མཆོག་དབྱིག་གཉིན་གྱིས་

གསུངས་པའི་ཕྱིར་ཏེ། མཛོད་ལས། འབྲུང་བ་དག་ནི་ས་ཁམས་དང་། །རྩ་དང་མི་
དང་རླུང་ཁམས་རྣམས། །ཞེས་གསུངས་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[It doesn't necessarily follow.]

It does necessarily follow, because that highest master, Vasubandhu, has stated
that the great elements are four.
And this is true because the *Treasure House* says,

The elements are the following:
The divisions of elements we call
Earth and water and fire and wind.

༥ ཡང་ཁོ་ན་རེ། སྐྱེ་དགོས་གྱི་དངོས་པོ་ཡོད་པར་ཐལ། སྐྱེ་འགྲུར་གྱི་དངོས་པོ་ཡོད་
པའི་ཕྱིར་ཏེ། འབྲུང་འགྲུར་གྱི་དངོས་པོ་ཡོད་པའི་ཕྱིར་ཟེར་ན།

Suppose yet another person comes and claims:

There must too exist a working thing which still has to start,
Because there does exist a working thing which is going to start.
And this is because there does exist a working thing which is going to
occur.

མ་ཁྲལ། རྟགས་གྲུབ་སྟེ། སྔོ་སེར་དཀར་དམར་བཞི་སོགས་འབྲུང་འགྲུར་ཡིན་པའི་
ཕྱིར་དང་། འབྲུང་འགྲུར་གྱི་རིག་བྱ་ཡོད་པའི་ཕྱིར་ཏེ། རིག་བྱ་ལ་འབྲུང་བ་དང་
འབྲུང་འགྲུར་གཉིས་ཡོད་པའི་ཕྱིར།

To this we answer, "It doesn't necessarily follow."

The reason in itself though does apply to the subject,
Because the four of blue, yellow, white, and red and the like are all derivatives
of the elements, and there also exist tangible objects which are
derivatives of the elements.
And this is true because all tangible objects can be divided into two types:
those that are elements, and those that are derivatives of the elements.

Course XIII: The Art of Reasoning
Reading Ten

[Translator's note: This argument depends on the fact that the Tibetan for "going to occur" and for "derivative of the elements" is the same ('byung-'gyur).]

མཛོད་ལས། རིག་བྱ་ནམ་པ་གཉིས་ཡིན་ཏེ། །ཞེས་གསུངས་པའི་ཕྱིར།

And this is true because *The Treasure House of Wisdom* says,

Tangible objects are of two types...

རྩ་བར་འདོད་མི་རྣམས་ཏེ། དངོས་པོ་ཡིན་ན། རྒྱུས་ཟིན་པས་བྱབ་པའི་ཕྱིར།

You can't though agree to the original statement, [that there must exist a working thing which still has to start],
Because anything which is a working thing is something which must have already started.

དེ་ལ་ཁོ་ན་རེ། འབྱུང་འགྱུར་གྱི་དངོས་པོ་མེད་པར་ཐལ། དངོས་པོ་ཡིན་ན། བྱང་
ཟིན་པས་བྱབ་པའི་ཕྱིར། ཞེས་ཁ་ཅིག་ཟེར་བ་ནི།

On this point some may make the following claim:

It must so be the case that there exists no working thing which is going to occur,
Because anything which is a working thing must have already occurred.

ཡིགས་པར་མ་བདགས་པས་ནོངས་པ་ཡིན་ཏེ། རྒྱེ་འགྱུར་དང་རྒྱེ་དགོས་ཞེས་པ་སྤྲར་
རྒྱེ་འགྱུར་དང་། སྤྲར་རྒྱེ་དགོས་ཁོ་ན་ལ་བྱེད་པར་མཚུངས་གྲང་།

This position though reflects a gross error of failing to examine things thoroughly. The expressions "going to start" and "still needs to start" are equivalent in meaning, exclusively, "going to start from the beginning" and "still needs to start from the beginning."

འབྱུང་དགོས་ཞེས་པ་སྤྲར་འབྱུང་དགོས་པ་ཁོ་ན་དང་། འབྱུང་འགྱུར་ཞེས་པ་ད་ལྟར་
བྱང་ཟིན་སྡོན་པོ་དང་། ཚ་བ་དང་། བྱང་བའི་རིག་བྱ་སོགས་ལའང་འཇུག་པའི་བར་
འཆད་མཛོད་པ་མ་ཐོས་པས་ནོངས་པའི་ཕྱིར།

But whereas "still needs to occur" means, exclusively, "still needs to occur from the beginning," the [Tibetan phrase for] "going to occur" also applies to things which have already occurred, such as the color blue, or the tangible objects of heat or cold, and so on. And the mistake by the opponent here is that they have never heard the terms explained this way.

༩ ཁ་ཅིག །བུམ་པའི་དུས་སུ་སྐྱེས་ལ་འགགས་པ་བུམ་པའི་དུས་སུ་འདས་པའི་
མཚན་ཉིད། བུམ་པའི་དུས་སུ་སྐྱེ་བའི་རྒྱ་ཡོད་ཀྱང་མ་སྐྱེས་པ། བུམ་པའི་དུས་སུ་མ་
འོངས་པའི་མཚན་ཉིད། བུམ་པའི་དུས་སུ་སྐྱེས་ལ་མ་འགགས་པ་བུམ་པའི་དུས་སུ་ད་
ལྟར་བའི་མཚན་ཉིད་ཟེར་ན།

Suppose someone comes and makes the following claim:

The definition of something "past" relative to the time of a water pitcher is "that which has started and also stopped, in the time that the water pitcher is present."

The definition of something "future" relative to the time of a water pitcher is "that which is such that—although the causes for it to start are already present—it has yet to start, in the time that the water pitcher is present."

The definition of something "present" relative to the time of a water pitcher is "that which has started and not yet stopped, in the time that the water pitcher is present."

དང་པོ་ལ། བུམ་པའི་རྒྱ་ཚུ་ཅན། བུམ་པའི་དུས་སུ་སྐྱེས་ལ་འགགས་པ་ཡིན་པར་
ཐལ། དེའི་དུས་སུ་འདས་པ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར་ཏེ། ཚུ་ཅན་དེའི་ཕྱིར།

Let us address the first of these definitions.

Consider the cause of a water pitcher.

Is this cause then something which has started and also stopped, in the time that the water pitcher is present?

Because it is something which is past relative to the time of the water pitcher. And this is because it is the example we've chosen here.

ཕྱིན་མར་འདོད་ན། བུམ་པའི་རྒྱ་ཆོས་ཅན། བུམ་པའི་དུས་སུ་སྐྱེས་པ་ཡང་ཡིན།
འགགས་པ་ཡང་ཡིན་པའི་གཞི་མཐུན་པ་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ། འདོད་པའི་ཕྱིར།

And suppose you agree to the previous statement. [That is, suppose you agree that the cause of a water pitcher is something which has started and also stopped in the time of the water pitcher.]

Consider again the cause of a water pitcher.

Is it then one thing which has both (1) started in the time of the water pitcher and (2) stopped in the time of the water pitcher?

[Why do you say that?]

Because you agreed.

འདོད་ན། དེ་ཆོས་ཅན། བུམ་པའི་དུས་སུ་སྐྱེས་པ་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ། འདོད་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[Then I agree that the cause of a water pitcher is one thing which has both (1) started in the time of the water pitcher and (2) stopped in the time of the water pitcher.]

Suppose you agree then.

Consider this same thing.

Is it then something which has started in the time of the water pitcher?

[Why do you say that?]

Because you agreed above.

འདོད་མི་རྣམས་ཏེ། བུམ་པའི་དུས་སུ་མ་སྐྱེས་པ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར་ཏེ། དེའི་དུས་སུ་མ་
བྱས་པ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

And yet you can't agree, because it is something which has not started in the time of the water pitcher.

And this is because it is something which has not been made in the time of the water pitcher.

མ་བྱས་ན། བྱས་ཤི། དེའི་དུས་སུ་མ་སྐྱེས་པ་དེ། དེའི་དུས་སུ་མ་བྱས་པའི་མཚན་

ཉིད་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར་ཏེ། དེའི་དུས་སུ་མ་བྱས་པ་ཡོད་པ་གང་ཞིག །མ་སྐྱེས་པ་མ་བྱས་
པའི་མཚན་ཉིད་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར་ཏེ། སྐྱེས་པ་བྱས་པའི་མཚན་ཉིད་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

[It's not necessarily the case that, because the cause of a pitcher is something which has not been made in the time of the water pitcher, it must be something which has not started in the time of the water pitcher.]

Suppose you say that it's not necessarily the case.

It is though necessarily the case,

Because the very definition of something's not having been made in a certain time is "something's not having started" in that same time.

And this is true because (1) there is at that time something which hasn't been made, and (2) the definition of "something that hasn't been made" is "something that hasn't started."

And this is true because "something that has started" is the definition of "something that has been made."

མ་བྱས་འཚམས་ལ་མ་བྱས་ན། དེ་ཚེས་ཅན། དེའི་དུས་སུ་མ་བྱས་པར་བལ། དེའི་
དུས་སུ་མེད་པའི་ཕྱིར་ཏེ། དེའི་དུས་སུ་འགགས་པ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར་ཏེ། དེའི་དུས་སུ་
སྐྱེས་ལ་འགགས་པ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར། དྲགས་ཁས།

Now suppose that you were to answer "it's not correct to say that" above, where you answered "it doesn't necessarily follow." [That is, suppose you say that it's not correct to say that the cause of a water pitcher is something which has not been made in the time of the water pitcher.]

Consider this same thing.

It is so true that it has not been made in that particular time,

Because it doesn't even exist in that particular time.

And this is because it has stopped in that particular time.

And this is because, in that particular time, it has started and also stopped.

And you've already agreed to what we stated as our reason.

གཞན་ཡང་། བྱས་པའི་རྒྱ་ཚེས་ཅན། བྱས་པའི་དུས་སུ་སྐྱེས་པ་ཡང་ཡིན།
འགགས་པ་ཡང་ཡིན་པའི་གཞི་མཐུན་པ་མ་ཡིན་པར་བལ། འགགས་པ་མ་ཡིན་པའི་

ཕྱིར་ཏེ། མ་འགགས་པ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར་ཏེ། འདུས་བྱས་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར་ཏེ།

Consider, moreover, the cause of a water pitcher, once again.
It is not so, that it is one thing which has both (1) started in the time of the
water pitcher, and (2) stopped in this same time,
Because it is not something which has stopped.
And this is true because it hasn't stopped.
And this is true because it is a produced thing.

༥ ཡང་ཁོ་ན་རེ། བྱས་པའི་རྒྱ་ཚུལ་ཅན། བྱས་པའི་དུས་སུ་སྐྱེས་པ་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ།
བྱས་པའི་དུས་སུ་སྐྱེས་ཟེན་པའི་ཕྱིར་ན། མ་བྱུང་།

Suppose yet another person comes, and makes this claim:

Consider the cause of a water pitcher.
It is too something which has started in the time of the water pitcher,
Because it has finished starting in the time of the water pitcher.

To this we answer, "It doesn't necessarily follow."

དེས་ན། བྱས་པའི་རྒྱ་དེ། བྱས་པའི་དུས་སུ་སྐྱེས་ཀྱང་། དེའི་དུས་སུ་སྐྱེས་པ་མ་ཡིན་
ཟེར་དགོས་ཏེ། དཔེར་ན། རང་རྒྱུད་པ་སོགས་ཀྱིས། ལས་འབྲས་བདེན་ཡང་དེ་
བདེན་པ་མ་ཡིན། ཞེས་བཞེད་པ་དང་ཁས་ལེན་འཛིན་ཕྱོགས་མཚུངས་སོ།།

Therefore we have to express the situation as follows: Although the cause of
the water pitcher, in the time of the water pitcher, has already begun, it is not
something which has begun in the time of the water pitcher. This is for
example like the case where the followers of the Independent group of the
Middle-Way School and such say that "Cause and effect is true [Tib: *bden-pa*],
but not real [Tib: *bden-pa*]." You have to be able to make the same kind of
distinction here.

༥ ཁ་ཅིག །རྣམ་མཁུན་གྱིས་བུམ་པ་མངོན་སུམ་དུ་རྟོགས་ཀྱང་། མངོན་རྗེས་གཉིས་
གྱི་ལྷན་ཕྱེ་བའི་མངོན་སུམ་དུ་མ་རྟོགས་ཟེར། དེ་ནི་ཤིན་ཏུ་འཐད་མོད།

Suppose someone comes along and claims,

Even though omniscience perceives a water pitcher directly, it does not do so in the sense that the word "directly" has when we divide perception into the two of "direct" and "deductive."

To this we answer, "You are absolutely correct."

རྟོག་ཀྱང་། མངོན་སུམ་ཡིན་ན། མངོན་རྗེས་གཉིས་གྱི་ལྷན་ཕྱེ་བའི་མངོན་གསུམ་
ཡིན་པས་བྱུང་བའི་ཕྱིར་ན། རྟོག་པའི་ཆོ་རིགས་པ་བྱུང་དགོས་སོ།

If however someone were to come along in a debate and say that "Every state of direct perception is 'direct' in the sense that this word has when we divide perception into the two of 'direct' and 'deductive'," some logic would be required to prove the point just made.

མཚན་ཉིད་གཉིས་པ་ལ། བུམ་པའི་འབྲས་བུ་ཆོས་ཅན། མ་སྐྱེས་པར་ཐལ། མ་སྐྱེས་
པའི་ཆ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར་ཏེ། བུམ་པའི་དུས་སུ་སྐྱེ་བའི་རྒྱ་ཡོད་ཀྱང་། མ་སྐྱེས་པའི་ཆ་
ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

As for the second definition, [the definition of "the future" given above,] consider the result of a water pitcher.

Is it then something that has not begun?

Because it is the condition of not having begun.

And this is because it is the condition of not having begun, even though the causes for its beginning exist in the time of the water pitcher.

༥ ཁ་ཅིག །མ་བྱུང་ཟེར་ཡང་བསྐྱེས་གྲ་མ་ཆགས་པའི་རྟོགས་སོ།

Now some may come along and claim, in response, that "it doesn't necessarily follow." This however would indicate that they had yet to grasp the meaning of the collected topics on logic and perception.

མ་གྲུབ་ན། དེ་ཚེས་ཅན། བྱམ་པའི་དུས་སུ་སྐྱེ་བའི་རྒྱ་ཡོད་ཀྱང་མ་སྐྱེས་པའི་ཆ་ཡིན་
པར་ཐལ། དེའི་དུས་སུ་མ་འོངས་པ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར། རྟགས་སྒྲ། བྱབ་པ་ཁས།

Suppose someone else came and said, instead, that "Your reason is not correct."

Consider then this same thing: [the result of a water pitcher].

Are you saying that it is the condition of not having begun, even though, in the time of the pitcher, the causes for its beginning are present?

Because it is "the future" at this same time.

The correctness of our reason is easy to accept.

And you've already accepted the necessity.

མཚན་ཉིད་གསུམ་པ་ལ། ཁ་ཅིག །བྱམ་པའི་རྒྱ་ཚེས་ཅན། བྱམ་པའི་དུས་སུ་ད་ལྟར་
བ་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ། བྱམ་པའི་དུས་སུ་སྐྱེས་ལ་མ་འགགས་པ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར། དེར་
ཐལ། བྱམ་པའི་དུས་སུ་སྐྱེས་པ་གང་ཞིག །མ་འགགས་པ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར་ཟེར་ན།

As for the third of the definitions above, [that of "the present,"] suppose someone comes and makes the following claim:

Consider the cause of a water pitcher.

It is so something which is present-time in the time of the water pitcher,
Because it is something which, in the time of the water pitcher, has
begun and not yet stopped.

It is so, because it is both (1) something which has begun in the time of
the water pitcher and (2) something which has not stopped in
that time.

རང་རིས་རྟགས་དང་པོ་མ་གྲུབ་བྱས་པར། དེ་ཚེས་ཅན། དེའི་དུས་སུ་སྐྱེས་པ་ཡིན་
པར་ཐལ། དེའི་དུས་སུ་སྐྱེས་ཟིན་པའི་ཕྱིར་ན། མ་བྱབ།

Our side would answer that the first part of this reason is not correct.

And then the other side would come back with,

Consider then this same thing.

It is too something which has begun in the time of the water pitcher,
Because it is something which has finished beginning in that time.

To this we'd answer, "It doesn't necessarily follow."

།འདས་མ་འོངས་ཡོད་མེད་ལ་དབྱུང་བ་ནི། སྤྱིར་འདས་པ་དང་མ་འོངས་པའི་མཚན་
ཉིད་མེད་དེ། འདས་པ་དང་མ་འོངས་པ་མེད་པའི་ཕྱིར་ཏེ། གཞི་གྲུབ་ན། ད་ལྟར་བ་
ཡིན་པས་བྱུང་པའི་ཕྱིར།

Here next is an analysis of the question of whether the past and the future exist or not. Generally speaking there exist no definitions for "the past" or "the future," because the past and future are not things which even exist. This is because, anything which can be established as existing must always be existing in the present [according to this school of Buddhism].

གཞི་ལ་ལྟོས་ནས་འཇོག་ན། བུམ་པའི་དུས་སུ་སྐྱེས་ཟིན་པ་ཡང་ཡིན། བུམ་པའི་
དུས་སུ་དགགས་ཟིན་པ་ཡང་ཡིན་པའི་གཞི་མཐུན་པ། བུམ་པའི་དུས་སུ་འདས་པའི་
མཚན་ཉིད། དེ་དང་བུམ་པའི་སྤྱི་ལོགས་སུ་བྱུང་བ་དོན་གཅིག

If though we were to establish the meaning of "the past" relative to a specific point of reference, we could say that the definition of its past relative to the time of a specific water pitcher could be given as follows:

Something which has, by the time of the water pitcher, already started; and which has, by the time of the water pitcher, already ended as well.

This and "the pitcher just before the pitcher" amount to the same thing.

བུམ་པའི་དུས་སུ་གྲུབ་ཟིན་པ་ཡང་ཡིན། བུམ་པ་དང་དུས་མཉམ་པ་ཡང་ཡིན་པའི་
གཞི་མཐུན་པར་དམིགས་པ། བུམ་པའི་དུས་སུ་ད་ལྟར་བའི་མཚན་ཉིད།

The definition of its present relative to the time of a specific water pitcher then could be given as follows:

That one thing which is both (1) something which has already come into existence by the time of the water pitcher; and (2) which is simultaneous to the water pitcher.

བུམ་པའི་དུས་སུ་སྐྱེ་བཞིན་པ་ཡང་ཡིན། བུམ་པའི་དུས་སུ་མ་སྐྱེས་པ་ཡང་ཡིན་པའི་
གཞི་མཐུན་པར་དམིགས་པ། བུམ་པའི་དུས་སུ་མ་འོངས་པའི་མཚན་ཉིད།

The definition of its future relative to the time of a specific water pitcher, finally, could be given as follows:

That one thing which is both (1) in the act of starting at the time of the water pitcher; and (2) not yet started at the time of the water pitcher.

བུམ་པའི་མ་འོངས་པ། བུམ་པའི་རྒྱ། བུམ་པའི་དུས་སུ་འདས་པ། བུམ་པ་ལ་སྟོས་
ཏི་འདས་པ་རྣམས་དོན་གཅིག

The following all amount to the same thing:

the not-yet-coming of the water pitcher;
the cause of the water pitcher;
its past at the time of the water pitcher; and
its past relative to the water pitcher.

[Translator's note: "Not-yet-coming" and "future" are the same word in Tibetan (ma-'ongs-pa).]

བུམ་པའི་འདས་པ། བུམ་པའི་འབྲས་བུ། བུམ་པའི་དུས་སུ་མ་འོངས་པ། བུམ་པ་ལ་
སྟོས་ཏི་མ་འོངས་པ་རྣམས་དོན་ཅིག

The following also all amount to the same thing:

the passing of the water pitcher;
the result of the water pitcher;
its future at the time of the water pitcher; and
its future relative to the water pitcher.

[Translator's note: "Passing" and "past" are the same word in Tibetan ('das-pa).]

སྐྱིར་འགགས་པ་མེད། ཞིག་པ་མེད། སྐྱེ་ཁ་མ་མེད། སྐྱེ་བཞིན་པ་མེད། སྐྱེ་བ་ལ་

མངོན་དུ་ཕྱགས་པ་མེད།

Generally speaking, there is no such thing as something which has stopped. And there is nothing which is about to begin. Neither is there anything which is in the act of beginning, nor is there anything which is approaching the state of beginning.

དུ་བ་འདས་པ་ཡོད། དུ་བ་འགགས་པ་ཡོད། དུ་བ་མ་འོངས་པ་ཡོད། དུ་བ་སྐྱེ་ཁ་མ་
ཡོད། དུ་བ་སྐྱེ་བཞིན་པ་ཡོད། དུ་བ་སྐྱེ་བ་ལ་མངོན་དུ་ཕྱགས་པ་ཡོད།

There does exist though the passing of the smoke; and the stopping of the smoke; and the smoke's not yet coming, and the smoke's being about to begin; and the smoke's being in the act of beginning; and the smoke's approaching the state of beginning.

སྐྱེ་བ་ལ་མངོན་དུ་ཕྱགས་པའི་དུ་བ་མེད། སྐྱེ་བཞིན་པའི་དུ་བ་མེད། སྐྱེ་ཁ་མའི་དུ་བ་
མེད། འགགས་པའི་དུ་བ་མེད། ཞིག་པའི་དུ་བ་མེད། འདས་པའི་དུ་བ་མེད། མ་
འོངས་པའི་དུ་བ་མེད།

There is though no such thing as smoke which is approaching the state of beginning. Neither is there any smoke which is in the act of beginning; nor any smoke which is about to begin; nor smoke which has stopped; nor smoke which has been destroyed; nor smoke which is past; nor smoke which is future.

དངོས་པོ། མི་རྟག་པ། སྐད་ཅིག་མ། འཇིགས་བཞིན་པ། འགགས་བཞིན་པ།
འདས་པ་ལ་མངོན་དུ་ཕྱགས་པ། ཞིག་པ་ལ་མངོན་དུ་ཕྱགས་པ་ནམས་དོན་གཅིག་

The following all amount to the same thing:

- a working thing;
- a changing thing;
- a momentary thing;
- a thing which is in the act of being destroyed;
- a thing which is approaching the past;
- a thing which is approaching its destruction.

དམ་བཅའ་འདི་དག་ནི། རིགས་པའི་རྗེས་འབྲང་གི་མདོ་སྡེ་པའི་དབང་དུ་བྱས་སོ།
གཞན་ལ་ནི་མ་ངེས་ཏེ། བྱི་བྲག་སྒྲ་བས། འདས་པའི་ལས་དང་། མ་འོངས་པའི་
ལས་སོགས་ཁས་ལེན་ཅིང་། ཐལ་འགྱུར་བས། ཞིག་པ་དངོས་པོར་བཞེད་པ་སོགས་
བཞེད་ཚུལ་བསམ་གྱིས་མི་བྱབ་པ་ཡོད་པའི་ཕྱིར།

These assertions [about the nature of time] are all presented in accordance with the beliefs of the "Logician" group within the Sutrists School. They would not necessarily be acceptable to any other school of Buddhism. The Detailists, for example, do accept ideas such as past karma and future karma, while the Necessity group entertains unimaginably profound positions such as the one that states that the destruction of something is a working thing.

Formal logic subject:
A Discussion of Incorrect Logical Statements

The following presentation on incorrect "logical" statements is excerpted from An Explanation of the Art of Reasoning (rTags-rigs), by the Tutor of His Holiness the Thirteenth Dalai Lama, Purbuchok Jampa Tsultrim Gyatso (1825-1901).

།གཉིས་པ་རྟགས་ཡང་དག་གི་ལོག་ཕྱོགས་གཏན་ཆོགས་ལྟར་སྒྲུང་བཤད་པ་ལ།
མཚན་ཉིད་དང་། དབྱེ་བ་གཉིས། དང་པོ་ལ། དགག་བཞག་གཉིས་ལས། དང་པོ་
ལ། ཁ་ཅིག་གིས་ཚུལ་གསུམ་མ་ཡིན་པ། གཏན་ཆོགས་ལྟར་སྒྲུང་གི་མཚན་ཉིད་
ཟེར་ན།

Here is the second major division of our presentation, in which we explain the opposite of a correct reason: that is, incorrect reasons. We proceed in two steps: the definition of such reasons, and their various divisions.

The first of these we'll discuss in terms of disproving our opponent's beliefs, and then establishing our own beliefs. Here is the first.

Suppose someone comes and makes the following claim:

"Any reason where the three relationships fail to hold" is the definition of an incorrect reason.

མི་འཐད་དེ། གཏན་ཚིགས་ལྟར་སྒྲུང་མེད་པའི་ཕྱིར་ཏེ། གཞི་བྱུང་ན། དྲགས་ཡང་
དག་ཡིན་པས་བྱུང་པའི་ཕྱིར།

This though is mistaken, for there is no such thing as an incorrect reason: everything which exists is a correct reason [to prove *something*].

གཉིས་པ་རང་ལྷགས་ནི། དེ་སྐྱབ་ཀྱི་ཚུལ་གསུམ་མ་ཡིན་པ། དེ་སྐྱབ་ཀྱི་གཏན་
ཚིགས་ལྟར་སྒྲུང་གི་མཚན་ཉིད།

Here secondly is our own position. The definition of an incorrect reason for a particular proof is:

A reason for a particular proof where the three relationships fail to hold.

གཉིས་པ་དབྱེ་བ་བཤད་པ་ནི། སྤྱིར་གཏན་ཚིགས་ལྟར་སྒྲུང་མེད་ཀྱང་། གཞི་ལ་སྤྱར་
ན། དེ་སྐྱབ་ཀྱི་འགལ་བའི་གཏན་ཚིགས། མ་ངེས་པའི་གཏན་ཚིགས། མ་བྱུང་པའི་
གཏན་ཚིག་དང་གསུམ། དང་པོ་ལ། མཚན་ཉིད། དབྱེ་བ། མཚན་གཞི་སྐྱབ་བྱེད་ཀྱི་
རིགས་པ་འགོད་པ་དང་བཞི།

Here secondly are the various divisions of incorrect reasons. Although there is not, generally speaking, any such thing as an incorrect reason, we can say that there do exist the following types of incorrect reasons in specific contexts:

- 1) Contradictory reasons for specific proofs;
- 2) Indefinite reasons for specific proofs; and
- 3) Wrong reasons for specific proofs.

We will discuss the first of these in four steps: definition; divisions; classical examples; and supporting arguments.

དང་པོ་ནི། སྒྲ་ཏྲག་པར་སྒྲུབ་པའི་ཕྱོགས་ཆོས་ཀྱང་ཡིན། སྒྲ་ཏྲག་པ་མ་ཡིན་པར་
སྒྲུབ་པའི་རྗེས་ཁྱབ་ཀྱང་ཡིན་པའི་གཞི་མཐུན་པ་དེ། སྒྲ་ཏྲག་པར་སྒྲུབ་པའི་འགའ་
ཏྲགས་ཀྱི་མཚན་ཉིད།

Here is the first. The definition of a contradictory reason for proving that sound is an unchanging thing is:

That one thing for which (1) the relationship between the subject and the reason does hold for proving that sound is an unchanging thing; and (2) the positive necessity between the reason and the quality to be proven also holds for proving that sound is *not* an unchanging thing.

[A classical example would be: Consider sound. It is an unchanging thing, because it is a made thing.]

གཉིས་པ་དབྱེ་བ་ནི། མི་མཐུན་ཕྱོགས་ལ་ཁྱབ་བྱེད་དུ་འཇུག་པའི་འགའ་ཏྲགས་དང་།
མི་མཐུན་ཕྱོགས་ལ་རྣམ་གཉིས་སུ་འཇུག་པའི་འགའ་ཏྲགས་གཉིས།

Here secondly are the divisions.

Contradictory reasons can be divided into two kinds: those which have a relationship with the group of dissimilar cases where they cover it completely, and those which have a relationship with the group of dissimilar cases where they go both ways, [covering or not].

གསུམ་པ་མཚན་གཞི་ནི། བྱས་པ་སྒྲ་མི་ཏྲག་པ་མ་ཡིན་པར་སྒྲུབ་པའི་མི་མཐུན་
ཕྱོགས་ལ་ཁྱབ་བྱེད་དུ་འཇུག་པའི་འགའ་ཏྲགས་དང་། བྱས་པའི་བྱེ་བྲག་དེ་སྒྲུབ་ཀྱི་མི་
མཐུན་ཕྱོགས་ལ་རྣམ་གཉིས་སུ་འཇུག་པའི་འགའ་ཏྲགས་ཡིན།

Here thirdly are the classical examples. "Something that was made" is a contradictory reason which has a relationship with the group of dissimilar cases where they cover it completely, in a proof that sound is not a changing thing. "Something which is a particular example of the general type called 'made things'" is a contradictory reason which has a relationship with the group of dissimilar cases where they go both ways, in proving the same thing.

བཞི་པ་སྐབ་བྱེད་འགོད་པ་ནི། བྱས་པ་ཆོས་ཅན། སྐྱ་མི་ཏྲག་པ་མ་ཡིན་པར་སྐབ་པའི་
མི་མཐུན་ཕྱོགས་ལ་བྱབ་བྱེད་དུ་འཇུག་པའི་འགལ་ཏྲགས་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ། དེ་སྐབ་ཀྱི་
འགལ་ཏྲགས་ཡིན་པ་གང་ཞིག །མི་ཏྲག་པ་ཡིན་ན། བྱེད་ཡིན་པས་བྱབ་པའི་ཕྱིར།

Next is the fourth category: the supporting arguments.

Consider "something that was made."

It is so a contradictory reason which has a relationship with the group of
dissimilar cases where they cover it completely, in a proof that sound
is not a changing thing,

Because it is both (1) a contradictory reason for proving this particular thing,
and (2) anything which is changing is also it.

བྱས་པའི་བྱེད་བྱ་ཆོས་ཅན། སྐྱ་མི་ཏྲག་པ་མ་ཡིན་པར་སྐབ་པའི་འགལ་ཏྲགས་ཡིན་
པར་ཐལ། སྐྱ་ཏྲག་པར་སྐབ་པའི་འགལ་ཏྲགས་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར་ཏེ། དེ་སྐབ་ཀྱི་ཕྱོགས་
ཆོས་གང་ཞིག །བྱེད་ཀྱི་ཏྲགས་ཀྱིས་དེ་སྐབ་ཀྱི་ཇེས་བྱབ་ཕྱིན་ཅི་ལོག་དུ་ངེས་པའི་
ཕྱིར།

And consider "something which is a particular example of the general type
called 'made things'."

It is so a contradictory reason which has a relationship with the group of
dissimilar cases where they go both ways, in a proof that sound is not
a changing thing,

Because it is a contradictory reason for proving that sound is an unchanging
thing.

And this is so because (1) the relationship between this reason and the subject
of the particular proof holds; and (2) it is definitely the case that the
positive necessity between it and the quality to be proven is
diametrically false.

གཞན་ཡང་། དེ་ཆོས་ཅན། སྐྱ་ཏྲག་པར་སྐབ་པའི་འགལ་ཏྲགས་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ། སྐྱ་
མི་ཏྲག་པར་སྐབ་པའི་ཏྲགས་ཡང་དག་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

Consider, moreover, this same example.

It is so a contradictory reason for proving that sound is an unchanging thing,
Because it is a correct reason for proving that sound is a changing thing.

ཁོ་ན་རེ། སྒྲ་མི་དྲག་པར་སྒྲུབ་པའི་འགལ་དྲགས་ཡོད་པར་ཐལ། སྒྲ་དྲག་པར་སྒྲུབ་
པའི་འགལ་དྲགས་ཡོད་པའི་ཕྱིར་ཟེར་ན་མ་བྱུང་།

Suppose someone comes and makes the following claim:

So does there exist then a contradictory reason for proving that sound
is a changing thing?

Because there does exist a contradictory reason for proving that sound
is an unchanging thing.

To this we answer, "It doesn't necessarily follow."

འདོད་མི་རྒྱས་ཏེ། སྒྲ་མི་དྲག་པར་སྒྲུབ་པའི་གཏན་ཆོག་སྤྱད་སྒྲུབ་ཡིན་ན། དེ་སྒྲུབ་
གྱི་མ་ངེས་པའི་གཏན་ཆོག་དང་། དེ་སྒྲུབ་གྱི་མ་གྲུབ་པའི་གཏན་ཆོག་གང་རུང་
ཡིན་དགོས་པའི་ཕྱིར།

And you could never agree [that there did exist a contradictory reason for
proving that sound is a changing thing],

Because anything which is an incorrect reason for proving that sound is a
changing thing must be either (1) an indefinite reason for the particular
proof or (2) a wrong reason for the particular proof.

ཁ་ཅིག་གིས། དེ་སྒྲུབ་གྱི་ཚུལ་གསུམ་ཡོད་ན། དེ་སྒྲུབ་གྱི་དྲགས་ཡང་དག་ཡོད་པས་
བྱུང་ཅིས་ཟེར་ན།

Suppose someone comes and makes the following claim:

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If there exist the three relationships for any particular proof, then there must exist a correct reason for the particular proof.

ཤེས་བྱ་ཚེས་ཅན། སྒྲ་ཏྲག་པར་སྒྲུབ་པའི་ཏྲགས་ཡང་དག་ཡོད་པར་ཐལ། སྒྲ་ཏྲག་
པར་སྒྲུབ་པའི་ཚུལ་གསུམ་ཡོད་པའི་ཕྱིར།

Consider all knowable things.

There must then exist a correct reason for proving that sound is an unchanging thing,

Because the three relationships do exist for proving that sound is an unchanging thing.

བྱུང་པ་ཁས། མ་གྲུབ་ན། དེར་ཐལ། དེ་སྒྲུབ་ཀྱི་ཕྱོགས་ཚེས་ཡོད་པ་གང་ཞིག །དེ་
སྒྲུབ་ཀྱི་ཇེས་བྱུང་ཡོད། དེ་སྒྲུབ་ཀྱི་ཕྱོགས་བྱུང་ཡོད་པའི་ཕྱིར།

You've already accepted that it necessarily follows.

Suppose then that you say that it's not correct [that the three relationships do exist for proving that sound is an unchanging thing].

They do too exist, because (1) there exists a relationship between the reason and the subject for this particular proof, and (2) there exists the positive necessity for the proof, and there exists the reverse necessity for the proof.

དང་པོ་གྲུབ་སྟེ། བྱས་པ་དེ་སྒྲ་ཏྲག་པར་སྒྲུབ་པའི་ཕྱོགས་ཚེས་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

The first part of our reason here is correct, because the relationship between the reason and the subject holds when "something made" is used as the reason in a proof that sound is an unchanging thing.

མ་གྲུབ་ན། དེ་ཚེས་ཅན། དེར་ཐལ། དེ་སྒྲུབ་ཀྱི་འགལ་ཏྲགས་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར་ཏེ།
སྒྲ་མི་ཏྲག་པར་སྒྲུབ་པའི་ཏྲགས་ཡང་དག་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

Suppose you say that it's not correct [that the relationship between the reason and the subject holds when "something made" is used as the reason in a proof that sound is an unchanging thing].

Consider this same thing [that is, "something made"].

The relationship does too hold with it,

Because it is a contradictory reason for the particular proof.
And that's true because it is a correct reason for proving that sound is a
changing thing.

གཉིས་པ་གྲུབ་སྟེ། ཆོས་དང་སྐད་ཅིག་མ་མ་ཡིན་པའི་གཞི་མཐུན་པ་དེ། སྐྱེ་ཏྲག་པར་
སྐྱབ་པའི་རྗེས་བྱུང་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

And the second reason is a correct one, because that one thing which is both
an existing phenomenon and something which is not momentary satisfies the
positive necessity in a proof that sound is an unchanging thing.

མ་གྲུབ་ན། དེ་ཆོས་ཅན། དེར་ཐལ། བྱོད་གྱི་ཏྲགས་གྱིས་དེ་སྐྱབ་གྱི་ཏྲགས་ཆོས་
གཉིས་ལྡན་གྱི་མཐུན་དཔེ་ཡང་དག་ཡོད་པ་གང་ཞིག །བྱོད་སྐྱེ་ཏྲག་པར་སྐྱབ་པའི་
མཐུན་ཕྱོགས་ཁོ་ན་ལ་འགོད་ཚུལ་དང་མཐུན་པར་ཡོད་པ་ཉིད་དུ་ཆད་མས་ངེས་པའི་
ཕྱིར།

Suppose you say that this is not correct.

Consider this same thing [that one thing which is both an existing
phenomenon and something which is not momentary].

It does too [satisfy the relationship of positive necessity],

Because (1) there does exist a correct similar example which covers both the
reason and the quality to be proven, in this particular proof where that
"one thing" we mentioned is used as the reason; and (2) this "one thing"
can be verified, through a valid perception, as something that fits only
the group of similar cases, in the way it is stated, within a proof that
sound is an unchanging thing.

དང་པོ་གྲུབ་སྟེ། འདུས་མ་བྱས་གྱི་ནམ་མཁའ་དེ། བྱོད་གྱི་ཏྲགས་གྱིས་དེ་སྐྱབ་གྱི་
ཏྲགས་ཆོས་གཉིས་ལྡན་གྱི་མཐུན་དཔེ་ཡང་དག་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

Now the first part of our reason is correct, because "unproduced, empty space"
would be a correct similar example which covers both the reason and
the quality to be proven in this particular proof, where the "one thing"
we mentioned is used as a reason.

གཉིས་པ་གྲུབ་སྟེ། བྱོན་དེ་སྐྱབ་ཀྱི་མཐུན་ཕྱོགས་ཁོ་ན་ལ་འགོད་ཚུལ་དང་མཐུན་པར་
ཡོད་པའི་ཕྱིར་ཏེ། བྱོན་དྲག་པའི་མཚན་ཉིད་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

And the second part of our reason is correct, because "that one thing which is both an existing phenomenon and something which is not momentary" is something that fits only the group of similar cases, in the way it is stated, within this particular proof.

And this is because it is, in fact, the definition of something which is unchanging.

གོང་གི་གསུམ་པ་གྲུབ་སྟེ། ཆོས་དང་སྐད་ཅིག་མ་མ་ཡིན་པའི་གཞི་མཐུན་པ་དེ་དེ་
ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

The third part of our reason above, [that there exists the reverse necessity for the proof,] is also correct. This is because that one thing which is both (1) an existing phenomenon and (2) something which is not momentary fulfils that same necessity.

མ་གྲུབ་ན། དེ་ཆོས་ཅན། སྐྱ་དྲག་པར་སྐྱབ་པའི་ཕྱོགས་བྱུང་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ། བྱོན་ཀྱི་
དྲགས་ཀྱིས་དེ་སྐྱབ་ཀྱི་དྲགས་ཆོས་གཉིས་དང་མི་ལྡན་པའི་མི་མཐུན་དཔེ་ཡང་དག་
ཡོད། བྱོན་དེ་སྐྱབ་ཀྱི་མི་མཐུན་ཕྱོགས་ལ་མེད་པ་ཁོ་ནར་ཚད་མས་ངེས་པའི་ཕྱིར།

Now suppose you say that our last reason is not correct.

Consider this same thing [that is, that one thing which is both (1) an existing phenomenon and (2) something which is not momentary].

It does so fulfil the reverse necessity for the proof that sound is an unchanging thing,

Because there does exist a correct dissimilar example for the proof in which it serves as the reason; that is, an example which possesses neither the reason nor the quality to be proven for the particular proof. And it can also be verified, through a valid perception, that it only does not fit the group of dissimilar cases for the proof.

རྩ་བར་འདོད་ན། སྐྱ་ཆོས་ཅན། བྱོན་དྲག་པར་སྐྱབ་པའི་དྲགས་ཡང་དག་མེད་པར་

ཐལ། ཁྱོད་རྟག་པ་མ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

Suppose finally that you agree to the original statement: [that is, you agree that there must exist a correct reason for proving that sound is an unchanging thing].

Consider then sound.

It is rather so, that there exists no correct reason for proving that sound is an unchanging thing;

Because it is not something which is unchanging.

ཁོ་ན་རེ། སྒྲ་རྟག་པར་སྒྲུབ་པའི་ཚུལ་གསུམ་ཡིན་པ་ཡོད་པར་ཐལ། དེ་སྒྲུབ་ཀྱི་
ཕྱོགས་ཆོས་ཡིན་པ་ཡོད། དེ་སྒྲུབ་ཀྱི་རྗེས་བྱུང་ཡིན་པ་ཡོད། དེ་སྒྲུབ་ཀྱི་ལྷོག་བྱུང་
ཡིན་པ་ཡོད་པའི་ཕྱིར། ཟེར་ན་མ་བྱུང་བོ།

Suppose someone comes and makes the following claim:

It must then be so, that there is something for which all three relationships hold, in proving that sound is an unchanging thing; Because there is something which fulfils the relationship between the subject and the reason for this proof; and there is something which fulfils the positive necessity for the proof; and there is something which fulfils the reverse necessity for the proof.

To this we reply, "It doesn't necessarily follow."

གཉིས་པ་མ་ངེས་པའི་གཏན་ཆོག་ས་ལའད་པ་ལ། མཚན་ཉིད་དང་། དབྱེ་བ་གཉིས།
དང་པོ་ནི། སྒྲ་རྟག་པར་སྒྲུབ་པའི་ཕྱོགས་ཆོས་ཀྱང་ཡིན། སྒྲ་རྟག་པར་སྒྲུབ་པའི་རྗེས་
བྱུང་མ་ཡིན་པ་ཡང་ཡིན། སྒྲ་རྟག་པ་མ་ཡིན་པར་སྒྲུབ་པའི་རྗེས་བྱུང་མ་ཡིན་པ་ཡང་
ཡིན་པའི་གཞི་མཐུན་པ་དེ། སྒྲ་རྟག་པར་སྒྲུབ་པའི་མ་ངེས་པའི་གཏན་ཆོག་ས་ཀྱི་

མཚན་ཉིད།

Here secondly is our explanation of an indefinite reason; we will proceed first with a definition, and then with the various divisions of this reason. Here is the first of these.

The following is the definition of an indefinite reason for proving that sound is an unchanging thing:

That one thing for which (1) the relationship between the subject and the reason for proving that sound is an unchanging thing does hold; (2) the reverse relationship between the reason and the subject for proving that sound is an unchanging thing does not hold; and (3) the reverse relationship between the reason and the subject for proving that sound is *not* an unchanging thing doesn't hold either.

[A classical example would be: Consider sound. It is an unchanging thing, because there is no such thing as antlers on a rabbit's head.]

གཉིས་པ་དབྱེ་བ་ལ། དེ་སྐབ་ཀྱི་ཐུན་མོང་མ་ཡིན་པའི་མ་ངེས་པའི་གཏན་ཚིགས་དང་།
དེ་སྐབ་ཀྱི་ཐུན་མོང་བའི་མ་ངེས་པའི་གཏན་ཚིགས་གཉིས། དང་པོ་ལ་མཚན་ཉིད་
དང་། མཚན་གཞི་གཉིས་ལས།

Here secondly are the divisions. This kind of reason can be divided into two: unique indefinite reasons for a particular proof, and common indefinite reasons for a particular proof. We will discuss the first of these two in two steps: its definition, and a classical example for it.

དང་པོ་ནི། བྱོད་དེ་སྐབ་ཀྱི་མ་ངེས་པའི་གཏན་ཚིགས་གང་ཞིག །བྱོད་དེ་སྐབ་པ་ལ་
ཕྱོགས་ཚེས་ཅན་དུ་སོང་བའི་གང་ཟག་གིས། བྱོད་དེ་སྐབ་ཀྱི་མཐུན་ཕྱོགས་ལ་ཡོད་
པར་མ་ངེས་པ་ཡང་ཡིན། གང་ཟག་དེས་བྱོད་དེ་སྐབ་ཀྱི་མི་མཐུན་ཕྱོགས་ལ་ཡོད་
པར་མ་ངེས་པ་ཡང་ཡིན་པའི་གཞི་མཐུན་པ་དེ། བྱོད་དེ་སྐབ་ཀྱི་ཐུན་མོང་མ་ཡིན་པའི་
མ་ངེས་པའི་གཏན་ཚིགས་ཡིན་པའི་མཚན་ཉིད།

Here is the first. The definition of something which is a unique indefinite reason for a particular proof is:

That one thing which is both (1) an indefinite reason for a particular proof; and (2) such that a person who already recognizes that it fulfils the relationship between the subject and the reason for the particular proof has yet to verify either one of the following: that it fits the group of similar cases for the proof, or that it fits the group of dissimilar cases for the proof.

གཉིས་པ་མཚན་གཞི་ནི། མཉན་བྱ། སྒྲ་མ་ཡིན་པ་ལས་འོག་པ། སྒྲི་ལྡོག་པ་
ནམས་རེ་རེ་ནས། སྒྲ་ཏྲག་པར་སྒྲུབ་པའི་ཐུན་མོང་མ་ཡིན་པའི་མ་ངེས་པའི་གཏན་
ཆོགས་དང་། སྒྲ་མི་ཏྲག་པར་སྒྲུབ་པའི་ཐུན་མོང་མ་ཡིན་པའི་མ་ངེས་པའི་གཏན་
ཆོགས་གཉིས་ཀ་ཡིན།

Here secondly are some classical examples.

The following are all both unique indefinite reasons for proving that sound is an unchanging thing, and unique indefinite reasons for proving that sound is a changing thing:

something you can hear;
the reverse of all that is not sound; and
the reversal of sound.

གཉིས་པ་ཐུན་མོང་བའི་མ་ངེས་པའི་གཏན་ཆོགས་ལ། མཚན་ནི། དབྱེ་བ་གཉིས་
ལས། དང་པོ་ནི། ཁྱོད་དེ་སྒྲུབ་ཀྱི་མ་ངེས་པའི་གཏན་ཆོགས་གང་ཞིག །ཁྱོད་དེ་སྒྲུབ་
པ་ལ་ཕྱོགས་ཆོས་ཅན་དུ་སོང་བའི་གང་ཟག་གིས་ཁྱོད་དེ་སྒྲུབ་ཀྱི་མཐུན་ཕྱོགས་ལ་ཡོད་
པར་ངེས་པ་དང་། གང་ཟག་དེས་དེ་སྒྲུབ་ཀྱི་མི་མཐུན་ཕྱོགས་ལ་ཡོད་པར་ངེས་པ་གང་
རུང་ཡང་ཡིན་པའི་གཞི་མཐུན་པ་དེ། ཁྱོད་དེ་སྒྲུབ་ཀྱི་ཐུན་མོང་བའི་མ་ངེས་པའི་གཏན་
ཆོགས་ཀྱི་མཚན་ནི།

Course XIII: The Art of Reasoning
Reading Ten

We will discuss the second type, common indefinite reasons, in two steps as well: definition, and divisions. Here is the first.

The definition of a common indefinite reason is:

That one thing which is both (1) an indefinite reason for a particular proof; and (2) such that a person who already recognizes that it fulfils the relationship between the subject and the reason for the particular proof has either verified (a) that it fits the group of similar cases for the proof, or (b) that it fits the group of dissimilar cases for the proof.

གཉིས་པ་ནི། དེ་ལ་དབྱེ་ན། དེ་སྒྲུབ་ཀྱི་དངོས་ཀྱི་མ་ངེས་པའི་གཏན་ཚིགས། ལྷག་
ལྷན་གྱི་མ་ངེས་པའི་གཏན་ཚིགས། དེ་གང་རུང་མ་ཡིན་པའི་མ་ངེས་པའི་གཏན་
ཚིགས་དང་གསུམ་ལས། དང་པོ་ལ། མཚན་ཉིད་དང་། དབྱེ་བ་གཉིས།

Here is the second. These types of reasons may be divided into three: those which are direct indefinite reasons for a particular proof; those which are uncertain indefinite reasons for a particular proof; and those indefinite reasons which are neither of the first two. Again we will discuss the first of these in terms of its definition and its divisions.

དང་པོ་ནི། ཁྱོད་དེ་སྒྲུབ་ཀྱི་མ་ངེས་པའི་གཏན་ཚིགས་གང་ཞིག །ཁྱོད་དེ་སྒྲུབ་པ་ལ་
ཕྱོགས་ཚེས་ཅན་དུ་སོང་པའི་གང་ཟག་གིས། ཁྱོད་དེ་སྒྲུབ་ཀྱི་མཐུན་ཕྱོགས་དང་། མི་
མཐུན་ཕྱོགས་གཉིས་ཀ་ལ་ཡོད་པར་ངེས་པ་དེ། ཁྱོད་དེ་སྒྲུབ་ཀྱི་དངོས་ཀྱི་མ་ངེས་པའི་
གཏན་ཚིགས་ཡིན་པའི་མཚན་ཉིད།

Here is the first. The definition of something which is a direct indefinite reason is:

That one thing which is both (1) an indefinite reason for a particular proof; and (2) such that a person who already recognizes that it fulfils the relationship between the subject and the reason for the particular proof has verified that it fits both the group of similar cases and the group of dissimilar cases for the proof.

གཉིས་པ་དབྱེ་བ་ནི། དེ་ལ་དབྱེ་ན། དེ་སྐྱབ་ཀྱི་མཐུན་ཕྱོགས་ལ་བྱབ་བྱེད་དང་། མི་
མཐུན་ཕྱོགས་ལ་བྱབ་བྱེད་དུ་འཇུག་པའི་དངོས་གྲིས་མ་ངེས་པའི་གཏན་ཆོག་ས་དང་།
དེ་སྐྱབ་ཀྱི་མཐུན་ཕྱོགས་ལ་བྱབ་བྱེད་དང་། མི་མཐུན་ཕྱོགས་ལ་ནུམ་གཉིས་སུ་འཇུག་
པའི་དེ་དང་། དེ་སྐྱབ་ཀྱི་མི་མཐུན་ཕྱོགས་ལ་བྱབ་བྱེད་དང་། མཐུན་ཕྱོགས་ལ་ནུམ་
གཉིས་སུ་འཇུག་པའི་དེ་དང་། དེ་སྐྱབ་ཀྱི་མི་མཐུན་ཕྱོགས་དང་མཐུན་ཕྱོགས་གཉིས་
ཀ་ལ་ནུམ་གཉིས་སུ་འཇུག་པའི་དེ་དང་བཞི།

Here secondly are the divisions of this type of reason. They come in four different types:

- 1) Those direct indefinite reasons that cover both the group of similar cases and the group of dissimilar cases for the particular proof;
- 2) Those same kinds of reasons that cover the group of similar cases for the particular proof, but which go both ways as far as its group of dissimilar cases;
- 3) Those same kinds of reasons that cover the group of dissimilar cases for the particular proof, but which go both ways as far as its group of similar cases; and
- 4) Those same kinds of reasons that go both ways as far as both the group of dissimilar cases and the group of similar cases for the particular proof.

མཆན་གཞི་རིམ་པ་ལྟར། རི་བོང་དུ་མེད་པ་དེ། སྒྲ་ཏྲག་པར་སྐྱབ་པའི་མཐུན་ཕྱོགས་
ལ་བྱབ་བྱེད་དང་། དེ་སྐྱབ་ཀྱི་མི་མཐུན་ཕྱོགས་ལ་ཡང་བྱབ་བྱེད་དུ་འཇུག་པའི་དངོས་
གྲིས་མ་ངེས་པའི་གཏན་ཆོག་ས་དང་།

Here are respective classical examples for each of these types.

- 1) The fact that there are no such things as rabbit antlers would be a direct indefinite reason that covers both the group of similar cases in a proof that sound is an unchanging thing, and the group of dissimilar cases for this same proof.

མི་དྭག་པ་དེ། ཏུང་སྒྲ་ཙྰལ་བྱུང་དུ་སྒྲུབ་པའི་མཐུན་ཕྱོགས་ལ་བྱབ་བྱེད་དང་། མི་
མཐུན་ཕྱོགས་ལ་རྣམ་གཉིས་སུ་འཇུག་པའི་དེ་དང་།

2) "Changing thing" would be a direct indefinite reason that covers the group of similar cases in a proof that the sound of a conch shell is something produced through a conscious effort, but which goes both ways as far as the group of dissimilar cases for this same proof.

མི་དྭག་པ་དེ། ཏུང་སྒྲ་ཙྰལ་བྱུང་མ་ཡིན་པར་སྒྲུབ་པའི་མི་མཐུན་ཕྱོགས་ལ་བྱབ་བྱེད་
དང་། མཐུན་ཕྱོགས་ལ་རྣམ་གཉིས་སུ་འཇུག་པའི་དེ་དང་།

3) "Changing thing" would be a direct indefinite reason that covers the group of dissimilar cases in a proof that sound of a conch shell is not something produced through a conscious effort, but which goes both ways as far as its group of similar cases.

དབང་ཤེས་དེ། ལྷ་བ་གཉིས་སྒྲུབ་གི་དབང་ཤེས་མངོན་སུམ་དུ་སྒྲུབ་པའི་མཐུན་ཕྱོགས་
དང་། མི་མཐུན་ཕྱོགས་གཉིས་ཀ་ལ་རྣམ་གཉིས་སུ་འཇུག་པའི་དངོས་གྲི་མ་ངེས་པའི་
གཏན་ཆིགས་ཡིན།

4) "Sense consciousness" would be a direct indefinite reason that goes both ways as far as both the group of dissimilar cases and the group of similar cases in a proof that a sense consciousness which thinks there are two moons [where there is only one] is a direct [valid] perception.

༥ གཉིས་པ་ལྷག་ལྷན་གྱི་མ་ངེས་པའི་གཏན་ཆིགས་ལ་ཡང་། མཚན་ཉིད་དང་།
དབྱེ་བ་གཉིས་ལས་དང་པོ་ནི། བྱོད་དེ་སྒྲུབ་གི་ཐུན་མོང་བའི་མ་ངེས་པའི་གཏན་
ཆིགས་གང་ཞིག །བྱོད་དེ་སྒྲུབ་པ་ལ་ཕྱོགས་ཆོས་ཅན་དུ་སོང་བའི་གང་ཟག་གིས།
བྱོད་དེ་སྒྲུབ་གི་མཐུན་ཕྱོགས་ལ་ཡོད་པར་ངེས་ནས། མི་མཐུན་ཕྱོགས་ལ་ཡོད་མེད་ཐེ་
ཆོམ་ཟ་བ་དང་། བྱོད་དེ་སྒྲུབ་གི་མི་མཐུན་ཕྱོགས་ལ་ཡོད་པར་ངེས་ནས། མཐུན་

ཕྱོགས་ལ་ཡོད་མེད་ཐེ་ཚོམ་ཟ་བ་གང་རུང་ཡིན་པ་དེ། ཁྱོད་དེ་སྒྲུབ་གྱི་ལྷག་ལྷན་གྱི་མ་
ངེས་པའི་གཏན་ཚིགས་ཡིན་པའི་མཚན་ཉིད།

Here secondly is our discussion of uncertain indefinite reasons; we will repeat the two steps of their definition and their divisions. Here is the first.

The definition of something's being an uncertain indefinite reason for a particular proof is the following:

That one thing which is both (1) a common indefinite reason for a particular proof; and (2) such that a person who already recognizes that it fulfils the relationship between the subject and the reason for the particular proof has either (a) already verified that it fits the group of similar cases for the proof, but is still uncertain whether it fits the group of dissimilar cases for the proof or not; or else (b) already verified that it does fit the group of dissimilar cases for the proof, but is still uncertain whether it fits the group of similar cases for the proof or not.

གཉིས་པ་དབྱེ་བ་ནི། ཡང་དག་ལྷག་ལྷན་གྱི་མ་ངེས་པའི་གཏན་ཚིགས་དང་། འགལ་
བ་ལྷག་ལྷན་གྱི་མ་ངེས་པའི་གཏན་ཚིགས་གཉིས་ལས།

Here secondly are the divisions of this type of reason. There are two: correct uncertain indefinite reasons and contradictory uncertain indefinite reasons.

ཁྱོད་དེ་སྒྲུབ་གྱི་ལྷག་ལྷན་གྱི་མ་ངེས་པའི་གཏན་ཚིགས་གང་ཞིག ཁྱོད་དེ་སྒྲུབ་པ་ལ་
ཕྱོགས་ཚོས་ཅན་དུ་སོང་བའི་གང་ཟག་གིས། ཁྱོད་དེ་སྒྲུབ་གྱིས་མཐུན་ཕྱོགས་ལ་ཡོད་
པར་ངེས་ནས། མི་མཐུན་ཕྱོགས་ལ་ཡོད་མེད་ཐེ་ཚོམ་ཟ་བ་དེ། ཁྱོད་དེ་སྒྲུབ་གྱི་ཡང་
དག་ལྷག་ལྷན་གྱི་མ་ངེས་པའི་གཏན་ཚིགས་ཡིན་པའི་མཚན་ཉིད།

The definition of something's being a correct uncertain indefinite reason for a particular proof is:

That one thing which is both (1) an uncertain indefinite reason for a particular proof; and (2) such that a person who already recognizes that it fulfils the relationship between the subject and

the reason for the particular proof has already verified that it fits the group of similar cases for the proof, but is still uncertain whether it fits the group of dissimilar cases for the proof or not.

ཁྱོད་དེ་སྐྱབ་ཀྱི་ལྷག་ལྷན་གྱི་མ་ངེས་པའི་གཏན་ཚིགས་གང་ཞིག ཁྱོད་དེ་སྐྱབ་པ་ལ་
ཕྱོགས་ཚོས་ཅན་དུ་སོང་བའི་གང་ཟག་གིས། ཁྱོད་དེ་སྐྱབ་ཀྱི་མི་མཐུན་ཕྱོགས་ལ་ཡོད་
པར་ངེས་ནས། མཐུན་ཕྱོགས་ལ་ཡོད་མེད་ཐེ་ཚོམ་ཟ་བ་དེ། ཁྱོད་དེ་སྐྱབ་ཀྱི་འགལ་བ་
ལྷག་ལྷན་གྱི་མ་ངེས་པའི་གཏན་ཚིགས་ཡིན་པའི་མཚན་ཉིད།

The definition of something's being a contradictory uncertain indefinite reason for a particular proof is:

That one thing which is both (1) an uncertain indefinite reason for a particular proof; and (2) such that a person who already recognizes that it fulfils the relationship between the subject and the reason for the particular proof has already verified that it fits the group of dissimilar cases for the proof, but is still uncertain whether it fits the group of similar cases for the proof or not.

མཚན་གཞི་རིམ་པ་ལྟར། ངག་སྐྱབ་དེ། ཀུན་མཁྱེན་ལ་ཐེ་ཚོམ་ཟ་བའི་གང་ཟག་གི་
ངོར། ངག་སྐྱབ་པའི་ལྷས་བྱིན་ཀུན་མཁྱེན་མ་ཡིན་པར་སྐྱབ་པའི་དང་པོ་དང་།

Here are some examples, in the order we gave the definitions. An example of the first would be giving "because he is making pronouncements" as a reason for proving that John, who is making pronouncements, is not an omniscient being—and giving this reason to someone who doubts the existence of an omniscient being.

ཡང་དེ་དེའི་ངོར་ངག་སྐྱབ་པའི་ལྷས་བྱིན་ཀུན་མཁྱེན་དུ་སྐྱབ་པའི་གཉིས་པ་ཡིན།

The same reason presented to the same person to prove that John, who is making pronouncements, *is* an omniscient being would be an example of the second type.

གསུམ་པ་དེ་གཉིས་གང་དུང་མ་ཡིན་པའི་ཐུན་མོང་བའི་མ་ངེས་པའི་གཏན་ཚིགས་ལ་

ཡང་། མཚན་ཉིད་དང་། མཚན་གཞི་གཉིས་ལས།

Here thirdly we'll explain those common indefinite reasons which are neither the direct nor uncertain types. Again we proceed in terms of definition and classical example.

དང་པོ་ནི། བྱོད་དེ་སྐྱབ་ཀྱི་ཐུན་མོང་བའི་མ་ངེས་པའི་གཏན་ཆོག་གས་གང་ཞིག །བྱོད་
དེ་སྐྱབ་པ་ལ་ཕྱོགས་ཆོས་ཅན་དུ་སོང་བའི་གང་ཟག་གིས། བྱོད་དེ་སྐྱབ་ཀྱི་མཐུན་
ཕྱོགས་ཁོ་ན་ལ་ཡོད་པར་ངེས་པ་དང་། བྱོད་དེ་སྐྱབ་ཀྱི་མི་མཐུན་ཕྱོགས་ཁོ་ན་ལ་མེད་
པར་ངེས་པ་གང་རུང་ཡིན་པ་དེ། བྱོད་དེ་སྐྱབ་ཀྱི་དེ་གཉིས་གང་རུང་མ་ཡིན་པའི་ཐུན་
མོང་བའི་མ་ངེས་པའི་གཏན་ཆོག་གས་ཡིན་པའི་མཚན་ཉིད།

Here is the first. The definition of something being a common indefinite reason which is neither the direct nor the uncertain types for a particular proof is:

That one thing which is both (1) a common indefinite reason for a particular proof; and (2) such that a person who already recognizes that it fulfils the relationship between the subject and the reason for the particular proof has already verified either that it fits only the group of similar cases for the proof, or that it only doesn't fit the group of dissimilar cases for the proof.

གཉིས་པ་མཚན་གཞི་ནི། བུ་རོ་ད་ལྟ་བུ་དེ། ཁ་ནང་བུ་རམ་གོང་བུའི་སྣང་དུ་བུར་
གཟུགས་ད་ལྟ་བུ་ཡོད་པར་སྐྱབ་པའི་དེ་གཉིས་གང་རུང་མ་ཡིན་པའི་ཐུན་མོང་བའི་མ་
ངེས་པའི་གཏན་ཆོག་གས་ཀྱི་མཚན་གཞི་ཡིན།

Here secondly is our classical example. "[Because there is a] taste of sugar in the present time" is a common indefinite reason which is neither the direct nor the uncertain types in a proof that a lump of sugar in one's mouth has the visible appearance of a lump of sugar in the present time.

གསུམ་པ་མ་གུབ་པའི་གཏན་ཆོག་གས་ལ། །མཚན་ཉིད་དང་། དབྱེ་བ་གཉིས་ལས།

དང་པོ་ནི། དེ་སྐབ་ཀྱི་དྲགས་སྤྱོད་པ་གང་ཞིག །དེ་སྐབ་ཀྱི་ཕྱོགས་ཆས་མ་ཡིན་
པ་དེ། དེ་སྐབ་ཀྱི་མ་གྲུབ་པའི་གཏན་ཆོག་གི་མཚན་ཉིད།

Here third is our presentation on wrong reasons. Again we proceed in two steps of definition and divisions. Here is the first.

The definition of a wrong reason for any particular proof is:

That which (1) has been put forth as a reason for a particular proof, but (2) for which the relationship between the subject and the reason does not hold.

གཉིས་པ་དབྱེ་བ་ལ། རྟོག་ལ་ལྟོས་ནས་མ་གྲུབ་པའི་གཏན་ཆོག་གི། རྟོག་ལ་ལྟོས་ནས་
མ་གྲུབ་པའི་གཏན་ཆོག་གི། རྟོག་ལ་ལྟོས་ནས་མ་གྲུབ་པའི་གཏན་ཆོག་གི་དང་
གསུམ་ལས།

Here secondly are the divisions of wrong reasons for particular proofs. There are three different types:

- 1) Reasons which are wrong relative to meaning.
- 2) Reasons which are wrong relative to a state of mind.
- 3) Reasons which are wrong relative to the particular opponent.

དང་པོ་ལ། དྲགས་ཀྱི་ངོ་བོ་མེད་ནས་མ་གྲུབ་པའི་གཏན་ཆོག་གི། ཆོས་ཅན་གྱི་ངོ་བོ་
མེད་ནས་མ་གྲུབ་པའི་གཏན་ཆོག་གི། དྲགས་ཆོས་ཐ་དད་མེད་ནས་མ་གྲུབ་པའི་གཏན་
ཆོག་གི། གཞི་དྲགས་ཐ་དད་མེད་ནས་མ་གྲུབ་པའི་གཏན་ཆོག་གི། གཞི་ཆོས་ཐ་དད་
མེད་ནས་མ་གྲུབ་པའི་གཏན་ཆོག་གི། དྲགས་ཤེས་འདོད་ཆོས་ཅན་གྱི་སྤྱི་དུ་འགོང་
ཚུལ་དང་མཐུན་པར་མེད་ནས་མ་གྲུབ་པའི་གཏན་ཆོག་གི། གཏན་ཆོག་གི་ཕྱོགས་
གཅིག་ཤེས་འདོད་ཆོས་ཅན་ལ་མེད་ནས་མ་གྲུབ་པའི་གཏན་ཆོག་གི་དང་བདུན།

མཚན་གཞི་རིམ་པ་ལྟར།

The first of these may itself be divided into seven different types:

- 1) Reasons which are wrong because the very nature of the reason is non-existent.
- 2) Reasons which are wrong because the very nature of the subject is non-existent.
- 3) Reasons which are wrong because the reason and the quality to be proven are indistinguishable from one another.
- 4) Reasons which are wrong because the subject and the reason are indistinguishable from one another.
- 5) Reasons which are wrong because the subject and the quality to be proven are indistinguishable from one another.
- 6) Reasons which are wrong because the reason does not pertain to the subject in the way it has been said to in the statement of the proof.
- 7) Reasons which are wrong because some part of the reason fails to belong to the subject under consideration.

The following are respective examples of these types of reasons, in particular proofs:

སྤྱི་མཐུན་ཆེས་ཅན། སྤྱུག་བསྐྱེད་བ་ཡིན་ཏེ། རི་བོང་རྩ་ས་བོ་ཐུག་པའི་ཕྱིར། ཞེས་
བཀོད་པའི་ཆོ། དེ་སྤྱུག་གྱི་དང་པོ་དང་།

- 1)
Consider a particular person.
They are a suffering being,
Because they have been impaled on a rabbit's antlers.

རི་བོང་རྩ་ཆེས་ཅན། མི་ཏྲ་གསལ། བྱས་པའི་ཕྱིར། ཞེས་བཀོད་པའི་ཆོ། དེ་སྤྱུག་གྱི་
གཉིས་པ་དང་།

- 2)
Consider the antlers on the head of a rabbit.
They are a changing thing,
Because they were made.

སྒྲ་ཆོས་ཅན། མི་དྲག་སྟེ། མི་དྲག་པ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར། ཞེས་བཀོད་པའི་ཆོ། དེ་སྒྲུབ་
གྱི་གསུམ་པ་དང་།

3)
Consider sound.
It is a changing thing,
Because it is a changing thing.

སྒྲ་ཆོས་ཅན། མི་དྲག་སྟེ། སྒྲ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར། ཞེས་བཀོད་པའི་ཆོ། དེ་སྒྲུབ་གྱི་བཞི་
པ་དང་།

4)
Consider sound.
It is a changing thing,
Because it is sound.

སྒྲ་ཆོས་ཅན། སྒྲ་ཡིན་ཏེ། བྱས་པའི་ཕྱིར། ཞེས་བཀོད་པའི་ཆོ། དེ་སྒྲུབ་གྱི་ལྔ་པ་
དང་།

5)
Consider sound.
It is sound,
Because it is something which was made.

སྒྲ་ཆོས་ཅན། མི་དྲག་སྟེ། མིག་ཤེས་གྱིས་བཟུང་བྱ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར། ཞེས་བཀོད་པའི་
ཆོ། དེ་སྒྲུབ་གྱི་དྲུག་པ་དང་།

6)
Consider sound.
It is a changing thing,
Because it is something that you see with your eyes.

སྟོན་ཤིང་ཆོས་ཅན། སེམས་ལྡན་ཡིན་ཏེ། མཚན་མོ་ལོ་མ་བླུ་ནས་ཉལ་བའི་ཕྱིར།
ཞེས་བཀོད་པའི་ཆོ། དེ་སྒྲུབ་གྱི་བདུན་པ་ཡིན་ནོ།

7)

Consider a fruit tree.

It must be a conscious thing,

Because its leaves curl up and night and seem to sleep.

གཉིས་པ་སྒྲོལ་ལྟོས་ནས་མ་གྲུབ་པའི་གཏན་ཆོག་ལ། དྲགས་ཀྱི་ངོ་བོ་ལ་ཐེ་ཆོམ་
ཟོས་ནས་མ་གྲུབ་པའི་གཏན་ཆོག་ཆོས་ཅན་གྱི་ངོ་བོ་ལ་ཐེ་ཆོམ་ཟོས་ནས་མ་གྲུབ་
པའི་གཏན་ཆོག་ལ། གཞི་དྲགས་ཀྱི་འབྲེལ་བ་ལ་ཐེ་ཆོམ་ཟོས་ནས་མ་གྲུབ་པའི་གཏན་
ཆོག་ལ། ཤེས་འདོད་ཆོས་ཅན་མེད་ནས་མ་གྲུབ་པའི་གཏན་ཆོག་དང་བཞི། མཚན་
གཞི་རིམ་པ་ལྟར།

This brings us to the second kind of wrong reason: the one that is wrong relative to a state of mind. Here there are four different types:

- 1) Reasons that are wrong because the opponent entertains doubt about the very nature of the reason.
- 2) Reasons that are wrong because the opponent entertains doubt about the very nature of the subject.
- 3) Reasons that are wrong because the opponent entertains doubt about the connection between the subject and the reason.
- 4) Reasons that are wrong because there is nothing that the opponent has yet to understand.

The following are respective examples of these four, for particular proofs.

ཤ་ཟ་བསྐལ་དོན་དུ་སོང་བའི་གང་ཟག་གི་ངོར། སྒྲ་ཆོས་ཅན། མི་དྲག་སྟེ། ཤ་ཟ་
ཆོད་མའི་གཞལ་བྱ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར། ཞེས་བཀོད་པའི་ཆོ། དེ་སྒྲུབ་ཀྱི་དང་པོ་དང་།

- 1) The following proof, presented to a person who has yet to confirm to himself that "flesh-eaters" [a kind of ghost] actually exist:

Consider sound.

It is a changing thing,

Because flesh-eaters are something which can be cognized through valid perception.

དི་ཟ་བསྐལ་དོན་དུ་སོང་བའི་གང་ཟག་གི་ངོར། །དི་ཟའི་སྤྱད་བྱངས་ཆོས་ཅན། མི་
རྟག་སྟེ། བྱས་པའི་ཕྱིར། ཞེས་བཀོད་པའི་ཆོ། དེ་སྐབ་ཀྱི་གཉིས་པ་དང་།

2) The following proof, presented to a person who has yet to confirm to himself that "smell-eaters" [spirits in the *bardo* or inbetween state] actually exist:

Consider the song of the smell-eaters.
It is a changing thing,
Because it is something that was made.

མ་བྱ་གང་ན་ཡོད་མ་ཤེས་པའི་གང་ཟག་གི་ངོར། །དེ་སྤྱད་གསུམ་གྱི་དབྱས་ན་ཆོས་
ཅན། མ་བྱ་ཡོད་དེ། མ་བྱས་སྒྲ་སྒྲོགས་པ་ཡོད་པའི་ཕྱིར། ཞེས་བཀོད་པའི་ཆོ། དེ་
སྐབ་ཀྱི་གསུམ་པ་དང་།

3) The following proof, presented to a person who doesn't know where a particular peacock is:

Consider that mountain vale over there.
There must be a peacock living there,
Because we can hear a peacock crowing.

དཔལ་ལྡན་ཆོས་གྲགས་ཀྱི་ངོར། སྒྲ་ཆོས་ཅན། མི་རྟག་སྟེ། བྱས་པའི་ཕྱིར། ཞེས་
བཀོད་པའི་ཆོ། དེ་སྐབ་ཀྱི་བཞི་པ་ཡིན་ནོ།

4) The following proof, presented to the glorious Dharmakirti:

Consider sound.
It is a changing thing,
Because it is something that was made.

གསུམ་པ་ཚོལ་བ་ལ་ལྟོས་ནས་མ་གྲུབ་པའི་གཏན་ཆིགས་ལ། སྒྲ་ཚོལ་ལ་ལྟོས་ནས་
མ་གྲུབ་པའི་གཏན་ཆིགས། ཕྱི་ཚོལ་ལ་ལྟོས་ནས་མ་གྲུབ་པའི་གཏན་ཆིགས། སྒྲ་
ཚོལ་ཕྱི་ཚོལ་གཉིས་ཀ་ལ་ལྟོས་ནས་མ་གྲུབ་པའི་གཏན་ཆིགས་དང་གསུམ་ལས།

མཚན་གཞི་རིམ་པ་ལྟར།

Here thirdly is our explanation of reasons which are wrong relative to the particular opponent. There are three different kinds of these reasons:

- 1) Reasons which are wrong relative to the proponent.
- 2) Reasons which are wrong relative to the opponent.
- 3) Reasons which are wrong relative to both the opponent and the proponent.

Here are respective examples for these three types of reasons, in particular proofs.

གྲངས་ཅན་པས་སངས་རྒྱས་པའི་ངོར། ལྷོ་ཆོས་ཅན། སེམས་མེད་ཡིན་ཏེ། སྒྲི་
འཇིག་ཅན་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར། ཞེས་བཀོད་པའི་ཆོ། དེ་སྒྲུབ་ཀྱི་དང་པོ་དང་།

1) The following proof, presented to a Buddhist by a Numerist [of member of the Sanghya, a non-Buddhist school of ancient India]:

Consider the intellect.
It is something devoid of mind,
Because it is something which starts and stops.

གཅིར་བྱ་པས། སངས་རྒྱས་པའི་ངོར། ལྷོ་ན་ཤིང་ཆོས་ཅན། སེམས་ལྡན་ཡིན་ཏེ།
ཤུན་བཤུས་ན་འཆི་བའི་ཕྱིར། ཞེས་བཀོད་པའི་ཆོ། དེ་སྒྲུབ་ཀྱི་གཉིས་པ་དང་།

2) The following proof, presented to a Buddhist by a member of the Unclothed [or Jain school of ancient India]:

Consider a fruit tree.
It must have a mind,
Because it dies when you peel its bark.

གྲངས་ཅན་གྱིས་རྒྱང་འཕེན་པའི་ངོར། ལྷོ་ཆོས་ཅན། མི་དྭག་སྟེ། མིག་ཤེས་ཀྱིས་
བཟུང་བྱ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར། ཞེས་བཀོད་པའི་ཆོ། དེ་སྒྲུབ་ཀྱི་གསུམ་པ་ཡིན་ནོ།

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3) The following proof, presented to a member of the Rejectionist [Lokayata] school by one of the Unclothed [Jain] school [both non-Buddhist groups of ancient India]:

Consider sound.
It is a changing thing,
Because it is something you see with your eyes.

The forms of debate:
The traditional debate year

The following annual calendar for Sera Mey Tibetan Monastery gives a good picture of the schedule of study followed by all monks in the geshe program at the monastery. It is a traditional schedule which developed at the original Sera Mey in Lhasa, Tibet, over the centuries; since the rebuilding of Sera Mey in south India, the schedule has been reinstated—with a certain number of variations from the one used in Tibet—and is now followed closely, with some exceptions due to the need to work in the monastery cornfields and so on. Below is a translation of the annual calendar as it is currently posted on at the main temple of the monastery; the notes and some amendments to the calendar were completed with the help of Khen Rinpoche Geshe Lobsang Tharchin, a former abbot of the monastery.

**Annual Calendar of Debates,
Examinations, and Other Special Events
at Sera Mey Tibetan Monastery
Bylakuppe, South India**

Schedule of Regular Dharma Sessions

The following are the eight traditional "dharma sessions" (chos-thog) that make up the standard periods of monastic study at Sera Mey Monastery. The first Tibetan month, by the way, normally falls in February or March of the western calendar. The dates below are the same for any given year, independent of the day of the week, and follow the waxing and waning of the moon.

Session One: The Earlier Dharma Session of Spring (dPyid-chos dang-po)

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Starting assembly: 26th of the first Tibetan month

First firewood break: 27th and 28th of the first Tibetan month

The "firewood break" (shing-slong), or literally "time for requesting firewood from sponsors" follows immediately after the starting assembly (yar-tsogs). This assembly features prayers for the success of the session, and is attended by all monks who intend to participate for this period. It is also during this assembly that young monks who have been deemed ready by the abbot, the debate master, and their house teacher undergo the ceremony of initiation into the debate park. These "newbies" are known as sarshuk (gsar-zhugs), or "newly entered." They are expected to demonstrate their commitment to the debate session through perfect attendance, and especially serious study and debate, for the entire length of the session.

In Lhasa, a head-count was taken during the starting assembly in order to determine the cooking and other needs. During the next two days, teams of monks would go out to help find firewood for the monastery kitchen, based on the head-count.

The first day of the firewood break was devoted to visiting lay communities in the countryside outside of Lhasa city to ask for firewood; families in these villages knew what day to expect the monks, and considered it an honor to prepare a good supply of wood in advance. On the second day the monks would travel to Lhasa city proper to request fuel. This supply of wood would have to last about two weeks, until the "mid-term firewood break" (rked-pa'i shing-slong).

Great debate examinations: *tsokrampa* geshe examinations, 28th to the 30th of the first Tibetan month

During specific sessions, intense debate examinations are held for candidates standing for various degrees at the monastery. The most well known of these degree titles is the geshe. The word "geshe" (kalyāṇa mitra in Sanskrit, or dge-bshes in Tibetan) literally means "spiritual friend," and is a term from the earliest days of Buddhism in India. Later, great masters among the first Tibetan Buddhists—the Kadampas—were called "geshe" out of respect for their learning and high level of practice.

As monastic institutions began to form in Tibet, the word "geshe" came to be used as a title. It was originally used in the early "Big Three" monasteries of Sangpu (gSang-phu), Kyormo Lung (sKyor-mo lung), and Gadong (sGa-gdong). Sangpu, for example, was founded around the middle of the eleventh century.

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Sangpu had two colleges within the confines (or gseb) of the monastery as a whole (known as the gling); early geshe candidates had to make their debate defense at a combined assembly of the two, and came to be known as lingse geshes, a corruption of the word lingsep (gling-gseb). The Great Dictionary of the Tibetan Language and other sources take the word lingse to mean gling-bsre, or a defense before the "combined" (bsre) assemblies of the two colleges in the monastery (gling). In either case, the point is the same.

At Sera Mey, there are typically four lingse geshe degrees conferred per year: these come in two pairs known as the "summer lingse" and the "winter lingse." Geshe of this rank go through an examination process within their own monastery, as described in a previous reading for this course. During some of their defenses, these and other geshe candidates are required to provide an elaborate series of refreshments, involving some served to the entire assembly of their monastery. This ceremony is known as the "Thirteen-Course Tea and Broth" (Ja-thug bcu-gsum).

During other defenses, lingse candidates need only provide a series of ten tea offerings on the day when they undergo a special part of their examination which involves reciting a great many pages of scripture from memory. This test is called a geshe shepa (dge-bshes bshad-pa); and since the major refreshments of tea and broth are not served to the entire assembly this time, the presentation is known as a "dry recitation" (skam-bshad).

Below the rank of lingse geshe is the rikrampa (rigs rams-pa), and the next higher rank after the lingse is the tsokrampa (tsogs rams-pa). In both cases, the word rampa refers to the veritable myriad (rab-'byams, shortened to rams-pa) number of great Buddhist classics that a geshe must master. The word tsok in tsokrampa refers to the Session of the Great Assembly (Tsogs-chos), an annual meeting in Lhasa city of the six great colleges. Here there are two each for the "Great Three" monasteries of later times: Sera, Ganden, and Drepung, all founded around the opening of the fifteenth century. Representatives from Deyang (bDe-yangs) monastery would also attend this gathering, during which the candidates for the tsokrampa rank would have to defend their knowledge.

The Great Assembly traditionally began on the 20th of the second Tibetan month, and ended on the 30th. This is the time it would take to complete the examination of one or two tsokrampa candidates from each college per year.

Candidates for the highest rank of geshe, the hlarampa (hla rams-pa), are examined during the Great Prayer Festival, or Munlam Chenmo. This festival was instituted by Je Tsongkapa in the 15th century as a great dharma celebration for the New Year. Since it was held in the capital city of Lhasa

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(Hla-sa), these geshes became known as hlarampa. Each of the six colleges normally nominates two candidates per year for the rank of hlarampa, although on some occasions it may be as many as four.

First actual debate session: begins 1st of the second Tibetan month
Mid-term firewood break: 5th and 6th of the second Tibetan month
Second actual debate session: begins 7th of the second Tibetan month
Auspicious conclusion: 18th of the second Tibetan month

The "Auspicious Conclusion" (Shis-brjod) is a day of prayer and celebration for the successful end of another dharma session; it is marked by special recitations known as "pronouncing" (brjod) the "auspiciousness" (bkra-shis, the "trashī" in "trashī delek"). These prayers are done in a unique melody or yang (dbyangs). On this day too, the abbot of the monastery will often deliver a special dharma teaching.

Intersession break (Chos-mtsams):

19th of the second Tibetan month to the 7th of the third Tibetan month

Session Two: The Great Dharma Session of Spring (dPyid-chos chen-mo)

Starting assembly: 8th of the third Tibetan month
First firewood break: 9th and 10th of the third Tibetan month
Great debate examinations: summer *lingse* geshes, 11th to the 12th of the third Tibetan month
First actual debate session: begins 13th of the third Tibetan month
Mid-term firewood break: 22nd and 23rd of the third Tibetan month
Second actual debate session: begins 24th of the third Tibetan month
Auspicious conclusion: 7th of the fourth Tibetan month

Intersession break: 8th of the fourth Tibetan month to the 16th of the fourth Tibetan month

Session Three: The Earlier Summer Dharma Session (dByar-chos dang-po)

Starting assembly: 17th of the fourth Tibetan month
First firewood break: 18th and 19th of the fourth Tibetan month
Great debate examinations: (no geshe debates)
First actual debate session: begins 20th of the fourth Tibetan month
Mid-term firewood break: (none)
Second actual debate session: (none)

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Auspicious conclusion: 1st of the fifth Tibetan month

Intersession break: 2nd of the fifth Tibetan month to the 16th of the fifth Tibetan month

Session Four: The Great Dharma Session of Summer (*dByar-chos chen-mo*)

Starting assembly: 17th of the fifth Tibetan month

First firewood break: 18th and 19th of the fifth Tibetan month

Great debate examinations: summer *lingse* geshe ("dry recitation") and *rikram* geshe; 20th to the 23rd of the fifth Tibetan month

First actual debate session: begins 24th of the fifth Tibetan month

Mid-term firewood break: 2nd and 3rd of the sixth Tibetan month

Second actual debate session: begins 4th of the sixth Tibetan month

Auspicious conclusion: 15th of the sixth Tibetan month

Intersession break: 16th of the sixth Tibetan month to the 16th of the seventh Tibetan month; includes *rikram* geshe exams, summer *lingse* geshe exams, *rikchung* pre-geshe exams, and *rikdra* inter-monastic debates

The rikdra (rigs-grva) inter-monastic debates begin on the last day of the sixth Tibetan month and last until the 15th day of the seventh Tibetan month. During this time, thirty debaters from Sera Mey debate with thirty counterparts from the sister monastery of Sera Jey in the main assembly hall (tsogs-chen) shared by both monasteries for major events such as the biweekly monks' purification ceremony, or sojong (gso-sbyong).

During this time, pairs of debaters match off twice a day, once in the morning and once in the evening, for fifteen days. In a typical session, the proponent (snga-rgol) will be responsible for a lengthy recitation of scripture from memory, after which his opponent (phyi-rgol) is charged with posing a difficult series of formalized debate questions. In Tibet, the combined monasteries of Sera Mey and Sera Jey had joint holdings of property, and the income from these would be used during this session to supply all the monks attending with gifts of Tibetan pastries (kabse) and roasted barley flour, or tsampa.

It is also during this time that the rikchen (rigs-chen), or advanced pre-geshe debates, are held. Here a student who intends to take a higher geshe degree engages in a difficult and highly formalized debate against a similar candidate from the sister monastery. Other students in the monastery during this time are engaged in special examinations, administered by the abbot and debate master of their home monastery, during which they are required to recite, from memory, about 100 pages of scripture.

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Session Five: The Water Dharma Session (*Chab-zhugs chos-thog*)

Starting assembly: 17th of the seventh Tibetan month
First firewood break: 18th and 19th of the seventh Tibetan month
Great debate examinations: (no geshe debates)
First actual debate session: begins 20th of the seventh Tibetan month
Mid-term firewood break: (none)
Second actual debate session: (none)
Auspicious conclusion: 30th of the seventh Tibetan month

The "Water" Session (Chab-zhugs) is possibly given this name due to the fact that, during the period following the especially intense Great Session of Summer, students in the geshe program finally have enough time to relax and "enter the water" (chab-zhugs), or take a nice slow bath. The rikchung and rikchen (preliminary and advanced pre-geshe debates) have been completed, as have the grueling rikdra inter-monastic debates, and memorization exams. Students would be allowed take breaks in special parks throughout out the monastery, and traditional folk-dance troupes would come there at times, to perform the "goddess" plays (lha-mo).

Intersession break: 1st of the eighth Tibetan month to the 7th of the eighth Tibetan month; this is the main "water break"

Session Six: The Dharma Session of Medicine Buddha (*sMan-bla chos-thog*)

Starting assembly: 8th of the eighth Tibetan month
First firewood break: 9th and 10th of the eighth Tibetan month
Great debate examinations: (no geshe debates)
First actual debate session: begins 11th of the eighth Tibetan month
Mid-term firewood break: 22nd and 23rd of the eighth Tibetan month
Second actual debate session: begins 24th of the eighth Tibetan month
Auspicious conclusion: 7th of the ninth Tibetan month

This session takes its name from the fact that an extensive Medicine Buddha rite is held on the 11th of the eighth month.

Intersession break: 8th of the ninth Tibetan month to the 16th of the ninth Tibetan month

Session Seven: The Great Dharma Session of Autumn (*sTon-chos chen-mo*)

Starting assembly: 17th of the ninth Tibetan month
First firewood break: 18th and 19th of the ninth Tibetan month

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Reading Ten**

Great debate examinations: winter *lingse* geshe examinations, 20th and 21st of the ninth Tibetan month

First actual debate session: begins 22nd of the ninth Tibetan month

Mid-term firewood break: 2nd and 3rd of the tenth Tibetan month

Second actual debate session: begins 4th of the tenth Tibetan month

Auspicious conclusion: 16th of the tenth Tibetan month

Intersession break: 17th of the tenth Tibetan month to the 16th of the eleventh Tibetan month

Session Eight: The Great Dharma Session of Winter (*dGun-chos chen-mo*)

Starting assembly: 17th of the eleventh Tibetan month

First firewood break: 18th and 19th of the eleventh Tibetan month

The great examinations: 20th to the 23rd of the eleventh Tibetan month; debate examinations for the winter *lingse* geshes and *hlarampa* geshes, the former presenting their "dry recitation"

First actual debate session: begins 24th of the eleventh Tibetan month

Mid-term firewood break: 12th and 13th of the twelfth Tibetan month

Second actual debate session: begins 14th of the twelfth Tibetan month

Auspicious conclusion: 16th of the twelfth Tibetan month

Intersession break

This break features further examination of winter *lingse* geshes, the Tibetan New Year, and the Great Prayer Festival; it begins on the 17th of the twelfth Tibetan month and ends on the 25th of the first Tibetan month.

Annual Special Events

Passing On of Kedrup Tenpa Dargye (*mKhas-grub dgongs-rdzogs*)

14th day of the fifth Tibetan month

Kedrup Tenpa Dargye (1493-1568) was an illustrious scholar from Sera Mey who wrote many of the monastery's textbooks. On special days like this, the monastery will be covered at night in strings of brightly colored electric lights that look like our Christmas-tree lights.

Summer Offering to the Two Dharma Protectors (*Chos-skyong rnam-gnyis kyi dbyar-gsol*)

15th day of the fifth Tibetan month

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This particular day every year is known throughout Tibet as the "Day of Auspiciousness throughout the World" ('Dzam-gling spyi-bzang). At Sera Mey, the occasion is used as an opportunity to thank the dharma protectors of the monastery for their help, and to request that they continue their sacred deeds. The two protectors here are Chamsing (lCam-sring) and Taok (Tha-'og). The protector Chamsing is shared with other monasteries, while Taok is a unique protector for Sera Mey. Please note that these two protectors have nothing to do with the current dharma protector controversy.

Rikchung (Pre-Geshe Degree) Debates

25th to the 28th of the sixth Tibetan month

First team

Proponent takes the subject "Turning of the Wheel," opponent takes "Book of Maitreya": 25th of the sixth Tibetan month

Each of the subjects mentioned here are important topics from the Ornament of Realizations, spoken to the realized being Asanga by Lord Maitreya around 350 AD.

Second team

Proponent takes "Sutra and Commentary," opponent takes "Final End": 26th of the sixth Tibetan month

Third team

Proponent takes "Wish for Enlightenment," opponent takes "Path of Preparation": 27th of the sixth Tibetan month

Fourth team

Proponent takes "Three Refuges," opponent takes "Buddha Nature": 28th of the sixth Tibetan month

Summer Examinations

8th of the seventh Tibetan month

Extensive Medicine Buddha Rite

11th of the eighth Tibetan month

Great Winter Examinations

8th of the eleventh Tibetan month

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Assembly of the Great Offering Ceremony for the Prayer of Maitreya
(Byams-smon sgrub-mchod chen-mo yar-tsogs)
25th of the eleventh Tibetan month

Khen Rinpoche notes that, in Tibet, this entire ceremony took nearly a month. The 17th of the eleventh month marks the opening ceremony for the session, and is followed by two days of a firewood break. The 20th and 21st are marked by the "dry recitations" for the winter lingshe geshe, and then the next three days are examinations for the hlarampa candidates. Finally, on the 25th, the actual prayer begins: all of the monks together recite the entire relevant work by the Buddha from memory. At Sera Jey, the recitation for this period is the Prayer of the Deeds of Samanta Bhadra (bZang-spyod smon-lam), also by Lord Buddha. The Prayer of Maitreya continues until the 13th of the twelfth Tibetan month.

Great Torma Offering of the Twenty-Ninth (dGu-gtor chen-mo)
29th of the twelfth Tibetan month

This is one of the year's biggest prayer ceremonies; the next day is the last day of the year, the new (black) moon (gnam-gang).

Presentation of the Debate Ground Schedule (Chos-grvar tsogs-gtam 'bul-yun)

16th of the third Tibetan month; 26th of the fifth Tibetan month; 16th of the eighth Tibetan month; and 26th of the ninth Tibetan month

On these four dates of the year, the debate master (dge-bskos) stands in the assembly of the debate park to announce the schedule for the coming period. He also outlines the duties that different members of the monastery will be expected to fulfill during this time, and reviews the general rule of behavior for the monastery from the monastery constitution (rtza-khrims, also known as a bca'-yig). This document for Sera Mey was written by His Holiness the Eighth Dalai Lama, Jampel Gyatso (1758-1804); copies were very rare following the invasion of Tibet. A complete carving was located and supplied to Sera Mey several years ago by Asian Classics Input Project staff at the Oriental Library of the Russian Academy of Sciences in St Petersburg, Russia.

The Asian Classics Institute
Course XIII: The Art of Reasoning

Supplement to Reading Ten

རིགས་པའི་འགྲོ་སྤངས།

Rikpay Drotang
Debating Format, Part Three

འཁོར་བ་ལ་མཐའ་ཡོད་པའི་ཕྱིར།

Korwa la ta yupay chir

A: Because the cycle of pain does have an end.

རྟགས་མ་གྲུབ།

Tak madrub

B: Wrong.

འཁོར་བ་ལ་མཐའ་མེད་པར་བཤམ།

Korwa la ta mepar tel

A: Are you telling me the cycle of pain doesn't have an end?

འདོད།

Du
B: Right.

མེད་དེ།

Me de
A: Why not?

འཁོར་བ་ལ་སྒྲོན་གྱི་མཐའ་མེད་པའི་ཕྱིར།

Korwa la ngun gyi ta mepay chir
B: Because the cycle of pain has no front end.

ཁྱབ་པ་མ་བྱུང་།

Kyappa ma jung
A: That doesn't mean it can't have an end!

འཁོར་བ་ལ་མཐའ་ཡོད་པར་བཤམ།

Korwa la ta yu par tel
B: Are you telling me the cycle of pain does have an end?

འདོད།

Du
A: Right.

ཡོད་དེ།

Yu de
B: Why so?

འཁོར་བ་ལ་སྤྱིའི་མཐའ་ཡོད་པའི་སྤྱིར།

Korwa la chiy ta yupay chir

A: Because the cycle of pain has a back end.

ཡོད་དེ།

Yude

B: Why so?

བདག་འཛིན་གྱི་གཉིན་སྟོབས་ལྡན་ཡོད་པའི་སྤྱིར།

Dakdzin gyi nyenpo top den yupay chir

A: Because there is a powerful antidote that will smash our habit of seeing things as self-existent.



Name:

Date:

Grade:

Homework, Class One

1) Give the Sanskrit and English names for the classical Indian treatise which forms the basis for the Buddhist art of reasoning and perceptual theory; also list its author and his approximate date. (Tibetan track in Tibetan.)

2) Name the principal Tibetan monastic textbook that we will use in our study of formal logic and other important topics found in the original treatise; also list its author and his dates. (Tibetan track in Tibetan.)

3) Give the two expressions used to describe, respectively, disciples of poor intellectual and spiritual capacity, and disciples of high intellectual and spiritual capacity. (Tibetan track in Tibetan.)

a)

b)

4) Give a positive reason why we should study the Buddhist art of reasoning, and then quote a verse from a famous Tibetan pandit to back up your statement. (Tibetan track in Tibetan.)

5) State a negative reason why we should study the Buddhist art of reasoning, and then give a quotation from Lord Buddha himself to back up your statement. (Tibetan track in Tibetan.)

6) Give the definition of a reason. (Tibetan track in Tibetan.)

Meditation assignment: 15 minutes per day, do an analytical meditation reviewing specific instances during the last few days when you judged someone from their appearance; then continue and evaluate whether or not it is possible that they could be a bodhisattva, or even a fully-enlightened Buddha—and that the true reason for their actions or words could be something very good which is not apparent to you right now.

Meditation dates and times (must be filled in, or homework will not be accepted):



Name:

Date:

Grade:

Homework, Class Two

1) Give the definition of an existing thing in Buddhist logic. (Tibetan track in Tibetan.)

2) Name, define, and give one example each of the two most common categories into which all existing things are divided. (Tibetan track in Tibetan.)

a)

b)

3) Why is it often incorrect to translate the word *mitakpa* (Tibetan: *mi-rtag-pa*; Sanskrit: *anitya*) as "impermanent"?

4) Give the definition of a "working thing," which is totally synonymous with "changing thing." (Tibetan track in Tibetan.)

5) Give the three different kinds of working things, their definitions, and a classical example of each one.. (Tibetan track in Tibetan.)

a)

b)

c)

6) How does the description of ultimate reality in the system of the Buddhist logic schools differ from its description in the highest school of Buddhism, the Prasangika group of Madhyamika (Middle-Way) philosophers?

Meditation assignment: 15 minutes per day, examining whether your current idea of what emptiness is fits the description that it is an unchanging thing.

Meditation dates and times (must be filled in, or homework will not be accepted):



Name:

Date:

Grade:

Homework, Class Three

1) Name, define, and give one classic example each of the three nominal divisions of "things that are general." (Tibetan track name and give example in Tibetan, but define in English.)

a)

b)

c)

2) Why is the study of "quality and characteristic" vital for those who wish to see emptiness directly?

3) Can one thing be both a quality and characteristic of a quality?

4) What are three criteria that make a water pitcher characteristic of the quality "working thing"? (Tibetan track in Tibetan.)

a)

b)

c)

5) Is "sound is a changing thing," a changing thing or an unchanging thing? Explain why.

6) When we say "group of similar cases" in a logical statement, what are these cases similar to? (Tibetan track give the name of the field, and then answer, in Tibetan.)

7) What are three ways in which parts of the group of dissimilar cases would be dissimilar to "changing thing" in the proof that sounds are changing things because they are things which are made? Describe and give one example of each. (Tibetan track in Tibetan.)

a)

b)

c)

*Meditation assignment: 15 minutes per day, analytical meditation trying to detect how you yourself tend to take your mental image of an object as the actual object itself.
Meditation dates and times (must be filled in, or homework will not be accepted):*



Name:

Date:

Grade:

Homework, Class Four

1) Give the definition of a cause. (Tibetan track in Tibetan.)

a)

b)

3) In the reading for this class, causes were divided in two different ways. Give them both. (Tibetan track in Tibetan.)

a)

b)

4) Give the definition of a material cause, and state an important application of this kind of cause. (Tibetan track in Tibetan.)

5) Give the definition of a result. (Tibetan track in Tibetan.)

6) Give the definition of a correct reason. (Tibetan track in Tibetan.)

7) Give the names of the three relationships that hold with a correct reason, and state them in a simplified manner for the logical statement, "Consider sound; it's a changing thing; because it's a thing which is made."

a)

b)

c)

Meditation assignment: 15 minutes of analytical meditation, focussing on your mind as a stream of material causes and results, and attempting to go back to the moment before the moment of your conception.

Meditation dates and times (must be filled in, or homework will not be accepted):



Name:

Date:

Grade:

Homework, Class Five

- 1) Give the definition of an object, and two other terms that are synonymous to "object."
(Tibetan track in Tibetan.)

- 2) Give the two broad divisions of all objects of the mind. (Tibetan track in Tibetan.)

- 3) Give the five broad divisions of working things. (Tibetan track in Tibetan.)
 - a)
 - b)
 - c)
 - d)
 - e)

- 4) Give the two broad divisions of the heap of physical matter. (Tibetan track in Tibetan.)
 - a)
 - b)

- 5) Give the definition of a subject. (Tibetan track in Tibetan.)

6) Name three different kinds of subjects, and give an example of each. (Tibetan track in Tibetan.)

a)

b)

c)

7) Name the two broad categories of mental things accepted by the Buddhist logic schools, but not by the Consequence School of the Middle-Way group. (Tibetan track in Tibetan.)

8) Name the two broad categories of mental things that are aware of other things. (Tibetan track in Tibetan.)

9) According to the Buddhist logic schools, how many mental functions are there? How many according to the Higher Knowledge (Abhidharma) school?

10) Mental things can also be divided into perceptions which are valid and those which are not. Give the definition of a valid perception according to the Buddhist logic schools. (Tibetan track in Tibetan, and also name the two divisions in Tibetan.)

11) Name the two kinds of valid perception. (Tibetan track in Tibetan.)

12) Name three types of conceptual valid perception, and give an example of each. (Tibetan track in Tibetan.)

a)

b)

c)

13) Name the three categories of correct reasons we get when we divide correct reasons by their basic nature. (Tibetan track in Tibetan.)

a)

b)

c)

14) Give an example of a logical statement with a correct reason that involves a result. (Tibetan track in Tibetan.)

Meditation assignment: 15 minutes per day, on the meaning of "valid perception" as far as your own perceptions during the day

Meditation dates and times (must be filled in, or homework will not be accepted):



Name:

Date:

Grade:

Homework, Class Six

1) Give the definition of a negative thing. (Tibetan track in Tibetan, also giving the Tibetan word for "negative thing.")

2) Give the two kinds of negative things, and an example of each. (Tibetan track in Tibetan.)

3) State a general description of something which is negative in the sense of not being something, and give a typical example.

4) Give one example from deceptive reality, and one example from ultimate reality, to prove the fact that the expression used for the name of a negative need not necessarily contain any negative wording. (Tibetan track in Tibetan.)

5) Give a typical example of a logical statement which includes a correct reason that utilizes a nature, and state generally what makes it such a reason.

Meditation assignment: 15 minutes per day, analytical meditation on why emptiness cannot be, as claimed in some Tibetan schools, something positive—such as the luminous quality of consciousness or the like. Check your own idea of what emptiness is, and see if it mistakenly involves something positive too.

Meditation dates and times (must be filled in, or homework will not be accepted):



Name:

Date:

Grade:

Homework, Class Seven

1) State the two conditions that are required for two things to be in contradiction with each other. (Tibetan track in Tibetan.)

a)

b)

2) Name and give one example each of the two kinds of contradictions. (Tibetan track in Tibetan.)

a)

b)

3) Name and give one example each of the two types of relationships. (Tibetan track in Tibetan.)

a)

b)

4) Give three criteria that are required for two things to share a relationship where to be one is to automatically be the other. (Tibetan track in Tibetan.)

a)

b)

c)

5) Name the two types of correct reasons used to prove the absence of something. (Tibetan track in Tibetan.)

a)

b)

6) What is the ultimate application of such a reason?

Meditation assignment: 15 minutes per day, think of someone who irritates you; make up complete logical statements that have three parts and the three relationships, to prove to yourself that you cannot really know if they have a certain good quality or not.

Meditation dates and times (must be filled in, or homework will not be accepted):



Name:

Date:

Grade:

Homework, Class Eight

1) Name the three qualities that must be present for something to be a definition. (Tibetan track in Tibetan.)

a)

b)

c)

2) Name the two types of definitions. (Tibetan track in Tibetan.)

a)

b)

3) Give an example of a single definition which incorporates both kinds of definition, and explain the parts of it that function as each of the two kinds. (Tibetan track in Tibetan.)

4) Give an example, in English, of a logical statement where the reason is used to prove the absence of something normally perceptible, and where the reason involves a cause.

Meditation assignment: 15 minutes per day, analytical meditation in which you think of common public debates going on nowadays, and frame them properly in the structure of a logical statement in Buddhism: take "A"; it is "B"; because of "C." Then see if the three relationships hold: Is "C" true of "A"? If something is "C" is it always "B"? Is it true that, if something is not "B", it cannot be "C"?

Meditation dates and times (must be filled in, or homework will not be accepted):



Name:

Date:

Grade:

Homework, Class Nine

1) Name the three kinds of exclusion, and give an example of each. (Tibetan track in Tibetan.)

a)

b)

c)

2) Identify the mentioned elements in the following logical statement. (Tibetan track identify in Tibetan, and also name each of the elements.)

Consider sound.

It is a changing thing,

Because it is a made thing.

It is, for example, like a water pitcher.

སྒྲ་ཚུལ་ཅན།

མི་རྟག་སྟེ།

བྱས་པའི་ཕྱིར།

དཔེར་ན་བུམ་པ་བཞིན།

(1) *the subject:*

(2) *the assertion:*

(3) *the quality to be proven:*

(4) *the explicit form of the quality to be proven:*

(5) *an implicit form of the quality to be proven:*

(6) *the position denied:*

(7) *the quality denied:*

(8) *the group of similar cases:*

(9) *a group of dissimilar cases:*

(10) *the reason:*

(11) *the expression of the relationship between the subject and the reason:*

(12) *the expression of the positive necessity between the reason and the quality to be proven:*

(13) *the expression of the negative necessity between the reason and the quality to be proven:*

(14) *the similar example:*

3) Name the two types of correct reasons in the classification made according to correct opponent. (Tibetan track in Tibetan.)

a)

b)

Meditation assignment: 15 minutes per day, analytical meditation thinking up correct logical statements and then identifying in them the 14 elements mentioned above.

Meditation dates and times (must be filled in, or homework will not be accepted):



Name:

Date:

Grade:

Homework, Class Ten

1) Give the general definitions for the past and the future, according to the part of the Sutrist School known as "Those Who Follow Logic." (Tibetan track in Tibetan.)

2) Give the definition, according to this school, of the past relative to the time of a particular object such as a water pitcher. (Tibetan track in Tibetan.)

3) According to this same school, the following twelve terms are synonyms for one of the following: (1) the cause of a water pitcher; (2) the result of a water pitcher; (3) a changing thing. Write one of these three numbers next to each of the terms it best fits below.

- _____ that which is future for a water pitcher
- _____ that which is past by the time of a water pitcher
- _____ that which is future by the time of a water pitcher
- _____ a working thing
- _____ that which is in the process of ending
- _____ that which is past for a water pitcher
- _____ something which only lasts a moment
- _____ that which is future relative to a water pitcher
- _____ that which is approaching the past
- _____ that which is past relative to a water pitcher
- _____ that which is in the process of being destroyed
- _____ that which is approaching destruction

4) What do—generally speaking—all the following have in common, according to this school? "That which has stopped," "that which has been destroyed," "that which is about to begin," "that which is in the act of beginning," "that which is about to begin."

5) Give two senses in which the Consequence group, the highest kind of Middle-Way school, says that the past is a working thing.

a)

b)

6) Name the three general types of incorrect logical statements for particular proofs, and give an example of each. (Tibetan track in Tibetan.)

a)

Example:

b)

Example:

c)

Example (one of seven):

Meditation assignment: 15 minutes per day, review meditation (*shar-sgom*) on the seven types of inaccurate reasons for a particular proof.

Meditation dates and times (must be filled in, or homework will not be accepted):



Name:

Date:

Grade:

Quiz, Class One

1) Give the Sanskrit and English names for the classical Indian treatise which forms the basis for the Buddhist art of reasoning and perceptual theory; also list its author and his approximate date. (Tibetan track in Tibetan.)

2) Name the principal Tibetan monastic textbook that we will use in our study of formal logic and other important topics found in the original treatise; also list its author and his dates. (Tibetan track in Tibetan.)

3) State a negative reason why we should study the Buddhist art of reasoning, and then give a quotation from Lord Buddha himself to back up your statement. (Tibetan track in Tibetan.)

4) Give the definition of a reason. (Tibetan track in Tibetan.)



COURSE XIII
The Art of Reasoning

Name:
Date:
Grade:

Quiz, Class Two

- 1) Give the definition of an existing thing in Buddhist logic. (Tibetan track in Tibetan.)
- 2) Name, define, and give one example each of the two most common categories into which all existing things are divided. (Tibetan track in Tibetan.)
 - a)
 - b)
- 3) Give the three different kinds of working things, their definitions, and a classical example of each one. (Tibetan track in Tibetan.)
 - a)
 - b)
 - c)



Name:

Date:

Grade:

Quiz, Class Three

1) Name, define, and give one classic example each of the three nominal divisions of "things that are general." (Tibetan track name and give example in Tibetan, but define in English.)

a)

b)

c)

2) Why is the study of "quality and characteristic" vital for those who wish to see emptiness directly?



Name:

Date:

Grade:

Quiz, Class Four

1) Give the definition of a material cause, and state an important application of this kind of cause. (Tibetan track in Tibetan.)

2) Give the definition of a correct reason. (Tibetan track in Tibetan.)

3) Give the names of the three relationships that hold with a correct reason, and state them in a simplified manner for the logical statement, "Consider sound; it's a changing thing; because it's a thing which is made."

a)

b)

c)



Name:

Date:

Grade:

Quiz, Class Five

1) Give the five broad divisions of working things. (Tibetan track in Tibetan.)

a)

b)

c)

d)

e)

2) Name the two broad categories of mental things that are aware of other things. (Tibetan track in Tibetan.)

3) Mental things can also be divided into perceptions which are valid and those which are not. Give the definition of a valid perception according to the Buddhist logic schools. (Tibetan track in Tibetan, and also name the two divisions in Tibetan.)

4) Name the two kinds of valid perception. (Tibetan track in Tibetan.)

5) Name the three categories of correct reasons we get when we divide correct reasons by their basic nature. (Tibetan track in Tibetan.)

a)

b)

c)



Name:

Date:

Grade:

Quiz, Class Six

1) Give the two kinds of negative things, and an example of each. (Tibetan track in Tibetan.)

2) State a general description of something which is negative in the sense of not being something, and give a typical example.

3) Give a typical example of a logical statement which includes a correct reason that utilizes a nature, and state generally what makes it such a reason.



Name:

Date:

Grade:

Quiz, Class Seven

1) State the two conditions that are required for two things to be in contradiction with each other. (Tibetan track in Tibetan.)

a)

b)

2) Name and give one example each of the two kinds of contradictions. (Tibetan track in Tibetan.)

a)

b)

3) Name and give one example each of the two types of relationships. (Tibetan track in Tibetan.)

a)

b)

4) Name the two types of correct reasons used to prove the absence of something. (Tibetan track in Tibetan.)

a)

b)

5) What is the ultimate application of such a reason?



Name:

Date:

Grade:

Quiz, Class Eight

1) Name the three qualities that must be present for something to be a definition. (Tibetan track in Tibetan.)

a)

b)

c)

2) Give an example of a single definition which incorporates both kinds of definition, and explain the parts of it that function as each of the two kinds. (Tibetan track in Tibetan.)



Name:

Date:

Grade:

Quiz, Class Nine

1) Identify the mentioned elements in the following logical statement. (Tibetan track identify in Tibetan, and also name each of the elements.)

Consider sound.

སྒྲ་ཚུལ་ཅན།

It is a changing thing,

མི་དྭགས་སྒྲི།

Because it is a made thing.

བྱས་པའི་སྒྲི།

It is, for example, like a water pitcher.

དཔེར་ན་བྱུམ་པ་བཞིན།

(1) *the subject:*

(2) *the assertion:*

(3) *the quality to be proven:*

(4) *the explicit form of the quality to be proven:*

(5) *an implicit form of the quality to be proven:*

(6) *the position denied:*

(7) *the quality denied:*

(8) *the group of similar cases:*

(9) *a group of dissimilar cases:*

(10) *the reason:*

(11) *the expression of the relationship between the subject and the reason:*

(12) *the expression of the positive necessity between the reason and the quality to be proven:*

(13) *the expression of the negative necessity between the reason and the quality to be proven:*

(14) *the similar example:*



Name:

Date:

Grade:

Quiz, Class Ten

1) Give the definition, according to this school, of the past relative to the time of a particular object such as a water pitcher. (Tibetan track in Tibetan.)

2) Give two senses in which the Consequence group, the highest kind of Middle-Way school, says that the past is a working thing.

a)

b)

3) Name the three general types of incorrect logical statements for particular proofs, and give an example of each. (Tibetan track in Tibetan.)

a)

Example:

b)

Example:

c)

Example:



Name:

Date:

Grade:

Final Examination

1) Give the Sanskrit and English names for the classical Indian treatise which forms the basis for the Buddhist art of reasoning and perceptual theory; also list its author and his approximate date. (Tibetan track in Tibetan.)

2) State a negative reason why we should study the Buddhist art of reasoning, and then give a quotation from Lord Buddha himself to back up your statement. (Tibetan track in Tibetan.)

3) Give the definition of a reason. (Tibetan track in Tibetan.)

4) Give the definition of an existing thing in Buddhist logic. (Tibetan track in Tibetan.)

5) Name, define, and give one example each of the two most common categories into which all existing things are divided. (Tibetan track in Tibetan.)

a)

b)

6) Give the three different kinds of working things, their definitions, and a classical example of each one. (Tibetan track in Tibetan.)

a)

b)

c)

7) How does the description of ultimate reality in the system of the Buddhist logic schools differ from its description in the highest school of Buddhism, the Prasangika group of Madhyamika (Middle-Way) philosophers?

8) Name, define, and give one classic example each of the three nominal divisions of "things that are general." (Tibetan track name and give example in Tibetan, but define in English.)

a)

b)

c)

9) Why is the study of "quality and characteristic" vital for those who wish to see emptiness directly?

10) Give the definition of a material cause, and state an important application of this kind of cause. (Tibetan track in Tibetan.)

11) Give the definition of a correct reason. (Tibetan track in Tibetan.)

12) Give the names of the three relationships that hold with a correct reason, and state them in a simplified manner for the logical statement, "Consider sound; it's a changing thing; because it's a thing which is made."

a)

b)

c)

13) Mental things can also be divided into perceptions which are valid and those which are not. Give the definition of a valid perception according to the Buddhist logic schools. (Tibetan track in Tibetan, and also name the two divisions in Tibetan.)

14) Name the two kinds of valid perception. (Tibetan track in Tibetan.)

15) Name the three categories of correct reasons we get when we divide correct reasons by their basic nature. (Tibetan track in Tibetan.)

a)

b)

c)

16) Give the two kinds of negative things, and an example of each. (Tibetan track in Tibetan.)

a)

b)

17) Name and give one example each of the two types of relationships. (Tibetan track in Tibetan.)

a)

b)

18) What is the ultimate application used to prove the absence of something?

19) Identify the mentioned elements in the following logical statement. (Tibetan track identify in Tibetan, and also name each of the elements.)

Consider sound.

སྒྲ་ཆོས་ཅན།

It is a changing thing,

མི་དག་སྟེ།

Because it is a made thing.

བྱས་པའི་ཕྱིར།

It is, for example, like a water pitcher.

དཔེར་ན་བྱུང་པ་བཞིན།

(1) *the subject:*

(2) *the assertion:*

(3) *the quality to be proven:*

(4) *the explicit form of the quality to be proven:*

(5) *an implicit form of the quality to be proven:*

(6) *the position denied:*

(7) *the quality denied:*

(8) *the group of similar cases:*

(9) *a group of dissimilar cases:*

(10) *the reason:*

(11) *the expression of the relationship between the subject and the reason:*

(12) *the expression of the positive necessity between the reason and the quality to be proven:*

(13) *the expression of the negative necessity between the reason and the quality to be proven:*

(14) *the similar example:*

20) According to this same school, the following twelve terms are synonyms for one of the following: (1) the cause of a water pitcher; (2) the result of a water pitcher; (3) a changing thing. Write one of these three numbers next to each of the terms it best fits below.

_____ that which is future for a water pitcher

_____ that which is past by the time of a water pitcher

_____ that which is future by the time of a water pitcher

_____ a working thing

_____ that which is in the process of ending

_____ that which is past for a water pitcher

_____ something which only lasts a moment

_____ that which is future relative to a water pitcher

_____ that which is approaching the past

_____ that which is past relative to a water pitcher

_____ that which is in the process of being destroyed

_____ that which is approaching destruction

Please PRINT your name clearly, exactly as you would like it to appear on your certificate, and the address to which the certificate should be sent.

Please circle one or specify other:

Mr. Ms. Mrs. Miss Venerable

Name as you would like it to appear on the certificate: _____

Mailing name, if different: _____

Address _____

City _____ State _____ Zip code _____

Country _____

These notes were taken by a student in class, and should used for reference only. Please check them against the audio for accuracy of content.

CLASS NOTES

Course XIII: The Art of Reasoning

Class One: Why Study Buddhist Logic

Introduction

Gyaltsab Je was the main disciple of Je Tsongkapa (1357-1419), who started our lineage and was the teacher of the first Dalai Lama. “Gyaltsab” means “regent,” and he was assigned as Je Tsongkapa’s replacement, but before these two met, Gyaltsab Je was the most famous logician in Tibet. After becoming one of Je Tsongkapa’s great disciples, Gyaltsab Je said that the kindest thing Je Tsongkapa ever did for him was to teach him Buddhist logic.

Each class in this course will include three parts:

1. The **content** of Buddhist logic.
2. The **format** or structure of Buddhist logic.
3. The form of Buddhist **debating**.

Logic Textbooks and Authors

TSEMA	NAMDREL	<i>Commentary on Valid Perception</i> , written by Lopon Chukyi Drakpa, Master Dharmakirti (650 ad). This classic logic text is a defense of an earlier book on Buddhist logic written by Master Dignaga who was the founder of Buddhist logic.
valid perception	commentary	
<i>pramana</i>	- <i>varttika</i> (skt.)	

Valid perception means perception that is reasonable given the information available. Based on what you know at the time, it’s true. However, perceptions that are valid may prove to be incorrect upon further analysis.

RIK LAM	TRUL	GYI	DEAMIK	<i>The key for Starting the Logic Machine</i> . This is the standard logic textbook at Sera monasteries. It was written by:
logic	path	machine	of starting key	

PURBUCHOK JAMPA	TSULTRIM	GYATSO	The author (1825-1901) for the modern commentary which we will use for this course. He was tutor to the thirteenth Dalai Lama.

Three Reasons to Study Logic

1. **Studying Buddhist logic allows you to see emptiness directly.** Gyaltsab Je said the kindest thing Je Tsongkapa ever did for him was to teach him Buddhist logic. If you are ready, studying logic triggers your intellectual capacity, and powers you to see emptiness directly -- especially the study of mental images (*chi-jedrak*).

CLASS NOTES

Course XIII: The Art of Reasoning

Class One, continued

Students can be described according to their level of intellectual and spiritual capacity:

WANG TUL	DEPAY	JEDRANG	To follow Buddhism from blind faith is stupid, for those with “dull power.” Faith is unstable, and to follow a teacher because they are attractive or appealing is foolish.
power	dull	faith to follow somebody	

WANG NUN	RIKPAY	JEDRANG	To follow because of reasoning is smart for those with “sharp power.” Don’t accept what any teacher says until it makes sense to you logically.
power	sharp	reasoning to follow somebody	

2. **TEN - DZIN**
true to hold
- To hold as true.** It means “keeping the Dharma safe in the world.” The great Sakya Pandita said the only people qualified to keep Buddhism safe in the world are those who understand and can logically prove the truth of Buddhism.

DETA	DRUP	DANG	SUNJIN	GYI	RIKPAY	SHANLUK	GANGI	SHEY
like that	to prove	and	disprove	of	logic	books that teach	anyone who	understood
KEPA	DENI	DZOKPA	YI	SANGGYE	KYI	NI	TENPA	DZIN
Buddhist	that guy	totally enlightened	Buddha	of	keeper	of Dharma		
master								

Suppose a person comes to understand the scriptural tradition for how to reason: this art of proving or disproving things. A master like this is a person who keeps the teachings of the totally enlightened Buddhas safe here in the world.

If you can’t prove your Buddhist faith to yourself, the teachings will disappear. You must understand why you believe the Dharma. If doesn’t make sense to you, drop it. If it does make sense, then drop the other stuff and follow this.

3. **NGA’AM** **DANG** **DRAWE** **GANGSAK** **GI** **TSU** **ZUNG** **GI**
me or and one like me other people of you can judge them but...

GANGSAK	GYI	GANGSAK	GI	TSU	MISUNG	TE	NYAMPAR	GYUR	TARE
other people	than me	other people	you can’t judge them	you’ll fail	you’re going to				

If you are me or someone like me [a Buddha] you can judge other people, but... other people [non-Buddhas] shouldn’t judge other people or they will fall down.

CLASS NOTES

Course XIII: The Art of Reasoning

Class One, continued

Only a Buddha who is omniscient can read other people's minds directly without getting into trouble. If you are a normal person, logically, you have to be very careful about judging other people because you can't see what is in their mind. It doesn't mean that you should let an apparently evil person do harm to others, etc. You should react to these situations and resist evil, but you should reserve final judgment. **The most important lesson of Buddhist logic is that you don't know who the people around you are.** You don't know their motivations, or whether they are a bodhissatva or a tantric deity, so you should just concentrate on your own practice. **Don't judge or criticize others.**

The Definition of a Reason

TAK SU KUPA TAK KYI TSENNYI
reason as a set forth reason of a definition

The definition of a reason is
anything you give as a reason.

"It's right to study Buddhism *because the sky is green.*" The sky being green is a reason; it doesn't have to be a good reason. Anything you want to give as a reason will qualify as a reason. It doesn't have to be correct, and it doesn't even have to exist. Anything you put forth as a reason is accepted as a reason.

The Right Motivation for Debating

NYI KU - RIM Prayers said by monks before beginning a debate session. The first thing you do when you arrive at the debate ground is to pray that you will have the right motivation for debating: to explore reality with your friends, and to get to the bottom of the truth so that you can get enlightened as soon as possible and then help other people. Debating quickly speeds you to the direct perception of emptiness which will quickly get you to Buddhahood so you can then help people in a big way. You have the potential to save people's lives by teaching them how to stop their suffering and their own death. This is the only motivation you should have for debating.

CLASS NOTES

Course XIII: The Art of Reasoning

Class Two: Changing and Unchanging Things

DURA A kind of literature where great Buddhist masters from each college have
logic text taken important ideas out of Master Dharmakirti's *Commentary on Valid Perception (Pramana Varttika)*, and made separate books from them.

Three Logic Texts

1. **YONG DZIN** **DURA** *The Key To the Logic Machine*, by Purbuchok, who was
tutor of Dalai Lama logic text the tutor to the thirteenth Dalai Lama.
2. **SE** **DURA** Logic text written by Ngawang Trash (sp?) who is the
spiritual son/daughter logic text spiritual son of the great Jamyang Shepa, the textbook
writer from Gomang college of Drepung monastery.
3. **RATU** **DURA** The first great *dura*, written at Ratu monastery near a
monastery logic text Hlasa.

Three-Section Structure of Logic Texts

The structure of each *dura* (logic text) includes approximately 15 important topics, which are presented in three distinct sections (called *gak shak pong sum*):

1. **GAK** **To choke someone.** It means to blow away the incorrect arguments of
to choke your opponent. Approximately 15 incorrect views are presented, then
correctly refuted.
2. **SHAK** **To set forth your own correct views.** It includes definition, divisions,
and clarifications. This is the critical section where our own correct
views are presented.
3. **PONG** **To refute your opponents' rebuttal.**
to eliminate

The logic texts begin with an opponent opening with an incorrect statement which challenges the defender to correct their false opening statement. You begin a debate with this statement:

DI **CHITAR CHU-CHEN** **Let's consider this topic...** Then you open with an
wisdom let's consider... incorrect statement which is disproved by the
defender.

CLASS NOTES

Course XIII: The Art of Reasoning

Class Two, continued

Presentation of All Existing Things

SHI-DRUP KYI NAMSHAK
outline of all of types of things
of existence

Everything you always wanted to know about things you can establish as existing. Buddhism divides all of existence into categories and sub-categories. Understanding this topic is very important because it will help you to see emptiness directly

Synonyms for “Existence”

YUPA Existing things. Anything that exists.

SHE JA Knowable thing. Any object in the universe that can be known.

CHU Dharma, any existing thing. This is one of the many definitions for Dharma.

SHI DRUP Anything that can be established as existing.

YUL An object, any thing.

Any one of these words can be used for one specific existing thing, or for the category of all knowable existing things in the universe.

An Outline of All Existing Things

TSEME MIPA YUPAY TSENNYI
valid perceived existing definition
perception thing

The definition of an existing thing is that which can be perceived by a valid perception. Almost all of our perceptions during the day are valid, except for when we are very emotionally upset, drunk or hallucinating, seeing an optical illusion, etc.

YUPA
existing things

Existing things. We will divide all of existence into unchanging things and changing things.

Class Two, continued

6

Class Two, continued

Class Two, continued

1. **SUK**
physical
thing
A physical thing. This is also called *pembo* which means a thing composed of atomic particles.

The definition of physical matter is anything that can be demonstrated as physical matter. For example, an object that is hot to the touch. If you try to explain to someone what the color blue is, the only way is to point to something that is blue.

SEL SHING RIKPA, SHEPAY TSENNYI, DEWA, YESHE
invisible and aware mental thing definition happiness wisdom

3. DENMIN DUJE BEM SHE GANGRUN MAYINPAY DULJE GANGSAK
 doesn't working physical mental either one it is not produced a person
 possess thing matter thing thing

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CLASS NOTES

Course XIII: The Art of Reasoning

Class Two, continued

The Subject, Quality and Reason of a Debate

DI CHITAR CHUCHEN
mantra of this one let's consider
Manjushri

Let's consider this one. You begin a debate by introducing the topic.

TONGPA NYI CHUCHEN
emptiness let's consider

Let's consider emptiness.

NGUPO YIN TE
working thing it is

It's a working thing.

DUJE NGUPA YINPAY CHIR
function it performs it is because

Because it performs a function.

CHUCHEN
the subject

The *subject* of a debate. It means "let's consider..." For example, let's consider emptiness. The subject must have two qualities:

1. The opponent must have perceived the subject with a valid perception; they must be somewhat familiar with the topic.
2. The opponent must be unsure whether or not the subject has the qualities you will assert. Your reasoning is considered incorrect if the opponent already believes what you're trying to prove.

DRUPAY CHU
prove quality

The *quality* of the subject you're trying to prove. For example, "being a working thing." It doesn't even have to exist; you just have to be willing to prove it. You and the opponent must agree that it is the quality you're trying to prove.

DRUPJA
assertion

The *assertion*, which consists of the subject and the quality you're trying to prove. For example, "emptiness is a working thing."

TAK
reason

The *reason*. The reason may include anything you want to say as a reason. For example, "because it performs a function."

Buddhist debate is all about exploring the unknown with your friends. It's a beautiful thing. It's not about the idea of competition that Americans typically have. Don't be shy, which is a kind of pride. Be courageous and try to sharpen your understanding by debating topics you don't understand well.

Note that this course on logic falls within the sautrantika, or logic school. In this school, the definition of ultimate reality is "anything you can confirm directly with your senses."

CLASS NOTES

Course XIII: The Art of Reasoning

Class Three: The Door to Emptiness

The goal of this course is to be able to sit in a chair and help every living being in the universe perfectly without any conscious thought. This is called *hlundruk*, to be a perfect match with every living being and to help them unconsciously. To do this, you must be a Buddha, and to become a Buddha you must have reached nirvana which is the permanent removal of all of your mental afflictions, because you saw emptiness directly. So to remove all of your mental afflictions you must first see emptiness directly; and to see emptiness directly, you must first reach the realization called *chu chok*, or “supreme object” where you directly perceive and understand perfectly what it is to be dependent origination (lower reality), and how it works; and before you reach *chu-chok* you must first study emptiness deeply and understand how mental images work. If you understand mental images well you eventually will see directly how lower reality works; then you will perceive higher reality directly very shortly afterwards. So studying mental images is a direct lineage to reaching Buddhahood. The whole essence of Buddhist logic is to understand mental images and dependent origination.

The study of mental images is very difficult because you need some kind of energy or power to get it. You must have a great collection of good karma, which gives you the ability to understand this topic. Without this good karma you will not be able to absorb these teachings. This material is extremely important and you should go through each argument in the reading slowly and work on it one bit at a time. It will take a lot of effort.

CHI	JEDRAK	“General” and “specific,” or “set” and “subset” are easy simple definitions for <i>chi-jedrak</i> . We will illustrate the the concept of general (<i>chi</i>) and specific (<i>jedrak</i>) using the example of “car.” If car is the general (<i>chi</i>), then Chevies, Fords and Toyotas can be specific instances, or subsets of “car.” It is also true that every specific (<i>jedrak</i>) can also be a general (<i>chi</i>). For example, if Chevies are the general (<i>chi</i>), then old Chevies and new Chevies can be the specific (<i>jedrak</i>). A very general test of whether something is a <i>chi</i> of a <i>jedrak</i> , is that if you wiped out all of the <i>chi</i> ’s, it would automatically wipe out all of the <i>jedrak</i> ’s. Two of these next three are only nominal <i>chi</i> ’s -- they are not real <i>chi</i> ’s; and one of them is a real <i>chi</i> .
general category	specific member of that category	

Three Types of CHI, or “Quality”

- | | |
|---------------------------------|---|
| 1. RIK CHI
type, kind | A type or kind, which has individual things which are characteristic of it. It is formally defined as “that existing thing which subsumes the multiple things which are of its type.” It means, it’s a general quality (car-ness), and many things are characteristic of it. |
|---------------------------------|---|

CLASS NOTES

Course XIII: The Art of Reasoning

Class Three, continued

You must think carefully about this: think of car as “car” or the quality of car-ness. It’s the difference between *a* car, *the* car, and “car.” This is a life or death question. Car-ness is not the same as a car. **Car-ness is a quality, an attribute, a nature and then there are different objects in the world that possess or are characteristic of that quality.** For example Chevies, Fords, and Toyotas. The way that your reality is occurring is closely tied to the question of car-ness. The reason you’re perceiving your reality the way you do, and the reason you’re suffering, is directly related to understanding car-ness and the quality called “car.” This is very very subtle and you have to work on it. If you understand this point, you will understand dependent origination and see it directly, and this will trigger the direct perception of emptiness. Then you will see your future enlightenment directly and you will know how many lifetimes you’ll have left and the nature of those lifetimes. You’ll know what you’ll be doing and how you will live. You will see the Buddha directly and you become an arya, or “superior being.” Then you will never doubt these truths, and you become very independent of everything going on in the world. You see the contents of the entire scriptures on emptiness. You see all these things and know they are true, so they are called the four arya truths.

So you must think of *chi jedrak* as “quality” and “characteristic of...” Don’t think of it as “a characteristic,” like blueness or whiteness is *a* characteristic of this pen. Think of it as “characteristic of...” or “typical of...” like a Chevy is characteristic or typical of the quality called car-ness. You have to work with this.

To understand this concept, you must pray for the help of your Lamas, and get divine assistance. Do really good preliminaries and visualize the Lamas and ask for help. Heavy duty guru yoga would be in order. You need to collect very powerful good karma to understand *chi jedrak*.

“Car” means the quality of car-ness, and those objects which are characteristic of car-ness. You must go home and think about this.

2. **DUN CHI** **A mental image.** It can be defined as having these three aspects:
mental image

1. **It’s a mental image of something you’ve already perceived**, like your refrigerator.
2. **You mistake it for the actual object.** The madhyamikas explain it like this. After studying *chi jedrak* like crazy, you’re making tea in a pot for your Lama, for example, and suddenly you realize that you’re not looking at a pot, you’re looking at a mental picture of a pot, because all there is is a circle of silver, a black long thing, other clues or indicators that your eyes can see. Your eye can’t see a pot of water. It can only see colors and shapes, and then your mind, under the influence of, ruled and dictated by your past karma, organizes that data into a certain object.

CLASS NOTES

Course XIII: The Art of Reasoning

Class Three, continued

Then your mind fills in the blanks and creates a mental image (*dun chi*) of a pot. You're actually staring mentally at an image of a pot in your mind, and then you mistake that for a pot because all you're actually getting is some sense data. A roach on the stove getting the same sensory data input, because of its karma, would interpret that data as a life-threatening hell realm with a burning hot floor -- validly so. It's no more a pot than a hell-realm floor. The roach would also be mistaking his mental image of a mountain of burning-hot metal as an external object. He's also looking at a mental image (*dun chi*) and not a real object -- and that's what makes him a roach. He is a roach because of the collective impressions that his karma is forcing him to have about the same sense data that you're getting. Your karma is forcing you to organize things into mental images (*dun chi*'s) that are much more comfortable normally. This is what makes you a human. Your karma is the human realm. There is no self-existent human realm independent of the mental images that force you to interpret the same sense data as a human realm. This makes tantric enlightenment possible, and you must change your karma so you will see the data around you as the nectar of the gods. Mental images (*dun chi*'s) are running your world and they make everything possible. Every single mental or physical event in your world is a mental image, and you're mistaking them for some outer object. When you do this, you like and dislike, and then you get into trouble. Only when you think of the object as being out there, and as not depending on your own mental images that you have created, can you dislike or like someone in the wrong way, and collect negative karma by having these negative emotions. If you really saw that everything that you experience is your fault, like every jerk you ever met is just something that you're maintaining, then you wouldn't get mad at anyone. You would just go home and be sad that you haven't kept your vows and so have lousy karma. If you changed your karma you would be freed from your bad karma and reach nirvana, because you understood the emptiness of your world.

To understand emptiness you must investigate the intimate relationship between a *rik chi* and a *dun chi*, between car-ness and your mental image in your mind when you think of a car. It will liberate you if you see the connection.

3. **You arrive at it by negating all which it is not** and then the mental image of the pen, for example, is all that's left. Take everything which is not the pen and cancel it, and you are left with only the pen. According to sautrantika school, this is a mental exercise you do every time you see something. This is not a crucial point; it's more important to think how your past karma is causing you to see this particular mental image in the way that you do.

A classic example of a mental image (*dun chi*) is "the opposite of all that a pen is not as I imagine it while I perceive something, and that which I mistake as the real pen."

CLASS NOTES

Course XIII: The Art of Reasoning

Class Three, continued

If you explore this question it will take you very close to seeing emptiness: what is it in your mind that allows you to look at the parts of an object and organize its parts and to then understand that those parts make a larger object? The answer is that your past karma forces you to see it that way, which is what makes tantric enlightenment possible in this life.

3. **TSOK CHI** **A physical collection of parts.** Physical members that make up a group, collection whole. *Tsok* means a group, and *chi* here means a general object that has its own parts. For example a water pitcher is composed of a handle, a base, etc. One particular car is composed of its physical parts. This is only a gross nominal *chi* and is not very helpful in seeing emptiness directly. Seeing how a car is a collection of its gross physical parts will not help you to see emptiness much.

By contrast, understanding the process of how you conceptualize car-ness when you think of a car could get you to see emptiness which will lead you to enlightenment. This is *the* key to seeing emptiness. You must go home and meditate about this for about five years. It's worth it.

JEDRAK, or "Characteristic of..."

JE DRAK **A member of a general category** is a simple definition. The real characteristic of... meaning is "**characteristic of...**" a quality. Two classical example are:

1. **NGUPO** **A working thing.** This is a synonym for a changing thing. It is working thing characteristic of all existing things.
2. **BUMPA** **A water pitcher,** which is characteristic of a working thing.
water pitcher

Three Tests for Being a JEDRAK

Is water pitcher a characteristic of (*jedrak*) the general category (*chi*) working thing (*ngupo*)? There are three tests for whether something is characteristic of (*jedrak*) of a general category (*chi*).

By the way, like every bit of Buddhist scripture, understanding these logic topics has a direct impact on your getting enlightened. All the topics are essential, and you have to get a good explanation of their application. If you could come to see that every scripture (*ka*) is directly relevant and applies to your personal enlightenment (*dam*), you could be called a *ka-dampa*, which means you understand that the Buddha didn't say anything that won't get you to your personal enlightenment.

CLASS NOTES

Course XIII: The Art of Reasoning

Class Three, continued

1. KYU NGUPO YIN

it working thing is

Is the object a subset or characteristic of (*jedrak*) the set/general category/quality (*chi*)? A water pitcher is characteristic of (*jedrak*) the general category (*chi*) working thing. A Chevy (*jedrak*) is characteristic of the general category car (*chi*). The characteristic (*jedrak*) must be only one component, or a subset, of the quality (*chi*). For example, all working things and all changing things are equivalent -- just two different names for the same thing -- so one can't be characteristic of (*jedrak*) the other as a general category (*chi*).

2. KYU NGUPO DANG DAKCHIK TU DREL

it working thing related to to be one is to be the other to share a relationship

The characteristic (a water pitcher) shares a relationship with the quality (working things) such that to be one (a water pitcher) is to automatically be the other one (working thing). Being a water pitcher is automatically to be a working thing.

3. KYU MAYIN SHING NGUPO YANG YINPAY SHI TUNPA DUMA DRUP

it is not and working thing it is one thing which many there exists
is both A and B

There must exist multiple other things which are both a) not the subject or characteristic in question (a water pitcher), and b) are still a characteristic of the quality (working things). For example, for a water pitcher (the subset) to be considered a part of the set working things, there must be multiple things other than water pitchers that are still working things. There must be multiple subsets to make up a set. In the example of "car", there are many other objects which are characteristic of the quality car-ness that are not Chevies (for example, Fords, Toyotas, etc.).

According to the highest school of Buddhist, every single perception you've ever had until the day you see emptiness directly is mistaken. You've been mistaking the mental image of a thing for the thing itself.

Is Sound a Changing Thing?

Some non-Buddhists in ancient India claimed that the syllable "OM" is an unchanging eternal thing. Buddhists disagree. In fact, sound is changing instantaneously, and this is a metaphor for everything in your life. The Buddhists present the following argument:

DRA CHUCHEN **Let's consider sounds.** This is called the **subject**, or *chuchen*.
sounds let's consider

CLASS NOTES

Course XIII: The Art of Reasoning

Class Three, continued

MITAK TE
they're not
unchanging things

They are changing things. This is called the **quality**, or *drupjay chu*; that sounds are changing things is the **assertion**, or *drupja*.

CHEPAY CHIR
it's made because

Because they are made. (This is called the **reason**, or *tak*.)

The sound "OM" is a changing thing, because it is made or produced. However, the *fact* that sounds are changing is itself unchanging. Facts are unchanging things. The fact that sounds are changing is truth itself, and truth never changes. The set of all things about which you can say "sound is changing" is exactly equal to the set of all things about which you can say "they exist," which is exactly equal to the entire set of things about which you can say "they have no nature of their own; they are only my projections, they are empty." These are exactly equivalent sets; they never change.

A Group of Similar Cases

TUN CHOK
to be in group of
harmony objects

A group of similar cases, which means things that are similar to the quality you're trying to prove. So if *sounds* is the subject, the whole set of all changing things is the group of similar cases.

DRUPJAY CHU
the quality object

The quality you're trying prove.

A Group of Dissimilar Cases

MITUN CHOK
to not be group of
in harmony objects

A group of dissimilar cases. Truth itself depends on whether these three relationships hold together. These three kinds of things are dissimilar to the quality "changing thing."

1. **MEPA MITUN CHOK**
non-existent dissimilar cases

Non-existing things. For example, a sky flower which could grow out of thin air, or the horns of a rabbit.

2. **SHENPA MITUN CHOK**
other thing dissimilar cases

Something other. A thing that is too big to be similar to the object being considered. For example, "all existing things."

3. **GELWA MITUN CHOK**
contradiction dissimilar cases

Directly contradictory or opposite. For example, "all unchanging things."

CLASS NOTES

Course XIII: The Art of Reasoning

Class Three, continued

Two Objections To a Logical Statement

CHIR
because

Because... This “because” indicates the reason. It comes at the end of the reason.

DRA CHUCHEN
sounds let’s consider

Let’s consider sounds...

MITAKTE
they are changing

They are changing...

CHEPAY CHIR
it’s made because

Because they are made.

There are two ways to object to an incorrect logical statement that ends with *chir* (because):

1. **TAK MA DRUP**
reason not correct

No! Your reason is not correct. Consider the sky; it has a color because it’s green. The reason doesn’t correctly apply to the subject. The sky is not green.

2. **KYAPPA MA JUNG**
to cover not it is

No, it’s not necessarily so. Consider the sky; it’s green because it has a color. The reason (because it has a color) is correct, but it doesn’t prove the assertion (that the sky is green).

If the logical statement is correct, you just agree with it by saying “it is,” or “it does.” For example, consider the sky, it has a color, because it is blue. You would respond “it has (a color).”

CLASS NOTES

Course XIII: The Art of Reasoning

Class Four: Causes and Results, and What Makes a Reason Correct

Comments On Class Three

MING-DE SHAK-TSAM **Established through a name (thought) and a term.** This
name term is how the madhyamika prasangika school defines
dependent origination. This is the only existence that
things have. You should consider the relationship between the term *quality*, and *quality-*
ness ("quality," meaning a mental image), and a *quality*, and the *quality*.

For this course, you should choose one small argument, and contemplate and meditate on it. Don't try to read through the readings like a novel. Be sure to read the middle sections of each reading which describes the correct viewpoint.

RIKPAY DROTANG **The way it goes.** This term describes the flow of the arguments
logic how it goes in the debates – the way they are structured.

Causes and Results

GYUN DRE **Causes and results.** We will study the shorter and easier of the two
causes results presentations from the *Dura*.

KYE - JE **GYUY TSENNYI** **Anything which brings about another thing is**
to bring about cause definition **the definition of a cause.** The three following
words are synonyms:

DREBU **Result.** It also means rice or fruit, which is the result you're hoping
result for. Anything that is a result is also a working thing and a cause.

NGUPO **Working thing.** Anything that performs a function must be both a
working thing result and a cause.

GYU **Cause.** Every cause must be a working thing and a result.
cause

The text emphasizes that anything that does anything is automatically a cause; anything that is a cause is automatically a result. Even the last moment of the flame of a butter lamp causes the perception of darkness.

CLASS NOTES

Course XIII: The Art of Reasoning

Class Four, continued

Direct and Indirect Causes

NGU GYU Direct cause.
direct cause

GYU GYU Indirect cause.
indirect cause

PEN GYI NGALOK SU JUNGWA
pen of flopped over the object as it was a moment before

The pen as it was a moment ago. The present thing that flopped over into the present. This is an example of a direct cause. So an example of an indirect cause would be the pen as it was the moment before the moment before (*pen gyi ngalok su jungwa ngalok su jungwa*). In Abhidharma, all the events of the past that didn't prevent the construction of a building are considered to be its causes. In meditation, you'll start to become aware of all the indirect causes of your current mind. You can trace your thoughts backwards far into the past and see the stream that led to your current thought. If you meditate regularly you can do this -- especially with Dharma teachings.

Material Causes and Contributing Factors

To understand why you have been here before in past lives, it is necessary to draw the distinction between material causes and contributing factors. This is the main application of this division of causes.

NYERLEN GYI GYU **Material cause.** A person can be a cause for a water pitcher, but the clay is the material cause, the stuff that turns into the water pitcher. So we say the potter is the contributing factor or secondary cause of a clay pot. A seed is the material cause of a tree, and sunlight, water, time, etc. are the contributing factors.

RANG GI DZE GYUN DU TSOWOR KYE-JE
its stuff continuation as a primarily brings about

Anything which brings about something else primarily as a continuation of the same stuff is the definition of a material cause. Stuff can be physical or mental.

HLENCHIK JEKYEN **Contributing factor.** Contributing factors for the first moment of your mind in your mother's womb are your parents, the sperm, the blood, the fact that they had relations, etc. If your parents' mental material were the material cause of your mind, your mind would automatically share the qualities of their minds, which it doesn't.

CLASS NOTES

Course XIII: The Art of Reasoning

Class Four, continued

One of the proofs for past and future lives is that there must have been a moment of consciousness prior to this life that turned into the first moment of your mind in your mother's womb. You can trace your thoughts back logically to the first conscious moment in the womb. Then look for the thing that flopped over from the bardo into that first moment of consciousness.

The Definition of a Result

KYE-JA	DREBUY	TSENNYI
anything brought about by another	result	definition

Anything brought about by another thing is the definition of a result. Results can also be divided into results of material causes and results of contributing factors.

Two Types of Relationships

There are two types of relationships between two different objects.

1. **Relationship of Identity.** This is the relationship between a quality and a characteristic, between car and Chevrolet: to be a Chevrolet is to be a car. This is called a *ngowo chikpay drawa* which means that to be one is to be the other automatically. The test for whether a relationship of identity exists is that if you remove one object the other one will also disappear. If you removed all cars in the world you would automatically remove all Chevrolets. So Chevrolet shares a relationship of identity with car, but car does not share a relationship of identity with Chevrolet (if you remove all Chevrolets all cars don't necessarily disappear. So this is a one-way relationship.
2. **Cause and Effect Relationship.** Normally causes and effects are in a one-way relationship: if you remove the cause you will automatically remove the result, but if you remove the result the cause can still have occurred. However, according to madhyamika prasangika, in terms of naming and identifying the cause as a cause, it's result also must exist, so they would get fancy and consider cause and effect to be a two-way relationship: the result depends on the cause; but the cause, in order to be a cause, also requires that it's result has also occurred.

There are only three possibilities for every pair of objects in the universe: they will either be in a relationship of identity, in a relationship of cause and effect, or not be in a relationship at all.

CLASS NOTES

Course XIII: The Art of Reasoning

Class Four, continued

Cause and Effect According to Madhyamika Prasangika

The logic school considers cause and effect to be a one-way relationship. However, one of the proofs for emptiness is the fact that there is never a moment when the cause and the effect both are existing together at the same time. So it is impossible that a cause can bring about a result, independent of your projections. There is never an instant when the seed became a tree self-existently. Similarly, when the last moment of your mind in the intermediate state between death and rebirth flops over into the first moment of your mind in the womb, there is never a self-existent point in time when the previous mind caused the latter moment of mind. This is evidence that there is no external reality out there, and these things are merely coming from your mind. For example, the reason the sun comes up in the morning is also just your projection.

According to the madhyamika prasangika school, your rebirth, the growth of a tree and a sunrise are all projections of your mind. They don't have any self-existent reality independent of your projections. However, these projections, which your karma is forcing you to see, function quite well. It's incorrect to say that these things (the sun, etc.) are not real because they are only projections. These things *are* real *because* they are projections. When you die of cancer it will be real because your mind projections it as real.

A Correct Reason

Consider sounds; they are changing things, because they are made.

TAK	A Reason. It can mean three things:
reason	- the whole three-part logical statement (above)
	- the reason (because they are made)
	- the thing mentioned in the reason (being a made thing)

The definition of a reason is “anything you put forth as a reason.” To qualify as a reason, it doesn't have to be a correct reason, and doesn't even have to make sense.

TAK	YANG DAK	A correct reason. It can refer to any of the three meanings of a
reason	correct	reason listed above. You must learn to give correct reasons that
		are logical and correct in order to prove the truths of Buddhism
		to yourself, and then to be able to prove things to others by
		using only concepts that your audience already accepts.

CLASS NOTES

Course XIII: The Art of Reasoning

Class Four, continued

Reasons which Are Correct

TSUL SUM YINPA **That which is the three ways.** This is the definition of a correct reason; it means **a reason where the three relationships hold.**
way three that which is If the reason is correct, these three conditions must hold true:

1. **CHOK CHU** **The relationship between the reason and the subject must**
subject reason hold. Does number three (the reason) apply to number one (the subject)? For *chok chu* to hold, the opponent must already accept that the reason applies to the subject. For example,

DRA JEPA **Sounds are made.** Being a made thing applies to sound.
sounds are made

2. **JE KYAP** **Positive necessity between the reason and the quality to be**
positive necessity **proven.** If three (the reason) is true, then two (the quality) must be true. For example,

JE NA MITAKPE KYAP **If something is made, it must be a changing thing.**
if it's made changing it must be

3. **DOK KYAP** **Negative necessity between the quality to be proven and the**
negative necessity **reason.** If two (the quality) is not true, then three (the reason) can not be true. For example,

TAK NA MA JEPE KYAP **If something is unchanging it can't be a**
unchanging if it's not made it must be **thing which is made.**

For an argument to be correct in Buddhism, you must use terms and concepts that the listener already understands, and you must only speak about relationships that the listener already accepts. Each of the three relationships above must already be accepted by the listener. So when you prove a Buddhist point you are merely taking people through ideas that they already accept but haven't yet tied together the three ideas.

You must reduce your argument to facts which the listener already believes. You must begin with assumptions that they already accept. You must stay on common ground. If you stick to this approach you can prove the existence of past and future lives, of emptiness, of karma, of the non-existence of a creator, and of the falsity of western world view. If someone then doesn't accept your good arguments, they simply are not able to dismiss their prejudices and think logically. People's lives are at stake based on our ability to persuade them using this proper approach. This presentation of logical reasoning is the immediate cause of having the highest mystical experience possible, which is the direct perception of emptiness. All of your meditation on up to the highest practices and

CLASS NOTES

Course XIII: The Art of Reasoning

Class Four, continued

realizations of tantric experiences are based thoroughly on logic. The way that logical thinking works is correct.

Three Objections to an Incorrect Statement

Consider sounds;
They are changing things,
Because they are made.

1. TAK MA-DRUP
reason not correct

Your reason is incorrect. For example, sounds are not made.

2. KYAPPA MA-JUNG
necessary not hold

It doesn't necessarily follow; your reason doesn't hold. Sounds are changing things because they exist (not everything that exists is changing).

3. TELN GYUR
Prasangika

Prasangika. You return a sarcastic absurd statement. For example, the attacker says "consider sounds they are changing things, because they exist." To this incorrect

reason you sarcastically respond, "so I guess emptiness is a changing thing" (because emptiness also exists, and your reason claimed that things that exist are changing). You are pointing out a necessary absurd consequence of his incorrect statement. This way of responding which points out the fallacy in your opponent's thinking is called *teln-gyur* or *prasangika*, and opponents can be led to a correct understanding of emptiness through hearing this kind of sarcastic response.

YINPA TA

Are you telling me...? When you believe your opponent's statement and speak *yinpa ta* in reply, your voice goes up when you say *ta*, like "it is so true that emptiness is an unchanging thing." When you don't believe your sarcastic statement your voice goes down when you say *ta*, like "so are you telling me that emptiness is a changing thing?"

CLASS NOTES

Course XIII: The Art of Reasoning

Class Five: Valid Perception

Objects and Subjects

YUL YUL - CHEN
object object possessing

Objects and subjects. A subject is “that which possesses an object.” Buddhist psychology is covered within this topic. This class will only touch on the basics. It is important for understanding emptiness clearly, specifically the idea that a person merges with the emptiness they are perceiving. This is a popular but ridiculous idea because a person is a changing positive object and emptiness is an unchanging negative thing.

Objects

TSEME SHELWAR JA WA
valid perception what is apprehended

Anything that can be apprehended with a valid perception is the definition of an object. Almost every perception you have is valid, meaning that given the information you have, your perceptions are reasonable. Perceptions that are not valid include when you are drunk, overcome with emotion, on a moving train, etc. Madhyamika school says that every perception you have ever had until you see emptiness directly has been incorrect, meaning that your perception doesn't match the real nature of these objects (their emptiness). The perceptions are valid, but incorrect.

Three synonyms for object:

YUL YUPA SHEL-JA
objects existing thing apprehended thing

1) All the objects in the world,
2) any existing thing, and
3) anything you can perceive with your mind. These three are synonyms. They all mean “everything that exists.” Every existing thing in the universe is an object of someone's mind. A Buddha can see all the cosmic dust drifting around the universe, so it exists.

Two Types of Objects

1. NGUPO 2. TAKPA
working thing unchanging thing

All objects can be divided into two types: **working things** and **unchanging things**. Every object must be a thing which is either a working, changing, produced, made, caused thing; or an unchanging thing.

CLASS NOTES

Course XIII: The Art of Reasoning

Class Five, continued

The Five Heaps

PUNGPO NGA **The five heaps.** All working things can be divided into the five heaps. pile, heap five Understanding these divisions of all existing things and all changing things is very important in your studies of emptiness. *Pungpo*, or *skandha* (skt.), means a pile of something, like a pile of leaves or dirt or rocks. Every person is made up of five different parts or heaps. Each of these five parts itself includes many members so they are called heaps to indicate their many parts. So every existing object in the universe can be divided into the five parts of a person.

1. **SUK** **Form.** In class two we defined physical matter as anything that you form can show someone to be physical matter, such as the colors and shapes you can see with your eyes. Here, *suk* is usually translated as form and means physical matter in a more general sense. So the first heap refers to all physical matter, which can be divided into two:

1a. **CHIY SUK** **Outer physical matter.** If you think about it carefully, the outer form wall that you see is part of you also. Does your body stop at the edge of your skin? Are your fingernails not *you* because you can't feel or control them? The logic scriptures consider that outer physical matter is part of you also. Studying the five heaps allows you to see the emptiness of each heap and deconstruct yourself, or break yourself down into five parts. If none of the heaps are self-existent, then a self-existent you in total also probably doesn't exist. There is no "you" independent of these heaps.

1b. **NANG GI SUK** **Inner physical matter.** For example, the optic nerve inner form which can detect colors and shapes.

2. **TSORWA** **Feelings.** Simply speaking you have three kinds of feeling: good, bad feelings and neutral. It also can be broken into five kinds: good and bad physical feeling, neutral, and good and bad mental feeling. To be even more fancy, feelings can be broken into 18 kinds: feeling good, bad and neutral about each of the six sense objects (the things you see, hear, smell, taste, touch and think). The logic school identifies 51 distinct mental functions; but feelings gets to be its own big heap because it creates your future suffering as you like and dislike things then collect bad karma to get or avoid them. This *doesn't* mean that you shouldn't like or dislike things or that you shouldn't be attached to the good things in your life. Buddhas like and dislike things and want to keep their Buddha paradise. It means that you should never commit a bad karma in order to get a good feeling; doing so would be ignorant and wouldn't work because doing bad deeds can never bring you a good feeling.

CLASS NOTES

Course XIII: The Art of Reasoning

Class Five, continued

3. **DUSHE** **Discrimination.** Thinking “this is good, this is bad, this is tall or short, discrimination red or blue; I like this, I don’t like that.” Discrimination also gets to be its own big heap because it’s the second trouble-maker. It doesn’t mean that you should ignore that something is mine and something is yours, or ignore the distinction between what hurts you and what is good for you. All living beings, including Buddhas, have discrimination. The discrimination that is harmful is when you say “this is mine and I’m not going to share it with you.” American Buddhists have made the mistake of trying not to feel or like anything. This is not the point. Buddhas like their Buddha paradise and they don’t like to see us suffering.
4. **DU-JE** **Other factors.** It means **everything not in the other categories.** The other factors word “factor” suggests something that acts as a cause, because all of these factors perform a function. It includes all the parts about you that didn’t make it into the other four heaps. In the logic school there are 49 different mental functions (in addition to feelings and discrimination). These include the person, Joanne (the concept of you).
5. **NAMSHE** **Awareness, consciousness.** Your awareness is not equal to your brain. awareness Why are you aware of everything? Your awareness doesn’t have a physical location. There are six types: awareness connected to your eye, ear, nose, tongue, body, and hearing your thoughts in your own mind.

Subjects

YUL - CHEN **Subjects.**
objects possessing

RANG YUL LA JUKPAY CHU **Any existing thing which engages in an**
it’s own object in engages existing thing **object** is the definition of a subject. It implies any sentient beings apprehending an object with a valid perception. Subjects must be changing things because to engage in an object the subject must change. So in which division of changing things do subjects fall: physical, mental, or that which is neither physical nor mental? The most obvious choice would be mental stuff. Can the person Magda in our class (which is neither mental nor physical) be a subject? In one sense, yes, because Magda can decide to focus on something. Can her physical body also be a subject? In one sense, yes, because her physical optic nerve, her eye power, can engage in a visual object and send the message to her mental awareness. The eye power is the contributing factor that allows visual consciousness to exist (so the present environment is always occurring a milli-second before your consciousness is experiencing it). In the final analysis only mental things can be subjects, because only mental things can have a valid perception of an object.

Class Five, continued

1. RANG	RIK	Mental things that are self-aware.
its self	to know	know itself – apperception -- simultaneous perception and awareness of that perception. The logic school believes in apperception, but the madhyamika school says that you can't be perceiving an object at the same time that you are perceiving yourself having that perception of the object, because the mind cannot simultaneously hold two different objects (e.g., you and the object you're perceiving).

- | | |
|---------------|--|
| 2. SHEN RIK | Mental things that are aware of something other than itself. |
| other to know | This category is divided into two types below. |

1. **SEM** Main mind, primary consciousness, the mind itself.
main mind
2. **SEM JUNG** Mental functions. For example: feeling, discrimination,
mental functions attention, concentration, jealousy, anger, sleep, pride, virtuous
states of mind. In the Abhidharma system there are 46 mental
functions; in this logic system there are 51 mental functions.
These are covered in the topic of Buddhist psychology.

1. TSEMA valid perception	Valid perception. These include almost all of our moment by moment perceptions.
2. TSE-MIN GYI LO valid not of mental perception event	A perception which is not valid. For example, what you see when you are drunk, on LSD, very angry or emotional; also, if you are in a moving boat, and the trees on the shore look like they are moving. These are all invalid perceptions.

- | | |
|---|---|
| <p>SARDU MILUWAY RIKPA</p> <p>fresh unerring perception</p> | <p>A fresh unerring perception is the definition of a valid perception. The logic school includes “fresh” in order to exclude memory which they consider not to be a valid perception (madhyamika includes memories as valid perceptions).</p> |
|---|---|

CLASS NOTES

Course XIII: The Art of Reasoning

Class Five, continued

Two Kinds of Valid Perception

1. **NGUN-SUM** **TSEMA**
direct perception valid perception **Direct valid perception** which doesn't involve any conceptualization. It can be awareness of an object or of your own thoughts.
2. **JEPAK** **TSEMA**
conceptualization valid perception **Valid perception involving conceptualization.**
Your first perceptions of emptiness are conceptual. In Buddhist philosophy, conceptual perception is just as valid as direct perception. This is important, because it allows you to act consistent with a belief in emptiness, past and future lives, hell realms, etc. Anything you perceive validly, whether directly or conceptually, is accepted as an existing thing.

Three Kinds of Conceptual Valid Perception

1. **NGUTOP**
deductive **Deductive, logical conceptual valid perception.** For example, the deductive perception that the pen behind my back is really there, or that sound is a changing thing.
2. **DRAKPA**
well known **Valid conceptual perception based on convention, consensus or agreement.** For example, that Uncle Sam means the federal government, or that Tibetans agree that the house for the rabbit means the moon.
3. **YI-CHE**
rational belief **Valid conceptual perception based on rational belief.** An unquestionable authority, that can be totally trusted, says that something is true. The Buddha said don't believe anything I say unless you have debated it thoroughly and can prove it to yourself through logic. Rational belief is based on logically establishing the existence of a being who cannot lie and who could never claim to have seen something that they haven't in fact seen. In your studies you will get to where you can test and then accept a being or text as unquestionably true. It must be consistent with scripture and be logically provable to you.

Tra-nge is the study of how to interpret when you should take the Buddha's words literally and when to take them figuratively. For example, the Buddha said "kill your father and kill your mother." This is obviously meant to be taken figuratively as meaning that if you are not able to practice the spiritual life well living at home with your parents, then move out on your own.

CLASS NOTES

Course XIII: The Art of Reasoning

Class Five, continued

Who Said That?!

CHI CHIR
who said that?

Who said that? Literally, it means “wherefore?” This is one of two answers to a *tel* which is where the attacker in a debate sarcastically says “are you telling me that...?” If what the attacker says is false, you say “who said that was true?” If what the attacker says is true, you say *du* which means “yes, that’s right.”

Three Kinds of Correct Reasons

TAK YANGDAK
reason correct

A correct reason. We study these three kinds of correct reasons in order to be able to prove emptiness to ourselves in many different ways, which is necessary if you want to see emptiness directly.

1. **DRE TAK YANGDAK**
result reason correct

A correct reason that involves a *result*.

There is a cause and effect relation. For example,

**Consider a mountain pass where there is a big cloud of smoke.
There must be a fire over there,
Because there’s a big cloud of smoke.**

2. **RANGSHIN TAK YANGDAK**
of its own nature reason correct

A correct reason which involves a *nature*.

This will be covered in class six.

3. **MAMIKPAY TAK YANGDAK**
absence of something reason correct

A correct reason to prove the *absence of something*. This will be covered in class seven. Most of the proofs of emptiness are based on this type of correct reason because

emptiness is simply the absence of a thing which never could have existed in the first place – a self-existent thing. Only the *idea* of a self-existent thing exists. Emptiness is the lack, or absence, of a self-existent thing.

CLASS NOTES

Course XIII: The Art of Reasoning

Class Six: Negative and Positive

GAK DRUP **Negatives and positives.** This topic, which focuses on negatives, is negative positive very important for the study of emptiness. In America, many wrong ideas about emptiness and ineffective techniques for realizing emptiness have emerged. For example, emptiness is the luminous awareness of your mind, or you can see emptiness by totally clearing your mind of any and all content. A fundamental problem in these misunderstandings is the failure to realize that **emptiness is a negative thing**.

A Definition of Negative Things

GAKPA **A negative thing.** A negative thing is a *chu*, a thing which *exists*.
negative thing For example, emptiness is a negative thing which exists.

RANG NGU SU TOKPAY LU RANGGI GAKJA
it's own directly perceives it state of mind its own thing we deny

NGU SU CHE NE TOK GUPAY CHU
directly eliminate perceive meaning existing thing

The definition of a negative thing is a thing which must be perceived by the state of mind which perceives it directly through a process of eliminating, directly, that which it denies.

In order for the mind to perceive a negative thing, such as emptiness, it first must exclude, or directly cut out, the existence of something – a self-existent thing in this case. Your mind can only perceive emptiness accurately by eliminating something; first you must focus on the absence of a self-existent thing. **Emptiness is not a positive thing**, such as the awareness of your mind. **Emptiness is the absence of something**. You perceive a negative thing by first excluding the thing which that negative thing denies. *So to perceive emptiness directly or intellectually, you must first eliminate what emptiness denies: a self-existent object.* This is why emptiness is a negative.

Three Examples of Negative things

1. **CHU-NYI** **Thing-ness or selflessness.** It means “the real nature of things.” This
thing-ness is the logic school’s term for emptiness. The real nature of things is a
negative thing because if you want to perceive it you must first
eliminate all things which are *not* it. (Note that this process of mental exclusion is different from the logic school’s description of the way you perceive something through a mental image or *dun chi* -- by reversing everything which is not the thing; this was described in class three.)

CLASS NOTES

Course XIII: The Art of Reasoning

Class Six, continued

2. **NAM KA** **Empty space**, or the absence of any physical obstruction. *Namka*
empty space literally means the sky; for example *kam-dro* is a sky-goer -- a *dakini* or
Buddhist angel, but in Buddhist philosophy *namka* means the space
which an object occupies -- empty space. When the object is occupying empty space, the
space itself is still empty, which is why it is able to hold the object; and when the object is
removed from the space, the space is obviously still empty. The place that the object
occupies is always there, so empty space never changes. This is the deeper meaning of
empty space. Empty space is defined as just **the simple absence of any physical
obstruction**; it's always there and it never changes and never functions. The point is that to
be able to conceive of empty space, you have to mentally exclude the idea of an
obstruction.

3. **HLEJIN TSUNPO NYINWOR SE MI SA** **John Smith, the chubby guy, who**
John Smith chubby daytime food never eats **never eats during the day.** This
is a joke that refers to a chubby
monk who never eats during the day; his not eating during the daytime is the negative --
the absence of his eating. However, it implies that he must be sneaking some food at
nighttime because something is making him chubby.

CHU SHEN PENPA **It implies some other thing.** By saying that *chubby* John
thing other it implies Smith never eats in the afternoon, you are implying that
he must be bingeing at night.

Two Divisions of Negative Things

1. **MEGAK** **A simple absence of something.** Empty space and emptiness (or
simple absence selflessness) are examples. Emptiness is the simple absence of a
self-existent thing, a thing that doesn't depend on your karma. The
test of whether you understand emptiness well is the extent to which other people can
cause a mental affliction in you, and whether you would commit a bad karma when
reacting to them. To be a negative thing, the term used to express it doesn't have to contain
any negative wording such as "not." Two examples are empty space, and selflessness.

2. **MAYIN GAK** **An absence where the words imply that it is not something**
implies negative **else.** For example, the fact that sound is changing, which
something implies that sound is *not* unchanging. Consider the statement,
else "*sounds are always changing things.*" This is a negative concept
because you can only conceive of it by eliminating something.

You must eliminate all cases where sounds would be unchanging things. Another example
is "John Smith, the chubby guy, never eats during the day," which implies that he must
stuff himself at night. Another example is "what you cooked *this time* is really good." This
statement implies the exclusion of all the other *bad* dinners you cooked in the past. It seems
that all general truths are *mayin gak*'s -- negative things which imply something else; and all
unchanging things are negative.

CLASS NOTES

Course XIII: The Art of Reasoning

Class Six, continued

Common Ground

If you become a good Buddhist teacher, you will always be asked to prove things. You must remember that what you say is not a good reason for the person listening unless the three relationships required for a correct reason hold, and unless the listener accepts the three relationships as well as the language and concepts you use to express the three relationships. For example, you shouldn't talk about hell realms until you have proven the likelihood that the mind continues on after the body stops moving. You must go back to common ground that you both accept. This is more important than the truth of your statement itself. In fact, according to Buddhist logic, your statement cannot be true unless the listener accepts your terms and the three relationships. Understanding this principle is critical because you can teach people to stop their death if you can catch them on common ground.

A Correct Reason that Involves a Nature

RANGSHIN GYI TAK YANGDAK A correct reason that involves a nature. This means that **to be the thing given as the reason is to automatically be the quality you're trying to prove**. For example, to be a Chevy is to automatically be a car. Or, consider sounds; they are changing things, because they are made. To be a thing which is made is to automatically be a changing thing; and in this case, to be a thing which is made is to automatically be a changing thing. In this case the relationship between three (the reason) and two (the quality) goes both ways.

However, the reverse is not necessarily true: to be the quality you're trying to prove is not necessarily to automatically be the thing given as the reason. For example, consider sound; it's a changing thing, because you can hear it. All things that you can hear are automatically changing things, but not all changing things are automatically sounds. This relationship only goes one way.

Two Ways to Prove Something

1. **LUNG**
scriptural
authority **Scriptural authority.** You must use a scripture that is accepted by both debating parties. For example, among educated Buddhists, the *Abhidharma Kosha* is accepted by virtually all Buddhist schools.
2. **RIK**
logic **Logical proof.**

CLASS NOTES

Course XIII: The Art of Reasoning

Class Seven: Contradiction and Relationship

The Importance of Studying Buddhist Logic

Without understanding Buddhist logic, you can't really read madhyamika scriptures or serious scriptures about emptiness. These are very important subjects. Each short argument (*kachikma*) in the readings is an important separate lesson in itself. So try to slowly read a few of them, and then go to the middle section of the reading where we present our own position and be sure to get this part. Each *kachikma* has a very important point to make and clarifies our own correct position. None of them are silly or trivial. Each one will give you deep insight into an important point if you take the time to get into it. You should have a lifetime relationship with this material. Memorize parts of it and then debate it with other people. It's like being married to the logic texts.

Contradiction and Relationship

GELN contradiction	DREL relationship	Contradiction and relationship. These topics are very important for understanding emptiness and dependent origination.
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GELWA contradiction	Contradiction. The study of when two objects are contradictory to each other.
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DRELWA contradiction	Relationship. The study of when two objects share a relationship with each other.
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Two Features of a Contradiction

For two things to be in contradiction with each other, they must have these two conditions:

- | | |
|----------------------------|---|
| 1. TADE
separate | Separate, distinct. The two things must be two separate things, and both must exist. Neither thing can be non-existent, because you can't discuss a contradiction between one thing that exists and another which doesn't exist, because there's only one thing there. |
|----------------------------|---|
- | | |
|---|---|
| 2. SHI - TUN MEPA
foundation harmony there is no | No one thing can be both things at the same time. <i>Shitunpa</i> means one thing which is both A and B. |
|---|---|

So the meaning of a contradiction between two objects is that both objects must be distinct from each other and there is no other thing which can be both objects at the same time.

CLASS NOTES

Course XIII: The Art of Reasoning

Class Seven, continued

Two Kinds of Contradictions

1. PENTSUN PANG - GEL

mutually eliminate contradiction

A contradiction where two things are mutually **exclusive**. No one object can be entirely both things. This kind is a *real* contradiction. When you perceive one object, the other object is necessarily excluded. For example, a water pitcher, and everything which is not a water pitcher. This example of a mutually exclusive contradiction encompasses everything in the universe. Heat and coldness is another example. In this case, there are things which are neither heat nor coldness but no one thing can be both, so this is a mutual exclusion

Three examples of mutually exclusive contradictions:

TAKPA **MITAKPA**
unchanging changing thing

Unchanging thing and **changing thing** is an example of a *direct* mutual exclusion, because one thing totally and directly excludes the other.

TAKPA **NGUPO**
unchanging working thing
thing

Unchanging thing and **working thing** is an example of an *indirect* mutual exclusion. "Coldness" and a "huge cloud of smoke" would be another *indirect* mutually exclusive contradiction.

NGUPO **NGUME**
working thing non-working
thing

Working thing and **a thing which does no work** is example of a *direct* mutually exclusive contradiction. Working thing, changing thing, and thing which is made all refer to the same material set of stuff, but the mental image that each term brings to mind is distinct for each.

2. HLENCHIK MINE GEL

to stay together can't contradiction

A contradiction where two things are **diametrically opposed**. They conflict with each other such that one works to eliminate the other.

A scriptural example of a diametrically opposed contradiction:

NYENPO **PANGJA**
antidote, problem you
counteragent want to eliminate

A **spiritual antidote** and the **negative personal quality which the antidote allows you to eliminate** is an example. For example, death meditation will eventually eliminate laziness, and meditating on the rotting innards of your body will eliminate desire for sense objects. One thing acts against the continued existence of the other thing. This kind of contradiction describes a gradual process of one object encountering, working on and removing the other object. Emptiness and the ignorance that sees things as self-existent are mutually exclusive (*pentsun panggel*) because they can't exist in one mind in the same instant, but they are diametrically opposed (*hlenchik mine gel*) in the sense that over time the developing understanding of emptiness will eventually remove the belief in self-existence.

CLASS NOTES

Course XIII: The Art of Reasoning

Class Seven, continued

Two Kinds of Relationships

DRELWA **Relationships.**
relationship

1. **DAKCHIK** **GI** **DRELWA**
oneself of relationship

To be one thing is to automatically be the other thing. This is called a relationship of identity.

For example, a changing thing and a thing which is made; this is a two-way relationship. A second example, car and Chevrolet, is only a one-way relationship because to be a Chevrolet is to automatically be a car but to be a car is not to automatically be a Chevrolet.

YUPA **MITAKPA** **DANG** **GEL**
existing changing thing and contradiction
thing

Being all existing things is contradictory to being a changing thing, but “being a changing thing” is not contradictory to “being all existing things.” So this is a one-way relationship. (This point relates to the previous section covering contradictions.)

BUMPA **BUMPA** **DOKPA**
water pitcher water pitcher reverse of
what it's not

Water pitcher and the reverse of all that is not a water pitcher is an example of one thing automatically being the other thing. Chevy and cars is another example.

According to the logic school, when you perceive the pen, you are perceiving the exclusion of all that the pen is not; but when you perceive the exclusion of all that the pen is not, you are perceiving the exclusion of all that is not the exclusion of all that the pen is not. The pen and the reverse of the pen's opposite are nominally and conceptually distinct, but are the same ontologically – they are the same material stuff, but are conceived of through different processes.

2. **DEJUNG** **GI** **DRELWAY**
came from it of relationship

The relationship of a thing and the thing which it came from. This is cause and effect, and it can only be a one-way relationship.

NGUPOY **CHI - LOK** **SU** **JUNGWA** **NGUPO**
working thing later flip working thing

A working thing in the moment after it and the original working thing is an

example. You can't say that the original working thing shares a relationship with the working thing a moment after it, because at the time that the original working thing exists, the future working thing does not yet exist and has never existed.

CLASS NOTES

Course XIII: The Art of Reasoning

Class Seven, continued

Three Criteria for a Relationship of Identity

1. DAKNYI CHIKPA To be one thing is to automatically be the other thing. They are the same thing materially or ontologically.
2. TADE The two must be separate things conceptually.
separate
3. CHU DE ME NA KYU ME GU If one thing ceased to exist, the other thing would have to cease to exist also. For example, if cars ceased to exist, then Chevis would have to cease to exist also.
thing that cease to exist this cease to exist

A Correct Reason To Prove an Absence

MA MIKPAY TAK YANGDAK A correct reason to prove the absence of something. This is extremely important. For example, consider this room full of educated Buddhists; it would be improper for anyone in this room to talk about hungry ghosts, if no one had had a valid perception of a hungry ghost. The thing that is *absent* in this proof is the propriety of anyone saying that hungry ghosts exist (if no one has seen one). The application is that you should not mention Buddhist ideas to others unless you have had a valid perception about the thing.

1. MINANGWA MA MIKPAY TAK YANGDAK A correct reason for proving the absence of something which is difficult for the other person to perceive. The thing we're denying involves something imperceptible to the opponent. Another example is: consider the guy standing in front of me; I can't say that he's not a Buddha, because I haven't had a valid perception about it. The better you get at Buddhist logic, the more you realize how little you really know about others and how much you are assuming illogically about others; and then you collect bad karma by thinking about and treating them poorly based on your perceptions about them that are not valid.
abstruse, hidden not perceived reason correct

2. NANGRUNG MA MIKPAY TAK YANGDAK A correct reason to prove the absence of something which the other person can perceive. The thing we're denying can appear to a valid perception. For example, consider the top of this pen; there's no car there because there's no Chevy there.
apparent not perceived reason correct

CLASS NOTES

Course XIII: The Art of Reasoning

Class Seven, continued

Debating Tactics

Like Mohammad Ali, the great boxing champion, you should try to confuse and distract your debating opponent. The motivation is not to be competitive or to beat your opponent. The point is to help your opponent to be able to focus his mind clearly in the middle of chaos so he can keep in mind his complicated responses. By practicing keeping your concentration, you will be able to focus clearly in future situations.

You can use the following format to review the class lessons. It will speed up your learning greatly.

Attacker: There are no different types of contradictions.

Defender: That's not correct.

Attacker: Are you telling me there are divisions of contradictions?

Defender: Yes.

Attacker: Show me them.

Defender: Mutually exclusive contradictions and diametrically opposed contradictions.

Attacker: Are you telling me those are the two contradictions?

Defender: Yes, that's right.

Some Other Responses In a Debate

UHN, or LAH **What did you say?** (this buys you time to think of a response)

SHOK **Show me.**

Dooooo CHIR **Come on, show me something** (give me an answer already!)

NGOooooooo TSA **You should be ashamed** (of that answer)!

KYEBA LUNG **Give me the statement of necessity** (the *kyeba*).

LEBTA **Say something** (quit stalling).

KORTEE KOR-SUM **You just traveled in a big circular reason** -- for example, you
circle circle three accept that sounds are made and that anything that is made
must be changing, but you refuse to accept that sound is a
changing thing. You must be crazy!

CLASS NOTES

Course XIII: The Art of Reasoning

Class Eight: Definitions and the Things They Define

Definitions and the Thing They Define

TSEN - TSUN
definition thing defined **Definition and the thing that is defined.** This topic is critical. It established precisely the objects you're debating. The rules of how a thing is to be defined must apply; they must be airtight.

TSEN-NYI
definition **The definition of a thing.** For example, the definition of a working thing is anything that performs a function.

TSUNJA
thing defined **That which you are defining.** For example a working thing.

Material and Nominal Existence

DZE-YU
material **Having material existence,** made of stuff. This term is part of the name of three qualities that make a good definition (see next page). According to the logic school, things that have a material existence can be perceived without first constructing them from their various parts and then conceptualizing the whole. For example, objects of the five senses such as colors and shapes, or the mind itself. The logic school says that perceiving it doesn't depend on perceiving its separate parts and then creating a conceptualization.

TAK-YU
Nominal **Having only nominal existence,** made up by ideas; it exists only conceptually. The logic school would say that to perceive things that have nominal existence you must first perceive the various parts and then put them together. An example from the lower madhyamika school would be your conception of a person, "John." It means the idea of "John" which is neither his mind nor his body.

The concept of material existence (*dzeyu*) is applied on the following page when considering the three qualities of a good definition. The distinction between things that have a material existence versus those that have only a nominal existence is also extremely important in the mind-only school and in the madhyamika school.

CLASS NOTES

Course XIII: The Art of Reasoning

Class Eight, continued

Three Qualities of a Good Definition

DZEYU CHU - SUM TSANGWA
material qualities three complete

Three qualities have to be complete for **something to be a definition**. Consider this definition of a *working thing*: it is a **thing that performs a function**.

1. CHIR TSENNYI YINPA
generally definition it is a

Generally speaking, it is a **definition**. It sounds like a definition. For example, "that thing that performs a function."

2. RANGGI TSENSHIY TENDU DRUPPA
its own classic example on top of it exists

It should **apply perfectly to the classic example**. For example, "a water pitcher."

3. SHEN GYI TSENNYI MAYINPA
other thing of definition it's not

It **can't be a definition for any other thing**. It must be precise or airtight, and apply only to the thing defined.

Three Conceptual Qualities of the Thing Defined

1. **It can be defined appropriately.** It sounds like a thing that is defined. Every existing thing can be defined.
2. **It should apply to a typical function.** The words "working thing" should apply to a water pitcher.
3. **It shouldn't be the thing defined by any other definition.**

In the *definition of a good definition* (above), these three qualities are called the *three material qualities*. In the *definition of something to be defined*, they are called the *three conceptual qualities*.

The reason for this may be that the thing you are defining, for example, "fire," is a conceptual thing, whereas the definition, for example "hot and burning" is more of a tangible material thing.

The thing that you choose as a classic example should combine the qualities of both the definition and the thing defined in one object. For example, a water pitcher should be both a working thing (the thing defined) and a thing that performs a function (the definition).

CLASS NOTES

Course XIII: The Art of Reasoning

Class Eight, continued

Direct Valid Perception as a Thing Defined

SARDU	MILUWAY	SHEPA	GANG SHIK	TOKDREL	MATRULWAY	SHEPA
fresh	unerring	state of mind	both A and B	free of conceptualization	un-mistaken	state of mind

A fresh unerring state of mind that is non-conceptual and un-mistaken is the definition of a direct valid perception. Each word in this definition supports either one or both of the goals of a definition, described below.

Two Goals of a Good Definition

1. **RIK MITUN SELWA** **Definitions which eliminate or disqualify things that**
type dissimilar eliminates **are dissimilar to the thing defined.** These terms serve to
disallow other dissimilar perceptions that might be
mistaken for the thing defined.

For example, in the definition above of a “direct valid perception:”

- The term “fresh” eliminates or disallows the dissimilar types of “memory.”
- The term “unerring” eliminates the dissimilar type of “perceptions that are not valid.”
- The term “free of conceptualization” eliminates the dissimilar type of “deductive” perception.

2. **LOK TOK SELWA** **Definitions which eliminate wrong ideas about the**
wrong idea eliminates **thing defined.** These terms address common mis-
perceptions about the thing defined.

For example, in the definition above of a “direct valid perception:”

- The term “un-mistaken” eliminates the wrong idea “direct perceptions are always correct” (some people considered any direct perception to be correct even if it was distorted, as when you press your eye and see double vision).
- The term “free of conceptualization” also eliminates the wrong idea that “perceptions with conceptualization could be direct.”

A Correct Reason To Prove the Absence of Something Perceptible

One of the most important goals of Buddhist logic is to prove to yourself logically that **much of the world is really unknown to you, and that you collect bad karma when you assume negative things about people which are really unknown to you and may be incorrect.** This way of thinking disqualifies you from reaching a Buddha paradise. So logically speaking, *you should be very skeptical about your perceptions about anyone’s apparent negative qualities.*

CLASS NOTES

Course XIII: The Art of Reasoning

Class Eight, continued

NANG RUNG	MAMIKPAY	TAK	YANGDAK	A correct reason to prove the
appear possible	not seen	reason	correct	absence of something which is
				normally perceptible to the
				opponent.

Two examples:

Consider the surface of a dark, nighttime ocean;

There is no smoke out there,

Because there's no fire out there.

Consider a bare rocky mountain crag;

There's no juniper trees there,

Because there's no vegetation there.

In these cases, the things used as the reason (fire, or vegetation), are normally the cause of the quality to prove (smoke, or juniper trees), so you're proving the absence of the result by proving the absence of its cause. Without fire, there can't be any smoke; and without any kind of vegetation, there can't be any juniper trees. Smoke and juniper trees are easily perceptible to normal people.

The Format of a Debate

RIKPAY	DROTANG	The format of a debate; how it goes.
debate	the way it goes	This describes the pattern of statements made by the attacker and defender in a debate.
		You should follow this structure, which begins by stating an incorrect reason, in order to get the debate going.

Attacker: *Bumpa takpa yinpay chir.* Because a water pitcher is an unchanging thing.

Defender: *Tak madrup.* Your reason is incorrect.

Attacker: *Bumpa takpa mayinpa tel.* Are you telling me water pitchers aren't unchanging things?

Defender: *Du.* Yea, that's right.

Attacker: *Mayin te:* Why not?

Defender: *Bumpa mitakpa yinpay chir.* Because water pitchers are changing things.

Attacker: *Bumpa mitakpa yinpay tel.* Are you telling water pitchers are changing things?

Defender: *Du.* That's right!

CLASS NOTES

Course XIII: The Art of Reasoning

Class Nine: Exclusion; Elements of a Logical Statement

SHEN-SEL **Exclusion.** The elimination of all which is not the thing. This topic is
other eliminate very important for the understanding of emptiness. Exclusions are not
 emptiness, but the topic addresses three common misperceptions
 about emptiness. For example, "all which is not sound."

Three Kinds of Exclusion

1. **DUN RAN GYI SHENSEL** **An exclusion which is the objectification of a**
object- specific of exclusion **specific instance of a thing.** It means the act of
ification instance creating a negative thing by considering the
 opposite of all which is *not* the thing. You establish
what it *is* by mentally eliminating all that it *is not*. A pen, from the point of view of being
the opposite of all that it is not, and a pen from the point of view of being a pen, are two
separate ways of looking at a pen; and these are important for understanding emptiness.
"Specific instance" here means one particular pen, as opposed to the generality of a pen. In
the logic school, this kind of exclusion only applies to working things. It doesn't apply to
empty space. This is important because the lower schools believed that things exist because
they function, and not because of your own karmic projections which is what madhyamika
prasangika's believe -- even the rising of the sun is a projection of your mind. It is not an
external independent event. Each working thing in the world has its own nature of being
the opposite of all that it is not.

BUMPA MAYINPA LE LOKPA **A water pitcher considered as the reverse**
water pitcher it's not than flopped over **of all that it is not** is an example.

2. **LOY SHENSEL** **A mental exclusion.** You create a mental image
mind exclusion of a negative thing by imagining all which is not
 the thing, and then you conceive of the opposite of
that to arrive at the negative thing. This mental exclusion is very close to a *dun-chi*, or
mental image (see class three), which is at the root of dependent origination because in the
highest school you are mistaking a mental image for the actual object. It is defined as "the
mental image that appears to conceptualization which is created by negating all that a
thing is not." The logic school says that anything that has no true nature of its own has an
exclusion. A purple elephant in this classroom doesn't exist, but it has its own emptiness -
- so the quality of not being self-existent applies even to things that do not exist. So mental
exclusions apply even to things that can only be imagined. You can picture the opposite of
all that is not a purple elephant in this room (which doesn't exist but can be imagined). An
imaginary thing cannot function, but the image of a thing can function -- to give you an
ulcer, for example. In order to see emptiness directly you must be able to imagine what a
self-existent thing would be like.

CLASS NOTES

Course XIII: The Art of Reasoning

Class Nine, continued

TOKPAY NANG YUL
conceptualizing appears object

An example is **the conceptualization of the object that appears to you**. It means the image that appears to conceptualization, e.g., the mental exclusion (*loy shensel*) of a rabbit's horns.

3. **ME GAK GYI SHENSEL** **An exclusion of a thing, which is a negative thing involving the absence of the thing.** It means that the object is not all that it is not. An exclusion and a negative are the same thing. This third kind of exclusion is a negative in the sense of being the simple absence of something (*me gak*). The first type of exclusion is a negative in the sense of not being something (that is, a *mayin gak*). For example, the pen is *not* all that is not – it is the opposite of all that it is not. The classic *me gak* is ultimate reality or emptiness. It is the simple absence of a self-existent thing. For example, a person or situation that could irritate you from its own side, independent of your karmic projections.

BUMPA MAYINPAY TONGWA An example is **the condition of a water pitcher being devoid of anything that belongs to the group of things that it is not.** When your mind thinks of this and draws a blank, you are thinking about emptiness.

The Elements of a Logical Statement

DRA CHU CHEN; MITAK TE; JEPAY CHIR; PERNA BUMPA SHIN
sound consider it's changing it's made because for example water pitcher it's like

**Consider sound; it is a changing thing, because it is a thing which is made.
It is, for example, like a water pitcher.**

JORWA **Putting it all together.** This is the root word used for *yoga* or *yolk*.
put together Fourteen elements of a logical statement are outlined below.

The reason you give an example, like a water pitcher, is to put you and your opponent on common ground. The reasoning is obvious when you use a water pitcher, and then you can say that the same line of reasoning applies to sound as the subject.

CLASS NOTES

Course XIII: The Art of Reasoning

Class Nine, continued

1. **DRA, CHUCHEN**
sound the subject **Sound** is the *subject*.
2. **DRA MITAKPA, DRUPJA**
sound it's changing assertion **Sound is a changing thing** is the *assertion*.
3. **MITAKPA, DRUBJAY CHU**
being changing to prove thing **Being a changing thing** is the *quality to be proven*.
4. **MITAKPA, NGU KYI DRUBJAY CHU**
being changing explicit of to prove thing **Being a changing thing** is the *explicit quality to be proven*.
5. **KECHIKMA, SHUK KYI DRUPJA CHU**
instantaneously implicit of to prove thing
changing **Being instantaneously changing**
is the *implicit quality to be proven*
6. **DRA TAKPA, GAKJA**
sound unchanging what we deny **Sound is an unchanging thing** is the *position we deny*.
7. **TAKPA, GAKJAY CHU**
unchanging we reject thing **Being an unchanging thing** is the *quality denied*.
8. **MITAKPAY CHU, TUNCHOK**
changing thing group of
similar things **All changing things** is the *group of similar cases*.
9. **TAKPAY CHU, MITUNCHOK**
unchanging thing group of
dissimilar things **All unchanging things** is the *group of dissimilar cases*.
10. **JEPA, TAK**
it's made reason **It's a made thing** is the *reason*.
11. **DRA JEPA, CHOKCHU**
sound it's made if 1 then 3 **Sound is a made thing** is the *relationship between the subject and the reason*.
12. **JENA MITAKYE KYAB, JE-KYAB**
it's made be changing it must if 3 then 2 **A made thing must be a changing thing**
is the *positive necessity between the reason and the quality to be proven*.
13. **TAKNA MAJEPE KYAB, DOK-KYAB**
not made it must if not 2, not 3 **A thing that isn't changing can't be a made thing** is the *negative necessity between the quality and the reason*.

CLASS NOTES

Course XIII: The Art of Reasoning

Class Nine, continued

14. **BUMPA, TUNPE** A water pitcher is the *similar example*.
water pitcher example

Two Kinds of Correct Reasons Relative to the Opponent

RANGDUN KAB KYI TAK YANGDAK A correct reason for your own sake, to
for your own sake of reason correct prove something to yourself. Buddhism
really is a private thing. You need to use
logic to prove emptiness to yourself, and to meditate on emptiness by yourself. Then you
will know that you can't judge anyone because you can't read other people's minds. You
will realize that you can not prove that anyone around you is not a Buddha or tantric deity.

SHENDUN KAB KYI TAK YANGDAK A correct reason for others' sake, to prove
for others' sake of reason correct something to other people.

CLASS NOTES

Course XIII: The Art of Reasoning

Class Ten: The Concept of Time

Presentation of the Three Times

DU SUM NAMSHAK
time three presentation

Presentation of the three times: past, present and future.
The different Indian schools, and especially madhyamika prasangika, have very different views on the nature of time.

DO DEPA
sutra

The Sutrist or Logic School, which uses the sutras to prove things.
These are the higher of the two hinayana schools.

RIKPAY JEDRANG
logic followers

Logic followers. This is a subset of the sutrist or logic school. The following presentation on time is from their point of view.

1. DEPA **Past time.**
past
2. DATAWA **Present time.**
present
3. MA-ONGPA **Future time**, not yet come.
not come

MEPE NA TSENNYI ME
don't exist definition none

[Past and future] don't exist so there is no definition for them. In an absolute sense, the past is gone, and the future has not yet come, so in general terms they don't exist and can't be defined. However, relative to a specific object that exists now, the past and future can be defined.

The Definition of the Past, Relative to a Water Pitcher

Two requirements are necessary in order to define the past. The past can only be defined relative to a specific object that exists in the present moment, such as a current water pitcher:

1. BUMPAY DUSU KYE SINPA
water pitcher in the time began already

By the time of the [current] water pitcher, it [the past] must have already begun.

2. BUMPAY DUSU GAK SINPA
water pitcher in the time cease already

By the time of the water pitcher, it must have already stopped.

The definition of the past, relative to the time of a water pitcher, is that time which has already begun by the time the current water pitcher exists, and which has already stopped by the time of the present water pitcher.

CLASS NOTES

Course XIII: The Art of Reasoning

Class Ten, continued

The Definition of the Present, Relative to a Water Pitcher

- | | |
|---|---|
| 1. BUMPAY DUSU DRUP SINPA
water pitcher at time of happened already | By the time of the [current] water pitcher it [the present] should have already happened. |
| 2. BUMPA DANG DU NYAMPA
water pitcher with time equal | By the time of the water pitcher, it should happen simultaneous to the water pitcher. |

The definition of the present, relative to the time of a water pitcher, is that time which has occurred by the time the current water pitcher exists, and which is simultaneous to the present water pitcher.

The Definition of the Future, Relative to a Water Pitcher

- | | |
|---|---|
| 1. BUMPA DUSU KYE SHINPA
water pitcher at time of beginning in the act of | By the time of the [current] water pitcher, it [the future] is in the process of beginning. |
| 2. BUMPA DUSU MA KYEPA
water pitcher at time of not beginning | By the time of the water pitcher, it hasn't happened yet. |

The definition of the future, relative to the time of a water pitcher, is that time which is in the process of beginning, but hasn't happened yet relative to the present water pitcher.

The Cause and Result of a Water Pitcher, and a Working Thing

- | | |
|--|---|
| 1. BUMPAY GYU
water pitcher cause | The cause of the water pitcher. This is a present object. You can say the cause of the current water pitcher exists in the present as a thing which is past. |
| 2. BUMPAY DREBU
water pitcher result | The result of the water pitcher. This is also a present object. |
| 3. NGUPO
working thing | A working thing. It exists in the present; it is functioning now. |

CLASS NOTES

Course XIII: The Art of Reasoning

Class Ten, continued

The following terms describe something which is either 1) the cause of a water pitcher, 2) the result of a water pitcher, 3) a working thing, or 4) non-existent:

1. **KECHIKMA** **That which only lasts for an instant:** this is a working thing.
instantaneously changing By definition, a working thing only lasts for a moment.
2. **KYE SHINPA** **That which is in the act of beginning:** this doesn't exist. It
beginning in act of hasn't happened yet, so it can't exist. It is not a future thing,
because the future only exists relative to a specific object.
3. **BUMPA LA TUTE MA-ONGPA** **That which is future relative to a water**
water pitcher relative to didn't come yet **pitcher:** this is the result of a water pitcher.
4. **BUMPA DUSU DEPA** **That which is past by the time of a water**
water pitcher at time of already **pitcher:** this is the cause of a water pitcher.
5. **BUMPAY MA-ONGPA** **That which is future for a water pitcher:** this is
water pitcher didn't come yet the cause of a water pitcher. Is the future
something which hasn't come yet that you are
moving toward, or is the future something you are moving through which then
becomes the past? For whom is the pitcher a future thing? For the cause of a water
pitcher.
6. **BUMPA DEPA** **That which is past for a water pitcher:** this is the result
water pitcher past of a pitcher. The pitcher is past for the result of the
pitcher.
7. **JIK SHINPA** **That which is in the process of being destroyed:** this is
destruction in the process of a working thing.

CLASS NOTES

Course XIII: The Art of Reasoning

Class Ten, continued

Four Schools' View of Time

The highest school of Buddhism says that all three times – past, present, and future – **do exists and are working things**. They say that a past pen, for example, does exist.

The topic of karma provides the basis for debating whether or not the past and the future do exist. If I do a negative deed today, will it affect me in the future?

- Some logic school proponents would say that although the absolute future does not exist, your future karma does exist.
- The mind-only school says that the karma is stored and carried in a separate mental consciousness called the *kunshi*, or storehouse consciousness, until it meets the conditions that make it ripen.
- The Abhidharmist school says the karma stays in your five heaps as they travel forward into the future.
- The lower madhyamika would say that the seed created by your bad deeds stays in your mental consciousness and floats on from year to year in your mental consciousness.

Madhyamika Prasangika's View of Time

The madhyamika prasangika school says that karmic seeds do *not* stay in your mind stream. Rather, the karmic streams are carried in “you.” They are carried in person as a *projection*, in the projected person. The reason a million years can go by between hitting someone on the head and being hit ten thousand times on the head is not that the karma sits around for a million years. It's that a mental seed is created which is carried on by the person that you think you see, because you're forced to see that. This gets very subtle. The karma stays with you as you are projected by your mind, forced to do so by your past karma. This is where karma *really* stays. A karma of the past can still affect you because a mental seed is planted in “you” as a projection of your own mind. It is carried in your projection of yourself as you move through time, as you continue to project yourself and those karmic seeds. Madhyamika prasangika accepts the mind-only school's description of how karmic seeds are planted, are carried through replication, and then ripen by meeting the appropriate conditions. However, prasangika doesn't accept that a separate consciousness has to be posited for storing the karmic seeds; the seeds simply stay in “you” as projected by your karma.

The madhyamika prasangika's second answer to the logic school's assertion that the past and future do not exist is called “parallel reasoning.” So how could the past and the future be working things? Consider a pen at the moment of its destruction. Does the destruction of the pen have a cause? Yes. And does the past pen which is destroyed have a cause? Yes. It's destruction is the cause. So if it has a cause it must be a working thing. Therefore, anything that is destroyed must be a working thing and therefore must have had a cause. You can't say there are causes for the birth of a thing, but that there are no causes for the thing itself.

CLASS NOTES

Course XIII: The Art of Reasoning

Class Ten, continued

Three Types of Incorrect Reasons for Particular Proofs

TAK TARNANG DE DRUP KYI An incorrect reason for a particular proof.
reason incorrect in a particular proof

1. **DE DRUP KYI GELWAY TEN-TSIK** The quality you're trying to prove
in a particular proof contradiction reason **totally contradicts the reason.** For
example, sound is *not* a changing
thing because it is made.
2. **DE DRUP KYI MA NGEPA TEN-TSIK** The quality you're trying to prove
in a particular proof not definitive reason **is not definitely proven by the**
reason. For example, sound is
something you can hear because it is
a changing thing.
3. **DE DRUP KYI MA DRUPPAY TEN-TSIK** The reason given is inaccurate.
in a particular proof not to prove reason Something is wrong with the reason.

Seven types of inaccurate reasons:

1. **The reason is non-existent:** He is suffering because he's been stabbed by rabbit's horns.
2. **The subject is non-existent:** Consider the horns of a rabbit...
3. **The quality is also the reason:** Sound is a changing thing because it's a changing thing.
4. **The subject is the reason:** Sound is a changing thing because it is sound.
5. **The subject is the quality to prove:** Consider sound; it's sound because it's changing.
6. **The reason does not apply to the subject:** Sound is a changing thing because you can see it with your eyes.
7. **Part of the reason is incorrect:** Trees have minds because at night their leaves curl up and go to sleep.

If the opponent doubts one of the elements to your argument, your reason is incorrect. So the final type of bad reason is called "bad for the particular school you are debating with." The Jains, for example, should not say to Buddhists, "consider a tree; it has a mind, because it dies when you peel the bark off of it," because Buddhists don't believe that a tree "dies" – they believe it just dries up. The point is that we must be logical when defending Buddhism to other Americans. Buddhism says that you can avoid death and reach a tantric paradise in this life if you do your practices well and track your vows regularly. If you don't present Buddhist ideas in a logical and compelling way that others can accept, you have destroyed their chances to avoid death. You must find common ground that they can accept logically. **The world-view of western civilization is wrong, and you can save people's lives if you present Buddhism to them logically.**

CLASS NOTES

Course XIII: The Art of Reasoning

Class Eleven: Course Review

Physical Matter and the Dharmadhatu

The real meaning of the term *Dharmadhatu* is the subject of the consciousness of the mind. It's what your mental sense looks at. It's the bunch of stuff that your mind perceives; for example, the thoughts that you hear, or the pictures you make in your mind. Physical form includes the purple that you see in your mind when you hear "purple elephants;" it is a color and is physical form, but you can't perceive it with your five senses. So the definition of physical matter is anything that you can show as physical matter.

Also, there is a distinction between *particulate matter*, which is made up of tiny atoms of stuff, and matter in general. The Buddha's sambhogakaya, which he has in his heaven, is not made up of atoms but it has colors and shapes. You can see it and it's physical matter, but it's not like particulate matter.

Meditation on Subtle Impermanence and on Quality and Characteristic

A good meditation to do following the completion of this course is to meditate on subtle impermanence and on quality and characteristic, which were described in classes two and three. It takes a lot of virtue and careful thought to get these topics. You can alternate in meditation on these two topics.

To meditate on quality and characteristic, try to see the difference between car and "car." In English, we can distinguish between car, "car," a car, and the car. If you meditate on these distinctions for a month, you might get very close to seeing dependent origination which is very difficult. We are all using ideation or conceptualization to get to things. Why do you use archetypes or mental images (*dun-chi's*) to perceive things?

To meditate on subtle impermanence, focus on the reason that it's true that the beginning of a thing destroys that thing. Why does the birth of a child kill that child, without any other external forces needed? The creation of a thing destroys that thing without any other intervening factors needed. Also, consider why we say that an object, for example a rosary, has a beginning, a staying, and an ending, but the *emptiness* of the rosary (the fact that it's *not* anything *other* than a projection forced on you by your past karma) is unchanging and it does not begin or end. The rosary is a changing thing (*mitakpa*) but the emptiness of the rosary is an unchanging thing (*takpa*) and you can only say that it comes into being and goes out of being, but doesn't begin nor end. When you destroy the rosary, it's emptiness goes out of existence but it doesn't end. You must meditate on this.

CLASS NOTES

Course XIII: The Art of Reasoning

Class Eleven, continued

The Validity of Logical Perceptions

The logic school defines valid perception as *a fresh unerring perception*. Valid perceptions are divided into direct perceptions and conceptual perceptions. It is important to realize that conceptual perceptions are just as valid as direct perceptions. We in America tend to focus only on what can be seen, touched and bought. But at this point in our study, we can only perceive the goals and concepts in Buddhism -- such as future lives and different realms -- through logical perception. The initial perceptions of emptiness and future lives can only be believed through logic; then later we will be able to see emptiness and our future lives directly. This is especially true of the secret teachings, which totally operate off of logic. If you trust your emotions or your culture you won't be able to practice them. Your natural instincts and culture reject these things and so much of it is invisible and can't be confirmed with your senses. You must function through your spiritual sense based on logic.

You have to establish truth by thinking carefully, and not ignore things just because you can't see them directly with your senses. Death is real and what happens to you after death is real whether or not you can see it right now. *The forces that created this world and are creating your death are invisible but you better figure them out, and you don't have much time.*

Does Samsara Have an End?

A brief debate:

Because the cycle of pain does have an end.

Wrong.

Are you telling me the cycle of pain doesn't have an end?

Right.

Why not?

Because the cycle of pain has no front end.

That doesn't mean it can't have an end!

Are you telling me the cycle of pain does have an end?

Right.

Why so?

Because the cycle of pain has a back end.

Why so?

Because there is a powerful antidote that will smash our habit of seeing things as self-existent!!!

The tendency to hold things as self-existent has a powerful antidote, which is called the direct perception of emptiness. This proves that you don't have to suffer anymore.



COURSE XIII
The Art of Reasoning

Answer Key, Class One

1) Give the Sanskrit and English names for the classical Indian treatise which forms the basis for the Buddhist art of reasoning and perceptual theory; also list its author and his approximate date. (Tibetan track in Tibetan.)

**The Commentary on Valid Perception (*Pramana Varttika*, Tsema Namdrel)
of Master Dharmakirti (about 650 AD).**

ཚད་མ་རྣམ་འགྲེལ།

tsema namdrel

ལོཔོན་ཅུ་ཡི་བླ་མ་གྱི་གྲགས་པ།

lopbon chukyi drakpa

2) Name the principal Tibetan monastic textbook that we will use in our study of formal logic and other important topics found in the original treatise; also list its author and his dates. (Tibetan track in Tibetan.)

**The "Key to the Logic Machine," by Purbuchok Jampa Tsultrim Gyatso
(1825-1901), a tutor to the Thirteenth Dalai Lama.**

རིགས་ལམ་འཕུལ་གྱི་ལྟུང་མིག།

riklam trulgyi deumik

ཕུར་བུ་ཕྱོག་བྱམས་པ་རྩལ་བློ་མཁོ།

purbuchok jampa tsultrim gyatso

3) Give the two expressions used to describe, respectively, disciples of poor intellectual and spiritual capacity, and disciples of high intellectual and spiritual capacity. (Tibetan track in Tibetan.)

a) Disciples of poor intellectual and spiritual capacity are called "Those who follow because of their faith"

དབང་རྒྱལ་དད་པའི་ཇེས་འབྲང་།

wangtul depay jedrang

b) Disciples of high intellectual and spiritual capacity are called "Those who follow because of their reasoning"

དབང་རྣམ་རིགས་པའི་ཇེས་འབྲང་།

wangnun rikpay jedrang

4) Give a positive reason why we should study the Buddhist art of reasoning, and then quote a verse from a famous Tibetan pandit to back up your statement. (Tibetan track in Tibetan.)

We should first study the Buddhist art of reasoning because this is the best way to keep the teachings of Lord Buddha safe in the world; that is, it is best to accept the ideas of Buddhism only when they seem logical to you. As the Sakya Pandit, Kunga Gyeltsen (1182-1251), has said:

**Suppose a person comes to understand
The scriptural tradition for how to reason:
This art of proving or disproving things.
A master like this is a person who keeps
The teachings of the totally enlightened
Buddhas safe here in the world.**

དེ་ལྟ་སྒྲུབ་དང་སྟུན་འབྲིན་གྱི།
རིགས་པའི་གཞུང་ལུགས་གང་གིས་ཤེས།
མཁས་པ་དེ་ནི་ཚྱོགས་པ་ཡི།
སངས་རྒྱས་ཀྱི་ནི་བསྟན་པ་འཛིན།

deta drupdang sunjin gyi
rikpay shungluk gang gi shey
kepa deni dzokpa yi
sanggye kyi ni tenpa dzin

5) State a negative reason why we should study the Buddhist art of reasoning, and then give a quotation from Lord Buddha himself to back up your statement. (Tibetan track in Tibetan.)

We should study the Buddhist art of reasoning because, with this knowledge, we will be able to avoid the grave karmic mistake of judging others on their appearances. As Lord Buddha has said,

**Only I, or someone like me, is able to judge another person.
No other person should ever judge another, for they will surely fall.**

ངའམ་ང་དང་འདྲ་བས་གང་ཟག་གི་ཚོད་བཟུང་གི་གང་ཟག་
གིས་གང་ཟག་གི་ཚོད་མི་བཟུང་སྟེ། ཉམས་པར་གྱུར་ཏེ།

nga'am dang drawe gangsak gi tsu zung gi, gangsak gyi
gangsak gyi tsu misung te, nyampar gyur tare

6) Give the definition of a reason. (Tibetan track in Tibetan.)

The definition of a reason is: "Anything put forth as a reason."

རྟགས་སྟུབ་ཀོད་པ། རྟགས་ཀྱི་མཚན་ཉིད།
tak su kupa, tak kyi tsenmyi



COURSE XIII
The Art of Reasoning

Answer Key, Class Two

- 1) Give the definition of an existing thing in Buddhist logic. (Tibetan track in Tibetan.)

The definition of an existing thing is "Anything which can be perceived with a valid perception."

ཚད་མས་དམིགས་པ་ཡོད་པའི་མཚན་ཉིད།

tseme mikpa yupay tsennyi

- 2) Name, define, and give one example each of the two most common categories into which all existing things are divided. (Tibetan track in Tibetan.)

- a) **Unchanging things, each of which are defined as "one object which is both a thing and which is not such that it only lasts for a moment"; classical examples would be empty space or emptiness.**

རྟག་པ། ཆོས་དང་སྐད་ཅིག་མ་མ་ཡིན་པའི་གཞི་མཐུན་པ།

takpa, chu dang kechikma mayin payshi tunpa

ནམ་མཁའ། ལྗང་པ་ཉིད།

namka, tongpa nyi

- b) **Changing things, each of which are defined as "anything that lasts only for a moment"; classical examples would be a pillar or a water pitcher.**

མི་རྟག་པ། སྐད་ཅིག་མ།

mitakpa, kechikma

ཀ་བ། བུམ་པ།

kawa, bumpa

3) Why is it often incorrect to translate the word *mitakpa* (Tibetan: *mi-rtag-pa*; Sanskrit: *anitya*) as "impermanent"?

The English word "impermanent," in its current usage, denotes something which is going to end, and not last forever; whereas "permanent" denotes something that will not end or break. The point of the Tibetan and Sanskrit words however is to denote something which changes from instant to instant: something fleeting or transitory. In fact, the definition of *mitakpa* is "something that only lasts for a moment."

Conversely, things which are *takpa* (the opposite of *mitakpa*) are not necessarily things that go on forever. The emptiness of a cup, for example, goes out of existence when the cup breaks, and came into existence when the cup was made, since it is simply the fact that the cup has no nature of its own. We *do not* though say that emptiness starts or stops, since this implies variability, and the point of things which are *mitakpa* is that they never change—their quality of being is perfectly constant and consistent: nothing is ever more or less than completely and purely empty of any nature of its own, for example.

We should note finally though that, in some of its usages, the word *mitakpa* is properly translated as impermanent, such as in the common lam-rim expression *chiwa mitakpa*: impermanence in the form of death.

4) Give the definition of a "working thing," which is totally synonymous with "changing thing." (Tibetan track in Tibetan.)

The definition of a working thing is: "Anything which performs a function."

དོན་བྱེད་ནུས་པ། དངོས་པོའི་མཆན་ཉིད།

dunje nupa, *ngupuy tsennyi*

5) Give the three different kinds of working things, their definitions, and a classical example of each one. (Tibetan track in Tibetan.)

a) Physical things, defined as "anything you can show as a physical thing"; an example would be heat.

གཟུགས་སུ་རུང་བ། གཟུགས་ཀྱི་མཚན་ཉིད།

suk su rungwa, suk kyi tsennyi

ཚ་བའི་རིག་བྱ།

tsaway rekja

- b) Mental things, defined as "anything which is both invisible and aware"; an example would be happiness or wisdom.

གསལ་ཞིང་རིག་པ། ཤེས་པའི་མཚན་ཉིད།

sel shing rikpa, shepay tsennyi

བདེ་བ། ཡེ་ཤེས།

dewa, yeshe

- c) Active things which are neither matter nor mind, defined as "any produced thing which is neither matter nor mind"; an example would be a person, which *has* both a physical form and a mind, but which *is* neither, and yet still changes.

ལྷན་མིན་འདུ་བྱེད། བཅ་ཤེས་གང་རུང་མ་ཡིན་པའི་འདུ་བྱས།

denmin duje, bem she gangrung mayinpay duje

གང་ཟག

gangsak

- 6) How does the description of ultimate reality in the system of the Buddhist logic schools differ from its description in the highest school of Buddhism, the Prasangika group of Madhyamika (Middle-Way) philosophers?

Those of the logic schools believe that something belongs to ultimate reality when it can, in a very real way, perform a function. The Madhyamika say that the only example of ultimate or higher reality is emptiness itself.



COURSE XIII
The Art of Reasoning

Answer Key, Class Three

1) Name, define, and give one classic example each of the three nominal divisions of "things that are general." (Tibetan track name and give example in Tibetan, but define in English.)

- a) A "general as far as types," otherwise known as a "quality." Defined as "that existing thing which subsumes the multiple things which are of its type." Classical example: "knowable things."

རིགས་སྤྱི།

rik chi

ཤེས་བྱ།

sheja

- b) A "general as far as objects," otherwise known as an "actual mental image." The one for a water pitcher is defined as "that element which is imputed to be the water pitcher, but which is not: that thing which appears to be the water pitcher to the conceptual state of mind which is perceiving a water pitcher, but which is however not the water pitcher." Classical example: "The appearance, to the second instant of a conceptual state of mind which is perceiving a water pitcher, of the opposite of all that is not the water pitcher of the second instant."

དོན་སྤྱི།

dun chi

བུམ་འཛིན་རྟོག་པ་སྐད་ཅིག་མ་གཉིས་པ་ལ་བུམ་པ་སྐད་ཅིག་གཉིས་པ་མ་

ཡིན་པ་ལས་ལོག་པར་སྒྲུང་བ་དེ་དེ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

*bumdzin tokpa kechikma nyipa la bumpa kechik nyipa mayinpa le
lokpar nangwa de de yinpay chir*

- c) A "general as far as a collection of parts." Defined as "a gross physical object which is composed of its multiple parts." Classic example: a water pitcher.

ཚོགས་སྡེ།

tsok chi

བུམ་པ།

bumpa

- 2) Why is the study of "quality and characteristic" vital for those who wish to see emptiness directly?

The study of a "general as far as types" and a "general as far as objects" allows us to understand that, when we perceive something, we do so actually by perceiving a mental object and mistaking it for the actual object. This mental object is forced upon us by our past karma. An actual object that existed independent of this process doesn't exist, and its absence is what emptiness is. By realizing directly how we perceive objects through mental images, we realize what the ultimate meaning of "dependent origination" is. This realization occurs during the final hours before seeing emptiness directly, at the "supreme object" stage of the path of preparation.

- 3) Can one thing be both a quality and characteristic of a quality?

Yes; an example would be "working things," which is a quality of which a water pitcher is characteristic, and yet also characteristic itself of the quality "knowable things."

- 4) What are three criteria that make a water pitcher characteristic of the quality "working thing"? (Tibetan track in Tibetan.)

- a) It is a working thing.

བྱ་དང་ས་པོ་ཡིན།

kyu ngupo yin

- b) It shares a relationship with "working thing" such that to be it is to automatically be a working thing.

ཁྱེད་དངོས་པོ་དང་བདག་གཅིག་ཏུ་འབྲེལ།

kyu ngupo dang dakchik tu drel

- c) There exist multiple other objects which are both not it, but still a working thing.

ཁྱེད་མ་ཡིན་ཞིང་དངོས་པོ་ཡང་ཡིན་པའི་གཞི་མཐུན་པ་དུ་མ་གྲུབ།

kyu mayin shing ngupo yang yinpay shi thunpa dura drup

- 5) Is "sound is a changing thing" a changing thing or an unchanging thing? Explain why.

"Sound is a changing thing" is itself an unchanging thing, because it is a fact or truth which never varies.

- 6) When we say "group of similar cases" in a logical statement, what are these cases similar to? (Tibetan track give the name of the field, and then answer, in Tibetan.)

The "group of similar cases" consists of objects which are similar to the quality to be proven.

མཐུན་ཕྱོགས།

tun chok

བརྒྱལ་བུའི་ཆོས།

drupjay chu

7) What are three ways in which parts of the group of dissimilar cases would be dissimilar to "changing thing" in the proof that sounds are changing things because they are things which are made? Describe and give one example of each. (Tibetan track in Tibetan.)

- a) They could be dissimilar in that they don't exist. Example: the horns on a rabbit's head.

མེད་པ་མི་མཐུན་ཕྱོགས།

mepa mitun chok

རི་བོང་གི་ར།

ri bong gi ra

- b) They could be dissimilar in that they are something else. Example: all knowable things.

གཞན་པ་མི་མཐུན་ཕྱོགས།

shen pa mitun chok

ཤེས་བྱ།

sheja

- c) They could be dissimilar in that they are something directly contradictory. Example: unchanging things.

འགལ་པ་མི་མཐུན་ཕྱོགས།

gelwa mitun chok

རྟག་པ།

takpa



COURSE XIII
The Art of Reasoning

Answer Key, Class Four

1) Give the definition of a cause. (Tibetan track in Tibetan.)

The definition of a cause is "Anything which brings about something else."

སྐྱེད་བྱེད། གྱུའི་མཚན་ཉིད།
kyeje, gyuy tsen nyi

2) "Cause" is one of three words that all refer to the same thing. Give the other two. (Tibetan track in Tibetan.)

a) "Result"

འབྲས་བུ།
drebu

b) "Working thing"

དངོས་པོ།
ngupo

3) In the reading for this class, causes were divided in two different ways. Give them both. (Tibetan track in Tibetan.)

a) Into direct and indirect causes.

དངོས་རྒྱུ།
ngu gyu

བརྒྱུད་རྒྱུ།
gyu gyu

b) Into material causes and contributing factors.

ཉེར་ལེན་གྱི་རྒྱུ།
nyerlen gyi gyu

ལྷན་ཅིག་བྱེད་རྒྱུ།
hlenchik jekyen

4) Give the definition of a material cause, and state an important application of this kind of cause. (Tibetan track in Tibetan.)

The definition of a material cause is, "Anything that brings about a working thing primarily as a continuation of the same material."

རང་གི་རྒྱུས་རྒྱུན་དུ་གཙོ་བོར་སླེད་བྱེད།
rang gi dzegyun du tsowor kyeje

This cause is important in the proof of future lives, since it is used to show that only a past instance of mind could have brought about our current instance of mind.

5) Give the definition of a result. (Tibetan track in Tibetan.)

The definition of a result is "Something which is brought about."

བསྐྱེད་བྱ། འབྲས་བྱའི་མཚན་ཉིད།
kyeja, drebuy tsennyi

6) Give the definition of a correct reason. (Tibetan track in Tibetan.)

The definition of a correct reason is "A reason where the three relationships hold."

ཚུལ་གསུམ་ཡིན་པ།

tsulsum yinpa,

རྟགས་ཡང་དག་གི་མཚན་ཉིད།

tak yangdak gi tsennyi

7) Give the names of the three relationships that hold with a correct reason, and state them in a simplified manner for the logical statement, "Consider sound; it's a changing thing; because it's a thing which is made."

a) The relationship between the reason and the subject. In this proof it could be simply stated as, "Sound is a thing which is made."

ཕྱོགས་ཚེས།

chok chu,

སྒྲ་བྱས་པ།

dra jepa

b) The positive necessity between the reason and the quality to be proven. In this proof it could be simply stated as "If something is a thing which is made, it must be a changing thing."

ཇེས་བྱུབ།

je kyap,

བྱས་ན་མི་རྟག་པས་བྱུབ།

je na mitakpe kyap

c) The negative necessity between the reason and the quality to be proven. In this proof it could be simply stated as, "If something is not a changing thing, it cannot be a thing which is made."

ལྷོག་བྱུབ།

dok kyap,

རྟག་ན་མ་བྱས་པས་བྱུབ།

tak na ma jepe kyap



COURSE XIII
The Art of Reasoning

Answer Key, Class Five

- 1) Give the definition of an object, and two other terms that are synonymous to "object."
(Tibetan track in Tibetan.)

"Anything which is apprehended by a valid perception" is the definition of an "object."

ཚད་མས་གཞལ་བར་བྱ་བ། ཡུལ་གྱི་མཚན་ཉིད།

tseme shelwar jawa, yul gyi tsennyi

"Objects" and "existing objects," and "objects apprehended by the mind" all refer to the same thing.

ཡུལ་དང་ཡོད་པ་དང་གཞལ་བྱ་ན་མས་དོན་གཅིག་

yul dang yupa dang shelja nam dunchik

- 2) Give the two broad divisions of all objects of the mind. (Tibetan track in Tibetan.)

Working things and unchanging things.

དངོས་པོ་དང་རྟག་པ་གཉིས།

ngupo dang takpa nyi

- 3) Give the five broad divisions of working things. (Tibetan track in Tibetan.)

These are the five heaps—parts of a person which contain many different parts:

ཕུང་པོ་ལྔ།

pungpo nga

a) The heap of physical matter

གཟུགས་ཀྱི་ཕུང་པོ།

suk kyi pungpo

b) The heap of feeling

ཚོར་བའི་ཕུང་པོ།

tsorway pungpo

c) The heap of discrimination

འདུ་ཤེས་ཀྱི་ཕུང་པོ།

dushe kyi pungpo

d) The heap of other factors

འདུ་བྱེད་ཀྱི་ཕུང་པོ།

duje kyi pungpo

e) The heap of consciousness

རྣམ་ཤེས་ཀྱི་ཕུང་པོ།

namshe kyi pungpo

4) Give the two broad divisions of the heap of physical matter. (Tibetan track in Tibetan.)

a) Outer physical matter

ཕྱིའི་གཟུགས།

chiy suk

b) Inner physical matter

ནང་གི་གཟུགས།

nang gi suk

5) Give the definition of a subject. (Tibetan track in Tibetan.)

The definition of a subject is "Any existing thing which engages in its object."

རང་ཡུལ་ལ་འཇུག་པའི་ཚེས།

rang yul la jukpay chu,

ཡུལ་ཅན་གྱི་མཚན་ཉིད།

yulchen gyi tsennyi

6) Name three different kinds of subjects, and give an example of each. (Tibetan track in Tibetan.)

a) States of mind acting as subjects; an example would be jealousy.

ཤེས་པར་གྱུར་པའི་ཡུལ་ཅན།

shepar gyurpay yulchen

སྤྲུག་དོག་

trakdok

b) Types of physical matter acting as subjects; an example would be the eye sense power

གཟུགས་སུ་གྱུར་པའི་ཡུལ་ཅན།

suk su gyurpay yulchen

མིག་གི་དབང་པོ།

mik gi wangpo

- c) Things which are neither mind nor matter, and are acting as subjects;
an example would be a person

འདྲམིན་དུ་བྱེད་དུ་གྱུར་པའི་ཡུལ་ཅན།

denmin duje du gyurpey yulchen

གང་ཟག

gangsak

- 7) Name the two broad categories of mental things accepted by the Buddhist logic schools, but not by the Consequence School of the Middle-Way group. (Tibetan track in Tibetan.)

Mental things that are aware of themselves, and mental things that are aware of other things.

རང་རིག

rangrik

གཞན་རིག

shenrik

- 8) Name the two broad categories of mental things that are aware of other things. (Tibetan track in Tibetan.)

Mind and mental functions.

སེམས་སེམས་བྱུང་།

semsem jung

- 9) According to the Buddhist logic schools, how many mental functions are there? How many according to the Higher Knowledge (Abhidharma) school?

According to this school, 51; according to the Higher Knowledge (Abhidharma) school, 46.

10) Mental things can also be divided into perceptions which are valid and those which are not. Give the definition of a valid perception according to the Buddhist logic schools. (Tibetan track in Tibetan, and also name the two divisions in Tibetan.)

The definition is: "A fresh, unmistaken perception". In Tibetan, the two perceptions which are valid and not valid are called *tsema* and *tsemin gyi lo*.

གསར་དུ་མི་བསྐྱེད་བའི་རིག་པ།

sardu miluway rikpa

ཚད་མ། ཚད་མིན་གྱི་ལྗོངས།

tsema, tsemin gyi lo

11) Name the two kinds of valid perception. (Tibetan track in Tibetan.)

Direct valid perception and conceptual valid perception.

མངོན་སུམ་ཚད་མ།

ngunsum tsema

ཞེས་དཔག་ཚད་མ།

jepak tsema

12) Name three types of conceptual valid perception, and give an example of each. (Tibetan track in Tibetan.)

a) Conceptual valid perception based on deduction; an example would be the perception that sound is a changing thing, based on deduction.

དངོས་སྟོབས་ཞེས་དཔག་

ngutop jepak

- b) Conceptual valid perception based on convention; an example would be the perception that "home for the rabbit" means "moon," based on convention.

གྲགས་པའི་ཇེས་དཔག

drakpay jepak

- c) Conceptual valid perception based on reasoned belief; an example would be the perception that something is true because it has been stated by a source known to be authoritative.

ཡིད་ཆེས་ཇེས་དཔག

yiche jepak

13) Name the three categories of correct reasons we get when we divide correct reasons by their basic nature. (Tibetan track in Tibetan.)

- a) A correct reason which involves a result.

འབྲས་ཏྟགས་ཡང་དག

dretak yangdak

- b) A correct reason which involves a nature.

རང་བཞིན་གྱི་ཏྟགས་ཡང་དག

rangshin gyi tak yangdak

- c) A correct reason which involves an absence.

མ་དམིགས་པའི་ཏྟགས་ཡང་དག

mamikpay tak yangdak

14) Give an example of a logical statement with a correct reason that involves a result.
(Tibetan track in Tibetan.)

Consider a mountain pass where there is a cloud of smoke.
There must be a fire there,
Because there is smoke there.

དུ་ལྷན་གྱི་ལ་ལ་ཆོས་ཅན།

མི་ཡོད་དེ།

དུ་བ་ཡོད་པའི་ཕྱིར།

duden gyi la la chuchen

meyu de

duwa yupay chir



COURSE XIII
The Art of Reasoning

Answer Key, Class Six

- 1) Give the definition of a negative thing. (Tibetan track in Tibetan, also giving the Tibetan word for "negative thing.")

The definition of a negative thing is: "A thing which must be perceived by the state of mind which perceives it directly through a process of eliminating, directly, that which it denies."

རང་དངོས་སུ་རྟོགས་པའི་སྒྲོས་རང་གི་དགག་བྱ་དངོས་སུ་བཅད་ནས་རྟོགས་
དགོས་པའི་ཆོས།

rang ngu su tokpay lu rang gi gakja ngu su che ne tok gupay chu

- 2) Give the two kinds of negative things, and an example of each. (Tibetan track in Tibetan.)

Things that are negative in the sense of not being something (*mayin gak*), and things that are negative in the sense of being the absence of something (*me gak*). An example of the first is the fact that sound is changing (implying that it is not unchanging). Examples of the second are space and emptiness.

མ་ཡིན་དགག་

mayin gak

སྒྲ་མི་རྟག་པ།

dra mitakpa

མེད་དགག་

me gak

ནམ་མཁའ།

namka

སྟོང་པ་ཉིད།

tongnyi

3) State a general description of something which is negative in the sense of not being something, and give a typical example.

It should be a negative thing where the wording used to express it implies something else—either another negative in the sense of not being something, or a positive—incidental to denying what it denies.

A typical example would be, "John Smith, who is chubby, does not eat during the day."

4) Give one example from deceptive reality, and one example from ultimate reality, to prove the fact that the expression used for the name of a negative need not necessarily contain any negative wording. (Tibetan track in Tibetan.)

Respective examples would be space and the true nature of things

ནམ་མཁའ།

namka

ཆོས་ཉིད།

chu-nyi

5) Give a typical example of a logical statement which includes a correct reason that utilizes a nature, and state generally what makes it such a reason.

Consider sound.

It is a changing thing,

Because it is a thing which is made.

སྒྲ་ཆོས་ཅན།

མི་དག་སྟེ།

བྱས་པའི་ཕྱིར།

dra chuchen

mitak te

jepay chir

Generally speaking, it is this kind of reason because to be it is to automatically be the explicit quality to be proven; that is, to be a thing which is made is automatically to be a changing thing.



COURSE XIII
The Art of Reasoning

Answer Key, Class Seven

1) State the two conditions that are required for two things to be in contradiction with each other. (Tibetan track in Tibetan.)

- a) They must be separate or distinct from one another; this automatically implies, by the way, that they both exist.

ཐ་དད།

tade

- b) They must be such that there is no one thing which can be both of them.

གཞི་མཐུན་མེད་པ།

shitun mepa

2) Name and give one example each of the two kinds of contradictions. (Tibetan track in Tibetan.)

- a) Contradictory in the sense of being mutually exclusive. An example would be "working thing" and "a thing which does no work".

ཕན་ཚུན་སྤང་འགལ།

pentsun panggel

དངོས་པོ།

ngupo

དངོས་མེད།

ngume

- b) Contradictory in the sense of being diametrically opposed. An example would be a spiritual antidote and the negative personal quality which it allows you to eliminate.

ལྷན་ཅིག་མི་གནས་འགལ།

hlenchik mi-ne gel

གཉེན་པོ།

nyenpo

སྤང་བྱ།

pangja

- 3) Name and give one example each of the two types of relationships. (Tibetan track in Tibetan.)

- a) A relationship where to be one thing is to automatically be the other. An example would be a Chevy and cars, or else a water pitcher and the exclusion of all that is not a water pitcher.

བདག་གཅིག་གི་འབྲེལ་བ།

dakchik gi drelwa

བུམ་པ།

bumpa

བུམ་པའི་ལྗོན་པ།

bumpay dokpa

- b) A relationship where one thing came from another. An example would be a working thing in the moment after it, and the original working thing.

དེ་བྱུང་གི་འབྲེལ་བ།

dejung gi drelwa

དངོས་པོའི་ཕྱི་ལོགས་སུ་བྱུང་བ།

ngupoy chilok su jungwa

དངོས་པོ།

ngupo

4) Give three criteria that are required for two things to share a relationship where to be one is to automatically be the other. (Tibetan track in Tibetan.)

a) To be one must mean, automatically, to be the other.

བདག་ཉིད་གཅིག་པ།

daknyi chikpa

b) The two must be separate things.

ཐ་དད།

tade

c) If one ceased to exist, the other would have to cease to exist as well.

ཆོས་དེ་མེད་ན་བྱེད་མེད་དགོས།

chu de me na kyu me gu

5) Name the two types of correct reasons used to prove the absence of something. (Tibetan track in Tibetan.)

a) Correct reasons for the absence of something involving a thing which is imperceptible to the particular opponent.

མི་སྣང་བ་མ་དམིགས་པའི་རྟགས་ཡང་དག

minangwa mamikpay tak yangdak

b) Correct reasons for the absence of something involving a thing which is perceptible to the particular opponent.

སྣང་རུང་མ་དམིགས་པའི་རྟགས་ཡང་དག

nangrung mamikpay tak yangdak

6) What is the ultimate application of such a reason?

To prove to ourselves that, just because we may not perceive a particular good quality in another person, it does not prove that they lack this good quality.



COURSE XIII
The Art of Reasoning

Answer Key, Class Eight

1) Name the three qualities that must be present for something to be a definition.
(Tibetan track in Tibetan.)

a) Generally speaking, the thing should be a definition.

ཤིར་མཚན་ཉིད་ཡིན་པ།
chir tsennyi yinpa

b) It should apply to some definitive example for it.

རང་གི་མཚན་གཞིའི་སྟངས་དུ་གྲུབ་པ།
rang gi tsenshiy tengdu druppa

c) It should be a definition for nothing other than the thing it defines.

གཞན་གྱི་མཚན་ཉིད་མ་ཡིན་པ།
shen gyi tsennyi mayinpa

2) Name the two types of definitions. (Tibetan track in Tibetan.)

a) Definitions which disallow dissimilar types.

རིགས་མི་མཐུན་སེལ་བ།
rik mitun selwa

b) Definitions which disallow wrong ideas.

ལོཀ་རྟོག་སེལ་བ།
loktok selwa

3) Give an example of a single definition which incorporates both kinds of definition, and explain the parts of it that function as each of the two kinds. (Tibetan track in Tibetan.)

An example would be the following, as a definition of direct, valid perception:

A state of mind which is (1) a fresh, unerring perception, and (2) which is free of conceptualization and also unmistaken.

གསར་དུ་མི་སྒྲུབ་པའི་ཤེས་པ་གང་ཞིག

sardu miluway shepa gang shik

རྟོག་བྲལ་མ་འབྲུལ་པའི་ཤེས་པ།

tokdrel matrulway shepa

"Fresh and unerring" disallows the dissimilar type of a perception which is not valid. "Free of conceptualization" disallows the dissimilar type of valid perception which is deductive. "Unmistaken" disallows the wrong idea that a sense perception of two moons when there is really only one is a direct, valid perception. "Free of conceptualization" disallows the wrong idea that perceptions with conceptualization could be direct.

4) Give an example, in English, of a logical statement where the reason is used to prove the absence of something normally perceptible, and where the reason involves a cause.

**Consider the surface of a totally dark, nighttime ocean.
There is no smoke there,
Because there is no fire there.**



COURSE XIII
The Art of Reasoning

Answer Key, Class Nine

1) Name the three kinds of exclusion, and give an example of each. (Tibetan track in Tibetan.)

- a) An exclusion which is the objectification of a specific instance of a thing. An example would be would a working water pitcher considered from the point of view of being the reverse of all that it is not.

དོན་རང་མཚན་གྱི་གཞན་སེལ།

dun rangtsen gyi shensel

བུམ་པ་མ་ཡིན་པ་ལས་འོག་པ།

bumpa mayinpa le lokpa

- b) The mental kind of exclusion for something. An example would be the image of something (whether it actually exists or not) that appears to a conceptualization.

སྒྲིའི་གཞན་སེལ།

loy shensel

རྟོག་པའི་སྒྲུང་ཡུལ་དུ་གྱུར་པ།

tokpay nangyul du gyurpa

- c) The exclusion of a thing which is a negative thing involving the absence of the thing. An example would be the condition that a water pitcher has nothing about it which belongs to what is not a water pitcher.

མེད་དགག་གི་གཞན་སེལ།

megak gi shensel

བུམ་པ་མ་ཡིན་པས་སྟོང་པ།

bumpa mayinpe tongpa

- 2) Identify the mentioned elements in the following logical statement. (Tibetan track identify in Tibetan, and also name each of the elements.)

Consider sound.

སྒྲ་ཚེས་ཅན།

dra chu chen

It is a changing thing,

མི་རྟག་སྟེ།

mitak te

Because it is a made thing.

བྱས་པའི་ཕྱིར།

jepay chir

It is, for example, like a water pitcher.

དཔེར་ན་བུམ་པ་བཞིན།

perna bumpa shin

- (1) the subject: sound

སྒྲ།

dra,

ཚེས་ཅན།

chuchen

- (2) the assertion: sound is a changing thing

སྒྲ་མི་རྟག་པ།

dra mitakpa,

བསྐྱབ་བྱ།

drupja

(3) *the quality to be proven:* **being a changing thing**

མི་དྲག་པ། བསྐྱབ་བྱའི་ཚེས།
mitakpa, *drupjay chu*

(4) *the explicit form of the quality to be proven:* **being a changing thing**

མི་དྲག་པ། དངོས་ཀྱི་བསྐྱབ་བྱའི་ཚེས།
mitakpa, *ngu kyi drubjay chu*

(5) *an implicit form of the quality to be proven:* **being a thing which only lasts a moment**

སྐད་ཅིག་མ། ལྷགས་ཀྱི་བསྐྱབ་བྱའི་ཚེས།
kechikma, *shuk kyi drupjay chu*

(6) *the position denied:* **that sound could be an unchanging thing**

སྒྲ་དྲག་པ། དགག་བྱ།
dra takpa, *gakja*

(7) *the quality denied:* **being an unchanging thing**

དྲག་པ། དགག་བྱའི་ཚེས།
takpa, *gakjay chu*

(8) *the group of similar cases:* **all changing things**

མི་དྲག་པའི་ཚེས། མ་ཐུན་ཕྱོགས།
nitakpay chu, *tunchok*

(9) *a group of dissimilar cases: all unchanging things*

རྟག་པའི་ཚེས། མི་མཐུན་ཕྱོགས།
takpay chu, mitunchok

(10) *the reason: made thing*

བྱས་པ། རྟགས།
jepa, tak

(11) *the expression of the relationship between the subject and the reason: sound is a made thing*

སྒྲ་བྱས་པ། ཕྱོགས་ཚེས།
dra jepa, chokchu

(12) *the expression of the positive necessity between the reason and the quality to be proven: if something is a made thing it must be a changing thing*

བྱས་ན་མི་རྟག་པས་བྱུབ། རྗེས་བྱུབ།
jena mitakpe kyab, jekyab

(13) *the expression of the negative necessity between the reason and the quality to be proven: if something is not a changing thing it cannot be a made thing*

མི་རྟག་ན་མ་བྱས་པས་བྱུབ། ལྷོག་བྱུབ།
mitakna majepe kyab, dok kyab

(14) *the similar example: a water pitcher*

བུམ་པ། མཐུན་དཔེ།
bumpa, tunpe

3) Name the two types of correct reasons in the classification made according to correct opponent. (Tibetan track in Tibetan.)

a) Correct reasons to use in the context of oneself.

རང་དོན་སྐབས་ཀྱི་རྟགས་ཡང་དག

rangdun kab kyi tak yangdak

b) Correct reasons to use in the context of others.

གཞན་དོན་སྐབས་ཀྱི་རྟགས་ཡང་དག

shendun kab kyi tak yangdak



COURSE XIII
The Art of Reasoning

Answer Key, Class Ten

1) Give the general definitions for the past and the future, according to the part of the Sutrists School known as "Those Who Follow Logic." (Tibetan track in Tibetan.)

This is a trick question: there are no definitions of the past and future per se in this school, since—according to them—these two do not exist.

འདས་པ་དང་མ་འོངས་པ་མེད་པས།

depa dang maongpa mepe,

དེའི་མཚན་ཉིད་མེད།

dey tsennyi me

2) Give the definition, according to this school, of the past relative to the time of a particular object such as a water pitcher. (Tibetan track in Tibetan.)

The definition of the past relative to the time of a water pitcher is: "That which has both (1) already begun by the time of the water pitcher and (2) which has already stopped by the time of the water pitcher.

བུམ་པའི་དུས་སུ་སྐྱེས་ཟིན་པ་ཡང་ཡིན།

bumpay dusu kye sinpa yang yin

བུམ་པའི་དུས་སུ་དགགས་ཟིན་པ་ཡང་ཡིན་པའི་གཞི་མཐུན་པ།

bumpay dusu gak sinpa yang yinpay shitunpa

བུམ་པའི་དུས་སུ་འདས་པའི་མཚན་ཉིད།

bumpay dusu depay tsennyi

3) According to this same school, the following twelve terms are synonyms for one of the following: (1) the cause of a water pitcher; (2) the result of a water pitcher; (3) a changing thing. Write one of these three numbers next to each of the terms it best fits below.

___1___ that which is future for a water pitcher

___1___ that which is past by the time of a water pitcher

___2___ that which is future by the time of a water pitcher

___3___ a working thing

___3___ that which is in the process of ending

___2___ that which is past for a water pitcher

___3___ something which only lasts a moment

___2___ that which is future relative to a water pitcher

___3___ that which is approaching the past

___1___ that which is past relative to a water pitcher

___3___ that which is in the process of being destroyed

___3___ that which is approaching destruction

4) What do—generally speaking—all the following have in common, according to this school? "That which has stopped," "that which has been destroyed," "that which is about to begin," "that which is in the act of beginning," "that which is about to begin."

According to this school, none of these even exist.

5) Give two senses in which the Consequence group, the highest kind of Middle-Way school, says that the past is a working thing.

a) A past water pitcher for example is a water pitcher which has been destroyed. Everyone agrees that the destroying of a water pitcher must have its own causes and conditions that make it happen. It is contradictory then to say that the destruction or past thing which this destroying itself brings about could *not* have its own causes and conditions. It would be like saying the birth of a thing had its causes, but not the thing.

b) In the case of a karma, we can say that the karma produces a result, even when it is past. This is because, even though the original karma does not remain for millions of years until it produces its result, it does leave a karmic seed or *bakchak* in the person as this person is projected to exist by the person's own mind, under the influence of karma itself. This group says that the failure of all other Buddhist groups to accept that the past is a working thing—in the same way they accept that it is—is ultimately due to their failure to accept that nothing exists through any nature of its own.

6) Name the three general types of incorrect logical statements for particular proofs, and give an example of each. (Tibetan track in Tibetan.)

a) Contradictory reasons for a particular proof.

དེ་སྐྱབ་ཀྱི་འགལ་བའི་གཏན་ཚིགས།
de drup kyi gelway tentsik

Example:

Consider sound.
It is not a changing thing,
Because it is a made thing.

སྒྲ་ཚེས་ཅན། མི་རྟག་པ་མ་ཡིན་ཏེ། བྱས་པ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།
dra chuchen, mitakpa mayin te, jepa yinpay chir

b) Indefinite reasons for a particular proof.

དེ་སྐྱབ་ཀྱི་མ་ངེས་པའི་གཏན་ཚིགས།

dedrup kyi ma-ngepay tentsik

Example:

Consider sound.

It is something you can hear,

Because it is a changing thing.

སྒྲ་ཚེས་ཅན། མཉན་བྱ་ཡིན་སྟེ། མི་རྟག་པའི་བྱིར།

dra chuchen, nyen ja yin te, mi takpay chir

c) Inaccurate reasons for a particular proof.

དེ་སྐྱབ་ཀྱི་མ་གྲུབ་པའི་གཏན་ཚིགས།

dedrup kyi madrupay tentsik

Example (one of seven):

Consider sound.

It is a changing thing,

Because it is sound.

སྒྲ་ཚེས་ཅན། མི་རྟག་སྟེ། སྒྲ་ཡིན་པའི་བྱིར།

dra chuchen, mitak te, dra yinpay chir



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Class One

ཚད་མ་ནམ་འབྲེལ།

tsema namdrel

ལོཔོན་ཅུག་ཆོས་ཀྱི་བྲག་པ།

loppon chukyi drakpa

རིག་པ་ལམ་འཕུལ་གྱི་ལྷེ་འུ་མིག་

riklam trulgyi deumik

ཕུར་བུ་ལྷོག་བྲམས་པ་རྩུལ་ཁྲིམས་རྒྱ་མཚོ།

purbuchok jampa tsultrim gyatso

དབང་རྩུལ་དད་པའི་རྗེས་འབྲང་།

wangtul depay jedrang

དབང་རྣམ་རིག་པའི་རྗེས་འབྲང་།

wangnun rikpay jedrang

དེ་ལྟ་སྒྲུབ་དང་སྟུན་འབྲིན་གྱི།
རིགས་པའི་གཞུང་ལུགས་གང་གིས་ཤེས།
མཁས་པ་དེ་ནི་ཚྲོགས་པ་ཡི།
སངས་རྒྱས་ཀྱི་ནི་བསྟན་པ་འཛིན།

deta drup dang sunjin gyi
rikpay shungluk gang gi shey
kepa deni dzokpa yi
sanggye kyi ni tenpa dzin

ངའམ་ང་དང་འདྲ་བས་གང་ཟག་གི་ཚོད་བབྱང་གི་གང་ཟག་
གིས་གང་ཟག་གི་ཚོད་མི་བབྱང་སྟེ། ཉམས་པར་གྱུར་ཏེ།

nga'am dang drawe gangsak gi tsu zung gi, gangsak gyi
gangsak gyi tsu misung te, nyampar gyur tare

རྟགས་སྟུབ་ཀོད་པ། རྟགས་ཀྱི་མཚན་ཉིད།
tak su kupa, tak kyi tsennyi

Class Two

ཚད་མས་དམིགས་པ་ཡོད་པའི་མཚན་ཉིད།
tseme mikpa yupay tsennyi

རྟག་པ། ཚོས་དང་སྐད་ཅིག་མ་མ་ཡིན་པའི་གཞི་མཐུན་པ།
takpa, chu dang kechikma mayinpay shi tunpa

ནམ་མཁའ། སྟོང་པ་ཉིད།
namka, tongpa nyi

མི་ཏྲ་པ། སྐད་ཅིག་མ།
mitakpa, kechikma

ཀ་བ། བུམ་པ།
kawa, bumpa

དོན་བྱེད་རུས་པ། དངོས་པོའི་མཚན་ཉིད།
dunje nupa, ngupuy tsennyi

གཟུགས་སྐྱ་རུང་བ། གཟུགས་ཀྱི་མཚན་ཉིད།
suk su rungwa, suk kyi tsennyi

ཚ་བའི་རིག་བྱ།
tsaway rekja

གསལ་ཞིང་རིག་པ། ཤེས་པའི་མཚན་ཉིད།
sel shing rikpa, shepay tsennyi

བདེ་བ། ཡེ་ཤེས།
dewa, yeshe

འདྲ་མིན་འདུ་བྱེད། བེས་ཤེས་གང་རུང་མ་ཡིན་པའི་འདུ་བྱས།
denmin duje, bem she gangrung mayinpay duje

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གང་ཟག

gangsak

Class Three

རིགས་ཤི།

rik chi

ཤེས་བྱ།

sheja

དོན་ཤི།

dun chi

བུམ་འཇིན་ཏོག་པ་སྐད་ཅིག་མ་གཉིས་པ་ལ་བུམ་པ་སྐད་ཅིག་གཉིས་པ་
མ་ཡིན་པ་ལས་འོག་པར་སྒྲུང་བ་དེ་དེ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

*bumdzin tokpa kechikma nyipa la bumpa kechik nyipa mayinpa
le lokpar nangwa de de yinpay chir*

ཚོགས་ཤི།

tsok chi

བུམ་པ།

bumpa

ཁྱུ་དངས་པོ་ཡིན།

kyu ngupo yin

ཁྱུ་དངས་པོ་དང་བདག་གཅིག་ཏུ་འབྲེལ།

kyu ngupo dang dakchik tu drel

ཁྱུ་མ་ཡིན་ཞིང་དངས་པོ་ཡང་ཡིན་པའི་གཞི་མཐུན་པ་དུ་མ་གྲུབ།

kyu mayin shing ngupo yang yinpay shi thunpa дума drup

མཐུན་ཕྱོགས།

tun chok

བསྐྱེད་བྱའི་ཆོས།

drupjay chu

མེད་པ་མི་མཐུན་ཕྱོགས།

mepa mitun chok

རི་བོང་གི་ར།

ri bong gi ra

གཞན་པ་མི་མཐུན་ཕྱོགས།

shen pa mitun chok

ཤེས་བྱ།

sheja

འགལ་བ་མི་མཐུན་ཕྱོགས།

gelwa mitun chok

རྟག་པ།

takpa

Class Four

མྱེད་བྱེད། ལྷུ་འི་མཚན་ཉིད།

kyeje, gyuy tsen nyi

འབྲས་བུ།

drebu

དངོས་པོ།

ngupo

དངོས་རྒྱ།

ngu gyu

བརྒྱད་རྒྱ།

gyu gyu

ཉེར་ལེན་གྱི་རྒྱ།

nyerlen gyi gyu

ལྷན་ཅིག་བྱེད་རྒྱུ།

hlenchik jekyen

རང་གི་རྩལ་རྒྱུན་དུ་གཙོ་བོར་སྐྱེད་བྱེད།

rang gi dzegyun du tsowor kyeje

བསྐྱེད་བྱ། འབྲས་བྱའི་མཚན་ཉིད།

kyeja, drebuy tsennyi

ཚུལ་གསུམ་ཡིན་པ། ཏགས་ཡང་དག་གི་མཚན་ཉིད།

tsulsum yinpa, tak yangdak gi tsennyi

ཕྱོགས་ཚོས། སྒྲི་བྱས་པ།

chok chu, dra jepa

རྩེས་བྱ། བྱས་ན་མི་ཏག་པས་བྱ།

je kyap, je na mitakpe kyap

ལྡོག་བྱ། ཏག་ན་མ་བྱས་པས་བྱ།

dok kyap, tak na ma jepe kyap

Class Five

ཚད་མས་གཞལ་བར་བྱ་བ། ཡུལ་གྱི་མཚན་ཉིད།

tseme shelwar jawa, yul gyi tsennyi

ཡུལ་དང་ཡོད་པ་དང་གཞལ་བྱ་རྣམས་དོན་གཅིག

yul dang yupa dang shelja nam dunchik

དངོས་པོ་དང་རྟག་པ་གཉིས།

ngupo dang takpa nyi

ཕུང་པོ་ལྷ།

pungpo nga

གཟུགས་ཀྱི་ཕུང་པོ།

suk kyi pungpo

ཚོར་བའི་ཕུང་པོ།

tsorway pungpo

འདུ་ཤེས་ཀྱི་ཕུང་པོ།

dushe kyi pungpo

འདུ་བྱེད་ཀྱི་ཕུང་པོ།

duje kyi pungpo

རྣམ་ཤེས་ཀྱི་ཕུང་པོ།

namshe kyi pungpo

ཕྱི་འོ་གཟུགས།

chiy suk

ནང་གི་གཟུགས།

nang gi suk

རང་ཡུལ་ལ་འཇུག་པའི་ཆོས།

rang yul la jukpay chu,

ཡུལ་ཅན་གྱི་མཚན་ཉིད།

yulchen gyi tsennyi

ཤེས་པར་གྱུར་པའི་ཡུལ་ཅན།

shepar gyurpay yulchen

སྒྲག་དོག

trakdok

གཟུགས་སུ་གྱུར་པའི་ཡུལ་ཅན།

suk su gyurpay yulchen

མིག་གི་དབང་པོ།

mik gi wangpo

འདྲ་མིན་འདུ་བྱེད་དུ་གྱུར་པའི་ཡུལ་ཅན།

denmin duje du gyurpey yulchen

གང་ཟག

gangsak

རང་རིག

rangrik

གཞན་རིག

shenrik

སེམས་སེམས་བྱུང་།

semsem jung

གསར་དུ་མི་བསྐྱུ་བའི་རིག་པ།

sardu miluway rikpa

ཚད་མ། ཚད་མིན་གྱི་ལྗོ།

tsema, tsemin gyi lo

མངོན་སྲུང་ཚད་མ།

ngunsum tsema

ཇེས་དཔག་ཚད་མ།

jepak tsema

དངོས་སྟོབས་ཇེས་དཔག

ngutop jepak

བྲགཔ་པའི་རྗེས་དཔག་

drakpay jepak

ཡིད་ཆེས་རྗེས་དཔག་

yiche jepak

འབྲས་རྟགས་ཡང་དག་

dretak yangdak

རང་བཞིན་གྱི་རྟགས་ཡང་དག་

rangshin gyi tak yangdak

མ་དམིགས་པའི་རྟགས་ཡང་དག་

mamikpay tak yangdak

དུ་ལྟན་གྱི་ལ་ལ་ཆོས་ཅན།

མི་ཡོད་དེ།

དུ་བ་ཡོད་པའི་ཕྱིར།

duden gyi la la chuchen

meyu de

duwa yupay chir

Class Six

རང་དངོས་སུ་རྟོགས་པའི་སྒོས་རང་གི་དགག་བྱ་དངོས་སུ་བཅད་ནས་རྟོགས་
དགོས་པའི་ཆོས།

rang ngu su tokpay lu rang gi gakja ngu su che ne tok gupay chu

མ་ཡིན་དགག།

mayin gak

སྒྲ་མི་དྲག་པ།

dra mitakpa

མེད་དགག།

me gak

ནམ་མཁའ།

namka

སྟོང་པ་ཉིད།

tongnyi

ནམ་མཁའ།

namka

ཆོས་ཉིད།

chu-nyi

སྒྲ་ཆོས་ཅན།

མི་དྲག་སྟེ།

བྱས་པའི་ཕྱིར།

dra chuchen

mitak te

jepay chir

Class Seven

ཐ་དད།

tade

གཞི་མཐུན་མེད་པ།

shitun mepa

ཕན་ཚུན་སྤང་འགལ།

pentsun panggel

དངོས་པོ།

ngupo

དངོས་མེད།

ngume

ལྷན་ཅིག་མི་གནས་འགལ།

hlenchik mi-ne gel

གཉེན་པོ།

nyenpo

ཕང་བ།

pangja

བདག་གཅིག་གི་འབྲེལ་བ།

dakchik gi drelwa

བུམ་པ།

bumpa

བུམ་པའི་ཕྱོག་པ།

bumpay dokpa

དེ་བྱུང་གི་འབྲེལ་བ།

dejung gi drelwa

དངོས་པོའི་ཕྱི་ལོགས་སུ་བྱུང་བ།

ngupoy chilok su jungwa

དངོས་པོ།

ngupo

བདག་ཉིད་གཅིག་པ།

daknyi chikpa

ཐ་དད།

tade

ཆོས་དེ་མེད་ན་བྱེད་མེད་དགོས།

chu de me na kyu me gu

མི་སྣང་བ་མ་དམིགས་པའི་རྟགས་ཡང་དག།

minangwa mamikpay tak yangdak

སྣང་རུང་མ་དམིགས་པའི་རྟགས་ཡང་དག།

nangrung mamikpay tak yangdak

Class Eight

ཤྱིར་མཚན་ཉིད་ཡིན་པ།

chir tsennyi yinpa

རང་གི་མཚན་གཞིའི་སྟངས་དུ་བྱུབ་པ།

rang gi tsenshiy tengdu druppa

གཞན་གྱི་མཚན་ཉིད་མ་ཡིན་པ།

shen gyi tsennyi mayinpa

རིགས་མི་མཐུན་སེལ་བ།

rik mitun selwa

ལོ་ཁ་འོ་ཁ་སེལ་བ།

loktok selwa

གསར་དུ་མི་སྐྱ་བའི་ཤེས་པ་གང་ཞིག

sardu miluway shepa gang shik

འོ་ཁ་བྲལ་མ་འབྲུལ་བའི་ཤེས་པ།

tokdrel matrulway shepa

Class Nine

དོན་རང་མཚན་གྱི་གཞན་སེལ།

dun rangtsen gyi shensel

བུམ་པ་མ་ཡིན་པ་ལས་ལོ་ཁ་པ།

bumpa mayinpa le lokpa

ལྷོ་འི་གཞན་སེལ།

loy shensel

འོ་ཁ་པའི་སྐྱང་ཡུལ་དུ་གྱུར་པ།

tokpay nangyul du gyurpa

མེད་དགག་གི་གཞན་སེལ།

megak gi shensel

བུམ་པ་མ་ཡིན་པས་སྟོང་པ།

bumpa mayinpe tongpa

སྒྲ་ཚེས་ཅན།

dra chu chen

མི་ཏྲག་སྟེ།

mitak te

བྱས་པའི་ཕྱིར།

jepay chir

དཔེར་ན་བུམ་པ་བཞིན།

perna bumpa shin

སྒྲ། ཚེས་ཅན།

dra, chuchen

སྒྲ་མི་ཏྲག་པ། བསྐྱབ་བྱ།

dra mitakpa, drupja

མི་ཏྲག་པ། བསྐྱབ་བྱའི་ཚེས།

mitakpa, drupjay chu

མི་རྟག་པ། དངོས་ཀྱི་བསྐྱབ་བྱའི་ཆོས།

mitakpa, ngu kyi drubjay chu

ཀླད་ཅིག་མ། ལྷགས་ཀྱི་བསྐྱབ་བྱའི་ཆོས།

kechikma, shuk kyi drupjay chu

སྒྲི་རྟག་པ། དགག་བྱ།

dra takpa, gakja

རྟག་པ། དགག་བྱའི་ཆོས།

takpa, gakjay chu

མི་རྟག་པའི་ཆོས། མཐུན་ཕྱོགས།

nitakpay chu, tunchok

རྟག་པའི་ཆོས། མི་མཐུན་ཕྱོགས།

takpay chu, mitunchok

བྱས་པ། རྟགས།

jepa, tak

སྒྲི་བྱས་པ། ཕྱོགས་ཆོས།

dra jepa, chokchu

བྱས་ན་མི་རྟག་པས་བྱབ། རྗེས་བྱབ།
jena mitakpe kyab, jekyab

མི་རྟག་ན་མ་བྱས་པས་བྱབ། རྟོག་བྱབ།
mitakna majepe kyab, dok kyab

བུམ་པ། མཐུན་དཔེ།
bumpa, tunpe

རང་རྟོན་སྐབས་ཀྱི་རྟགས་ཡང་དག།
rangdun kab kyi tak yangdak

གཞན་རྟོན་སྐབས་ཀྱི་རྟགས་ཡང་དག།
shendun kab kyi tak yangdak

Class Ten

འདས་པ་དང་མ་འོངས་པ་མེད་པས། དེའི་མཚན་ཉིད་མེད།
depa dang maongpa mepe, dey tsennyi me

བུམ་པའི་དུས་སུ་སྐྱེས་ཟིན་པ་ཡང་ཡིན།
bumpay dusu kye sinpa yang yin

བུམ་པའི་དུས་སུ་དགགས་ཟིན་པ་ཡང་ཡིན་པའི་གཞི་མཐུན་པ།
bumpay dusu gak sinpa yang yinpay shitunpa

བུམ་པའི་དུས་སུ་འདས་པའི་མཚན་ཉིད།
bumpay dusu depay tsennyi

དེ་སྐྱབ་ཀྱི་རག་ལ་བའི་གཏན་ཚིགས།
de drup kyi gelway tentsik

སྒྲ་ཚེས་ཅན། མི་དྭག་པ་མ་ཡིན་ཏེ། བྱས་པ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།
dra chuchen, mitakpa mayin te, jepa yinpay chir

དེ་སྐྱབ་ཀྱི་མ་ངེས་པའི་གཏན་ཚིགས།
dedrup kyi ma-ngepay tentsik

སྒྲ་ཚེས་ཅན། མཉན་བྱ་ཡིན་སྟེ། མི་དྭག་པའི་ཕྱིར།
dra chuchen, nyamja yin te, mitakpay chir

དེ་སྐྱབ་ཀྱི་མ་བྱབ་པའི་གཏན་ཚིགས།
dedrup kyi madrupay tentsik

སྒྲ་ཚེས་ཅན། མི་དྭག་སྟེ། སྒྲ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།
dra chuchen, mitak te, dra yinpay chir



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